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Prosperity in Rural Africa?
This refreshing book disrupts old narratives and, in the midst of dramatic changes 
in African agriculture, shows what really matters from the point of view of rural 
people themselves: agency and assets. A dazzling compilation of detailed ethno-
graphic and survey research, accessibly and vividly portrayed.
Ruth Hall, SARChl Chair, PLAAS, University of the Western Cape
This collection of case studies and surveys of the rural socialscape in Tanzania is 
weaved around the argument that in determining the index of poverty it is impor-
tant to take into account the ownership and expansion of assets of rural households. 
The conclusions of the authors are arguably controversial and debatable. 
Nonetheless the essays offer rich empirical material amenable to a more nuanced 
analysis of the processes of varied forms of capitalist accumulation in its neo-liberal 
phase. For that reason alone, students of the political economy of the Agrarian 
Question in Tanzania may do well to consult it. 
Issa Shivji, Professor Emeritus, University of Dar es Salaam
I am very excited about what I read. This is an extremely instructive and and 
highly valued book. It is remarkably novel highlighting assets as markers of wealth 
and poverty in rural areas; it comes alive with the authors’ rich experiential longi-
tudinal enquiry encapsulated in the book’s epilogue; and it is a rare keep for every 
reader as it brings together diverse but cogent set of many years of rich research 
and contact with the same subjects and loci of enquiry that I have not seen in any 
work done in my country. It trumps by far the use of recollection to assess livelihood 
changes.  A must read for any researcher and practitioner.
The late Benno Ndulu, Former Governor of the Bank of Tanzania
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The book challenges many of the established truths about rural Tanzania. And it 
does so based on a series of revisits by researchers with their feet on the ground 
and with long- term knowledge of the respective communities. It is not an anthol-
ogy in in the common sense, but a collective project with methodological clarity. 
Based on its actual empirical material, it breaks new ground without following a 
pre- set formula with expected outcomes.
Mats Widgren, University of Stockholm
This book is a classic in the making, dealing with the significance of assets in 
understanding differentiated outcomes alongside rising prosperity across rural 
Tanzania. The first few chapters will be of tremendous use to researchers and stu-
dents across a wide range of fields, with the case study chapters that follow being 
of huge interest to people working in those particular areas. The main contribu-
tions are written in a direct and engaging style and the work is enriched with the 
authors’ unusual personal field work histories. Overall this is a fantastic compen-
dium, and a tremendous achievement by the editors (and central contributors) to 
have drawn these different studies out, and pulled them together.
Kathy Homewood, University College London
Cogent and compelling, this book tells how rural Tanzania has changed substan-
tially for the better in recent decades, more so than some may imagine. Most rural 
households, almost all engaged in smallholder farming, have accumulated assets: 
better housing, more consumer goods, more education. In the process, many have 
become more able to manage their lives—uwezo. A combination of (modest) pub-
lic investments, the vigour of private traders, but above all the efforts of farming 
households has made this so. For anyone who wonders if and how rural Africa 
can prosper, please read this book. You will be pleasantly surprised.
Steve Wiggins, Overseas Development Institute
This series of longitudinal studies from Tanzania de- bunk common but poorly 
informed narratives about Africa’s rural economy, which is far from stagnant! The 
many people surveyed by these rich case studies have been remarkable, innova-
tive, and strategic in their grasp of new market opportunities, bringing substantial 
increases in incomes and wealth in diverse parts of the country. The different 
chapters make clear the ways in which some people are much better able than 
others to take advantage of new opportunities and the sequence of new invest-
ments and activities which unfurl over time. This book will be a central, long- 
lived part of the development economics canon, not only for illuminating rural 
development pathways in Tanzania, but also for its lively discussion of research 
methods in practice.
Camilla Toulmin, International Institute for 
Environment and Development
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A Guide to Using the Book
This book provides the findings of a large collaborative project that explored 
long- term change in a variety of sites in rural Tanzania. There are people who will 
read this cover to cover—and thanks for doing so! But we realize that there will 
not be many of those. Rather, most people will be reading individual chapters—
and downloading these chapters individually also. In particular we realize that 
any students reading this book will be focusing on individual chapters rather than 
the whole thing.
Accordingly we have written this book to facilitate that sort of reading. Each 
chapter should stand alone. You should be able to read each chapter and under-
stand it without having to read the others. And, at the same time, we have indi-
cated where arguments mentioned in particular chapters can be followed up.
But, if you are reading it from cover to cover please be warned that you will 
find some of the arguments repetitive. They are framed in the same way, and draw 
on similar literatures. Please just skip the bits which say the same thing.
To get the best out of this book read the introductory chapter, and Chapter 2, 
which explains why we measure what we measure. And then take your pick of 
any of the other chapters. You will find a guide to them in the introductory 
Chapter 1. And whichever of the case studies you pick, please make sure you also 
read the ‘back- story’ that lies behind them that you will find in the Epilogue. It is 
not often that you will get to read such honest and frank accounts of the business 
of doing fieldwork as these provide. We hope you enjoy them.
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Understanding Long- Term Change  
in Rural Tanzania
Dan Brockington and Christine Noe
The Insistent Farmer
We had to talk to Erick. He would not let us carry on with the other interviews we 
had planned for that day until we had visited him. We wanted to say that we were 
conducting a stratified random sample of families in this village and that he was 
not on the list. But that did not translate too well into Swahili. Also it was not 
appropriate to use a sample frame as an excuse not to meet someone. And Erick 
was interesting.
He and his wife, Paulina, wanted to tell us about the transformations that they 
had experienced in their lives in the last fifteen years or so. It had not begun well. 
He had been imprisoned for bad debt. But he had cleared himself of it, and his 
family’s fortunes had transformed since. He and Paulina had farmed their land—
a relatively small plot of a few acres growing maize, sunflower, and sesame. They 
had sold their crops at various times to buy goats, an ox, a plough, and its chain 
and to build a new brick house with a metal roof. They were pleased and proud of 
all the changes that they had brought to their lives.
Erick and Paulina lived in Mtowisa, in a remote part of Tanzania. When we had 
first met, in 2000, they were immersed in poverty. There was no electricity, no 
passable roads in the wet season. Crops were difficult to move out of the village, and 
goods expensive to move in. The region itself had no tarred roads connecting it to 
the rest of the country. It was distant and isolated. Children died young, relatively 
few villagers made it to old age. The village clinic was poorly equipped, the second-
ary school (build by villagers’ initiative) was crumbling and barely functioning.
But now it was completely different—there were roads, regular bus services, 
telecommunications towers, a hospital with an operating theatre and a huge, 
vibrant secondary school. The village was transformed, and not just to our eyes. 
In our initial focus group discussions, we were told to expect to find a village that 
had ‘lifted itself ’ because of the myriad stories like Erick’s—of people working 
themselves out of some of the forms of the poverty they experienced by virtue of 
their farming.
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The encounter with Erick and Paulina was one of hundreds that the researchers 
in this collection have undertaken as part of a large research project that tried to 
do something deceptively simple. We re- visited families who had been surveyed 
as part of research projects some twenty to thirty years previously and we explored 
what had changed in their lives since then. It is difficult work to do well, but when, 
as in Tanzania, there are few data available which can track change over the last 
three decades, then it can be useful.
Erick and Paulina’s story, and the complexities and nuances which come with 
it, matter a good deal in a continent plagued by poor data and data gaps. If their 
story is repeated widely then it may require rethinking how we measure and value 
progressive change. Specifically, revisits such as this can provide insights into the 
debate on the consequences for rural poverty of economic growth and on the 
nature, condition, and basis of prosperity in rural Africa.
Tanzania provides an excellent lens with which to examine this issue. The 
country has experienced strong economic growth in recent decades (from the 
1990s onwards). But it is not clear what that growth had done to rural areas, and 
there is sharp disagreement as to what is happening in the Tanzanian country-
side. As we show in the next chapter, radical critics insist that economic growth is 
not benefiting rural areas. The profits of new economic change are confined to 
urban areas, or particular sectors (such as mining or tourism) which export most 
of the wealth they create. Indeed, the problem may be far worse than a simple 
failure to distribute the benefits of growth. Present- day capitalism, it is alleged, 
can actively impoverish the rural poor in Africa. Some forms of investment 
require land alienation and loss of the very resources upon which the rural poor 
depend. Other changes bring rural differentiation and class formation in villages 
that maintain significant deprivation.
Exultant advocates of market solutions and stronger capitalism welcome the 
economic revolution Tanzania has witnessed because they perceive it to be part of 
a broader transformation of a backwards continent. The fourth Tanzanian gov-
ernment under President Jakaya Kikwete in particular announced grand new 
policies (SAGCOT, Kilimo Kwanza, Big Results Now) that would, it believed, cut 
through the problems of obdurate, slow- moving, smallholder farmers and create 
welcome forces for change in rural areas. With the fifth government under 
President John Pombe Magufuli, industrialization and infrastructure develop-
ment (including rural electrification) were to add impetus to the wave of rural 
transformation. The changes that radical critics deplore are welcomed with equal 
vehemence by these analysts. Moving smallholders out of agriculture and into 
productive labour serving capital lies at the heart of their vision of progres-
sive change.
Erick and Paulina’s story challenges both camps. Because neither the critics 
who decry persistent poverty despite growth, nor the progressives who seek 
transformation and replacement of smallholder farming, are good at seeing the 
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welcome changes that smallholders bring to their own lives through investment 
in rural assets. Their story asks both sides: are they measuring the right thing? 
Are they looking at the changes which count to the people who matter? What 
does economic prosperity look like for the rural poor? What sort of changes 
do rural Africans, and particularly rural Tanzanians, welcome? And what are 
the epistemological and methodological difficulties of trying to track these 
changes?
The purpose of this book is to explore these questions. In the chapters that fol-
low we consider the role of assets, the significant purchases of which Erick and 
Paulina were so proud, as markers of wealth and poverty in rural societies. We 
consider why they matter and why they may have been overlooked in current 
debates about rural poverty. We discuss the challenges of tracking change in 
assets over time, and we present twelve cases studies which have tried to do 
this. We glean general lessons, methodological and substantive, that others will 
find useful.
In the rest of this chapter we provide the key building blocks that you will need 
to understand this collection. First, we state our argument. Second we present the 
methods we used to build up the collection of case studies. Finally we provide an 
outline of each of the chapters in the book as a whole.
The Argument
We contend that if we are to understand poverty dynamics in rural African so ci-
eties then we must examine changes to the assets that people control. We define 
assets broadly as things which provide revenue streams. They matter because they 
are the sources of income and consumption which are the more frequently used 
measures of poverty and prosperity. They matter also because when we talk to 
rural Tanzanians about what wealth and poverty means those Tanzanians tell us 
about assets. Assets are crucial to local perceptions of what the good life is. And 
assets are systematically excluded from the most commonly used measure of pov-
erty (consumption data). The first part of our argument is that we need to pay 
more attention to rural people’s assets.
The second part is that, in Tanzania, when we do look at assets, rural people are 
richer than we were expecting them to be. In case after case we have found 
transformations in rural people’s lives as viewed through the assets they have 
been able to build up. If there is one general tendency that emerges from this 
collection it is that Erick’s story is, if anything, the norm. To our surprise most of 
the people we revisited, in most of the places, tended to be better off than they 
had been, as measured by their assets.
It does not follow, however, that rural Tanzanians are in fact wealthy and not 
poor because of the growth in their assets. That is the third part of the argument. 
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Poverty and prosperity are multi- faceted. We have to look at all their dimensions. 
Owning a plough and a cow and building a new house—in short, improving your 
assets—does not necessarily make you rich. It does not mean that your children 
are healthier or better educated. It does not mean you will be free from hunger. 
The transformations we describe in this volume are inscribed in lives which also 
continue to experience other forms of harm and deprivation.
People are not ‘really’ wealthy if they have been able to invest in assets. In fact 
they may have been able to invest in assets despite their poverty, or even by going 
hungry and reducing day- to- day expenditure. Assets matter because they are 
important locally and have been overlooked by commonly used measures of pov-
erty and prosperity. But documenting assets does not provide the answer to prob-
lems of data poverty. There can be no such single answer. Rather it behoves us to 
try and understand better the nature of the relationship between these different 
dimensions of wealth and poverty.
But given that assets are part of the story, and given that their growth has sur-
prised most of the researchers in this collection, what might explain this apparent 
prosperity in assets? Here we have to be careful. It is tempting to say that the story 
here is that there is no story. The timing of the changes we have documented, the 
crops involved, the social relations, the infrastructural changes, all are different 
from place to place.
But in all this diversity there are some consistent common threads, which are 
further supported by other research across the country and broader continent, 
and these concern the abilities of smallholders to realize the changes that they 
want to achieve. Tanzanian peasants have long been dismissed in policy circles, 
national and international, as being dominated by subsistence practices that 
were slow to change, unproductive, and therefore mired in poverty. Change 
requires outside investors and the transfer of land and water to them. More 
 radical commentators have been vocal in their concerns about such changes. 
They warn that the invasion of market forces can unleash forces of commoditiza-
tion and social differentiation that will build inequality, dispossession, and 
disadvantage.
But we dispute both views. Smallholders are engines of growth and rural pros-
perity. They have seized the opportunities that new markets have afforded. This 
does not always result in disadvantage and want that the radical critics feared.
The final element of our argument is that the growth of markets for crops 
across the country has spread prosperity and locally valued change. We make this 
argument with caution. Longstanding cash crops have suffered price fluctuations; 
new high- value crops will do too. But we believe this remains the case even when 
we bear in mind the considerable exclusions and limits our methods present. This 
begs the question what broader conditions and circumstances—infrastructural 
changes and policy support—are conducive to bringing such rural trans form-
ations? We attend to these in the conclusion.
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Methods in Longitudinal Survey Research: Exploring 
Assets in Tanzania
If trends in assets are an important source of information how might we study 
them? Long- term data sets that track change in asset ownership over time are 
hard to find. They require longitudinal data sets which can comprise restudies 
(of particular places), revisits (returning to specific people and domestic units), 
or panels (in which cohorts are recruited for repeated revisits to the same people 
or families) (Vandergeest and Rigg 2012). Panels tend to have shorter time intervals 
between their visits, whereas decades can elapse between revisits and restudies 
(Baulch and Hoddinott  2000, Dercon and Shapiro  2007, Dercon et al.  2009, 
Baulch 2011).
Longitudinal studies, as Burawoy (2003) observed, have to cope with four 
types of change (see also Kloos 1997). As well as the changes to internal dynamics 
and external pressures in the places studied that we have reported above, there are 
also changes to the researcher (on which see Ponte in the Epilogue p. 387), and 
the theoretical contexts in which they are thinking (Himanshu et al.  2016). 
Vandergeest and Rigg neatly capture how in Asian and South East Asian research 
theoretical foci have shifted from self- contained ‘villages’ to ‘communities’ and to 
larger concerns of political economy.1 Revisits conducted now have to cope with 
the theoretical frames of earlier village- contained baseline surveys (Vandergeest 
and Rigg 2012). Similarly earlier approaches may have used concepts like ‘house-
hold’ in ways which hid important dynamics. As Vandergeest and Rigg put it: 
‘there was [in our original studies] a tendency to expect individual voices to 
emerge, unbidden, from the household context’ (ibid.: 15).
There is a niche literature in longitudinal research that we review in the final 
chapter of this collection. Suffice to say here that it is a small niche, and there are 
surprisingly few studies of this sort in African contexts. There are more in Asia and 
Latin America. In the global north governments frequently sponsor large- scale 
panel surveys which makes the need to look for longitudinal studies less pressing.
Tanzania is not blessed with many longitudinal studies or panels. Pat Caplan’s 
decades of engagement in Mafia island provide detailed and intimate accounts 
with one community using largely qualitative data (Caplan  1992,  1997). For 
more quantitative data there are three studies. There is the Kagera Health and 
Demographic Study (hereafter the Kagera study) which spans 1994 and 2004 (de 
Weerdt 2010, Beegle et al. 2011); the AFRINT study which covers ten villages in 
Iringa and Morogoro from 2002 to 2016 (Djurfeldt et al. 2011, and see Chapter 10 
in this volume), and the Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) data from 
2008 to the present for a sample of 3,000 families (Christiaensen 2017). So the older 
1 The village frame is clearly visible in some longitudinal works—such as Epstein’s (1973, and 
Epstein et al. 1998).
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studies cover few regions (just three) and the nationally representative case is 
recent. Altogether they do not provide a good basis to understand the changes 
that have been brought by the economic growth that has persisted since the late 
1980s. Stefan Dercon’s call for more longer- term insights into the fortunes of rural 
households during periods of growth remains as relevant as ever in Tanzania 
(Dercon 2006).
The problem is not confined to Tanzania. The World Bank, with Gates 
Foundation support, are expanding panel data collection in a number of African 
countries. This is why the LSMS was established in Tanzania. It is already yielding 
some results but cannot fill historical gaps and help us to understand changes that 
happened in the early years of economic growth.
Moreover analyses of panel data have suffered from a problematic conceptual-
ization of poverty. This arises where analyses focus primarily on the qualities of 
households and individuals, and quantitative analyses of the same, and pay less 
attention to the politics of poverty creation and reduction (Harris 2009). Such an 
approach risks seeing poverty as a condition of the poor alone. It misses its 
production through broader local, national, and international relations, which 
have, as Schaffer has observed, been a ‘blindspot in applied microeconomic causal 
analysis’ (Shaffer 2012a: 1779).
Our response to this lack of data has been to take one- off surveys conducted in 
the late 1980s to early 2000s and turn them into longitudinal surveys by re- 
surveying the same families. It is similar to methods which ask respondents to 
reconstruct change over time from the present (turning survey data ‘upside down’ 
as Dercon and Shapira put it, 2007: 30), except that it does not rely on those 
memories for its baseline. The baseline is provided by the first survey. This gives it 
an advantage as recall can suffer from rose- tints and inaccuracy, a risk, for all its 
insights, in the ‘stages of progress’ method (Krishna et al.  2004, Krishna  2006, 
Krishna  2010). We rely instead on actual observations recorded some twenty 
years ago.
To undertake this work we had to build up a suitable list of sites that could be 
revisited. We had two essential criteria. The researcher had to have first visited 
their study sites between 1985 and 2005, and they had to have a list of the named 
domestic units (aka families or households) that they had interviewed in their 
first survey. 1985 was the lower limit because after that problems of recall and 
domestic unit integrity (on which more below) make the method problematic. 
2005 is the upper limit because after that there are panel data in the form of the 
LSMS. The list of family names was necessary because our method hinges upon 
re- visiting the actual families visited in the original survey in order that we can 
see how asset ownership changes over time.
We constructed a list of sixteen different researchers who have worked in thirteen 
regions, twenty- six districts, and in over seventy villages (see Figure 1.1). This is 
fewer than we expected to find. We had thought that there would be many more 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 01/07/21, SPi
Understanding Long-Term Change in Rural Tanzania 7
researchers and that we would be able to select a good variety of studies to revisit. 
This has not been the case. There was no comprehensive list of researchers upon 
which to draw. COSTECH records (which provide research permission to over-
seas researchers) and the East Africana library (holding theses written by 
Tanzanians) proved less forthcoming than we had hoped. We relied on our own 
networks and connections and our own readings to identify the surveys we used. 
Fortunately the network of researchers in Tanzania is strong, and it was possible 
to find out about possible studies using snowballing and word of mouth enquiries.
We do not think that we have identified all possible surveys. And we have cer-
tainly not identified a nationally representative sample. There are obvious gaps 
here (no coastal areas, none in the south- east and far west of the country) and 
there is a selection bias arising from researchers’ accumulated preference for sites 
along the main roads out of Dar es Salaam. The central eastern regions of 
Morogoro and Iringa are over represented. Just four of the surveys are in remoter 
locations: (Katherine Snyder, Vesa- Matti Loiske, Dan Brockington, and Monique 
Borgerhoff Mulder). Others were in remoter locations (Stefano Ponte in Songea, 
Esbern Friis- Hansen in Njombe) which are now more accessible.
Another disappointing aspect is that too few of the researchers who are listed 
here are Tanzanians. It seems that here we were confronting different cultures of 















































































































































Figure 1.1 Sites identified for possible revisits.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 01/07/21, SPi
8 Dan Brockington and Christine Noe
surveys unusually problematic. Northern- based researchers rarely throw away 
their PhD or post- doc data. These are kept in boxes and attics awaiting possible 
re- use. The collector’s ethos is rather deeply engrained. Tanzanian researchers 
were more likely to have suffered lost data, sometimes inadvertently, on other 
occasions because it did not seem particularly important to keep it at the time. 
There was at least one heart- breaking story of questionnaires disposed of when 
they had been safely stored (because the room they were stored in was re- allocated 
to another use) or of data lost with stolen computers and failed back- ups.
Finally, despite the prominence of land alienation and displacement in the lit-
erature on rural Tanzania (Bluwstein et al. 2018), only one of the sites we have 
covered has been subject to active land loss. In this instance some villagers in 
Mbeya have suffered as a result of the creation of Kitulo National Park (see 
Chapter 14). This has had a significant impact on people’s livestock keeping prac-
tices, restricting many to zero grazing. However other sites have not experienced 
these new restrictions. The relative absence of incidents of land loss in our work 
does not mean that the claims about land alienation in Tanzania are overblown or 
stated (on that topic please see Locher and Sulle 2014). Indeed the overlapping 
amalgamation of alienations (Bluwstein et al. 2018), both existing and portending 
are in and of themselves concerning. This gap in our work simply means that we 
cannot report on the consequences of that sort of change. As we hope is clear 
from Brockington’s and Noe’s other works, land loss and eviction pose extremely 
serious problems (Brockington 2002, Noe 2013, Kangalawe and Noe 2015, Noe 
and Kangalawe 2015, Olwig et al. 2015). They deserve a great deal of attention. 
Their absence in this volume is an accident of the case studies we were able to 
find, not a deliberate choice, nor a good indication of the experience of land 
alienation more generally.
Notwithstanding these gaps we believe that we have identified enough studies 
to make this collection worthwhile. Indeed the insights they afford can be won-
derful. They are testimony to years of committed research. For example, Monique 
Borgerhoff Mulder had visited her community in Pimbwe every two years since 
1995 and rigorously surveyed the entire community each time. The quality of 
those data sets the standard for all others. Similarly Katherine  Snyder and 
Emmanuel Sulle’s work in Kainam is one of the most intimate and engaged pos-
sible. Sulle was born and bred in Kainam, Snyder has been working there for 
thirty years including a number of extended stays of over one or two years for her 
PhD and subsequently. Both have also been collaborating continuously since. The 
survey they repeated was first conducted in 1994 and came at the end of five years 
of research work when respondents were already comfortable with the re searchers 
and their questions. Anna Mdee is reporting from families in a village which she 
has been visiting since the mid- 1990s, as researcher and also having married into 
the village. Wilhelm Östberg’s work built on previous revisits prior to our own 
with other collaborators (Slegers and Östberg 2008, Östberg and Slegers 2010). 
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Similarly Agnes Andersson Djurfeldt’s work (part of the AFRINT project afore 
mentioned) already takes the form of a panel data- set which has been surveyed 
three times (2002, 2008, and 2016). Again the depth of quantitative data available 
here will make these data a useful sounding board against which to test other 
findings.
But the single- visit studies are remarkable too. Friis- Hansen’s re- survey entails 
revisiting families with whom he worked in the mid- 1980s when there were high 
levels of poverty and deprivation. He had already begun revisiting these families 
before we contacted him. Brockington’s work in Rukwa entailed a survey of over 
four hundred households from one village, Mtowisa B (and nearly as many from 
its immediate neighbour, Mtowisa A). Cosmas Sokoni was re- visiting villages 
where he was both raised and studied for his PhD.
Finally there is the case of the Rolf Larson’s survey from Meru, whose work is 
being followed up posthumously by Christine Noe. This story is hard to tell and is 
best expressed in the words of Christine’s blog:
The research reported here is unusual for a couple of reasons. First, the original 
work was undertaken by the late Rolf Larson in the mid- 1990s. I am, in some 
ways, following in his footsteps, and how I have come to do so is a moving and 
difficult story. Rolf was killed in a road accident in Tanzania in 2004, on his way 
to revisit Meru and the sites of his original research. He had kept his data in 
meticulous order, however, and a chance encounter with his former colleagues 
has meant that I have been able to access it and use it. I am [we are] very grateful 
to Rolf and Göran Djurfeldt for making this possible.
The second is that, in other ways, Rolf was walking where I had trod when he 
did his research. Unlike most researchers in this livelihood change project, the 
work in Meru is a return to my homeland, the place where I was born and grew 
up. I was born in Poli- Ndatu village and studied at Makumira primary and sec-
ondary school for thirteen years. My village is among the nine villages that Rolf 
Larson studied in 1994/1998. Part of my excitement with this project is that I am 
so well placed to contribute to the interpretation of change in Meru due to my 
personal experience, the local network, language fluency and connection to the 
landscape.2
In fact the technique we used, of building a network of federated studies each 
exploring slightly different aspects of change, proved to be one of the joys of the 
project. It brought together people with decades of experience living and working 
in the country and all with similar interests in rural economic and livelihood 
2 http://livelihoodchangeta.wixsite.com/tanzania/single- post/2016/06/20/Coffee- BreakPotentials- 
and- Pitfalls- for- Meru- Farmers- Prosperity visited 15/12/16.
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change. The researchers involved in this project have met twice to discuss find-
ings and progress and present their work. We have also shared findings with gov-
ernment officials, multilateral institutions, and NGO staff in two stakeholder 
workshops in 2017 and 2018. The work in this collection is therefore the col lect-
ive product of decades of engagement by numerous people, some of whom have 
been working in the country all their lives, others all their professional lives, and 
many of whom have enjoyed lasting relationships with the places they have 
studied and know as home. It is also the result of a comparative engagement with 
each other’s work and experience. The Epilogue to this book presents a recorded 
discussion of what it was like for us as individuals to undertake that work.
Through this network of researchers, and others who contributed their data 
(such as Fred Ellis and Ntengua Mdoe) we covered thirty- seven villages (see 
Figure 1.2 and Table 1.1). Our work used a mixture of quantitative and qualitative 
methods building on our own experience, and others (Lawson et al. 2003, Adato 
et al.  2007, Howe and McKay  2007, de Weerdt  2010, Shaffer  2012b, Muyanga 
et al. 2013). For each visit we undertook focus groups to discuss the meaning of 
wealth, and its changes over time. We met with key informants and government 
officials to talk about the changing history of the village, and wherever possible 
we used ranking exercises to explore the distribution of wealth in each village. We 
then revisited all the domestic units that we could find from the original surveys 
(the highest attrition rate was 40 per cent, 10–20 per cent was more normal). 
Finally, wherever possible, we returned to the villages after our work to discuss 
findings with them. 
Figure 1.2 Actual revisited villages and the researchers who led the studies.
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Table 1.1 List of study sites re- visited
Region District Village Researcher Sample 
size
Arusha Arumeru Malala Christine Noe/Rolf Larsson 54
    Mulala Christine Noe/Rolf Larsson 57
    Nkoanrua Christine Noe/Rolf Larsson 50
Dodoma Chemba Goima Wilhelm Östberg 34
    Mirambu Wilhelm Östberg 41
Iringa Iringa Rural Ilambilole Torben Birch- Thomsen 21
   Ihemi Agnes Andersson Djurfeldt 27
  Kilolo Ikuwala Torben Birch- Thomsen 26
    Isele Agnes Andersson Djurfeldt 26
    Kipaduka Agnes Andersson Djurfeldt 21
Katavi Mlele Mirumba Monique Borgerhoff Mulder 267
Kilimanjaro Moshi Rural Uchira Anna Mdee 15
    Koresa Anna Mdee 15
Manyara Hanang Gitting Vesa- Matti Loiske 40
    Gocho Vesa- Matti Loiske 36
  Mbulu Kainam Katherine Snyder 180
Mbeya Mbeya Rural Igoma Cosmas Sokoni 21
    Shibolya Cosmas Sokoni 25
    Ulenje Cosmas Sokoni 21
Morogoro Kilosa Chanzuru Fred Ellis, Ntengua Mdoe 67
  Morogoro 
Rural
Bonye Fred Ellis, Ntengua Mdoe 27
    Kongwa Fred Ellis, Ntengua Mdoe 27
    Sesenga Fred Ellis, Ntengua Mdoe 27
  Mvomero Kanga Stefano Ponte 13
    Langali Stefano Ponte 13
    Mlali Stefano Ponte/Fred Ellis, 
Ntengua Mdoe
32
    Nyandira Fred Ellis, Ntengua Mdoe 30
  Kilombero Idete Agnes Andersson Djurfeldt 36
   Katarukila Agnes Andersson Djurfeldt 41
Njombe Makete Maliwa Esbern Friis- Hansen 12
  Njombe Ngamanga Esbern Friis- Hansen 18
  Njombe 
Rural
Mamongolo Esbern Friis- Hansen 16
Rukwa Sumbawanga Mtowisa B Dan Brockington 64
Ruvuma Madaba Lilondo Stefano Ponte 15
  Namtumbo Ligunga Stefano Ponte 18
  Songea Rural Lipaya Stefano Ponte 17
Shinyanga Kishapu Lubaga Koos Kingma 10
Totals
Regions Districts Villages Researchers Domestic 
Units
12 21 37 16 1460
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The Organization of This Book and How to Use It
Assembling this book has been something of a challenge because it comprises 
many voices. We have tried to write this such that each chapter is comprehensible 
on its own, without reading all the others. This is necessary because few people 
will read the book all the way through. Many will just study individual chapters. 
We have tried to make that easier for readers.
At the same time this also means that there will be an element of repetition 
across some of the chapters. In order to stand alone each chapter is anchored in 
particular research debates, and sometimes these have overlapped across different 
chapters. This can happen across Chapters 5 to 16 in which we dwell on different 
case studies. Where they find that to be the case, readers are advised to concen-
trate on the methodological and substantive findings which are unique to each 
chapter.
However we have ensured that there is no overlap in the introductory chapters 
and final conclusion which frame and conclude these case studies. Chapters 2 to 4 
examine substantive and methodological debates that surround assets—the 
touchstone of this collection. Chapter seventeen presents our substantive conclu-
sions on that topic. Readers who have time to dip into more than one chapter are 
advised to attempt these chapters before they explore the case studies.
Finally some readers will appreciate the Epilogue which explains candidly what 
it was like actually to do the research which lead to the different case studies. In 
case that is difficult to read all the way through, we have explained which pages of 
the Epilogue match to which chapter.
To guide readers through the different chapters they may wish to explore we 
present here a summary of all the chapters. The chapters in Part 1 examine more 
carefully the key concepts and methods on which this collection is built. In 
Chapter 2 Dan Brockington and Christine Noe consider the importance of assets 
as markers of wealth and poverty in rural economies. They summarize findings 
which show why assets are so important for understanding poor rural societies 
and explain why they may have been overlooked in current data and debates 
about economic and social change in many African countries.
Chapter 3 examines one particular aspect of assets in more detail—the ques-
tion of asset indices, and how they fit empirically with the geographically variable 
prioritization of different assets across Tanzania. Using data from focus groups 
Olivia Howland, Christine Noe, and Dan Brockington consider how assets were 
actually reported to matter as notions of wealth and poverty vary across different 
parts of Tanzania. The authors compare these findings, from different villages and 
for men and women and charts the common ground and differences. The collec-
tion of villages on which this work draws were largely agricultural—it missed 
fishing villages and more pastoral villages. But despite that similarity this 
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comparison of different grounded notions of wealth and poverty produces con-
sid er ably different definitions and interpretations of prosperity in different parts 
of the country. It also produces a different list of meaningful items from that nor-
mally found in the shorter asset indices usually used to determine wealth in large 
samples.
The challenge of identifying and tracking ‘domestic units’ required for our 
methods is not trivial. We used domestic units because many of the assets 
described here (land, houses, livestock) are effectively owned and managed by 
social units larger than individuals. Their benefits, or the problems of their loss, 
are experienced collectively, if not equally. However, it is well established, but 
inadequately recognized, that domestic units contain and can obscure con sid er-
able inequalities, power struggles and differences between intersections that 
include gender and age. These can be fundamental to understanding the nature 
and reproduction of poverty and prosperity. This issue is compounded in longitu-
dinal research because domestic units are not static entities. Their membership, 
location, activities, and both internal and external power relations can change 
substantially and rapidly. In Chapter 4 Dan Brockington, Ernestina Coast, Anna 
Mdee, Olivia Howland, and Sara Randall explores the challenges of using assets 
to understand dynamics of poverty and prosperity within and across domestic 
units over time. They argue that in some respects changes in assets cannot be 
attributed to individuals alone—they belong to, distribute benefits to, and are 
managed by domestic units. But this introduces a number of interesting chal-
lenges with respect to the difficulties of tracking changes to those domestic units 
over time, and changes to the assets in these domestic units. This chapter explores 
the circumstances through which change to assets could be tracked over time 
through longitudinal studies of domestic units.
The second part of the book then presents the different case studies. In 
Chapter  5 Monique Borgerhoff Mulder presents her extraordinary work from 
Mirumba, in Katavi Region. Monique visited this village seven times over a 
fifteen- year period and conducted a full village census every time. It is in terms of 
its quantitative data, as well as many of its other insights, the most authoritative 
longitudinal study of which we are aware. Moreover Monique first began working 
in Tanzania since 1979. Mirumba is but one of several long- term engagements 
she has had with different parts of the country. One of the advantages of her 
approach is that, despite working in a poor village with high rates of migration, 
family breakdown and divorce, she is able to trace change in highly unstable 
social environments. She shows clearly that there has been a significant improve-
ment in different types of asset for most domestic units. She also shows that 
improvement in assets is, in this instance, well correlated with other measures of 
well- being, such as farm productivity, decreased stress, education, and health. She 
also shows that significant levels of poverty remain.
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Chapter  6 presents the work of Emmanuel Sulle and Katherine Snyder on 
Kainam, in Manyara Region. This village was remote and isolated. It was quite 
self- sufficient and known for its productivity, but it was cut off from the rest of the 
country. Now it is much more thoroughly integrated into the rest of the economy, 
and in many ways, as measured by local indices, villagers appear wealthier. But all 
this new wealth, and all the assets associated with it, also bring unwelcome change 
in social practices and social cohesion which means that people do not feel richer.
Christine Noe, Olivia Howland, and Dan Brockington in Chapter 7 take up the 
case of Meru villagers, close to Arusha town and in Arusha  Region, who grew 
rich on coffee from the 1950s onwards—and on male control of female labour to 
produce it. The demise of coffee from the 1990s and rise of market gardening and 
urban employment opportunities is welcomed by women and sustains new forms 
of prosperity and new meanings of wealth. The result is an interesting tale of vil-
lagers who have, in many respects, lost assets (they farm less and they have fewer 
cows); however the returns on their farming, and the things that they count as 
wealth, have changed too, and the results may be livelihoods that are more 
empowering for women than was previously the case.
Dan Brockington’s work in Mtowisa in Rukwa Region began in 1999–2000 and 
features in Chapter  8. His work explores a boost to local economies caused by 
sesame seed price rises which have transformed the appearance of the village and 
the lives of sesame farmers. At the same time the closing of the land frontier 
means no new farms are easily available, which heralds much greater inequality. 
Part of the value of this contribution is that it is based on a full census survey that 
was undertaken in late 2000 (n > 400), this presents a more complete picture of 
the changes in subsequent years.
Chapters 9 and 10 bring out some of the sharpest contrasts in these case stud-
ies. Wilhelm Östberg and Joseph Mduma’s work in Dodoma  Region in Chapter 9 
demonstrates the benefits, but also dangers, of expanding agricultural activity 
through extensification. In the mid- 1990s he worked in two remote communities 
characterized by small farms, long fallows, and abundant land and forests. Now 
he has found much wealthier families, much improved infrastructure, and sub-
stantially reduced forests. Families appear wealthier due to increased inequality 
(because newly wealthy entrepreneurs and philanthropists are improving village 
infrastructure and equipment), transformed national infrastructure (roads and 
buses), and better crop prices. There has also been dramatic decline in for-
est cover.
But all this is the obverse of Vesa- Matti Loiske’s findings in Chapter 10 from 
Gitting and Gocho in Manyara Region. He also found much improved living 
standards, by local measures of wealth, but this has occurred in the absence of 
any locally available land to distribute, because of increasing equality, which has 
reduced oppressive practices by local big men and without any change in national 
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infrastructure provision. The one common denominator with Chapter 9 is that 
improved crop prices seem to have driven the higher returns to farming activity 
that underpin asset acquisition.
Chapter 11 reports findings from the AFRINT dataset (Djurfeldt et al. 2011, 
Andersson Djurfeldt et al. 2018) which has built up a longitudinal dataset across 
six countries with three visits between 2002 and 2017. The findings and insights 
possible from this dataset are remarkably rich. In this chapter Agnes Andersson 
Djurfeldt, Ellen Hillbom, and Elibariki Msuya examine two villages in Kilombero 
District, Morogoro Region, which have been transformed by improvements in 
rice irrigation. It examines the driving forces of these changes, locating them 
within current theories of change to irrigation practices. The authors argue that 
smallholder farmers have been responding to price improvements nationally and 
have been facilitated by improving technology and extension services. They also 
note that the transformations in rice cultivation were fuelling a strong demand to 
rent land, and that this was benefitting women who were able to keep the rev-
enues from lands they rented, but less able to control income from family farms.
In Chapter 12 we return to Stefano Ponte’s work in Morogoro which he first 
began in 1996. That research formed the basis of a series of substantial contribu-
tions to our understanding of rural economies through his publications on farm-
ers and markets and on rural value chains. We have been able to revisit these 
study sites, and combine these findings with others from neighbouring villages 
(surveyed in the LADDER project). We show that, despite earlier published fears 
of agricultural involution, pathways to prosperity (in terms of assets) do exist, 
which are sufficiently inclusive to produce proportionately larger middle groups 
of relatively wealthy villagers, with the poor being relatively few. On the basis of 
this work the authors chart different livelihood trajectories which characterize the 
transformations in these regions.
Chapter 13 reports changes in the longest- running study of all, led by Esbern 
Friis- Hansen. Friis- Hansen’s work is the longest study as he first began his 
research in these villages in the mid- 1980s. It is also a story of the greatest trans-
formation as he encountered extreme levels of poverty when he first arrived, and 
is now recording landscapes and societies which have become wealthy through 
emigration and tree planting. Villagers in Njombe Region were desperately poor 
in the mid- 1980s with even clothing scarce. Many emigrated and found prosper-
ity elsewhere, sending money home. Those who have remained have become 
remarkably wealthy from the trees they have planted. The changes derive in the 
first instance from rural transformation—services and income from remittances 
improved the welfare of residents. Only later did agricultural transformation, 
driven by potatoes and trees, bring the substantial increases in wealth he found.
Cosmas Sokoni conducted his PhD in 1999 visiting six villages in Mbeya 
Region, where he himself grew up as a child. His family remains there. In 
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Chapter 14 Cosmas Sokoni and Verdiana Tilumanywa report on the findings of 
revisits to three of these villages. The story is mixed in that there are signs of 
increasing wealth in the form of housing quality. There are more opportunities to 
take part in the growing urban economy of nearby Mbeya town, and there are 
changes to the cash crops from which people have grown wealthy. However 
 people in this area are also constrained by the decreasing availability of land due 
the presence of forest reserves, forestry plantations, and the national park. Farm 
sizes are smaller than before and there are signs that poorer families are being 
squeezed out of farming lifestyles.
We present further research from the south of Tanzania in which draws on 
Torben Birch- Thomsen and Esbern Friis- Hansen’s decades of work in Iringa. 
Chapter 15 shows how, despite a closing land frontier, improved infrastructure 
and opportunities to develop cash crops for urban markets have benefitted farm-
ers with the social and economic capital to invest in these new crops. These 
requirements exclude other families from joining and so creates new divisions of 
wealth and poverty.
Anna Mdee’s work in Chapter 16 is one of several in this collection which pro-
vides a mixture of professional engagement with personal insight. She has been 
associated with Uchira village (Kilimanjaro  Region) since the mid- 1990s in the 
form of various research projects. But she also married into the village, into 
the family of the then village chairman which has enhanced her understanding of 
the place. This case study is also important because it bucks the trend in the rest 
of the study. People are not richer in Uchira; there has been stasis and decline. The 
local economy has suffered from adverse climate and a collapsed cattle economy. 
There is money coming into the village from people seeking to buy now expen-
sive plots of land. Uchira is close to the growing town of Moshi and its reliable 
water supplies and good connections to the town make it suitable for rich urban-
ites. But this injection of wealth is patchy and episodic and does not benefit the 
large groups of people in the ways that we have seen in other study sites.
Chapter 17 concludes the book. In this chapter the editors draw together the 
experience of the case studies to consider what they collectively imply for our 
understanding of rural economies, and what their implications are for current 
debates about land grabs, investment and smallholder farming, and policies per-
taining to them. We consider here the surprises of this work, and why they should 
exist, and what generalizable lessons we can draw from this analysis
Finally, at our writing workshops that have created this collection we recorded 
discussions of our own fieldwork experiences, our understanding of what we 
learned, and the effect it had on our lives. In the Epilogue we present an edited 
transcript of those discussions. This is a crucial element of the book. It shows, 
pretty much warts and all, what doing this work was like and how we have strug-
gled, and thrived on it. 
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Assets, Prosperity, and Data in Rural Africa
Dan Brockington and Christine Noe
Is economic growth good or bad for prosperity? The question is not crazy. 
Economic growth is calculated by measuring change to GDP, a number which we 
know does not capture really important aspects of our lives. In fact, worse still, it 
counts as progress things that harm us (Stiglitz et al.  2010, Fioramonti  2017). 
GDP puts together all the unwelcome economic activity (expensive medical 
procedures following accidents, rebuilding homes and businesses after fires and 
disasters, pollution clean- ups, insurance claims) and all the welcome activity 
(organic vegetable markets, toy shops, universities, sales at co- operative art 
galleries) and counts them all as one thing. If all the toy shops, co- operatives, and 
organic vegetable markets burned down and were replaced by casinos, plastic 
factories, and chemical waste depots, then disastrous as these would be for their 
customers and owners, it would make a great contribution to GDP.
The evidence is fairly clear that many forms of poverty decline with economic 
growth. But we are not interested in this book in just poverty reduction. We are 
concerned with well- being and prosperity. And the relationship between these 
and economic growth is much more opaque.
Moreover even if we were certain that larger economies might be able to gener-
ate more prosperity it is not at all clear how we get there. Do we invest in the 
livelihoods that people currently pursue, even if they are lowly, unproductive 
forms of agriculture? Or do we encourage a shift to more productive sectors of 
the economy? This could entail violence and dislocation, if, for example, the more 
productive sectors require land and resources currently occupied by less pro duct-
ive peasants. Where there is economic growth in poor countries does it generate 
beneficial change for those who need it most? And how are we to measure this 
progress (or regress)?
These debates are at the core of this book. In trying to understand what has 
happened using retrospective longitudinal research we ask fundamental ques-
tions about the nature and measurement of welcome change. In this chapter we 
tackle these questions. We outline a vigorous debate about the nature of economic 
change in rural African economies and whether or not it benefits rural Africans. 
We consider if indeed economic growth could depend on their displacement. 
Then we question the type of data that have been used to sustain those arguments. 
Dan Brockington and Christine Noe, Assets, Prosperity, and Data in Rural Africa In: Prosperity in Rural Africa? Insights into 
Wealth, Assets, and Poverty from Longitudinal Studies in Tanzania. Edited by: Dan Brockington and Christine Noe, 
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We suggest that analysts on both sides of the argument may in fact be looking at 
the wrong thing. This is because the data which they are using does not count 
the forms of wealth—assets—which matter a great deal to rural Tanzanians. We 
explain, using case studies and economic theory, why we need to pay more attention 
to assets when trying to understand rural change.
Transforming Africa or Leaving Rural Areas Behind?
Rapid economic growth is transforming many African economies (Radelet 2010). 
Sustained high rates of growth (despite downturns and austerity elsewhere in the 
world), macro- economic stability, relatively low inflation, and growing invest-
ment and infrastructural development are seeing numerous countries become 
more prosperous. Some observers are celebrating a rising continent that will be 
known for its growth, peace, and stability (Chuhan- Pole and Angwafo  2011). 
Jayne and colleagues have recently described a general economic transformation 
of numerous (but not all) poor African countries that is built on increased rural 
productivity and associated prosperity (Jayne et al. 2018).
These trends are exemplified in Tanzania. Observers are quick to praise 
Tanzania’s economic success over the last twenty years (Edwards 2014, Adam et al. 
2017). According to Edwards, in Nyerere’s last years in power, the country was 
suffering from stagnant agriculture and manufacturing, productivity in ‘free fall’, 
and a ‘sky- rocketing’ trade deficit (Edwards  2014: 81). The broad social vision 
that drove his policies (such as free universal primary education) were suffering 
from a basic absence of state funds. Since then, with reforms and structural 
adjustment, the economy has been transformed. Nord and colleagues summarize 
the changes as a ‘remarkable turnaround’, compared to the want and scarcity that 
characterized the country in the 1980s. Now there is low inflation, a ‘buoyant’ 
economy which has averaged 7 per cent annual growth and real per capita income 
has risen 50 per cent (Nord et al. 2009: 1). Robinson and colleagues describe a 
period of accelerated growth since 1996 that has seen macro- economic stability 
and increased public spending (Robinson et al.  2011). Arndt and colleagues 
found that indices of education, shelter, and water provision had improved in 
Tanzania from 1990 (Arndt et al. 2017). As we were working on the final version 
of this book, Tanzania was deemed by the World Bank to have become a lower- 
middle income country, graduating from its low income status five years ahead of 
expectations.1
Is all this growth inclusive and pro- poor? This is less obvious (Barrett 2011). 
Robinson and colleagues note that agriculture has not really contributed to 
1 https://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/what- does- tanzanias- move- lower- middle- income- status- 
mean. Viewed 21 October 2020.
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economic growth, which is a ‘cause of concern’ given that agriculture is the 
economic mainstay of rural areas where most people, and most of the country’s 
poor  people, live (Robinson et al. 2011: 26–7). Globally agriculture appears to be 
one of the best ways of reducing poverty among the poorest of the rural poor 
(Christiaensen et al. 2011). But in several African countries agricultural growth is 
not correlated with poverty reduction (Jayne et al.  2018). Far deeper change 
appears to be necessary to reduce poverty (Barrett et al. 2017).
For the most severe critics, the deprivation in rural areas despite years of 
 economic growth is particularly damning. Mashindano and colleagues compared 
change in poverty statistics using Household Budget Survey data with GDP 
growth data. They conclude that there has been substantial economic growth, but 
that this growth has not reached the poor; if anything it has passed them by 
(Mashindano et al. 2013: 126). They suggest that:
[i]n Tanzania the critical question is why has rapid growth in Tanzania not been 
accompanied by a corresponding fall in poverty? Why have the numbers of 
impoverished risen? (Mashindano and Shepherd 2013: 3)
The gap is particularly stark after 2000 when GDP growth outstripped population 
growth considerably, but was not matched by a commensurate fall in rural poverty. 
Edwards, using the same data, notes that poverty decline has been far slower in 
Tanzania than in other countries (Edwards 2014: 251). Arndt and colleagues also 
observe that the growth in GDP from 1990 to 2007, but a slow decline in poverty 
over the same period, was a conundrum (Arndt et al.  2017). The indications 
are  that most households (and particularly most rural households) were not 
bene fit ting from the continued economic growth that the country was experiencing 
in this period.
The poor performance of agriculture, which has not seen significant increases 
in productivity, and the consequent inability of smallholders to get wealthier in 
appreciable numbers, is particularly sobering. This reflects low productivity of 
smallholders in absolute terms—they cannot produce enough to feed themselves, 
let alone prosper (Jayne et al. 2010, Bryngelsson et al. 2012). Analyses of the 2007 
Household Budget Survey data reported signs that agricultural livelihoods are 
proving particularly unprofitable (Hoogeveen and Ruhinduka  2009). These 
analyses suggest that Tanzanians were diversifying out of agriculture in order to 
improve their wealth, and investment in agricultural assets (livestock, ploughs, 
and hoes) declined between 2001 and 2007. Indeed the analysts go so far as to 
state that ‘it is difficult to make a decent living out of agriculture’ (ibid.: 29).
Further there are signs that social dynamics in rural areas can enhance poverty. 
Some studies point to increased inequality and poverty as rural labour markets 
and land and resource poverty fuel differentiation within villages (Mueller 2011, 
Greco 2015). Studies of changes to land- holdings at the national scale suggest a 
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slow insidious growth of larger farms at the expense of smaller farms, with 
wealthy urbanites purchasing increasing amounts of land and a growth in landless 
rural families (Jayne et al. 2016).
More recent waves of the Household Budget Survey suggest that there has been 
a reduction of poverty in recent years (between 2007 and 2011), and that growth 
has become more inclusive (World Bank 2015). But poverty remained concen-
trated in rural areas. Rural areas held 68 per cent of the population, but 84 per 
cent of the poor (World Bank 2015). That had barely declined (to 81 per cent) in 
the most recent surveys for 2017–18 (URT 2019).
However even if there has been an improvement in rural wealth after 2007, that 
cannot explain the persistent rural poverty, despite strong economic growth, before 
that year. The poor connectivity between national economic growth and rural 
poverty remains a conundrum. For around two decades since 1990, Tanzania’s 
economic growth appears not to have been sufficiently inclusive, and substantial 
parts of the population, especially in rural areas do not appear to be getting richer in 
proportion to economic growth (Figure 2.1). Many Tanzanians have only been able 
to enjoy their country’s growing prosperity vicariously.
There are several different perspectives on the reasons for such persistent rural 
poverty. For some observers this simply reflects the fact that smallholders are just 
unproductive compared to other sectors of the economy. Economic growth 
hinges on adding value through investment and labour. If the labour is wielding 
hand hoes, and land owners are too poor to buy fertilizer, then such a sector 
cannot produce enough to generate meaningful economic change. Bluntly put, 
peasants are backward. The best way to obtain economic growth is for people to 
leave agriculture and find employment in other sectors. This view is most eff ect ive ly 
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Figure 2.1 Key trends in GNI and poverty in Tanzania.
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Others profoundly oppose this thinking. For some this view is just wrong- headed 
because it does not appreciate the value of rural livelihoods and lifeways for rural 
people. Pauline Peters captures this best:
The villagers in southern Malawi where I’ve lived and researched for many 
years . . . express satisfaction in work well done on the land—a fine field of maize 
or pigeon peas, a good tobacco harvest for sale, fat goats and laying chickens, a 
healthy stand of trees for fruit and timber, well- brewed sorghum beer—these are 
appreciated not only as material goods but as aesthetic and cultural values to be 
cherished. (Peters 2013: 556)
For others the key constraint is not peasant productivity, but peasant poverty. 
Peasants cannot gain from their productivity because of the way surplus is 
extracted from them. This view underpins Shivji’s following remarks:
In spite of the low rate of surplus, the peasant is subjected to a high degree of 
exploitation. How is this possible? It is possible only because exploitation digs 
into the necessary consumption of the peasant. The peasant yields to capital not 
only surplus labour, but part of his necessary labour as well by depressing his 
requirements to a subhuman level. It is through superhuman labour and sub-
human existence that the peasantry satisfies the rapacious demands of capital. 
Peasants wear rags; eat the coarsest kind of food, forego education and medical 
care and put the whole family, men, women and children, to work to satisfy the 
insatiable greed of imperialism and its local allies . . . . Since the surplus is size-
able there is very little accumulation in agriculture . . . . What is preserved and 
reproduced, therefore, is an impoverished, starving middle and poorer peas-
antry which forms the backbone of agricultural production and the source of 
surplus for capital. (Shivji 1992: 129, 143)
In the field of peasant studies the persistent problem of peasant poverty has been 
a leitmotif for decades. The question has two dimensions—why are peasants poor, 
and why do they persist in their poverty? For many of these critics the answers to 
both in African contexts hinge on the invasions and depredations of capital, 
historic and contemporary (Rodney  1972, Bond  2006, Wuyts  2008). They see 
land loss and insecurity in rural areas as driving immiseration and increasing 
poverty. Rural poverty may be enhanced because of the growth strat egies being 
advocated by mainstream economists (Borras et al. 2011, Gardner 2012). A number 
of authors have argued that rural populations are suffering as a result of diverse 
forms of dispossession, primitive accumulation, and forms of rural differentiation 
and growing inequality that happen when overseas investment hits the ground 
(Hall 2011, Scoones et al. 2013, Wolford et al. 2013, Ansoms and Hilhorst 2014, 
Greco 2015, Hall et al. 2015, Hall et al. 2017).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 01/07/21, SPi
28 Dan Brockington and Christine Noe
Specifically in Tanzania problems of land alienation are marked. Green grabs 
for wildlife conservation (Fairhead et al.  2012) and REDD+ (Benjaminsen and 
Bryceson 2012, Svarstad and Benjaminsen 2017) are combining with mining con-
cessions and agricultural investment corridors to render large swathes of the 
country inhospitable to rural residents (Bluwstein et al. 2018). The stark maps show-
ing how swathes of the country are becoming off- limits in Bluwstein and colleagues’ 
work and the detail of how this dispossession concentrates disadvantage on more 
vulnerable and marginalized groups is disturbing (Homewood et al. 2020).
The critics of these processes are convinced that a disaster is unfolding. Just 
over thirty years ago Shivji predicted that the consequences of economic trans-
form ation and capital investment in Tanzania would include concentration of 
prime agricultural land into the hands of foreign corporations, rapid development 
of a ‘landless peasantry’, massive migration to urban areas, and high inequality 
with ‘sprawling cities full of luxury consumer goods’ with ‘millions of marginalised 
unemployed masses on the verge of starvation’ (Shivji 1987: 128, cited in Shivji 
2017: 5–6).2
Those same views of 1987 were repeated in 1992 when that essay was reprinted. 
As the quotation above makes clear, for Shivji, peasants are super- exploited either 
directly by capital or indirectly by states. That exploitation leaves them, in his 
words, in rags, and starving. Further exposure of peasant resources and societies 
to capital will lead to further exploitation, and their ultimate disenfranchisement.
Writing much more recently, Shivji thinks that his prediction of thirty years 
ago was too close to the mark. ‘One wishes . . . one would have proved wrong!’ 
(Shivji  2017: 6). He feels these predictions have ‘come close’ to fulfilment in 
Tanzania and is uncannily close to reality for Africa as a whole. Elsewhere he speaks 
of the peasantry being ‘flushed’ out of land, and of processes of primitive accumula-
tion driving marginalization, rather than proletarianization (Wuyts  2008: 1088). 
Plans for Africa’s economic ‘development’ will simply mean that rural people will 
lose access to resources with no industrial development to absorb their labour.3
How Do We Know about Rural Poverty?
Another way of thinking about this dispute is not in terms of the nature of social 
and economic processes taking place in the countryside, but rather as a question 
of evidence and data. How do we know what changes are happening to whom?
2 Technically a peasantry is, by definition, not landless. But Shivji’s meaning is clear.
3 Shivji’s views typify a gloomy outlook that pervades the writing of radical critics on the outlook 
for rural peasants. Michael Watts completed his magnum opus Silent Violence thus: ‘For the peas-
ants . . . Barrington Moore is probably right when he says that under capitalism “sooner or later they 
are its victims.” I suspect that what we are witnessing in Nigeria is the beginning of what John Berger 
refers to as a final act of historical elimination’ (Watts 1983: 513).
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The problem of data is indicated by the same Household Budget Surveys 
that seem to depict obdurate, slowly declining poverty. There are apparent incon-
sistencies in the trends these surveys capture. At the same time as poverty is 
declining slowly, house quality is improving considerably—and at rates which 
match economic growth (Figure  2.2). If has poverty persisted, how can poor 
peasants build so many (relatively) good- quality houses (Figure 2.3)?
Another way of putting this question is: what are the forms of poverty that 
peasants experience? We know that the insults and injuries of poverty are multi- 
dimensional (Green and Hulme 2005, Alkire and Foster 2011). They have many 
different expressions which will require different sources of data to comprehend. 
Yet that complexity has yet to filter through into debates about peasant poverty.
For example, the central premise of a recent edited collection on peasant pov-
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Figure 2.3 Key trends in poverty levels and house construction in Tanzania.
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is no doubt that peasant poverty has persisted, if not increased, in recent decades. 
The constitution of that poverty was not a significant concern of the book. As the 
editors themselves observed, poverty measurement was not their ‘central object’ 
(ibid.: 7). They establish the basic facts of peasant poverty briefly and succinctly 
using poverty line data. They argue that problems with World Bank poverty- line 
data in fact mean that levels of poverty globally, as determined by these lines, 
have not fallen as widely as the Bank claims (Boltvinik and Mann  2016a). 
Similarly Mashindano and Shepherd’s claim that poverty persists in rural 
Tanzania is also based on an analysis of poverty- line data.
But poverty- line data, if they are based on consumption patterns, are not a 
good way of tracking change in poor rural societies.4 They deliberately exclude 
aspects of life, wealth, and poverty that can be particularly important for peasant 
families. To understand how this is the case we need to examine more carefully 
how poverty lines are calculated.
A poverty line is a measurement of how much people spend over a particular 
time period. It captures the ‘cost of attaining a given level of economic welfare or 
“standard of living”’ (Ravallion 2016: 183). The famous notion that you are poor if 
you are living on less than $1 per day (or, more recently, $1.25 or $1.90) is made 
on the basis of poverty lines. Distributions of daily expenditure across nations are 
drawn up and anyone deemed to be spending less than particularly low levels per 
day are deemed to be poor.
From this measure the World Bank and others insist that fewer people are poor 
because the proportion (and in many places the number) of people below that 
line is declining. 35.9 per cent of people in the world used to live below the inter-
national poverty line (World Bank 2018). Now 10 per cent live below the line. In 
absolute terms this is a decline from 1.9 billion to 736 million. By this measure a 
capitalist world economy and economic growth have reduced poverty in the last 
few decades.
Boltvinik and Mann dispute the validity of this decline in two ways. Taking the 
numbers at face value, they insist that the line is too low, and a more realistic 
measure of poverty would be $2.50 per day (Boltvinik and Mann 2016a). The pro-
portion of people in that category increased by 13 percentage points between 
1980 and 2005.5 By this measure the capitalist world economy which flourished 
in those twenty- five years has increased the number of poor people.
More fundamentally they also dispute the validity of the construction of such 
lines. Here they draw on Pogge and Redde’s conceptual and practical critique of 
the methodology of making historical and geographical comparisons required for 
4 Poverty lines can also be based on income data, rather than expenditure data. These are not the 
focus of our discussion.
5 Chen and Ravallion note the same pattern (Chen and Ravallion 2010) and see Pogge for a short 
and biting rejoinder to the political significance of poverty lines which are set too low (Pogge 2008).
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international poverty lines (Reddy and Pogge 2010). The adjustments required to 
make prices in different countries, and times, comparable are just much harder 
to  do well than the World Bank has allowed. Ravallion has offered a spirited 
defence of international poverty lines in response, but without necessarily dealing 
with all the criticisms (Ravallion 2010).6
We do not dispute the problems of setting poverty lines too low, or the chal-
lenges of making poverty lines drawn from one place and time comparable with 
others. But we need also to recognize the limits that pertain to the sorts of poverty 
that poverty lines can capture. This is an entirely different critique to that we have 
discussed so far.
The poverty lines we have discussed are only concerned with the money that 
people spend on day- to- day needs. They are constructed from Household Budget 
Survey data using measures of consumption.
The basis for assessing income poverty is a measure of households’ consumption 
expenditure . . . . This is compared with a poverty line, which represents the cost 
of a basic basket of consumption. Households that fall below the poverty line are 
poor; individuals are classed as poor if they live in a poor household.
 (URT 2007: 47)
However, not all expenditure undertaken by a family is included in this measure 
of household consumption. These calculations deliberately exclude all production 
costs. That is, they exclude all costs entailed in creating any income. If a farmer is 
managing a 100- acre farm, then the survey will not try to capture her costs of 
ploughing, planting, weeding, or harvesting it. It captures (consumptive) use of 
the income resulting from such activity. The survey would also similarly not 
record any purchase of new land, or ploughs or oxen, or seeds or labour for 
smaller farmers. These too are production costs.
The instructions with respect to production costs are unambiguous. The World 
Bank’s guidance states that:
Care must be taken not to interpret spending that is made for inputs into house-
hold production, including outlays for tools or other inputs like fertilizer, water, 
or seed in agricultural production, as spending for consumption or as income. 
If we included spending on in- puts in the consumption or income aggregate, we 
would overstate the actual welfare levels achieved by households.
(Coudouel et al. 2002: 32)
6 A further issue arises with respect to the availability of adequate data with which to track changes 
in poverty- line data. Even if the methods for comparing between countries were sound they require 
good data to work with. In the most recent assessment of the data Beegle and colleagues found that, as 
of 2012, only twenty- seven of forty- eight countries had two comparable surveys since 1990 (!) which 
could be used to track changes in poverty lines (Beegle et al. 2016).
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In Tanzania’s 2011/12 Household Budget Survey the nature of the exclusions is 
clearer from the schedule of ‘COICOP’ codes used.7 This provides an ex haust ive 
list of all different types of expenditure recorded in a consumption survey, including 
food, clothing, house costs, furniture, education, water, electricity, insurance, and 
even money spent employing sex workers.
But this same code list does not include any purchase of land. Nor does it allow 
for the purchase of ploughs, power tillers, or tractors. Livestock purchase is only 
recorded if the animal is to be used for meat. Veterinary services are only recorded 
for pets, not herds, and fertilizer and other inputs for gardens, not farms. It is 
impossible to mention investment in productive assets because there are no codes 
for them.
Investment in productive assets is not the only thing that would be missed. As 
we have pointed out elsewhere (Brockington et al. 2018), expensive purchases are 
excluded because they are outliers, and skew the data.8 Indeed in the published 
COICOP codes there is no entry for house construction. So if a family invests in 
building a new house, or putting a new roof on it, then that cannot be captured in 
this survey.
There are good reasons for these omissions. A Household Budget Survey is just 
that—surveys of household budgets, not business budgets. But this means that a 
frugal family, which was restricting day- to- day expenditure in order to save for 
assets, would appear poor, even if it was also purchasing land, oxen, ploughs, and 
diverse inputs.9 It is therefore problematic to use poverty- line data based on 
consumption to track poverty dynamics in rural areas. These data cannot see 
some improvements in rural prosperity that are important for rural people.
Taking a critical look at data on economic growth in Tanzania therefore 
 presents a problem. On the one hand the vibrant economic growth of the last 
twenty years appears to have been a largely urban phenomenon which is simply 
not enjoyed by the bulk of the population, the rural poor, who need most to see 
some change. On the other hand the measures which raise this alarm are in them-
selves incomplete. If assets are an important part of rural livelihoods then it may 
be premature to conclude, as Mashindano and others have done, that economic 
7 COICOP refers to ‘Classification of Individual Codes by Purpose’ for the purposes of recording 
consumption (see https://unstats.un.org/unsd/class/revisions/coicop_revision.asp, viewed 14 March 
2019). A copy of the list of COICOP codes used in Tanzania is in the first author’s possession.
8 Indeed our 2018 publication was mistaken. In it we claimed that investment in assets, such as 
land or large livestock, might be excluded if the asset was expensive, and so the expenditure would 
appear as an outlier. They would be excluded, but for the prior reason that any expenditure on such 
assets would be classified as productive. In discussing these findings with colleagues we have been 
struck how often understanding of the exclusions of poverty- line data were known only by people 
with a good background in economics.
9 Investment in agricultural assets is recorded elsewhere in the survey, but these are not assigned 
COICOP codes and are not included in the indices of family consumption. The full surveys and their 
explanations are in the first author’s possession.
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growth in Tanzania has excluded the poor. The measure of poverty they were 
used did not look at change in the productive assets in which rural Tanzanians 
will be so keen to invest.
Assets in Rural Livelihoods
What do we mean by assets? They are crucial to our argument and the book as a 
whole. More restricted definitions refers to things which are owned, bought, 
saved, and disposed of—land, livestock, houses, and domestic goods. In rural 
African contexts assets can refer to land, livestock, and businesses, or equipment 
like ploughs, boats, or fishing nets.
Many definitions of assets are broader, indeed Carter and Barrett (2006) 
describe assets as the things which generate income or a livelihood, without 
 specifically offering a definition. A number of papers on assets have included a 
var iety of other measures of prosperity as ‘assets’ (Sahn and Stifel 2000, Booysen 
et al. 2008, Young 2012). Barrett and colleagues recently defined assets
broadly . . . as the state/stock variables used to generate income, including future 
income against which one might borrow. This includes both public and private 
goods and encompasses financial, human, natural, and social capital. (2016: 5)
This definition includes broad aspects of prosperity such as levels of education, 
health, or more hard- to- measure notions of social connections or happiness, such 
that, as Johnston and Abreu observed, the term ‘assets’ has come to be more a 
measure of well- being than assets per se, and can sometimes be used in a way 
which makes it synonymous with ‘sustainable livelihoods’ (Scoones  1998) or 
‘capabilities’ (Sen  1999).10 Ellis (2000: 296) explicitly equates assets to the five 
forms of capital outlined in the sustainable livelihoods framework. Bebbington 
treats assets and capitals synonymously:
assets—or what I call capitals in this framework—are not simply resources that 
people use in building livelihoods: they are assets that give them the capability to 
be and to act. (Bebbington 1999: 2022 emphasis in the original)
Even when broadly defined, assets are useful for exploring poverty dynamics 
because they allow researchers to distinguish between different sorts of income 
poverty, according to the asset profiles that underlie them (Barrett et al. 2006). 
10 We are mainly concerned in this paper with tangible assets that can be bought, used, and sold 
because we are interested in the social units that are engaged in the processes of acquiring and distrib-
uting them. This means that we will use a more restrictive definition of assets.
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Those without assets or much income are structurally poor or else endure per sist ent 
poverty (Naschold 2012). Assets are also a good measure to use because they are 
relatively easily counted—there is less room for the sort of errors that can arise 
when trying to count income (Johnston and Abreu 2016).
Assets can be divided into ‘productive assets’ which produce food or income 
(land or livestock), and ‘non- productive assets’ which do not normally do so 
(phones, televisions, and fridges). However the productive and non- productive 
distinction can break down when non- productive assets also generate income. 
Fridges can be used to store medicines or sodas and ice cubes for sale in informal 
shops. Televisions attract customers to bars. Use of phones (normally a non- 
productive asset) is also sold—as calls reduce time spent on long journeys. A 
domestic unit with electricity will charge neighbour’s phones for a small fee. 
Likewise land can be kept unused or become infertile and oxen can be rested; 
productive assets are not always productive.
Assets, and change in assets, can provide a number of insights into poverty 
dynamics. In the first instance they can be used to construct asset indices—this 
topic we tackle in the next chapter. Further, one of the most important insights is 
that ownership and control of assets are fundamental to the definitions of poverty 
and wealth that are used by poor people (Narayan 2000). As we discuss in the 
next chapter, when focus groups in Tanzanian villages discuss the meaning of 
wealth they tend to focus on the quality of houses, amount of land farmed, size of 
herds and the abilities and freedoms that derive from owning these things, rather 
than income per se. Similarly poverty is defined, in part, by the lack of ownership 
of or access to important assets. Assets provide a means of providing sustained 
long- term income, and an insurance against risk and loss.
Poverty researchers have frequently observed this phenomenon. The ‘Voices of 
the Poor’ study undertaken by the World Bank found that assets were particularly 
important for the poor’s own understanding of their poverty and desired wealth 
(reported in Meinzen-Dick et al.  2011). Wanjala and Muradian similarly 
 conclude, based on a study of the Millenium Village Project in Kenya that ‘accu-
mulation of productive assets—and particularly land—is fundamental for poor 
households to increase their income and escape poverty’ (2013: 157). Andrew 
Shepherd observes that the ‘[k]ey to success in agriculture is accumulating 
assets—land, oxen, and ploughs’ (Mashindano et al.  2013: viii). Barrett and 
Carter’s work on poverty traps examines the possibility that some families may 
be  trapped in poverty because they cannot accumulate assets (Carter and 
Barrett 2006).
Conversely sale of assets can also be important signs of stress and im mis er-
ation. Assets, particularly productive assets, are usually the things which poorer 
people experiencing immiseration hold onto for the longest (De Waal  1989). 
Better to go hungry than sell the cow that could sustain you when the rains return 
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(Behnke and Scoones 1993). The sale of (important) productive assets therefore is 
a good indicator that things have got bad, and are about to get worse.
One of the reasons why assets feature so prominently in rural definitions of 
prosperity is that, especially in rural areas with few shops and poor banking ser-
vices, assets are a useful means of storing and saving wealth in agricultural 
so ci eties where income is lumpy and infrequent because it depends on harvests 
(Van der Ploeg 2014). Injections of cash will be targeted at acquiring assets rather 
than everyday consumption. This is captured by the following focus- group 
statement:
We get money seasonally. Some people . . . after the harvest they buy a TV, or 
solar panels, or all manner of things and they have a good life. But [later] 
although she’s got her television, if she . . . needs 50,000 shillings she’ll have to 
wait 5 months. In July if you want to borrow a million shillings she will give it, 
but go to them in November and ask to borrow 200,000 . . . and they will tell you 
I have nothing, I have bought a TV, I’ve bought a plot, I’ve bought bricks. Focus 
Group Kilwa 22 February 2017 (50,000 shillings is about $20)
The statement reflects a key aspect of rural life. When people are experiencing a 
rise in their fortunes they will often invest in assets and capabilities rather than 
day- to- day expenditure (Scott 2010). If fortunes improve, you do not necessarily 
start enjoying meat meals or a bottled soda every day. Rather you might invest in 
education, sewing machines, livestock, a better home, and so on. Assets provide 
for the long- term future of households. That is why owning assets is a good indi-
cation of long- term prospects, and selling assets a sign of impending problems 
(cf. De Waal 1989). They make families more resilient to shocks and problems, and 
better able to prosper from good fortune.
The salience of assets in local meanings of wealth and poverty is underlined by 
the centrality of assets in understanding longitudinal poverty dynamics (Carter 
and Barrett  2006, Dercon et al.  2012, Naschold  2012). Barrett and colleagues 
observe that meagre asset bases yielding poor income streams result in behaviour 
that reinforces poverty (see also Barrett and Swallow  2006, Barrett and 
Carter 2013, Barrett et al. 2016). Growth which is accompanied by loss of assets, 
inability to use them well, or a failure to acquire new assets (such as education) 
among the poor will not be inclusive (McKay and Lawson 2002, Naschold 2012).
A number of useful case studies underlines the importance of asset investment 
for poor people in poor countries. Adato and colleagues have shown that poor 
asset bases and weak social capital limit economic mobility for the South African 
poor (Adato et al. 2006, Adato et al. 2007). Changing assets can be a more sensitive 
measure to increases in wealth than, for example, changes to diet. Liverpool- Tasie 
and Winter- Nelson found from panel data in Ethiopia that asset- based measures 
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of wealth were much better at predicting future expenditure and asset portfolios 
than expenditure- based measures of wealth (Liverpool- Tasie and Winter-
Nelson 2011). Carter and Lybbert (2012), exploring panel data from Burkina Faso 
in the mid- 1980s, found two different responses to weather shocks with respect to 
assets that neatly captures the significance and role of assets in poverty dynamics. 
They observed that households who were poor with respect to their productive 
assets (herd sizes of less than 15.5 Tropical Livestock Units—TLU) conserved 
their assets, and experienced declines in every- day consumption due to weather 
shocks. Conversely those who were productive asset rich (more than 24.1 TLU) 
were able to offset consumption declines with herd sales, and readily did so. 
Nguyen and colleagues observe similar behaviour in rural households in Vietnam 
(Nguyen et al. 2019). Productive assets therefore are a crucial means of becoming 
wealthy in rural areas in poor countries and rural people save in order to invest 
in them.
We should also note that this manner of local asset accumulation is also con-
sistent with primitive accumulation by capital, as defined by Shivji: ‘a process of 
surplus extraction by capital based on expropriation of a part of necessary consump-
tion of the producer’ (Shivji 2017: 11, italics in the original). They are consistent 
because it is possible both for peasants to yield surplus to capitalists, and to save 
for assets. But this fact means that, contra Shivji, these processes are not charac-
terized only by peasants’ immiseration. It is still possible, slowly, and with diffi-
culty, for poor rural families to acquire forms of wealth which are meaningful to 
them. Himanshu and colleagues observed in Palanpur, an Indian village that has 
been studied for sixty years, that one of the most marked changes, even in a popu-
la tion characterized by considerable poverty, was investment in assets and 
 people’s houses (Himanshu et al. 2018).11 As Lord Stern, one of Himanshu’s co- 
authors, put it at a book launch, it is remarkable how the poorest people are still 
able to save and invest. Measures of poverty which only capture weekly ex pend-
iture cannot capture changes in assets. This is why we insist that we need a richer 
understanding of the nature of peasant poverty that includes assets, better to 
understand its dynamics.
The importance of assets does not mean that families who are, by dint of 
repeated denial, able to accumulate assets are actually well- off and just ‘look’ poor 
according to consumption data. As we will show below, and as should be plain 
anyway, having to scrimp and save to acquire or conserve assets is an aspect of 
poverty. When Chayanov observed that the best adapted peasant farmer ‘knows 
how to starve’ (1991 (1927): 40), then that farmer’s condition is characterized by 
her occasional starvation as much as her adaptation. So, while assets matter a 
great deal for understandings of rural poverty, they can be problematic if 
11 Half of the population of Palanpur was at or below the international poverty line in 2008/9 while 
this wealth was being accrued.
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understanding of prosperity is reduced only to assets. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, this is a risk when using assets to derive asset indices.
Finally interest in assets and debates about African poverty has risen following 
Alwyn Young’s controversial paper which argued that trends in assets available 
from DHS data indicated that Africa was experiencing a ‘growth miracle’ (cf. Sahn 
and Stifel 2000, Young 2012). These findings have been disputed. Harttgen and 
colleagues argue that the countries which drive this pattern have experienced 
more than normally high economic growth, and that there are problems with 
building in depreciation costs (Harttgen et al. 2013). But this criticism still makes 
it possible for individual countries to have experienced a growth miracle, if not 
the continent as a whole. And if economists find it hard to capture depreciation, 
that should not detract from the continued use- value Africans enjoy from 
their assets.
More fundamentally, Johnston and Abreu (2016) have argued that it is not 
always safe to assume that wealth (or well- being) is correlated with assets (and see 
Chapter 3 p. 46 for more discussion on this topic). Asset ownership may reflect 
cultural preferences rather than wealth per se. It can also contain elements of 
social signalling, or marking distinction or aspiration, for example where teachers 
should have a certain type of house or clothes. Beegle and colleagues similarly 
find that asset indices are difficult to use in international comparisons and are not 
good proxies for monetary poverty (Beegle et al. 2016).
There are dangers, therefore, in inferring too much from asset data alone. 
Accordingly, in this book we do not use assets as proxies for other forms of 
wealth. Rather we use definitions of wealth and poverty that hinge on how these 
assets are combined by different socially recognized wealth classes. As we show in 
this book, for specific communities across Tanzania, assets matter in terms of 
their own definitions of what it means to be rich and poor. We have shown in this 
chapter, work on peasant poverty has omitted, inadvertently, attention to these 
assets by virtue of the measures it used. We therefore will explore what can be 
learned from assets in Tanzania contexts.
Conclusion
We have argued in this chapter that assets matter a great deal to rural Tanzanians. 
We have shown that assets are not adequately counted by traditional measures of 
poverty built on counting consumption. Indeed assets are systematically excluded 
from these measures. We have also shown why, from a variety of studies, this will 
be a problem and will not help us to understand poverty dynamics in Tanzania.
But we need now to take a less theoretical approach. Assets matter to rural 
Tanzanians—but which assets, and what are the patterns in the assets that Tanzanians 
count in different parts of the country? That is the task of the next chapter.
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The Multiple Meanings of Prosperity 
and Poverty in Tanzania
Olivia Howland, Christine Noe, and Dan Brockington
Introduction
We saw in the last chapter that the consequences of economic growth in Tanzania 
are contested. Mainstream researchers celebrate the consequences of economic 
growth. More radical critics fear that these are built on displacement and 
marginalization.
Yet despite these substantial differences, the two camps, and indeed all ob ser­
vers of social and economic change hold one important view in common. They 
believe there is a shared story to be told. They look for common experiences arising 
from contemporary dynamics that affect many groups of people. Such accounts, 
be they of the benefits of economic growth (Young 2012, Jayne et al. 2018), or of 
the sacrifices that growth has entailed because of land loss (Shivji 2017, Bergius 
et al. 2018), have to be based on generalizable measures that capture locally valued 
meanings of wealth, poverty, dignity, and well­ being.
Given the focus in this collection on assets, one of the most obvious means of 
telling a common story would be to use the widespread technique of constructing 
asset indices to examine patterns in wealth and poverty. However this presents a 
problem for our project. Ours is a granular study: we have proceeded village by vil­
lage. And we have also grounded our perceptions of change that matters in villagers’ 
perceptions of what poverty means and what prosperity entails. But asset indices are 
not built on these principles. As we shall see they entail two essential assumptions: 
first, that they can be compiled at a national scale (they are constructed for large 
national­ scale samples), and second that asset ownership correlates with ‘wealth’.
Too often, however, asset indices are used without a good empirical under­
standing of how the value and meaning of assets actually vary across space. 
Specifically, few studies have tried to explore how local meanings and definitions 
of wealth can vary within particular countries. This is explicitly recognized in the 
literature and there are recently published calls to examine how the meaning of 
wealth and poverty can vary at the national scale (Johnston and Abreu  2016). 
This chapter addresses that call.
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To explore this we present findings of a series of focus groups that we con­
ducted as part of the restudies in 2016–17 from seventeen villages in Tanzania. 
We focus on the spatial variation in importance of different assets in the present 
day. As we have seen in the previous chapter these attributes are also noticeable 
for their absence in official statistics monitoring change in wealth in the country, 
and debates about persistent peasant poverty.
We argue it is possible to discern a cluster of attributes that broadly signify 
wealth across many parts of Tanzania. However a definitive list would be hard to 
construct because precisely how much, and what forms of, wealth any given vari­
able signifies changes from place to place. It is also clear that, although assets are 
frequently used to construct asset indices, many aspects of life that do matter 
locally are not tracked by current asset indices because they do not include the 
right assets.
A Brief Introduction to Asset Indices
Given that the previous chapter showed that assets are omitted by poverty­ line 
data, then the obvious tool to use to compensate for this gap should be asset indi­
ces. Asset indices impute differences in household wealth from the different bun­
dles of assets they own. The bundles are weighted according to principal 
component analyses (or factor or multiple correspondence analysis), which looks 
for structures and patterns in the asset ownership data.
Asset indices can be used to group populations (quintiles, quartiles, etc.) and 
make comparisons between these groups. Asset indices are also used to check the 
accuracy of new proxies of poverty, such as mobile phone records (Blumenstock 
et al. 2015), or remotely sensed images (Jean et al. 2016, Watmough et al. 2019). 
Thus one set of proxies of wealth (social media data, built infrastructure visible 
from space) is used to verify another (asset indices).
Asset indices are valued for their speed and ease of construction (Filmer and 
Pritchett 2001, for reviews see Howe et al. 2009, Howe et al. 2012). The advantage 
of such indices is that their data are easily collected, for few variables are required. 
Indeed recent attempts try to do so using as few variables as possible. For example 
Chakraborty et al. (2016: 152) developed simplified asset indices which could use 
as few as six questions (Table 3.1). Blumenstok and colleagues (2015) found that 
an asset index comprising just six assets (ownership of a fridge, bicycle, television, 
motorbike/scooter, radio, and electricity in the house) could be used to test meas­
ures of wealth in Rwanda based on mobile phone data.
The assets owned in such short lists are affected by broader infrastructural pro­
vision (such as the availability of electricity), which leads to the well­ recognized 
urban bias of asset indices. They can differentiate urban populations from rural 
populations (as the six assets Blumenstok used would suggest) but not necessarily 
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indicate the wealth of rural families, who may prioritize different asset bundles, 
based on land, livestock, and agricultural technology (Howe et al. 2012).
Asset indices can identify patterns that are statistically meaningful. But 
whether these correspond to locally recognized wealth is a different issue. 
Underpinning these lists is the assumption that ownership of those assets pro­
vides locally meaningful and sensitive markers of differences in wealth.
Johnston and Abreu (2016) observe that the relationship between an asset 
index and wealth is a key assumption of the makers of the index. It is not an 
empirical observation. Researchers assume that the feature that allows families to 
accumulate assets is wealth, and that asset bundles co­ vary with wealth. But, they 
point out, this is not always the case. Other dimensions of culturally determined 
choice that prevent the purchase of some goods, and hasten the purchase of others, 
will shape asset ownership irrespective of wealth. Moreover the core assump­
tion of asset indices—that assets correlate with wealth—is more likely to be vio­
lated if indices are used to cover large geo graph ic al areas and long periods of 
time. This is because differences in infrastructure provision (determining the 
Table 3.1 Simplified and minimized asset indices
Bangladesh Benin Tanzania






What is the main material 
used in your house walls?
What is the main material 
used for your house floor?
Does any member of this 
household have a bank 
account?
Does your household have:
–electricity;
–a television;
–a VCD or DVD player?
What is the main material 
used in your house walls?
What is the main fuel you 
use for cooking?
What type of toilet do 
members of your 
household use?




What is the main material of 
the floor of your dwelling?
What is the main material of 
the exterior walls of your 
dwelling?
What is the main material of 
the roof of your dwelling?
What type of fuel does your 
household mainly use for 
cooking?
What is the main source of 
energy for lighting in the 
household?
Does any member of this 
household have a bank 
account?
Source: (Chakraborty et al. 2016: 152) and http://www.equitytool.org/tanzania/ accessed 16th 
February 2018.
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availability of electric goods and cost of building materials), and local values and 
cultural priorities, are more likely to become important at these larger scales.
Johnston and Abreu then make three recommendations that need to be 
addressed before assets can be reliably used over larger scales. These are:
(1) indices should be constructed and compared over limited geographic scales 
and time periods; (2) the choice of assets should be based on an understanding 
of what it means to be wealthy or poor in a particular place; and (3) that the 
choice of assets in an index should reflect the kind of well­ being to be measured.
(ibid.: 417–18)
This chapter considers the first two of the recommendations made by Johnston 
and Abreu. We explore what assets mean to different definitions of wealth and 
poverty, and how local understandings of poverty and wealth vary geographically. 
We want to understand whether national comparisons are possible or simply 
ruled out by the difference we find. We also explore the meaningfulness of using 
the abbreviated asset indices that have been suggested by other observers.
These questions could have considerable consequences for debates about the 
distribution of benefits of economic growth with which we began. If we find that, 
broadly, the same assets matter across the country, then it will be possible to use 
asset indices to explore poverty dynamics nationwide. Likewise if we find that the 
assets used in abbreviated asset indices are also locally meaningful, then these 
abbreviated indices will provide robust means of tracking change. But if the mean­
ing and value placed in assets vary across the country then these methods are 
flawed. It may be possible to derive statistically robust relationships within asset 
indices, but they will not tell us much about locally important change. They will 
not provide a good lens for understanding wealth and poverty or changes to them.
Methods
The data presented here derive from a sub­ sample of seventeen villages that we 
surveyed from seven regions from a variety of parts of the country, with data col­
lected in 2016 and 2017 (Table 3.2). The data we use cover contemporary local 
definitions of wealth and poverty; we have not tried to compare how definitions 
have changed over time across our different study sites. As we have seen earlier, 
our methods bind us to sites which have been previously visited. We cannot 
set out systematically to sample different parts of the country. However, we are 
fortunate that the sites we have reached do provide us with good coverage which 
captures different parts of rural Tanzania, with different social, economic, and 
physical geographies.
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There are some aspects of diversity across Tanzania that we have been able to 
capture. There is environmental difference. We have mountainous regions 
characterized by limited land availability, good rainfall and good soils (Arusha, 
Mbeya), and mountainous sites also well watered and crowded, where soils are 
poorer (Morogoro). We also have flatter regions, which are less well watered and 
with a mixture of poor soils (Iringa, Shinyanga) and good soils (Rukwa). Across 
these environmental gradients we cover also a variety of ethnic groups from 
matri lin eal Luguru societies in Morogoro to strongly patriarchal societies of the 
Meru people in Arusha and Sukuma­ Nyamwezi in Shinyanga, to Fipa societies 
not marked by strong gender differences in Rukwa.1
Across this social and environmental diversity there are also very different his­
tories of development. Our sites in Morogoro, Arusha, and Iringa are close to 
major towns and well­ maintained roads. These are also sites which have benefit­
ted from historical investment either from the state (when the Southern 
Highlands were the breadbasket of the country) or from farmers’ associations 
(when Meru coffee farmers were making substantial investment in farms and 
crops). In contrast sites in Rukwa, Dodoma, and Shinyanga have only recently 
(within the last ten years) enjoyed improved infrastructure and still remain dis­
tant from larger towns and markets. Historically they have suffered from lack of 
investment, poverty, and emigration.
These differences are considerable but there are still others we missed. Our 
study sites were only rural. Our method (revisiting families surveyed long ago) 
did not bring up any urban surveys.2 We have missed (because few researchers 
went there) significant geographical regions such as the south­ east and west of 
Tanzania.
1 We did not collect data on ethnicity as part of our surveys, and do not know what ethnic groups 
our focus groups represented. The point we are making is that there are a variety of cultures and values 
which can be found across the regions in which our work has been conducted.
2 Our method, revisiting the same families, is unlikely to work well in areas of high mobility.
Table 3.2 The study sites covered in this paper
Region District Village count
Arusha Meru 2
Dodoma Chemba 2
Iringa Iringa Rural 2
  Kilolo 3
Mbeya Mbeya Rural 2
Morogoro Mvomero 4
Rukwa Sumbawanga Rural 1
Shinyanga Kishapu 1
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Another notable omission is the general lack of pastoralist groups and fisher­ 
people. These groups are often marginalized in Tanzania. Their lives and liveli­
hoods are considered unruly by a Tanzanian state long bent on their 
‘modernization’ (Homewood  2008, Benjaminsen and Bryceson  2012). Their 
absence from this work limits our conclusions in some respects, and creates 
important tasks for any follow­ up. However that absence also strengthens our 
findings. Working with different agriculturalist groups should make it more likely 
to find constant notions of wealth and poverty across the different sites. The dif­
ferences we report therefore become more compelling.
Focus groups were organized by village representatives and consisted of 
between six and fifteen participants. Men’s and women’s focus groups were con­
ducted separately. Most groups involved much lively debate and discussion. They 
were conducted in Swahili and led mostly by Olivia Howland and the project 
assistant, Cathbert Mwanyika, as well as some lead by Dan Brockington and our 
research partners.
The focus groups considered generally open­ ended questions about what 
wealth and poverty mean and what were the characteristics of poor and wealthy 
people. We did not have an exhaustive list of variables that we wanted people to 
cover or mention; rather we let the groups define things for themselves. This 
method produces a list of the salient properties of wealth for each focus group—
the things that they think matter. It does not produce a definitive list of all the 
characteristics of wealth and poverty. Thus if one group mentions something 
(such as owning a motorbike), and another fails to, this does not mean that 
motorbike ownership is not an attribute of wealth for the second group. A differ­
ent set of techniques would be required to determine that. Our purpose was to 
see what, unprompted, wealth meant locally.
We took a mixture of transcripts or notes according to the preferences of the 
groups. These transcripts were analysed to bring out the commonalities and dif­
ferences that we describe below using Nvivo software. When examining the signi­
fiers of wealth and poverty we have examined how people talked about wealth 
and poverty generally, and then examined what characteristics stand out as char­
acteristics for poor and wealthy groups. We have analysed these for similarities 
and differences across study sites.
In the results we summarize the main themes which emerge and illustrate with 
the apposite phrases and remarks taken from focus groups in boxes associated 
with each theme. We have not listed everything that every focus group said in the 
boxes. Rather we have chosen the most apposite phrases to illustrate what is 
meant by particular concepts. Separate lines denote separate focus groups and the 
origins of phrases from women’s groups and men’s groups is given by ‘(W)’ and 
‘(M)’ respectively after each statement. We have grouped findings across men and 
women because we found that they were broadly similar, except that women 
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tended to provide more detail as to the nature of good assets (especially houses) 
than men.
Variations in Wealth and Poverty across and within Study Sites
The general pattern across these studies is that there are broad areas of agreement 
as to what wealth constitutes. The Swahili term that we used in our discussions 
was ‘uwezo’, which literally translates as ‘ability’ or ‘means’. It refers to the where­
withal to get things done, to cope with the misfortunes and happenstance that can 
happen at any moment while also being able to plan ahead far enough for the 
various projects they are engaged in to succeed.
One group went into considerable detail on the meaning of uwezo, touching 
upon many common themes:
Uwezo is the ability to work, to have strength in your body to farm your land, 
and to have good health. It is the ability to do whatever you need to do, and to be 
able to farm without problems or issues. It could be someone who also runs a 
business without problems. It is being able to use your brain to solve issues. 
Someone who has a car has more uwezo, but this is a different type of uwezo. 
This is uwezo of money. But the other meaning is uwezo in your body. Uwezo to 
do your work well. It is about strength.
Good seeds, modern fertilizer and chemicals—these inputs are an indicator 
of uwezo, so if you have no uwezo you cannot use them. Cash crops and market 
access are also factors in uwezo. A man with uwezo will be a quick thinker. He 
does not have to be really educated but educated enough for his own job. Cars, 
shops, businesses, several houses, maybe he himself has not studied more than 
primary school but he invests in things which bring returns on money. Things 
that bring in more money all the time. A house built with bricks and a metal 
roof is an indicator of uwezo. Schooling is more important than housing though. 
They might have left improving their home until all the children have been edu­
cated. Uwezo is about prioritizing what matters.
Uwezo is someone with good health but also if they get sick, they can afford 
to go to hospital, or they think to go to hospital. If you have no children then 
you have no uwezo, but if you have many children then this is not uwezo—how­
ever, if you can send them all to school and afford their healthcare, then you 
have uwezo. It is about supporting your family. (Morogoro men’s focus group)
From this and other groups it was plain that typically a wealthy family in rural 
Tanzania enjoys a number of similar attributes (shown in Box 3.1). However, as 
we shall see, there are also important differences in the way that the elements of 
wealth are described, quantified, and assembled from place to place. A wealthy 
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family in one place may not have been considered wealthy in all respects else­
where. In addition the list also differs in important ways from some of the exist­
ing literature. Poverty obviously entails not having these characteristics. But 
participants also mentioned a number of other aspects, that did not feature so 
frequently in definitions of wealth, as shown at the bottom of Box 3.1. We will 
discuss these in detail, and then consider their broader implications.
Housing
One of the most salient and common features of wealth and poverty was the 
quality of the home (Box  3.2). A good home had a metal roof (pitched) with 
cement or burned bricks, cement rendering, a cement or even tiled floor, and had 
good windows and doors. These were the most common features. Also men­
tioned was the fact that the best homes even had water and electricity (with solar 
power increasingly common), or South African roofing material. Some groups 
also stipu lated that houses would be large with enough rooms to sleep in and a 
living room.
Conversely the houses of poor people were in poor condition, with grass or leaf 
roofs, or old, tired metal sheets and without solar power. The walls would be 
Box 3.1 General characteristics of wealth and poverty
Wealth
Good quality houses
Ability to hire in labour
Good access to farmland
Use of modern inputs which increase agricultural productivity
Control over businesses and undertaking business­ orientated farming
Livestock ownership
Educated children
Being a source of support and loans
Ability to pay for medical needs (to remain mentally and physically healthy)
Poverty
Having to work for other people to secure basic needs
Not being able to use land productively
Dependence on others
Inadequate food
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Box 3.2 Rich peoples’ houses
Arusha:
Housing—self­ contained (toilet, kitchen, water), sofa, South African roofing 
materials, tiles, grills and glass, television, electricity. (W)
Dodoma:
They live in a big house with eight rooms or more. The house has an iron sheet 
roof and has tiles inside. (M)
Iringa:
Their homes are built with burned bricks, iron sheet roof, glass in the win­
dows, and modern inside toilets. (M)
They live in a modern house with electricity and water, a modern toilet, a 
pitched metal roof and burned bricks. (W)
Mbeya:
Wealth is someone with a modern house, burned bricks, plastered floor, and a 
metal roof. Someone with a proper toilet and a house maybe with more than 
four big rooms. They would have a sitting room, modern toilet with a brick 
lined hole and a cement floor, a sink. (W)
Morogoro:
Has a good house: baked bricks, inside toilet, nice doors, electricity or solar 
panels. (M)
Rukwa:
Has a good house with a tiled floor and electricity (solar). Has water inside the 
house. (W)
Shinyanga:
They build their houses with bricks and roofing with iron sheets. (W)
made of wattle and daub, or if using bricks then they would be merely sun­ dried, 
not burned, and the walls would not be plastered. The houses would be small, 
with inadequate rooms, and would be vulnerable to the weather, letting the rain 
in, or being damaged during storms. The very poorest were those who had no 
home of their own but rented rooms in other peoples’ houses.
We should note here that renting is common among immigrants but that dif­
ferent sorts of village immigrants will have different sorts of social and economic 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 17/06/21, SPi
The Multiple Meanings of Prosperity in Tanzania 53
status from that of other villagers. For example, social workers (teachers, nurses, 
extension officers) rent houses but are often respected for their profession, the 
services they offer, and the salaries that they earn. Migrant agricultural labourers 
will rent the meanest houses and barest rooms.
Labour
The rich were defined as those who could pay other people to work for them 
(Box  3.3). This was partly because this indicated that such families had both 
the  means and liquidity to hire labour (often in cash­ poor times of the year, 
before harvests). But this also denoted wealth because of the lifestyle that went 
with, being, effectively, a farm manager (or a ‘veranda farmer’), rather than a 
farm worker.
Conversely the poor were those who had to work for other people for daily 
needs, and often at a cost to their own longer­ term needs (Box 3.4). It is im port­
ant to note that it is not the condition of working for others per se which 
denotes poverty. When villagers drew up wealth groups for their villages there 
Box 3.3 ‘Veranda’ farmers pay others to farm for them
Dodoma:
They do not do day labouring themselves. They employ day labourers on their 
farm. (M)
They are veranda farmers—they can sit on the veranda and instruct other 
 people to do the work. They might also have livestock but they are herding not 
themselves. (W)
Iringa:
They are using day labourers on the farm. (M)
Mbeya:
They plough with hired labour and cows, use chemicals and hired labour to 
spray crops. They are not doing any of this themselves. (W)
Morogoro:
Hires labour not only for farming but also to help in other jobs. Does not farm 
him/herself. (M)
Rukwa:
Pays for hired labour work to do his/her weeding. (M)
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was often a group (or groups) in the middle who were less able to hire in labour, 
and who might, in order to build up capital or invest in assets, perform labour 
for other people. Rather it is why people work for others that matters. Having to 
work for others for daily food or soap was a sign of poverty. But working to 
raise capital to invest in your own projects was not; it just meant not being 
wealthy already.
Land
Land was frequently mentioned as a condition of wealth, although the quantity 
varied. In some villages it would be 100 acres, in others twelve. But in mountain­
ous crowded areas smaller farm sizes (3–7 acres) denoted wealth. Importantly 
Box 3.4 Poor people have to work for other people for their 
basic needs
Dodoma:
Poor people have to do day labouring as there is no other way to get 
money. (W)
Iringa:
Most of their time they have to spend doing day labour for others. They must 
work for others to get money for food, or are paid in food. (M)
They cannot cultivate their farm. They must work for others, but then they 
cannot farm their own land because there is not enough time. (W)
Mbeya:
The poor have to do daily labour work to buy soap. This is only surviving, 
doing daily labour work and renting out their own farm because they need the 
money and cannot farm it themselves. (M)
Morogoro:
They do not have enough food to last them in a year so they work to the rich 
people as labour so as to get food. (M)
Rukwa:
The poorest people do lots of casual work. (M)
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this need not be owned land, but rather land that wealthy people could access 
through rental or sharecropping arrangements.
Poverty, on the other hand was not necessarily marked by landlessness. The 
poorest groups identified could have neither land nor a home, or they could 
have particularly small plots (less than 1 acre in crowded villages). However a 
far more common feature of poverty than landlessness was the inability of poor 
families to make their land productive (Box 3.5). This was because they did not 
have the cap ital to purchase the inputs required (pesticide, fertilizer, ploughing 
services), access to high­ value marketable varieties, or were unable to choose 
the planting time (for want of access to their own ploughs). It was particularly 
apparent in places where poor soil fertility made extra inputs essential for 
decent returns. Another common reason that made farms unproductive was 
that they had to invest their labour into other people’s farms rather than on 
their own projects. Sometimes poor families’ farms could be quite large (up to 
10 acres), but they just could not be worked or managed properly. Alternatively 
the lands had to be hired out to other people to bring in money for daily needs, 
as farms without inputs are worth little.
Box 3.5 Poor people’s insufficiently used land
Dodoma:
They are renting out their land to others because they cannot use it all. (M)
They have a small farm but are unable to farm it properly because they have to 
keep going to look for work, for money, for food for the family, and this means 
there is no time for farming their own land. (W)
Iringa:
They have 3 to 10 acres of land but their farms are poorly managed. They don’t 
use fertilizers and other agrochemicals because they can’t afford to buy them and 
so they plant without tilling the land. They rent their farms to other people. (M)
Mbeya:
Everyone has a farm but some cannot afford any inputs so they harvest very 
little. (W)
Morogoro:
They have farms but they unable to cultivate and so they rent their farms to 
other people. (M)
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Inputs
If land without inputs made people poor, then being able to use inputs on land 
was a clear sign of wealth (Box 3.6). This came up frequently. In part it referred to 
land preparation and was signified by owning tractors (the most wealthy) but 
more frequently being able to access ploughing services, renting in tractors, and 
owning or renting oxen. Poverty in contrast was marked by having to prepare 
fields for planting using hand hoes. In part it referred to what was put on the 
fields—it meant being able to use the modern seed varieties which could be high 
yielding, and the corresponding chemicals required (fertilizer, pesticide).
Box 3.6 Wealthy people’s agricultural inputs
Dodoma:
Wealthy people are able to use inputs: buying improved seeds, fertilizer, 
 pesticides. (W)
Iringa:
They are able to grow any type of crop that they want because they have 
enough capital to run their farming projects. (M)
Using manure as well as chemical fertilizer. They can farm 10 acres of  tomatoes 
and all types of inputs that they might need. They use a tractor (either their 
own, or they rent) or they use oxen to plough. (W)
Mbeya:
The difference is not the crops but how much land they have combined with 
how well they can farm it. They plough with hired labour and cows, use chemicals 
and hired labour to spray crops. (W)
The wealthy are able to buy inputs of all types, at the time they need them. 
They invest in things. The biggest thing making people poor is lack of inputs, 
and so those who can afford them have more wealth. (M)
Morogoro:
The wealthy have at least 5–8 acres of farming and uses tractors for land 
preparation. They use chemical fertilizer and other agrochemicals. (M)
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Businesses
Wealthy people however were not just industrious farmers, they were multi­ 
tasking entrepreneurs who were able to generate funds from diverse sources 
(Box 3.7). Their farming was commercial, which meant growing cash crops and 
selling them far afield. If they had the resources they could even invest in vehicles 
which would allow them to sell directly in towns and bypass the middlemen, thus 
improving their farm gate returns. But in addition to the cash crops wealthy 
 people were frequently said to have other business interests. Shops were 
Box 3.7 Rich people’s ventures
Arusha:
A wealthy man should have more than three projects e.g. shops, chickens, 
farm. (M)
Dodoma:
They own a milling machine; they have shops; they have a business selling 
crops. They send their harvests to Arusha, Moshi, and Dodoma to market. 
These are the higher value crops. (W)
Iringa:
They own small businesses, like small grocery shops. Often they have more 
than one house, because they are renting houses out to other people. (W)
Mbeya:
Someone who has a small business has wealth: selling clothes, rice, cooking 
oil, sodas, and vouchers. They have their own shops. (W)
Someone with a milling machine and/or a shop. If someone has a house in the 
centre of the village, they can rent it out. (M)
Morogoro:
A rich person has one or more motorbikes, some also rented out to young 
men to drive. (M)
Shinyanga:
Renting out houses means wealth because each time the owner receives 
money. (W)
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mentioned in many places, or milling machines, and owning houses to rent to 
others also mattered.
Livestock
Owning cattle, goats, sheep, pigs, and chickens was often considered an attribute 
of wealth. But the number of livestock required to make people wealthy varied 
considerably from place to place (from less than ten to one thousand or more, see 
Box  3.8). It was also recognized that livestock ownership could correlate in 
 different ways with wealth. In some cases it might be the form of wealth and was 
not used to purchase other forms. In other instances it provided liquidity. Being 
poor meant not having cattle, or sometimes neither cattle or smallstock and just 
Box 3.8 Variations in livestock and wealth
Arusha:
Three or four cows regularly milking, each producing around 10 litres per day. 
Goats for milking each producing around five litres a day. Local variety chick­
ens selling eggs getting around 20 eggs a day. (M)
Dodoma:
More than 50 cattle means somebody is wealthy but they still might have a 
poor house and might not eat three times a day. Some people might have no 
cows but a modern house. More than 50 acres is more important than cows 
because cows can get lost in the bush . . . . You might own a lot of cattle but not 
know how best to use them. Therefore it does not matter how many cattle you 
own, more how you care for them and their uses. Somebody might not have a 
good place to sleep, but he looks after his cows well. It depends on each per­
son. For some the house is important, for others livestock is important. (M)
Iringa:
They have cows starting from 300 and more, 100 to 200 goats, 100 pigs, and 50 
chickens for eggs. (W)
Mbeya:
Someone with cows also is a sign of wealth: 4 pigs, more than 15 chickens kept 
inside, goats, guard dogs, 2 zero­ grazing cows. (W)
Continued
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having a few chickens. In some cases it could also mean having unproductive 
 livestock (cattle without milk or chickens without eggs for sale and exchange for 
other goods).
Residents of more mountainous villages seem to have fewer cattle since there is 
not the space or grazing for them, and saw smaller livestock, such as sheep, goats, 
or fowl, as important. In places where geographical constraints make ownership 
of larger livestock difficult, it is not the number of livestock which are important, 
but the variety, and whether they are improved stock or not, as we see in the 
mountainous Meru villages, or the higher altitude Morogoro villages in the study.
Supporting Others and Being Supported
One of the most marked and frequently mentioned aspects of poverty was not 
being able to support oneself and being reliant on others (Box 3.9). Deeper pov­
erty was experienced when people did not have the normal networks (children 
and relatives) needed to support them when they got old and sick. Alternatively 
poverty could also be marked by not being wealthy enough or reliable enough to 
be loaned to. Poor families would need to borrow money, for example to invest in 
their farms at particular times of the year or to meet health or educational 
expenses, but their reputation or circumstances made them too risky a prospect 
for local money lenders. In contrast wealth was marked by the ability to give loans 
and provide support. This is both a mark of esteem (helping others) and also a 
business venture (money lending at high local interest rates).
Education
The wealthy educated their children and educated them well, to higher levels 
(university) and in good institutions (private schools). The poor could only man­
age primary school, if that (Box 3.10). At the time of the research education in 
Morogoro:
They have more than 1000 cows. (W)
Rukwa:
60 cows as well as goats and some pigs. (M)
Shinyanga:
Cows means wealth because people with cows are not much affected with 
hunger as they just sell their cows and get money to buy food. (W)
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Box 3.9 Support and dependence
Wealthy people support and lend to others
Dodoma:
You can ask wealthy people for loans for small businesses. In return, you give 
them a small percentage of your business, and repay your loan. (M)
Iringa:
Someone who has ability is somebody who can help others. (M)
Shinyanga:
Wealthier persons are also lending money to others to help them solve their 
problems such as buying food. However, the interest rate is high as it is 100 per 
cent per year. . . . So wealthy men give loans with interests, poor people cannot 
access this money. (W)
Being rich means for the men that they are approached to give loans and 
requests to help others. (M)
Poor people have to ask for support
Dodoma:
The people right at the bottom cannot farm, can barely eat, and rely on  others 
to feed them. (M)
Children might have to sleep elsewhere with neighbours or extended 
family. (W)
Those in the lowest group depend on others because they are disabled or old 
or completely unable to work. They live in someone else’s house and cannot 
look after themselves. (W)
Iringa:
If they have health problems they have to ask neighbours to help. (W)
Morogoro:
They depend on getting assistance from their relatives, neighbours and 
TASAF. (W)
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Box 3.10 Contrasting educational experiences
Wealthy Families
Arusha:
Children go to international schools and reach the university. (W)
Dodoma:
They send their children to private schools, and up to university. (W)
Iringa:
Their children go to school here in the village for primary school, but by the 
time they go to secondary school they are sent to private school or the 
expensive school. (W)
Mbeya:
They send all their children to school if they are wealthy. It doesn’t matter if 




Children are not able to go to school, they have no clothes for school, there is 
no food at home. (W)
Iringa:
Their children are only able to attend primary school. (M)
Mbeya:
They might be able to educate their kids up to form 4 but mostly only finish 
primary school. (W)
Rukwa:
Children only go to primary school not secondary school—although free sec­
ondary schooling now makes that easier. (M)
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secondary school was free in terms of school fees up to form four. However there 
were other costs (uniform, text books, and lost family labour) which meant that 
going to school beyond primary was difficult for poor families. Education is a 
relatively new aspect of wealth in that many groups pointed out that wealthy 
 people were often themselves unschooled.
Food, Possessions, and Clothes
Finally wealth and poverty was also about day­ to­ day conditions—about having 
enough to eat (three meals a day for the rich), and not enough to last the year, or 
to have more than one or two meals per day for the poor. Being rich meant hav­
ing good clothes. It was also indicated in good transport arrangements, cars for 
the most wealthy, motorbikes for well­ off families (and especially in mountainous 
areas). Being poor meant simply not having much stuff at all—few possessions, 
nor furniture.
What Counts and What Does Not: Are Abbreviated  
Asset Indices Counting the Right Thing?
Expected aspects of poverty such as poor diet and lack of possessions are clearly 
present in the transcripts above. These in turn are likely to be driven by low levels 
of daily and weekly expenditure. Or in other words, they are the consequences of 
patterns in expenditure and consumption which are already captured in the 
Household Budget Surveys used to construct poverty lines. But, for most focus 
groups, these consumption indicators were but one aspect of wealth and poverty. 
Often they were not the most important thing which animated them. The more 
important aspects were land use, livestock, and farming activities. Food, clothing, 
and possessions were consequences of deeper causes of poverty (cf. Brockington 
et al. 2018, Östberg et al. 2018).
Similarly, income was rarely mentioned. Only in Meru—a peri­ urban area on 
the edge of Arusha, was monthly income (over 1 million shillings) stipulated as 
one of the conditions of wealth. In almost every other focus group it was simply 
not mentioned. The ability to access money to make farms productive, run busi­
nesses, pay for labour, and make loans mattered. But this was not thought of in 
terms of ‘income’.
Instead, prominent in these definitions from rural settings are the factors 
which make agriculture productive—land, labour, livestock, inputs as well as the 
liquidity to run businesses. Many of these attributes could be called assets, accord­
ing to the definition used by economists of:
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broadly . . . as the state/stock variables used to generate income, including future 
income against which one might borrow. This includes both public and private 
goods and encompasses financial, human, natural, and social capital.
(Barrett et al. 2016: 5).
But where assets are used in constructing abbreviated asset indices then they 
appear to be using the wrong assets from the perspective of rural Tanzanians. 
Televisions, irons, and fridges do not feature much in rural Tanzanian focus 
groups. The list of assets reported for abbreviated asset indices in Table 3.1 does 
not match well with the assets reported in our boxes. The fault lines in rural 
Tanzanian society are defined differently. Fuel or energy sources were also not 
mentioned. Both the latter depend on the availability of electricity and wood sup­
plies locally in the first instance. Their role in determining wealth or poverty is 
predetermined by geography and infrastructure.
This means that the abbreviated asset indices, while they might report patterns 
in particularly large samples, and especially when comparing urban to rural soci­
eties, simply do not mean much when applied to rural Tanzanian society. They do 
not monitor aspects of life which matter to many rural Tanzanians. They cannot 
give sensitive understandings of differences in wealth and poverty.




by men not women 
/ women not men
Things mentioned by most 
men and a few women / 
most women and a few men
Things mentioned in 
common by both men and 
women
Women Painted house; 
television; donkeys; 





access to a vet
Private health care; private 
education; solar electricity; 
water; enough food; children 
educated to university; 
ploughing with oxen; ability 
to work; selling milk; milling 
machine; ability to farm 
land; renting extra land; 
growing potatoes/tomatoes
A good house; electricity; 
metal roof; glass windows; 
modern toilet; burned­ 
brick walls; plastered walls; 
using paid labour; farm 
size; improved livestock 
varieties; ploughed fields; 
modern inputs in farms; 
commercial tree crops; 
external crop market; 
business owner; property 
investments; cows; sheep/
goats; fowl; pigs; car; 
tractor; motorbike; eat 
three times per day; 
educate children to form 
IV and above;  sofa set; 
social networks; salaried 
job; fewer children
Men Bank account; 
livestock well cared 
for; land well 
managed
We could not populate this 
cell with any attributes.
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Instead the assets which matter (subject to the caveats below) are house quality 
(particularly a combination of good attributes), livestock (although the quantity 
varies considerably), land worked (note not land owned), modern agricultural 
inputs, vehicles, and businesses. These assets matter because they are (in the 
main) productive, they yield income streams, or in the case of houses, substantial 
benefits to the well­ being of those who enjoy them.
There are also a series of attributes which are better described as forms of social 
capital rather than assets per se (cf. Bebbington 1999 and the discussion in the 
previous chapter). These include the ability to educate children, being respected, 
and being a source of loans and support. Similarly a prominent theme in the con­
dition of poverty was dependence on others.
This view of assets should come as little surprise to economists who have 
explored how assets can be the focus of investment strategies for poor people, 
who will save to accumulate them, and reduce consumption to avoid selling them 
(Carter and Barrett 2006, Scott 2010, Liverpool­ Tasie and Winter­Nelson 2011, 
Carter and Lybbert 2012,Barrett and Carter 2013). We explored this in the previ­
ous chapter. Asset ownership becomes one of the means by which we can distin­
guish between ‘shallow’ and ‘deep’ poverty (cf. Wuyts 2006). The latter refers to 
those in poverty, the former those who are vulnerable to it, should they lose 
their assets.
Nonetheless it is surprising how discussions about class formation and social 
distinction in writings about Tanzanian peasantry so rarely cover all these dimen­
sions of wealth and poverty. Land worked is a pre­ eminent concern and labour is 
similarly mentioned (Mueller 2011). But the other attributes that were so im port­
ant in our focus groups are not so frequently covered.
Variation in the Meaning of Assets and Their  
Implications for Asset Indices
We found some diversity in the meaning of assets within and between study sites. 
In particular men and women tended to talk about assets in different ways in that 
women were much more detailed and specific when discussing the assets that 
mattered, particularly with respect to homes, than were men (Table 3.3).
Across study sites some assets that people mentioned signified different things 
in different places. A metal roof, we were told in Mbeya, meant nothing these 
days as they were so common. A good house must be good in all its aspects if it is 
to signify wealth. Furthermore what levels of wealth are indicated by what sort of 
house will vary in different parts of the country as the price of basic inputs 
(cement, glass, and metal sheeting) vary. Tanzania is still characterized by weak 
infrastructural links and long retail chains (many middle men and women) which 
can substantially raise the costs of provisions. The cost of building materials is 
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much cheaper close to well­ connected urban areas. It costs more to build well in 
remote rural areas.
Livestock present obvious problems for measuring wealth. The availability of 
cattle in some parts of the country (such as the south­ east) has been historically 
restricted because of tsetse fly and other diseases. Pigs are rare in predominantly 
Muslim areas. But even where cattle are present and welcome then, even within a 
single village, these animals can be both a correlate of wealth, and its ultimate 
measure. Some respondents noted that people could be wealthy in livestock, but 
not use that wealth to invest in houses or education. Livestock (cattle) were wealth 
for such respondents. For others they were a means of providing liquidity—a 
resource to be turned to when need arose.
Livestock are also interesting because the numbers entailed could vary so 
much from place to place. In Meru a really wealthy family might send their chil­
dren to international school, work overseas, and have as many as five cattle. In 
Morogoro the wealthy numbered their herds in the thousands. Clearly livestock 
would be difficult to operationalize in any nationally comparative asset index.
Land signifies wealth and poverty in somewhat surprising ways. The 
Demographic and Health Surveys ask only about land ownership.3 But, according 
to our informants, ownership per se does not signify wealth. Owning small areas 
of land was not a problem if rich people could access other peoples’ farms through 
rental agreements or sharecropping. Likewise a common characterization of pov­
erty was not landlessness, but rather the inability properly to use land assets for 
productive gains. This was either because of incapacity, or because people lacked 
the capital to make their land productive, or because they had to use their labour 
on other people’s farms to satisfy daily needs. They could not invest their labour 
time in their own lands. Either way the relevant criteria to determine wealth 
would be use of the more advanced means of farming (ploughs, improved seeds, 
and fertilizers). These are not covered in the Demographic and Health Surveys.
Labouring for other people was generally and commonly an indication of pov­
erty. This is also found in recent work which finds that engagement in casual work 
(universally called kibarua) is an indication of poverty (Homewood et al. 2020). 
However, as we shall see in later chapters (on Dodoma and Meru), while kibarua 
is associated with and created by poverty, it is also a means of enrichment. It can 
be used as part of an investment strategy.
More generally, while similar things appear in the meaning of wealth and pov­
erty across the country, it is difficult to put together a list of assets that has the 
same meaning across the country. Here our findings match other similar studies. 
Keane and colleagues in wealth­ ranking work in focus groups from twelve  villages 
in north and south Tanzania found that the:
3 https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/DHSQ7/DHS7_Household_QRE_EN_16Mar2017_DHSQ7.
pdf, accessed 26 February 2018.
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criteria chosen to define wealth categories differed substantially from village to 
village and made sense given what is known of local livelihoods. For example, 
villages in the north give greater prominence to the importance of cattle, reflecting 
their well­ established cultural and economic importance, while some villages in 
the south did not refer to cattle at all in their wealth rank definitions.
(Keane et al. 2020: 231)
We have therefore, a response to Johnston and Abreu’s challenge posed at the 
beginning of the paper. They insisted that asset ‘indices should be constructed 
and compared over limited geographic scales and time periods; [and that] the 
choice of assets should be based on an understanding of what it means to be 
wealthy or poor in a particular place’ (2016: 417–18). Our results clearly show 
that the national scale is too large a canvas for the limited geographic scales 
Johnston and Abreu call for. This means that where we have comparative data 
that crosses several sites within one country then we must presume that any asset 
index constructed from these data cannot be generalized beyond particularly 
similar places (villages or neighbouring villages). Instead a meaningful asset index 
will have to be built up from the ground up—starting with localized asset indices 
derived from the smallest scale, and generalizing to include other areas only if 
there is significant similarity.
It follows too that where we have studies of change as observed through assets 
then these too need to be localized studies. As we have tried to show in the 
accompanying papers, we need to build up a plethora of different case studies in 
order to understand how different societies respond to new economic op por tun ities 
and constraints in terms of adjusting their asset portfolios.
This point is reinforced if we consider the limitations of our site selection. All 
the societies we visited were mainly agricultural. They were not herders, not 
fisher­ people, and not running small businesses in towns. Were we to include 
these other groups then the differences we found are likely to grow. Agriculturalists 
might be expected to share more similarities. The fact that they do not empha­
sises the difficulties of finding common measures of locally meaningful wealth 
and poverty.
Conclusion
We have examined variations in the local meaning of wealth and poverty for men 
and women in seventeen rural locations from seven different regions in Tanzania. 
Our data come from a variety of social, economic, and environmental settings, all 
of them rural, but all primarily agricultural (not pastoral or fishing communities). 
We undertook this work in order to explore the recommendations made by 
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Johnston and Abreu (2016) as to the geographical limits of asset indices and the 
need for asset indices that reflected local understandings of wealth.
We found that, across Tanzania, assets feature prominently in local definitions 
of wealth and poverty for rural Tanzanians who were pursuing agricultural liveli­
hoods. This poses two challenges. First, if we are to follow asset ownership over 
time then with what social units do we track assets? Assets are rarely owned solely 
by individuals. The benefit streams they afford, the work done on them, are shared 
(unequally) by families. Tracking assets over time requires tracking these domes­
tic units over time too—and this presents significant methodological issues. We 
tackle this problem in the next chapter.
The second challenge is that while assets are good indicators of local level 
change, it is difficult to use change in assets to generalise across cases studies and 
different regions. There are signs that, across rural Tanzania, quality of housing 
and access to electricity and electrical goods are generic indicators of wealth. 
However the value of these elements in distinguishing families will vary from place 
to place. A fine house with electricity may be relatively common in peri­ urban 
areas; it will be a mark of some distinction in the remoter areas we visited. It is 
possible also that measures related to farm inputs and livestock can be used across 
large areas. But again this will depend on the environmental circumstances. Some 
dryland areas may be more suited to livestock than agriculture; some soils and 
some crops will require more inputs than others. There are also differing cultural 
values that surround particular types of livestock that vary regionally.
We have also found that, in rural areas, current commonly used asset indices 
do not well reflect local interpretations of wealth or poverty. The Demographic 
and Health Surveys counts land ownership, instead of land use. Conversely, asset 
indices may count things (irons, televisions, or fridges) that were simply not men­
tioned in our focus group discussions. Asset indices plainly capture statistically 
significant difference. But it does mean that these statistical patterns are not good 
proxies of the changes that rural Tanzanians want to see.
To summarize as briefly as possible, we have found that it is difficult to compile 
effective asset indices that will work across Tanzania. There is too much variety. 
This is true for our study sites, and the point is enhanced if we recall the limita­
tions of our sources, which omit large areas of the country and important liveli­
hoods. There is more variety to be found than we have been able to capture. 
Instead we have to find ways of intelligently combining different indices from 
different places and livelihoods. For some datasets this will be hard, because the 
sample size from particular places will not allow sample sizes which are large 
enough from specific places. For other studies larger sample sizes per village allow 
such localized constructions. Our response to that challenge in this collection has 
been to compile a series of different case studies—reported in this collection. But 
first we have to consider the methodological challenges of undertaking this work, 
and these we consider in the next chapter.
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Introduction
Throughout this collection we describe repeated instances of transformation. We 
have frequently found that once- poor families appear to be richer due to better 
farming technology (ploughs, more oxen, and improved crop breeds), higher 
crop prices, and changing social relations within villages. Or we find villages that 
were once remote are now bustling with busy centres, motorbike taxis for hire, 
frequent bus services, solar- powered electricity, and mobile telephone services. 
Housing quality has markedly improved.
These stories may appear easy to tell. Changes to farming activity have made 
people richer and they have invested in their homes and farms. But things are not 
as simple as that. Before we can claim that there is greater meaningful local pros-
perity, we have to pay more attention to what has improved, and how it has been 
experienced. Embedded in any claim about changing prosperity are other im port-
ant claims about how prosperity should be measured and the social units which 
experience that prosperity.
As we discussed in the second chapter of this book, many of the changes in 
wealth described here are best captured by exploring changes to assets, not pov-
erty lines, because the latter measure standard baskets of consumption and 
exclude assets. Describing the transformations we have just reported requires 
describing changes in asset access, ownership, and control. Assets are particularly 
important to emic definitions of wealth and well- being.
Any measure of wealth and poverty requires the right analytical social unit to 
track change. Inseparable from any investigation of assets is the question of what 
is the appropriate social unit of analysis required to understand change in assets. 
Many of the assets described here (land, houses, livestock) are effectively owned 
and managed by social units larger than individuals. Their benefits, or the 
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problems of their loss, are experienced collectively, although not equally. They are 
not, therefore, a good measure of change in individual fortunes. Rather assets will 
require reference to the families, households, domestic units, or domestic groups 
who collectively own and manage these assets. We will talk about these social 
entities as ‘domestic units’ in this chapter.
However, investigations involving domestic units are difficult. It is well estab-
lished, but inadequately recognized, that domestic units contain and can obscure 
considerable inequalities, power struggles, and differences between intersections 
that include gender and age (inter alia). These can be fundamental to understand-
ing the nature and reproduction of poverty and prosperity. This issue is com-
pounded in longitudinal research because domestic units are not static entities. 
Their membership, location, activities, and both internal and external power rela-
tions can change substantially and rapidly.
In this chapter we explore the conceptual and practical challenges that can 
arise when trying to use assets, and therefore domestic units, in longitudinal 
research on wealth and poverty. We contend that exploring the socially embed-
ded dynamics of assets is necessary to understanding changing prosperity, both 
in and out of poverty.
We argue that this requires examining carefully the nature of the domestic 
units in which assets are socially embedded. As we will show, in some circum-
stances the challenges of tracking change by following domestic units can be 
insurmountable. We will argue that it is useful to examine the circumstances in 
which instability of domestic units makes working with assets so hard. But we 
will also identify situations where it is more practical to use assets and domestic 
units in longitudinal research, if the challenges of so doing are tackled carefully.
We proceed as follows. First, we consider how the complications of exploring 
assets and wealth change over time. Next we turn to the social units through 
which changes in assets need to be examined. We show that this needs to work 
with entities like domestic units, but we then outline the problems of working 
with such units over time. We conclude with thoughts on the importance of tack-
ling these problems in order to understand dynamics of asset ownership 
over time.
Assets and Poverty Dynamics over Time
As we explored in the two previous chapters, assets are an essential part of rural 
definitions of wealth and poverty. They provide income streams upon which day- 
to- day consumption and strategies for investment and growing wealth depend. 
They are clearly important to monitor as part of understanding poverty dynam-
ics. But their contribution is probably best described as a necessary complication, 
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rather than a welcome clarification. Assets are central to any robust understand-
ing of wealth and poverty, but how to capture that relationship and its changes 
over time is fraught with difficulty.
If we try and explore the changing value of assets over time problems arise. 
The monetary value of assets is hard to capture because asset prices can vary 
considerably over various time scales both seasonally (livestock) and over years 
(land or motorcycles). Meaningful depreciation costs of houses, in contexts 
where houses are rarely bought or sold, and where each domestic unit con-
structs their own, are hard to calculate. This is particularly true of poorer 
 people’s houses, or houses built from naturally and locally available materials. 
The value of land, especially where markets are dominated by informal 
exchanges, can be hard to ascertain.
These problems grow when exploring the changing value of assets over the 
long term. In high inflationary environments converting an asset into a cash value 
and then subjecting that number to modifications due to inflation and purchasing 
power parity changes, further adds to the difficulties in determining the worth of 
assets. Even without these financial considerations, exploring change in asset 
ownership and wealth is complicated because local interpretations of wealth and 
the value of assets change over time (cf. Mushongah and Scoones 2012).
Finally, the relationship of assets with more common measurements of poverty 
is not straightforward. The relationship between income and assets is not linear 
(Harttgen et al. 2013) and asset indices are not always a good proxy for consump-
tion (Howe et al. 2009, and cf. Friis- Hansen, this volume). A recent study, and one 
of the few to use longitudinal data, found that income increased in all groups 
studied, but that over the same time period the value of asset portfolios owned by 
these groups decreased (de Weerdt 2010, Beegle et al. 2011). Borgerhoff Mulder 
(this volume) does find good relationships between assets and other measures of 
well- being, concluding that ‘assets tell us a lot about a household’ (p. 90). But 
she also cautions against extrapolating these findings broadly. Assets share the 
flaws of income, consumption, and other measures in that all are, individually, 
imperfect measures of welfare.
None of these challenges make historical comparisons using assets futile. 
Indeed, the very fact that asset dynamics can vary from measures of consump-
tion and nutrition is another reason to include assets—for otherwise the 
changes they signify will be missed. However our point is that it is no easy 
task. Indeed, as Angus Deaton and Thomas Pogge have pointed out for 
poverty- line data, these difficulties attend all international and diachronic 
measures of poverty (Deaton 2004, Pogge 2004). Attention to assets therefore 
complicates recognized methodological woes; it does not solve them. But the 
difficulties of examining assets are not in themselves an objection to trying to 
use them.
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Domestic Units and Poverty Dynamics over Time
If assets are important for understanding wealth and poverty dynamics then the 
social unit and scale of analysis used to assess assets also has to be considered 
carefully. The social consequences of access to an asset or a bundle of assets can 
only be understood in the context of the domestic units that own, access, use, and 
share them (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2011, Johnson et al. 2016). Domestic units can 
even be understood as entities that come to exist and form themselves around 
particular configurations of assets. Their origins, fission, and fusion are signalled 
by transfers and changes in asset distribution. The classic example of this is live-
stock in pastoral societies, in which male heads of domestic units may have sig-
nificant decision- making power over the disposal of cattle, but their wives, and 
their children and their children’s fiancés and prospective in- laws, all have claims 
of varied importance and priority to different animals. In pastoral societies the 
transfer of livestock marks moments of engagement, marriage, childbirth, and 
ties between families (Broch- Due 1990).
If the benefit streams and management costs of assets at any moment in time 
are controlled by domestic units then it follows that any sort of meaningful claim 
about changes in wealth based on assets which are owned by domestic units 
hinges on the conceptualization, composition, and stability of domestic units. For 
example, consider the claim that a particular village has become richer because 
the asset ownership of its constituent domestic units has improved—they have 
more livestock, more televisions, more smartphones, and bigger houses. This sin-
gle claim has in fact two components: the obvious claim that asset portfolios are 
better, and, underlying it, the claim that domestic units being compared have 
been stable enough to merit comparison.
If there is no such stability then the comparison becomes less meaningful. For 
example, it might be that a village appears to have become richer only because the 
poor are no longer present. This could be the case if poorer domestic units have 
died, or their members redistributed, because of their poverty, or been forced out, 
or been displaced by some process of gentrification. Another possibility might be 
that the organization of domestic production and the membership of domestic 
units has changed in ways which have allowed new forms of asset accumulation. 
There may have been no noticeable immigration or emigration, but the domestic 
units that people live in have changed.
We must attend to the stability of the social unit used because there is a history 
of domestic units which has seen the term, and particularly cognate terms like 
‘household’, used carelessly and in ways which disguise important dynamics 
(cf. van de Walle 2006). Specifically, they conceal inequalities between age groups 
and gender that make generalizations across ‘households’ problematic at best. 
These problems have been recognized for many years (cf. Guyer 1981, Vandergeest 
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and Rigg 2012), but still persist (Randall et al. 2011, Randall and Coast 2015). The 
problems, serious enough in cross- sectional surveys, are compounded in longitu-
dinal studies which attempt to revisit communities, and in particular the same 
domestic units more than once, because the sorts of economic activity (of pro-
duction and consumption) that creates domestic units, and the social life that 
animates them, will vary considerably over time. They may be, in short, not at all 
the same units that were originally visited.
Numerous dynamics that have to be accounted for when attempting to use 
domestic units as a vehicle for understanding social change. Perhaps the most 
well known is the ‘developmental cycle’ of domestic groups (Goody 1958). This 
refers to the stages through which domestic units pass as they age and mem-
bers are born and die, which, to an extent, determine their residence patterns, 
control over resources, and membership, as well as their asset base. Fortes used 
this concept to explain how households from the same ethnic group could 
appear to adopt different residence patterns, demonstrating that this was sim-
ply a function of the ‘time factor’ that had to be grasped if we are to understand 
how these so ci eties reproduce themselves (Fortes 1958: 2). As Stenning showed 
so clearly, the developmental cycle of WoDaabe pastoralists in northern Nigeria 
was marked by stages of betrothal, child birth, and then the subsequent disper-
sal and dissolution of the domestic units (Stenning 1958). He also made clear 
that exigencies of climate, disease, and the internal dynamics of units them-
selves would mean that units would coalesce and fissure over varying time- 
scales. For the purposes of understanding dynamics in prosperity and wealth 
with respect to assets, the developmental cycle is essential. It shows how 
younger units and older units can be expected to be poorer than mature units. 
Growing prosperity may simply be a sign of a maturing family, and immiseration 
a sign of senescence.
But the developmental cycle contains important assumptions that, if violated, 
may limit its usefulness (Murray 1987). First, it assumes a homogeneity in so ci-
eties to processes of change over time that allows for these generational processes 
to be observed. Second, the developmental cycle can be distinguished from other 
forces for change which are occurring over similar time spans. Murray argued 
that, in southern African contexts in the 1980s, there was too much variety in the 
form and dynamics of domestic units to generalize in terms of cycles. What 
 people did, and what happened to their residential groups and larger families, was 
bound up in changes to the migrant labour economy of South Africa, more than 
it was driven by internal dynamics.
These tensions illustrate that the domestic unit is both a product of cultural 
expression that reproduces a society (it facilitates stasis), and an expression of the 
ways that individuals interact through relations of mutual dependence in order to 
ensure their own survival in a context of varying economic, environmental and 
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political conditions (it helps people to cope with change). Hyden suggests that an 
economy of affection is characteristic of the peasant mode of production:
it denotes a network of support, communications and interaction among struc-
turally defined groups connected by blood, kin, community or other affinities, 
for example, religion. It links together in a systematic fashion a variety of dis-
crete economic and social units which in other regards may be autonomous.
(Hyden 1983: 8)
Whilst the original analysis saw the economy of affection as offering resistance to 
the capitalist mode of production, Hyden (2015) finds the concept still useful 
to  describe social relations and reciprocity in increasingly urban and capital-
ist Africa.
Ferguson’s recent work on notions of dependence in southern Africa develops 
the idea that people seek relations of dependence on each other and on collective 
institutions (Ferguson  2013 and  2015). In apartheid South Africa, the labour 
market and apartheid laws dominated the domestic networks that could be con-
stituted, with many men migrating to earn wages to send home to their depend-
ents in the homelands. In contemporary South Africa, social protection systems 
and high unemployment create new forms of dependence, where the recipients of 
social welfare (the elderly and children) can construct domestic units that do not 
rely on the waged labour of a male employee. Thus the domestic unit is also 
 buffeted and shaped by wider economic and political forces.
There are common forms of heterogeneity and instability in some societies that 
make it difficult to talk about developmental cycles, and indeed stymy the whole 
project of trying to explore change through the lens of domestic groups, particu-
larly if those groups are seen as geographical nodes, rather than as networks of 
relationships. Membership of domestic units may be highly unstable because of 
divorce, fostering practices, or migration. Mathew Lockwood describes in detail 
the sorts of dynamism that occurred in rice growing districts of southern 
Tanzania that exemplify these difficulties:
The following is the history of the household in which I lived between December 
1985 and September 1986. Before I moved in, the household consisted of a man 
in his forties, A, his wife, son from a previous marriage, aged about 15, and a 
daughter aged about 5. In December his wife left him and went to live with rela-
tives in Zanzibar. The daughter went to stay with her grandmother in the village. 
At this point I moved in. January: a cousin of A’s arrives, with her teenage 
daughter. They start preparing to farm rice in the valley. February: A’s son argues 
with his father and leaves for relatives in Mkongo. A’s daughter comes back to 
the house. April: The visiting cousin moves to a dungu [small hut in the fields 
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used when cultivation work is heavy] in the rice fields. Her daughter, together 
with A’s daughter, lives half there and half in the village. A’s son returns for a 
short time and then leaves again. Late May/June: A’s cousin and her daughter 
harvest rice and return to the village. They then go off to a village on the road to 
Dar es Salaam to visit her husband. Throughout this period, A would go to Dar 
es Salaam for a few days every month, where he acted as a rent collector for 
someone. The cousin’s husband would also come at weekends from the other 
village, where he was a teacher. (Lockwood 1998: 143 fn 1)
The relationships and dependencies which make domestic units come to exist in 
the first place, are themselves dynamic. Units, and their cycles, may experience 
varied pressures as they take on tasks of educating children (and young adults) or 
providing migratory labour, or taking on new livelihoods (agriculture, urban 
occupations). The domestic unit, which was configured around one set of assets, 
livelihoods and their social relations, may have transformed into differently 
structured and configured units under new forms of livelihood, opportunity, and 
constraint, whilst continuing to serve key roles as a site of socialization, care, and 
support.
When exploring change involving domestic units the stability of the unit 
becomes key. ‘Stability’ here does not refer simply to residential stasis, but to 
social relations within domestic units. Whitehead’s experience of working 
with ‘households’ in Northern Ghana provides a salutary example of the difficulties 
of comparing domestic units whose location remains the same, but whose 
developmental cycles have become so complex and convoluted that understanding 
how assets benefit different members cannot be understood without delving into 
the different  components of the domestic unit. She describes, for example, 
(polygamously) married sons remaining with their (polygamously married) father 
in the same compound, and sometimes continuing to do so after their father had 
died. As a result:
Households could have several adults living in them and these adults included 
closely related married and single men, as well as polygamously married wives 
and the elderly widows of former male household members. This complex com-
pound was an asset holding and cooperative work unit, although its physical, 
economic and social organization allowed for the possibility of overlapping cir-
cles of individual and collective responsibilities. (Whitehead 2006: 285)
The number of people living in these groups were large, with median ‘household’ 
size being over twelve and ranging up to 73. Any assumption that domestic units 
remain sufficiently constant to compare over time is clearly ambitious in this case. 
Jane Guyer’s longitudinal study of change around Ibadan eschewed domestic 
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units altogether because ‘people were mobile from one house to another, and 
their income earning, including farming, was individuated [so] at the pragmatic 
level of research method “the household” was unmanageable’ (Guyer 1997: 25).
It is possible therefore, that a domestic unit surveyed for one purpose, or at one 
particular moment, may not be the best vehicle to understand the relationships 
and dependencies around which different sorts of domestic units come to exist at 
a later time. This could be because its circumstances have changed so much over 
time, or it could reflect the nature of the research instrument. A large- scale 
questionnaire- based survey creates a particular domestic unit through both the 
definition of the unit designed to guide the interviewers and the questions that 
are being asked in order to make it visible. The domestic unit produced by a sur-
vey may preclude understanding of wider dynamics, resource flows, and relation-
ships. These important dynamics can be beyond the scope of many research 
projects, as their limited levels of analysis and recording of data precludes under-
standing such complexity as experienced in daily realities of life. The type of data 
we, as researchers, want to collect, especially when we need larger scale statistics, 
are not concerned with the dynamics of domestic unit level changes or fluctuations.
Alternatively there may be so little stability, or even recognizability, in the con-
stitution of domestic units from one period to the next that using domestic units 
when bounded by geographical location as a lens through which to view change 
simply makes no sense at all. They are too ephemeral. This is likely to be the case 
in Mathew Lockwood’s study site in Rufiji (Lockwood 1998). Housing structures 
might remain constant, but who lives in them, how they are related to each other, 
and, crucially, what assets bring which benefits to whom are too variable to be 
easily tracked over time.
Even if a once surveyed domestic unit ceases to exist, the relationships of 
dependence between individuals can still continue in ways largely invisible to the 
outsider using a survey tool. In 2004–5, Mdee interviewed what she thought were 
several distinct households located around a public tap in the village of Uchira in 
Tanzania (see Chapter 16). On marrying into one of those households, and over 
the course of several visits, she realized that these several households were in fact 
one domestic unit sharing blood relations, economic interests, and assets. 
However, a survey of domestic units which assumed domestic units were consti-
tuted by housing units would have recorded two elderly female- headed house-
holds, and two male- headed households at different life stages. In fact, the ‘unit’ 
in the terms defined in this paper is constituted by relations of dependence, obli-
gation, and reciprocity that now extend across continents.
A variation of the scenario that Lockwood describes is that the degree of 
in stabil ity in social relations that constitute domestic units may be a contributing 
factor to the prosperity of the units. More stable units may experience more pros-
perity and derive more benefits from their assets. De Weerdt’s research on the 
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Kagera panel study indicates as much (de Weerdt  2010). He used quantitative 
data to predict which households (as defined by the Kagera study) were more 
likely to lose and gain assets over time, and then focus group research to explore 
which households were bucking the expected trends (gaining assets when losses 
would have been predicted, and vice versa). This produced a number of charac-
teristics that were typically missed by econometric analyses, including the 
im port ance of good co- operative relations between spouses for prosperity. 
Conversely, divorce could be particularly disadvantageous to women, as could 
widowhood in polygamous marriages.
In instances such as these the dynamism of domestic units becomes a means 
by which the fortunes of their members can be understood. Such longitudinal 
data cannot be organized by rows of ‘households’ in a spreadsheet—with obvious 
implications for panel data. Rather it is the changes to the definition and func-
tioning of domestic units, and individuals within them, which becomes the focus 
for analysis. The domestic units become the dependent variable.
Once again the dynamism of the domestic units which come to exist around 
bundles of assets does not make exploration of asset dynamics impossible. That 
very dynamism, potentially visible through assets, can make exploring change in 
assets ever more important. Our point therefore is not that domestic units should 
not be used, just that they should be used carefully, and, if necessary re- defined 
should the stability required for meaningful comparison simply be inadequate.
Assets, Progress, and Change
Ben White, in his review of Revisting Rural Places captures well the dangers of 
longitudinal research. They are certainly pleasurable and exciting for the 
researcher but:
however promising, many re- studies are ultimately disappointing, showing us 
‘then it was like that, now it is like this’ but unable to tell us much more about 
how and why things changed, or how these changes have been experienced. To 
be useful, they must go beyond the presentation of contrasting snapshots or 
time slices to the more demanding project of writing rural social history, focus-
ing on the processes and mechanisms, rather than just the ‘facts’ and outcomes, 
of rural change. (White 2014: 635)
We do not dispute this point. But for longitudinal studies to be taken seriously, 
there must be room for some more empirically focused approaches. As we saw in 
Chapter 2 sometimes the facts are disputed, or obscured by techniques used to 
track change. We need to get a clear understanding of who gets what, or who 
owns what, as well as what do they do with it (following Bernstein  2010) to 
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understand the role of assets (and not just land ownership) in class dynamics. 
That means knowing what the ‘what’ is that Bernstein refers to.
In our case studies the assets we examined are also particularly important for 
vernacular definitions of wealth and poverty, for, in other words, understanding 
situated class dynamics. For example, change in Gitting (see Chapter  10), the 
example with which we began was locally explained by the decline in ‘capitalism’ 
(Swahili: ubepare). This was a reference to a broadening of the means of produc-
tion which had seen ploughs, oxen, and eventually tractors spread from a 
restricted number of individuals who charged extortionate fees for their use. 
Greater equality in asset ownership, through local investment, resulted in a gen-
eral rise in prosperity. As we have seen in Chapter 2 it is precisely this form of 
investment that poverty- line data omit.
But the opposite proved to be the case in Dodoma, where Östberg worked (see 
Chapter 9). Here wealthy entrepreneurs’ tractors are new arrivals and essential to 
the larger farms that people are now working. Investment in shared water points 
has also reduced labour (particularly women’s work) in collecting water. Greater 
inequality, in the form of relatively benevolent wealthy businessmen, has been 
key to raising productivity generally. The changes to the village have also seen a 
change in the meaning of daily labour from being solely a sign of penury and 
disadvantage to also signifying, in some circumstances, the ability to invest in 
particular projects.
However, while greater attention to assets can provide more sensitive insights 
into local- level class dynamics it is also possible for attention to assets to be used in 
ways which obscure change. In tandem with this burgeoning interest in measuring 
assets lies a significant danger of the ‘seduction of quantification’ (Merry  2016), 
with the push to quantify, track, and compare complex social phenomena.
Specifically there is a danger that one or two assets become proxies for ‘pros-
perity’. For example, if the use of iron sheeting as a roofing material (which is 
helpfully visible to remote sensing) denotes progress (Jean et al. 2016, Watmough 
et al. 2019), then policy and resources might shift to fulfil this indicator. However, 
changes to the roofing of a dwelling can conceal all sorts of changes in the social 
lives of those living in it, and may not be linked to the ‘prosperity’ of the in di vid-
uals living under it. Thus a single asset used as an indicator could conceal im port-
ant dynamics, and become as a proxy for a normative concept (that iron sheeted 
roofing makes a better home).
If assets can be incorporated into national measures of well- being (Maganga et 
al. 2016), it is important to understand how such changes might be grounded in 
specific instances in the lived experiences of particular domestic units in different 
places. General measures of change in assets across regions or countries may be 
based in very different experiences of the distribution and enjoyment of those 
assets in particular places. There remains a strong role for locally based and well- 
grounded research that can contextualize such change.
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Conclusion: Exploring Asset Dynamics in  
Development Research
We began with apparently straightforward observations of simple changes, and 
improvements in people’s lives that are measurable and locally meaningful 
because they detail changes that matter, for which people strive. The purpose of 
our reflections in this chapter is not to invalidate such observations. However, we 
want to make clear precisely what claims are being made when prosperity is said 
to have improved because of a change in patterns of asset ownership.
In the first instance the prosperity that assets signify has to be taken in con-
junction with other measurements of well- being. In the second, these claims are 
not just about assets, they also entail claims about the social units which share, 
benefit from, maintain, and reproduce these assets. We must recognize that there 
are two things which have happened in numerous examples in this collection: 
assets have increased, and domestic units have remained sufficiently stable for 
that to be a visible and meaningful change. Instability in the membership of 
domestic units would render the comparison over time less meaningful.
If circumstances allow—reasonable membership stability in domestic units—
then exploring change in assets can be useful. And if not, then not. In two chap-
ters in this collection (Chapters 13 and 16) other methods have been necessary. 
But we also suggest that this is, ideally, not the only measure used. The weak 
relationship between assets and other forms of well- being and prosperity 
(income, nutrition, wealth) means that it is but one measure among many that 
needs to be considered. This should be no surprise: poverty is multi- facetted. The 
main reason why these other measures were not also included in the re- studies 
we have undertaken is simply that they were not easily accessible in the original 
survey data.
Researchers of poverty dynamics and long- term change, we submit, need to 
understand these conceptions of wealth and the social units which wield them. 
This requires accurate and nuanced evidence and conceptualizations of domestic 
units that are recognizable to those communities from which we collect our data. 
An approach to understanding poverty dynamics, dominated by Western aca-
demic or policy evidence, cannot claim to understand those changes as experi-
enced within their original context.
More generally, understanding poverty in its many dimensions requires 
exploring different indicators at a variety of scales—the individual, the domestic 
unit, the community, region, or nation. For each scale particular indicators are 
required, and others may be inappropriate. But tracking change over time 
requires sufficient constancy in the unit of measurement. And if the individuals, 
households, or communities we are interested in effectively disappear, then we 
cannot make statements about change over time at those scales, and we may not 
be able to compare different places for which data at particular scales no 
longer exist.
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Or, to make this point another way: there are some aspects of the world which 
are simply unknowable because of the ways that they are constituted and because 
of the ways in which they change. The challenge of research in development is to 
push the boundaries between what can be known, and what cannot. The chan-
ging nature and meaning of assets, and the changing social units which govern 
and derive benefit from them, will make the location and shape of this research 
frontier ever interesting.
We believe that tracing assets through domestic units does indeed push the 
boundaries of our knowledge and understanding of social change, but only if the 
limitations of what we can learn from assets, and how we treat domestic units, are 
taken seriously. Attempts to use assets as proxies for change without due care will 
miss the social contexts that make assets meaningful in the first place. As the con-
sequences of land loss and economic investment strategies are vigorously debated 
we encourage more researchers to use this sort of longitudinal approach to under-
stand change in rural areas. However progress in understanding will be achieved 
if researchers recognize the heterogeneity of change and the critical importance 
of local context and conditions, often at small scales.
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Research on changing poverty and prosperity in African contexts, and in Tanzania 
specifically, is split. Some authors celebrate a rising continent with healthy eco-
nomic growth, macro- economic stability, and climbing productivity 
(Radelet 2010, Chuhan-Pole 2011), or at least elements of such optimism (as in 
some chapters of Adam et al. 2017). Some have even suggested an ‘African Growth 
Miracle’, on the basis of DHS data across numerous African countries showing 
increases in asset ownership, education, and employment, together with declines 
in morbidity and mortality (Young  2012). Indeed The Economist (3 December 
2011) produced the caption ‘The Hopeful Continent: Africa Rising’ when only 
eleven years earlier they had dubbed Africa ‘The Hopeless Continent’ on their 
cover. Others find many indications that the structural causes of spatially concen-
trated poverty persist, that economic growth fails to be inclusive of the poor 
(Barrett  2011, Barrett and Carter  2013) and may indeed merely exacerbate 
in equal ity (Benjaminsen and Bryceson  2012). For example, studies of the 
Tanzanian Household Budget Survey conclude that the economic growth that 
occurred between 1991–2 and 2000–1 failed to reduce poverty among the poor 
(Mashindano et al. 2013). Yet other scholars maintain that the economic policies of 
neoliberalism promote land loss, alienation, and eviction among the poor, leading 
to the neglect of rural livelihoods, marginalization, and increased impoverish-
ment of vulnerable communities (e.g., Mueller  2011, Bluwstein et al.  2018). In 
short, emphasizing the recent economic growth in African countries can be a dis-
traction from recognizing persistent poverty and inequality.
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As Brockington and Noe (Chapter 2) note, the differences between these 
positions are ideological and epistemological as well as empirical. This chapter 
turns squarely to the latter. Specifically I address the extent to which inclusive 
economic growth reflects experience in the lives of villagers living in south- 
western Tanzania, and I explore how a widely used measure of wealth—material 
asset holdings—is associated with well- being.
As regards the ‘African Growth Miracle’ the picture in Tanzania is quite mixed. 
Two decades of stable economic growth have brought a reduction in non- 
monetary measures of poverty, contingent on public (and private) investments in 
education and health. Monetary poverty has nevertheless declined only min im-
al ly (38.6 to 35.7 per cent) between 1991 and 2007, with the absolute number of 
people living in poverty actually rising to 3.3 million (Arndt et al. 2016, based on 
Household Budget Survey consumption figures that exclude expenditures on 
durable goods). Furthermore, as regards inequality—well recognized as imped-
ing future economic growth and progress towards poverty reduction (e.g., 
Ravallion 2014), and now prioritized as one of the seventeen Sustainable 
Development Goals to guide development over the next fifteen years—the picture 
is again mixed. Tanzanian society is showing widening wealth inequality between 
regions, gender, and the rural- urban divide (Maliti 2016, using DHS wealth data 
2004, 2007, and 2010), and both increasing and (latterly) decreasing horizontal 
inequality in education (Hassine and Zeufack  2015, Maliti  2016, using HBS 
and  DHS data respectively). Furthermore different dimensions of inequality 
(income, education, health, water, and sanitation, Maliti 2018) are both spatially 
and socially patterned. For example the Gini coefficient in income inequality 
declined from 0.37 in 2007 to 0.34 in 2012, due primarily to improved distribu-
tion of consumption in rural as compared to urban areas. On the other hand the 
top 20 per cent of income earners in Tanzania accounts for almost half the total 
income in Tanzania, and 28 per cent of Tanzanians still live below the national 
poverty line (with 9 per cent classed as ‘extremely poor’, i.e., below the food poverty 
line). Furthermore spatial, wealth- based, and gender- based inequities in some 
health outcomes are still on the rise, as is access to clean water (Maliti  2018). 
In  short, national level data offer no clear narrative of how livelihoods and 
well- being have changed over the last two decades. Whether this reflects the 
somewhat patchy quality of national statistics or genuine heterogeneity across 
the nation is unclear.
This should not be surprising. The problems with depicting shifts in poverty 
levels using national statistics are well recognized (Jerven  2013). These include 
inconsistencies in data collection protocols over time, difficulties in finding 
appropriate price deflators, discrepancies between findings using poverty indices 
based on consumption as opposed to national PPP1US$/day data, and possible 
biases against identifying rich households, all recognized as problems for Tanzania 
(Arndt et al.  2016). In short, country- level analyses can conceal disparities in 
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disadvantage, and hide the specific dynamics entailed in poverty alleviation and/
or persistence. Village- level studies, by comparison, can complement national 
statistics by offering insights into locally relevant features of wealth transitions, 
insights that national studies might miss on account of their coarse (and typically 
aggregated) description of economic changes across time and space. As such 
evidence from village- level studies may have a role to play in both confirming 
and/or contesting the inferences drawn from national- level studies.
Turning now to measurement issues, there is considerable debate over the 
nature of the data needed to adjudicate on the nature and drivers of change over 
time in levels of poverty, well- being, and prosperity. Indeed the principle critiques 
of Young’s conclusions regarding the African Miracle focus on measurement 
problems, and specifically the use of assets to identify wealth.
Using assets, and assets- based wealth rankings, as indices of changing eco-
nomic conditions can be problematic, particularly when sites are compared across 
geographical zones with differing natural resources, infrastructure, and length of 
value chains, and also when sites are compared over time (Harttgen et al. 2013, 
Johnston and Abreu 2016). Not only do preferences, prices, as well as quality and 
mere availability of different items vary across regions and decades, but the very 
significance of an item (be it a corrugated iron roof, a bicycle, or a mobile phone) 
changes over time (Howland et al. 2021). More fundamentally, notions of well- 
being, poverty, and security are hugely variable with respect to their dependency 
on material wealth, and of course differ on whether they are defined by subjective 
(emic) or objective (etic) criteria (Tucker et al. 2011). Furthermore, even when 
focus is restricted to the material domain, expenditure, income, consumption, 
and assets are often only weakly associated (Howe et al.  2012, Johnston and 
Abreu  2016, Kaiser et al.  2017), with households handling their stocks (assets) 
and flows (income) in different ways. For example, when faced with weather shocks, 
poorer pastoral families in Burkina Faso sought to conserve their assets (herds) 
and reduce their consumption (‘asset smoothers’) whereas pastoral families with 
bigger herds could offset consumption declines by selling cattle (‘consumption 
smoothers’) (Carter and Lybbert 2012).
Alternatives to assets indices are measures based on consumption, and meas-
ures based on income. For multiple reasons these can also be problematic. As 
argued by Johnston and Abreu (2016), consumption measures (that typically 
exclude large/durable expenditures including productive assets so as to avoid rare 
events that might skew data) fail to capture the key investments rural families 
make to change their lives, such as a plough, secondary education, or hospital 
charges after an accident. Using income raises different challenges. Small payments 
here and there can be hard to quantify. They are also difficult to recall, especially if 
they are seasonal, and they may also be concealed from other household members, 
a the interviewee. Furthermore, as discussed below, income can be an indicator of 
poverty or landlessness rather than wealth.
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There is no easy answer to the question of which measures of wealth are most 
informative. Which measure to use will depend crucially on the question to 
be asked, the specifics of the study site, and the opportunities for obtaining ac cur-
ate data. Further considerations are whether the data are to be used for compari-
son with other sites, and whether the goal of the research is to assess change over 
time. Given these complexities, it certainly behoves researchers to explore the 
consequences of their chosen wealth measure for broader individual or family 
well- being, especially those outcomes that are deemed emically prominent; in 
other words, to determine whether the measure of wealth selected  provides a 
robust means of tracking locally important changes in well- being (Howland 
et al. 2021). It is also important to follow the fortunes of rural households during 
periods of economic growth, and when this growth slows, in order to glean 
insights into the dynamics of change, as advocated by Dercon (2006).
To address these issues, I use a fifteen- year study in Tanzania’s Rukwa (now 
Katavi) Region to examine changes in well- being over time. Specifically, using 
data from the village of Mirumba, I tackle two sets of questions. The first asks 
whether economic livelihoods improved or faltered in Mirumba between 1995 
and 2010. More specifically:
 • How have farm productivity, land use, and off- farm economic pursuits 
changed over time?
 • How has overall economic well- being changed over time, using locally rele-
vant indigenous wealth categories that are comparable to other studies?
 • Are changes in household wealth over time a consequence of selective emi-
gration and/or selective household dissolution?
 • Turning from households to individuals, how do individuals prosper or 
flounder with respect to the indigenous wealth ranking of their household?
 • And is there any difference by gender?
The second set of questions address whether wealth measures based on assets, 
explored in this collection of papers, offer a good indicator of broader well- being. 
Specifically I ask:
 • Are assets associated with farm productivity?
 • Are assets associated with absence of stress?
 • Are assets associated with educational performance of school- aged children 
in the household
 • Are assets associated with the growth of members under 15 years of age, and 
with BMI of adult household members?
Briefly, the answer to the first question is: production and asset holdings have 
generally increased, but with some worrying trends. To the second question, the 
answer is an unambiguous yes—assets tell us a lot about household well-being. 
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More generally, with respect to the divergence of views among researchers 
investigating changes in prosperity over time, I show that both narratives in 
their more extreme forms probably over- simplify the picture, and that there is 
considerable power in ethnographically based longitudinal studies, at least to 
the extent that they can be generalized.
In the next section I give the ethnographic context of the study and the  methods 
used to assess changes in economic livelihoods and consequences thereof. I then 
turn to answer the two questions concerning changes in economic livelihoods, 
and the value of wealth measures based on assets, before discussing the findings 
in their broader context and offering a brief conclusion from the study regarding 
the African Growth Miracle.
Ethnography and Methods
Introduction to the Village and Nation
The Rukwa Valley (previously Mpanda District, Rukwa Region; now Mlele 
District, Katavi Region) lies in western Tanzania to the east of Lake Tanganyika 
below the Ufipa Plateau. The traditional home of the Pimbwe people (Mgawe 
et  al. 2013) its villages are now a mix of Pimbwe and neighbouring Fipa and 
Rungwa groups (Willis  1966) and, like most other villages in Tanzania, repre-
sentatives of many other ethnicities. The area is and has for the last one hundred 
years been poorly served administratively in terms of infrastructure (Mgawe 
et  al.  2013, Seel  et al.  2014), labelled as a forgotten corner and administrative 
backwater of central Africa (Tambila 1981) and still seriously lagging in the 1990s 
(Jerve and Ntemi 2009). The national neoliberal reforms of the late 1990s were 
slow to affect life in Rukwa Region, but gradual improvements to the road into 
the valley (Kisi- Kibaoni, starting most notably around 2005), and efforts to link 
the regional capital Sumbawanga to the city of Mbeya 350km to its south, have 
brought greater economic opportunities to the valley, although primarily with 
respect to the agricultural sector. While Ufipa has long been dubbed a bread- 
basket of Tanzania, the northern Rukwa Valley (and similarly the communities 
along the shores of Lake Tanganyika) suffered from poor soils, no transport 
 network, and poor infrastructural development (e.g., Wandel and Homboe-
Ottesen 1992, Hadley et al. 2007). Like many other parts of western Tanzania vil-
lages in Mpimbwe have received an influx of Sukuma agro- pastoralists who began 
arriving in the area in the mid- 1970s (Salerno et al. 2017). The Sukuma live on 
the peripheries of villages, and have brought large numbers of livestock, co- 
operative work parties, new crops (sweet potato, rice), and the use of ox- drawn 
ploughs, as well as generating new jealousies between the ‘indigenous’ peoples 
and the immigrants (for further south in the Rukwa Valley, see Brockington 2001).
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Transformation of the agricultural sector from subsistence to commercial 
 production has been at the heart of Tanzanian policy since the early 2000s. Strategic 
frameworks include the Tanzania Development Vision 2025, the National Strategy 
for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP/MKUKUTA and ZSGRP/MKUZA), 
Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS), Agricultural Sector Development 
Programme (ASDP), Comprehensive African Agriculture (CAADP)-TAFSIP, and 
SAGCOT, culminating in Kilimo Kwanza launched in 2009. The impact of such pro-
grammes on the Rukwa Valley has been limited, but not negligible, due in part to the 
Pimbwe origins of the nation’s Prime Minister serving between 2008 and 2015 and 
the albeit highly delayed building of a tarmac road into the Rukwa Valley. This road 
was only effectively linked to the national network in 2016, but it was already making 
crop marketing much more practicable and profitable by 2006. Furthermore there 
was no implementation of the pilot phase of the Tanzania Social Action Fund’s con-
ditional cash transfers in the study area, an intervention with considerable social and 
economic benefits for vulnerable families elsewhere in the nation (Evans et al. 2014).
The data presented here were collected using full censuses of every household 
in the village of Mirumba conducted on seven occasions (always dry season) 
between 1995 and 2010; (subsequent visits until 2016 did not produce full cen-
suses). As elsewhere in Tanzania the village of Mirumba consists of a varying 
number of subvillages—all of which were censused unless they were predominantly 
Sukuma. The data therefore capture the lives of the non- Sukuma inhabitants of 
Mirumba village over a fifteen- year period, and were virtually exclusively collected 
by myself, almost always with one or more local assistant.
A household is defined by the identity of its household head(s) rather than 
physical location. There may be one or two household heads—either a married 
couple, a single man, or a single woman. Households can re- form across years due 
to death, migration, marriage, and divorce. In the analyses below a household is 
considered to be the same household across two consecutive censuses if it is 
headed by the same individual(s) at both censuses (all paired household heads are 
in heterosexual unions, unsurprisingly). A household is considered to have dis-
banded if not found in the village at the next census (although in some cases the 
household will have moved in its entirety to another village). Finally, a household 
is considered to be new if it is made up of a new pairing of individuals from within 
or outside of the village, even if they occupy a pre- existing, but subsequently 
abandoned, phys ic al structure.
Livelihoods in Mpimbwe
Farm production
Prior to successive expropriation of their traditional homeland primarily for con-
servation purposes (Borgerhoff Mulder et al.  2007, Seel et al.  2014) cassava 
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production, fishing, and hunting were central to Pimbwe livelihoods. Over the 
twentieth century cassava, finger millet, and increasingly maize became critical to 
subsistence, with cash crop production (maize, and in recent years sunflower, rice, 
finger millet, and sesame) gaining particular prevalence in recent years as op por-
tun ities for reliable sale are boosted by the improved road network out of the 
Rukwa Valley (in the 1990s sacks produced for sale were often found rotting in 
peoples’ homes or on the side of the road). Maize is currently both the primary 
subsistence crop and the most common cash crop. Typically maize surpluses are 
sold either directly after harvest or later in the year when prices climb, depending 
on a family’s immediate cash needs. Often, as a result of cash exigencies, a house-
hold will sell too much maize at harvest season, such that they run out of maize in 
their store prior to the next harvest. If this occurs before April/May, there is not 
yet green maize available for picking in the fields and maize (or maize flour) must 
be purchased (often for a high price). These observations motivate measures used 
in this study: the total number of sacks produced (total sacks [ttsacks]); and the 
number of months a household was without maize in the store prior to the next 
harvest (months without maize).
Land in Tanzania is ultimately the property of the village. Accordingly ques-
tions about land ownership are poorly understood. Furthermore typically it is 
access to land (described below) rather than land ownership that is of crucial 
importance to crop production. Land access is conditioned as much on labour 
availability, friendly ties to a household with surplus land and/or cash for paying a 
season’s rent as it is on nominal ownership. Typically in any given year well over 90 
per cent of households farm. The reasons for not farming are mixed, and include 
recent arrival in the village, impending departure, or labour shortages arising 
from sickness, pregnancy complications, or a diverse set of family problems. For 
example, severe illnesses or accidents, bereavement and witchcraft cases may 
necessitate long absences from the village that interfere with optimally timed 
planting and weeding, and can lead to fields being taken over by others and/or 
invaded by wildlife. Amongst active farmers in any one year, the amount of land 
in production varies considerably, primarily as a function of labour resources, 
health, and age; between 10–20 per cent of households cultivate less than an acre 
in any one year. Households often use multiple plots in any one year. To the extent 
that land is formally owned, it can be inherited typically from husband’s (patri- 
family) or wife’s (matri- family) parents, from the clearing of village bushland, 
from a direct purchase, or through the bestowal of land via village institutions (for 
example special dispensation from the school or the village chairman). The 
majority of farm work is provided by the members of the household, but a small 
proportion of households hire in paid wage labour for a certain period. Some 
households rent out land, for very variable rates, and/or simply allow others to 
farm there for free. Pimbwe claim fear of cattle, do not like to drink milk ‘mixed 
from different cows’, and traditionally avoided the use of oxen for ploughing, 
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although the use of ploughing services (with oxen, or very occasionally a tractor 
or power tiller) has grown in recent years. Goats, chickens, ducks, guinea fowl, 
and occasionally doves are kept for food, and starting around 2006 a few house-
holds keep pigs and/or cattle as sources of protein and cash.
To capture inequalities in land, livestock, and labour this study measures the 
percentage of households that farm in any one year (farming households), acreage 
in use in any one year (acres), source of acquisition of the household’s primary 
agricultural plot (provenance of plot), and the suite of household livestock con-
verted into total livestock units (Jahnke et al. 1988) (TLU). Unfortunately neither 
the hiring in of farm labour, the renting out of land, nor the renting and/or use of 
oxen for ploughing were systematically recorded across all censuses. However, by 
2010, between 80–85 per cent of households were still depending exclusively on 
hand- held hoe (jembe  in Swahili) cultivation, less than 5 per cent of households 
were renting out land for cash on a regular basis, and only 5–10 per cent house-
holds had used hired labour on their fields at some time in the year. Furthermore, 
the use of fertilizer and chemical inputs was rare before 2006, largely because of 
the common practice of burning last year’s straw prior to planting; slightly less 
than 5 per cent of Pimbwe households were using general (undifferentiated) pur-
chased inputs by 2010, though many families complained of insufficient cash to 
purchase much- needed improved seeds and modern fertilizers.
Off- Farm activities
Given the highly variable rainfall patterns, crop pests, theft, wildlife damage, 
problems with household labour, and variable soil quality (data recorded but not 
presented here) there is high food insecurity in the Rukwa Valley (Wandel and 
Homboe-Ottesen 1992, Hadley 2005, Hadley and Patil 2006, Hadley et al. 2007), 
and most families attempt to engage in supplementary off- farm activities. These 
are of various sorts. Some households rely on the harvest of natural resources 
(fish, meat, grass, bees, timber) and the associated secondary processing (carpen-
try, honey, baskets, thatch, rope, etc.). Others focus more on the provision of ser-
vices, which might include traditional medicine, sewing, butchery, pottery, 
brick- making, building, and repairing bicycles, buckets, shoes, hoes, etc. Others 
engage in small- scale trading of crops, dried sardines from Lake Tanganyika (such 
as dagaa in Swahili), or trade products (cooked food, harvested foods, other 
goods) either at monthly cattle auction markets (minaada in Swahili) or more 
informally in the village on temporary stands. In this study all such activities are 
grouped as crafts- trade; no attempt was made to estimate annual income from 
such activities because it was so evident that this was highly unpredictable. 
Nevertheless persistent engagement in such activities indicates a household is not 
entirely vulnerable to the vicissitudes of farming. Households who engage in trade 
on the basis of more considerable capital investment are considered as engaged in 
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business: this includes households with someone running a bar, a small shop 
(duka in Swahili) or semi- permanent kiosks (fixed locales with stored merchan-
dise for sale), a milling machine, or permanent eating venue (mgahawa in 
Swahili). Two activities are typically turned to by the more desperate: the provi-
sion of day labour (kuhemea in Swahili literally ‘shopping’) on Sukuma farms—
typically weeding in a given area compensated for with food (such as a few sweet 
potatoes or a scoop of maize or cassava flour, piecework), and the brewing (kukoroga 
in Swahili) of beer from maize (brewing). Working for Sukuma can be brutally 
hard work and is poorly rewarded (reportedly sometimes unrewarded), and 
brewing is not only exhausting, but entails using precious maize flour destined for 
family consumption, collecting large logs to support the lengthy boiling period, 
and disrupting the household on the beer- selling day with drunken revellers 
(though increasingly beer is now sold to local bars, avoiding this latter in con veni-
ence). Notably, however, brewing is also engaged in by wealthier households, spe-
cifically by women seeking to profit from a maize surplus. Accordingly, only 
households that, as off- farm activities, engage only in Sukuma day labour and/or 
brewing are considered as particularly poor in the wealth rankings developed 
below; households that supplement their economic portfolios with piecework 
and/or brewing are not necessarily particularly poor.
Wages and salaries
Wages can be earned by working as a farm labourer, assisting in a bar, shop, or 
milling machine, or serving as a watchman (for example, for the dispensary) or 
cook; by 2010 such opportunities increased with the arrival of the Chinese road 
builders; households with individuals engaged in such activities are classed as 
having wage labour. There are in addition a few salaried individuals in the village: 
these include the village secretary (mtendaji  in Swahili), primary school teachers, 
a nurse attendant, a few men working as rangers for the adjacent national park, 
and a foreman for a company in the regional town. These households are con-
sidered as salaried.
Material assets
Household productivity is primarily directed at securing food products (such as 
oil, salt, sugar, tea, etc.) that require purchase, the health of family members, the 
education of children, productive assets, luxury items, and better- built (and often 
more salubrious) houses. To monitor success in the acquisition of material assets 
a few items were monitored systematically across the years—these include buck-
ets, cooking pots, basic implements, hoes, watches, radios, kerosene lamps, 
bi cycles, drums (for beer brewing); in recent years to this list were added mobile 
phones, solar panels, TV- DVD sets, motor cycles, modern furniture like sofas, 
and cupboards. In previous analyses these have been combined in a cash value 
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(Borgerhoff Mulder and Beheim 2011). While cash assets as a measure of wealth 
can be problematic (Harttgen et al. 2013), they provide at least a coarse indicator 
of wealth differences at any one point in time. Like Brockington et al. (2018) I view 
assets as greatly preferable to income or consumption as a potential indicator 
of  family well- being; income suffers from many zero values, poor reporting of 
potentially sensitive information, and the fact that people with no assets are 
forced into working for money, such that presence of an income does not ne ces-
sar ily indicate well- being. Consumption expenditures were not measured, and 
would be extremely difficult for respondents to report (and recall) accurately. For 
this paper, given our interest in depicting changes over time, I quantify both the 
total (annually deflated) cash value (in thousand TZ shillings) of household assets 
(household assets), and the distribution of some key assets. Regarding cash value, 
most items have easily determined village prices identified on an annual basis. 
Regarding the annual deflation rate, despite the use of the recommended corrected 
deflators (pers. comm. Emmanuel Maliti) these measures are not ideal for 
comparing wealth over time. Accordingly I also look at some specific assets, 
examining separately three items—bicycles, drums, and the building material 
quality of the primary household residence (if the house is built of mud brick or 
sticks, of baked brick or improved with cement and/or a tin roof). Bicycles and 
building material quality are chosen because these are assets to which everyone 
aspires, for a combination of productivity, comfort and healthy/salubrious living 
conditions. Large metal drums (or barrels) are important capital for women, 
given the profits from beer brewing.
Indigenous Household Wealth Category Rankings
No wealth ranking of households was conducted in the field, though individual 
productivity (work effort and use of alcohol) was characterized for other purposes 
(Borgerhoff Mulder 2009). Accordingly all household economic data were exam-
ined retroactively and fitted into categories (IWC_cat) best capturing local classi-
fications easily recognizable among villagers and researchers alike over the years: 
‘destitute’, ‘very poor’, ‘vulnerable’, ‘struggling’, ‘satisfactory’, ‘productive’, ‘very pro-
ductive’, and ‘rich’ (described in the first two columns of Table 5.1). For present 
purposes I aligned my categories with two alternative household wealth- ranking 
schemas reported for East/South African countries: Dorward and Loiske. 
Dorward’s (2009) categories (IWC_dorward) of ‘dropping out’, ‘hanging in’, ‘step-
ping up’, and ‘stepping out’, to which two additional categories were added: ‘mar-
ginally dropping out’ and a ‘very comfortable’ existence (see column 3, Table 5.1). 
Loiske’s categories (IWC_loiske), comprised of ‘extremely poor’, ‘poor’, ‘average 
farmer’, ‘above average farmer’, ‘rich’, ‘very rich’, and ‘immensely rich’ (Brockington 
et al. 2018) were also coded from my initial categories for comparative purposes 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 01/07/21, SPi
Assets and Well-Being in Complex Social Environments 97












Destitute and unable to help self, often 
because ill, old, or alcoholic; nothing to 
rent out; often marginalized, scavenging, 









Destitute but able to do piecework for 
Sukuma and/or brewing, but have no 










Struggling through mix of beer brewing 
or piecework labour for Sukuma, 
off- farm activities in crafts and/or trade, 
but with very few assets and no other 
off- farm activities; erratic income/




[6] Poor; rents 





Struggling through piecework for 
Sukuma, brewing, off- farm activities in 
crafts and/or trade; supplemented by 
paid day labour, with some evidence of a 
few assets that are likely sold off in crisis, 
and erratic earnings; vulnerable to 
moving into destitute category, but not 




farmer; a few 




Satisfactory condition, with some 
productivity in farming, off- farm 
activities in crafts or trade; not typically 
forced to brew of do piecework for 
Sukuma; able to accumulate assets and 
some livestock, and possible investment 
in very small business enterprise and/or 




farmer; a few 




Relatively productive farm; effort 
invested additionally in business, crafts, 
and or trade, with some accumulation of 
assets through local production and/or 







some use of 
labourers
Continued
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(column 4, Table 5.1), although there were no households falling in the highest 
two categories (since none owned a tractor or a lorry in 2010). The categories 
used here overlap closely with those of other studies in the region (e.g., 
Mushongah and Scoones 2012). Despite the retroactive nature of my wealth cat-
egor ies the amount of data collected on each household made decisions over 
these rankings straight forward. This likely results from my having conducted 
more than 1,400 households interviews with families with whom I became very 
familiar over the fifteen- year period.
Additional Data on Education and Growth
To assess the impact of wealth measures (including assets) for household well- 
being, the data are combined with standard measures of educational performance 
and anthropometrics as reported elsewhere (Borgerhoff Mulder and Beheim 
2011). Educational attainment is measured by the standard/grade of school- 
aged children in the household for each year, calculated as a standardized residual 
on the cubic function of age (educational performance). As is common in Tanzanian 
village schools, students ‘repeat’ a year if they perform badly. Hence whether a 
child is relatively old or relatively young in a class, as measured here, is a good 
indicator of a child’s performance (and indeed his or her attendance) at school. 
Health is determined indirectly through the use of anthropometrics (heights and 
weights) conducted, on a voluntary basis, each census year. From linking these 














Productive farm with some paid labour, 
supplemented with diversified sources of 
income, such as successful trade or 
capital- intensive business (like a bar or 
milling machine, typically in a group); 
household would typically include a 
mobile phone owner by 2006 and 






Rich (40) Look comfortable in terms of farming; 
considerable modern assets; well- built 
house with furniture, cement, and maybe 
even glass; and often a salary and/or 
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residuals for height (Z-height) and weight (Z- weight) for all household members 
under 20 years of age at time of measurement can be calculated. For individuals who 
have passed their twentieth birthday Body Mass Index (BMI) is calculated (BMI), 
as is more appropriate. Since there is as yet very little obesity at the fieldsite, positive 
BMI measures are taken as indicators of a healthy rather than a diseased body.
Have Economic Livelihoods Improved or Faltered 
between 1995–2010?
Farming, Land, and Off- Farm Economic Pursuits 
Compared over Time
Using cross- sectional data, and comparing variables measured at the household 
level (Table 5.2a), we observe that the mean total number of sacks produced (pri-
marily maize, but also rice, sunflower, and sesame) has increased (notably since 
2004) over time (Figure  5.1a). This pattern likely reflects the gradual improve-
ment of transport into the Rukwa Valley, and policies to boost commercial crop 
production through Kilimo Kwanza and other initiatives. There has also been an 
increase over time in mean and variance in livestock holdings, most notably 
starting in 2006 (Table 5.2a, Figure 5.1b). Perhaps most notably, total value of 
household assets, and the variability in this measure (as measured by the  coefficient 
of variation) have increased steeply since 2004 (Table 5.2a, see also Figure 5.1f), 
reflecting purchase of mobile phones, basic furniture, solar panels, and in three 
instances motorcycles (Figure 5.1f). 
Despite this indication of greater productivity in the agricultural and livestock 
sector, the mean number of acres used (and variability therein) has remained 
quite stable (Table  5.2a), as has the proportion of households actively farming 
(Table 5.2b). Furthermore, despite considerable inter- annual variability in house-
holds that farm less than 1 acre, the percentage hovers at a little above 10 per cent 
(Table 5.2b). This cross- sectional perspective therefore gives evidence of greater 
farm productivity and no indication of consequential loss of access to land, or 
proletarization. While many Sukuma families (not included here) have arrived in 
the village since 1995, typically they establish farms outside of the village, only 
rarely taking possession of land formerly farmed by Pimbwe. Finally (data not 
shown) there is no noticeable change in the source of household land, with the 
majority (~40 per cent) acquiring their primary plot of land from the husband’s 
family, approximately 20 per cent from the wife’s family, 15–20 per cent from 
clearing bushland, 15 per cent through direct purchase, and the remainder either 
through a combination of rent and/or borrowing from other villagers, from 
Sukuma households, or granted through village institutions. The most concerning 
trend in the data is the large number of months (between four and six) that 
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Table 5.2a Household characteristics compared across years: continuous variables. 
Coefficient of variation (CV) is calculated as Std. dev./Mean, providing a standardized 
measure of inequality. A between group linearity coefficient in an ANOVA model is 
significant for total sacks (F1, 1440=79.99, p<0.001), livestock in TLU (F1, 1439=16.25, 
p<0.001), and household assets (F1, 1440=27.19, p<0.001), as shown in Figure 5.1






N 154 137 154 154 154
Mean 6.1087 4.7737 1.6740 3.5146 38.2818
Std dev. 5.21737 2.18280 2.53351 2.78553 68.34731
CV 0.8541 0.4573 1.5134 0.7926 1.7854
Range 25 10.00 14.40 15.00 306.15
Min. 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max. 25 10.00 14.40 15.00 306.15






N 183 na 182 176 183
Mean 4.1151 na 1.5258 3.7858 41.5017
Std dev. 5.24074 na 2.46586 2.35094 61.61767
CV 1.2735 na 1.6161 0.6210 1.4847
Range 36.00 na 14.80 13.50 276.92
Min. 0.00 na 0.00 0.50 0.00
Max. 36.00 na 14.80 14.00 276.92






N 193 171 193 189 193
Mean 5.3498 3.9825 1.2782 2.6730 35.8011
Std dev. 6.30353 2.73641 2.26448 1.78670 66.06115
CV 1.1783 0.6871 1.7716 0.6684 1.8452
Range 48.00 10.00 15.90 12.00 454.84
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max. 48.00 10.00 15.90 12.00 454.84






N 207 181 207 191 207
Mean 6.6928 6.4254 0.8077 2.1531 38.7244
Std dev. 7.44025 2.83847 1.38957 1.76547 61.14074
CV 1.1117 0.4418 1.7203 0.8200 1.5789
Range 49.00 12.00 7.60 13.00 330.84
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households have no maize in their store prior to the next harvest season 
(Figure  5.1c). This probably reflects temptation to sell food crops directly after 
harvest for much- needed cash, although note that there is no statistically linear 
trend in this measure. There is also weak evidence of greater inequality in farm 
production (total sacks show increased ranges and coefficients of variation across 
years, Table 5.2a).
Turning to off- farm activities, the proportion of households with one or more 
member doing piecework labour for Sukuma and in brewing varies greatly 
between years (particularly high in 1998 with El Nino and 2004 with heavy 
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max. 49.00 12.00 7.60 13.00 330.84






N 219 182 219 219 219
Mean 9.3816 6.7473 1.0982 2.0553 50.5002
Std dev. 12.91663 3.02327 2.21175 1.87112 68.45379
CV 1.3768 0.4481 2.0140 0.9104 1.3555
Range 95.00 12.00 21.00 12.00 354.03
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max. 95.00 12.00 21.00 12.00 354.03






N 224 202 224 224 224
Mean 11.7854 6.1089 1.6094 2.3969 92.0740
Std dev. 12.33836 2.99884 3.23097 1.96650 279.47930
CV 1.0469 0.4909 2.0076 0.8204 3.0354
Range 66.00 12.00 21.00 13.00 3089.93
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max. 66.00 12.00 21.00 13.00 3089.93






N 267 235 267 267 267
Mean 11.2137 4.4809 2.5764 2.8236 118.9566
Std dev. 14.70482 3.32991 4.23682 2.14937 390.62051
CV 1.3113 0.7431 1.6445 0.7612 3.2837
Range 132.00 12.00 24.50 15.00 5193.72
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max. 132.00 12.00 24.50 15.00 5193.72
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floods), but shows no overall secular trend (Table 5.2b). Similarly, the proportion 
of households supplementing farming with off- farm crafts and trade stays rela-
tively stable over time (Table  5.2b). Households engaging in business increase 
from 10 per cent to 25 per cent of the village (Table  5.2b), wage labour from 
13 per cent to 30 per cent (Table 5.2b), bike ownership from 23 per cent to 48 per 
cent (Table 5.2b, Figure 5.1d), drum ownership from 12 to 20 per cent, ownership 
of a primary dwelling with baked bricks from 17 per cent to 55 per cent 
(Table 5.1b, Figure 5.1e), and with a metal roof from 6 per cent to 16 per cent of 
the village (Table 5.2b).
In short, these descriptive cross- sectional data suggest farm productivity and 
the number of livestock owned have increased, with implications for housing 
quality, and the ownership of assets. This has not changed the proportion of 
households engaged in crafts and trade, but has increased the more capital- 
intensive business activities. These changes most likely reflect improved op por-
tun ities to market crop surpluses, and the availability of labour and ancillary 
0
1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2010












































































































Figure 5.1 Changes across years in (a) number of sacks harvested by the household, 
(b) number of livestock per household, (c) number of months without maize in the 
store (no data for 1998), (d) proportion of households with one or more bicycles,  
(e) building material quality of the primary residence, and (f) cash value of household 
assets (in thousand TZ shillings). Mean and standard errors (a–c, f), proportions  
























Table 5.2b Household characteristics compared across years: binary variables. A significant increasing linear patterning (Pearson’s Chi- square 
linear- by- linear association) is found over time for having one or more household member involved in business (Chi- square=78.75, n=1455, 
p<0.001), wage labour (Chi- square=123.69, n=1455, p<0.001), for the household owning one or more bicycles (Chi- square=51.36, n=1455, 
p<0.001), drums for beer- making (Chi- square=20.09, n=1455, p<0.01), and for the household being constructed of baked bricks and/or tin roof 
(Chi- square=20.09, n=1455, p<0.01). Households engaged in traditional trades and crafts have declined somewhat (Chi- square=78.75, n=1455, 
p<0.001)





Crafts/trade Business Piecework Brewing Wage 
labour




N 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 153 153
Proportion 0.93 0.08 0.55 0.10  0.65 0.13 0.07 0.23 0.12 0.17 0.06





Crafts/trade Business Piecework Brewing Wage 
labour




N 183 176 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183
Proportion 0.96 0.01 0.40 0.05 0.58 0.28 0.07 0.05 0.28 0.10 0.22 0.10





Crafts/trade Business Piecework Brewing Wage 
labour




N 193 189 200 200 200 200 200 200 193 193 193 193






















































Crafts/trade Business Piecework Brewing Wage 
labour




N 207 191 208 208 208 208 208 208 207 207 207 207
Proportion 0.88 0.12 0.34 0.03 0.00 0.38 0.03 0.05 0.26 0.09 0.32 0.09





Crafts/trade Business Piecework Brewing Wage 
labour




N 219 219 219 219 219 219 219 219 219 219 219 219
Proportion 0.91 0.21 0.42 0.16 0.50 0.66 0.37 0.07 0.33 0.13 0.42 0.11





Crafts/trade Business Piecework Brewing Wage 
labour




N 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224
Proportion 0.96 0.17 0.31 0.17 0.40 0.59 0.23 0.08 0.34 0.14 0.50 0.14





Crafts/trade Business Piecework Brewing Wage 
labour




N 267 267 267 267 267 267 267 267 267 267 267 267
Proportion 0.95 0.10 0.36 0.25 0.21 0.64 0.30 0.04 0.48 0.20 0.55 0.16
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business on the new road. Nevertheless the large number of months in which 
households are without maize is concerning, piecework for Sukuma continues, 
and inequalities in asset- holding and crop production are increasing.
Changes in Household Wealth Rankings over Time
Studies of economic change in the developing world commonly rely on wealth 
indices as an easy way (famously ‘without tears’, Filmer and Pritchett  2001) to 
assess wealth differences between households. Typically, these are based on prin-
cipal components analysis, with the first components being converted into a 
wealth rank whereby economic differences are identified. In most rural commu-
nities these days however it may be ill- advised as an analyst to assume that there is 
a single dimension along which economic capacity varies (e.g., Randall and 
Coast 2015). Heterogeneity among livestock herding, farming, wage earning, and 
business households renders economic indices based on PCA (e.g., Filmer and 
Pritchett 2001, Howe et al. 2012) problematic, since rarer household types that are 
doing well (or badly) may not load informatively on the first principal component 
(Bingenheimer 2007, Kaiser et al. 2017). For example in a comparison of fifty- six 
villages across northern Tanzania a generic wealth ranking revealed minimal dif-
ferences between monogamous and polygynous households, yet livelihood- 
specific measures of wealth (land in cultivation, livestock) showed polygynous 
households to cultivate more land and own more livestock (Lawson et al. 2015). 
Furthermore, wealth rankings are often poorly predictive of expenditures (Howe 
et al. 2009), and are also effectively impossible to compare across sites without a 
normalizing procedure that combines household wealth rankings with mean 
wealth per capita nationally, and national Gini coefficients (Hruschka et al. 2015).
Here I adopt a different approach, supplementing the raw data reported above 
with the use of indigenous wealth category rankings that aim to capture a constel-
lation of factors (assets, productivity, use of labour, coping mechanisms, etc., see 
Table  5.1) that impact a household’s well- being. Examining the cross- sectional 
distribution of indigenous wealth categories for households over censuses, there 
is corroborative evidence of economic improvement (Figure 5.2). The ‘destitute’ 
and ‘very poor’ (IWC_cat), the ‘dropping out’ or ‘marginally dropping out’ (IWC_
Dorward) and the ‘extremely poor’ (IWC_Loiske) are all declining in frequency. 
On the other hand, the ‘rich’ and ‘very productive’ (IWC_cat), the ‘stepping up’, 
the ‘stepping up and out’, and the ‘comfortable’ (IWC_Dorward), and the ‘rich’ and 
‘very rich’ (IWC_Loiske) have stayed quite stable. Where we see most expansion is 
among households I call ‘struggling’ (IWC_cat), Dorward calls ‘hanging in’, and 
Loiske call the ‘average farmer’. This likely reflects increasing economic op por tun-
ities in the village, particularly more wage labour and perhaps more clients for 
business activities.
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In short, not everyone is on the rising ship, but the new economy is increas-
ingly sheltering more people from total destitution. There was nevertheless little 
evidence (in 2010) of great riches extending beyond one or two families, notably 
those with political office.
Is Economic Improvement Caused by Selective Emigration?
Improvement in economic conditions could reflect differential outmigration from 
the village if, for example, relatively poor households are more likely to leave. 
Similarly very poor households may dissolve, and therefore not be present at a 
subsequent census. This selection dynamic is unlikely to mar inferences drawn 
from this study, since at each census all households (including new ones) were 
included. It is nevertheless of interest to determine whether household per sist-
ence (effectively the subsequent fate of the household within the next census (an 
interval of two, three, or four years)) is influenced by household wealth (in assets). 
This requires not cross- sectional but longitudinal analysis.
Households that persist with the same paired household heads across censuses 



























brown stepping up and out
amber: stepping up
yellow: hanging in











light grey: above av. farmer




Figure 5.2 The distribution of indigenous wealth categories across years: (a) categories 
created for this study; (b) data recoded to align with Dorward’s categories; (c) data 
recoded to align with Loiske’s categories.
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(e.g., 1995–8, 2004–6, and 2006–10). Also, households that re- form as new house-
holds between censuses, for example as a result of first marriages, of divorces, 
and/or remarriages, are typically somewhat poorer than more persistent house-
holds. Note however that the differences are not significant in any transition 
(Figure 5.3) resulting from the very large standard errors.
Briefly, differential household attrition cannot account for the increasing 
wealth of households over the 1995–2010 census because of the use of full cen-
suses in this study.
disappeared (27) new (15)
Household status in 1998
same (114)
disappeared (15) new (15)
Household status in 2002
same (169)
disappeared (34) new (11)
Household status in 2006
same (187) disappeared (40) new (25)
Household status in 2010
same (178)
disappeared (28) new (10)














































































































































Household status in 2000
same (146)
Figure 5.3 Plots showing the association between household wealth and persistence 
at subsequent census for transitions between (a) 1995 to 1998, (b) 1998 to 2000,  
(c) 2000 to 2002, (d) 2002 to 2004, (e) 2004 to 2006, and (f) 2006 to 2010. Households 
in the subsequent census are classified as ‘disappeared’ (the household is not found in 
the village at subsequent census), ‘new’ (the household is headed by a new pairing of 
individuals from within or outside of the village) or ‘same’ (the household is headed 
by the same individual(s) at both censuses). Number of households in parentheses. 
None of the differences in household assets between households of different status  
are statistically significant, although the pattern is quite consistent. (a) F=1.49, ns;  
(b) F=0.01, ns; (c) F=1.48, ns; (d) F= 1.76, ns; (e) F=1.56, ns; (f) F=1.26, ns.
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Wealth Transitions of Individuals
Given that households are somewhat ephemeral phenomena (as apparent from 
the sample sizes in Figure 5.3), it is perhaps more informative to focus on indi-
viduals as linked to their household wealth to see what wealth transitions look 
like at the personal level. Here, again using longitudinal data, I present transition 
matrices between indigenous wealth categories (Table 5.3; IWC_Loiske is shown, 
but the patterning is highly comparable across the other categorizations). To read 
the table, of the twenty- four individuals ranked as extremely poor in 1995, twelve 
advanced to being ranked as poor, eleven to average farmers, and five to above 
average farmers. In some years almost twice as many individuals moved up in 
status rather than down (these totals are shown in the table); only between 2000 
and 2002 was there a general decline in status reflecting reductions in economic 
activity contingent on a marked collapse in piecework, wage labour, and business 
in 2002 (Table 5.2b) that may be associated, in part, with a poor harvest and with 
livestock disease prompting the departure (temporarily) of many Sukuma house-
holds from the valley.
In short, focusing on individuals does not temper the general finding of 
improved economic circumstances for most people. Note however that future 
analyses will incorporate additional individual- level variables, in particular age, 
gender, marital status, and number of dependents as well as individual economic 
activities, to identify more precisely the factors influencing changing wealth status 
over an individual’s lifetime. The finding that individuals typically improved with 
respect to their household wealth between 1995 and 2010 may prove to be consid-
erably more nuanced than portrayed here.
Gender and Wealth Transitions
Household, or domestic unit, level data obscure intra- household inequalities. 
This is a problem because there can be marked differences in bargaining and 
decision- making power within households, patterned typically by gender and age 
(e.g., Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003, Doss et al. 2008, Bevis and Barrett 2013); 
this can be particularly acute in polygynous households (Barr et al. 2019).
The data from Mpimbwe allow two insights into such gender inequities: the 
first relies on individual economic activities (still to be analysed), and the second 
on the wealth rank transitions individuals make between two sequential censuses 
in which they are present in the village. This latter measure is inevitably some-
what constrained. This is because to the extent individuals remain in the same 
household paired to the same household head the improvements/declines in wealth 
























Table 5.3 Transition matrices for indigenous wealth categories (following Loiske).
  1995
  Extremely poor Poor Average farmer Above average farmer Rich    
1998 Extremely poor 24 17 10 2 0 59 down  
Poor 12 15 13 0 0  
Average farmer 11 16 27 6 0  
Above average farmer 5 3 14 19 11  
Rich 0 2 2 10 6  
Total 75 up 225  
  1998 Total  
  Extremely poor Poor Average farmer Above average farmer Rich    
2000 Extremely poor 23 8 17 2 0 56 down  
Poor 0 9 8 3 0  
Average farmer 40 33 22 6 2  
Above average farmer 5 5 19 32 10  
Rich 2 3 2 17 10  
Total 126 up 278  
  2000 Total  
Extremely poor Poor Average farmer Above average farmer Rich    
2002 Extremely poor 25 14 47 3 2 164 
down
 
Poor 17 7 32 13 1  
Average farmer 12 5 32 30 14  
Above average farmer 2 2 8 18 8  
Rich 0 0 2 10 12  

















































  2002 Total  
Extremely poor Poor Average farmer Above average farmer Rich    
2004 Extremely poor 30 13 6 2 0 47 down  
Poor 32 15 4 2 2  
Average farmer 19 27 60 6 0  
Above average farmer 1 6 9 18 12  
Rich 3 2 8 13 12  
Total 120 up 302  
  2004 Total  
Extremely poor Poor Average farmer Above average farmer Rich    
2006 Extremely poor 18 11 14 2 1 67 down  
Poor 8 16 4 2 0  
Average farmer 31 28 79 15 6  
Above average farmer 0 0 14 12 12  
Rich 0 2 7 10 20  
  Very rich 0 0 0 0 2  
Total 102 up 314  
  2006    
Extremely poor Poor Average farmer Above average farmer Rich Very rich Total
2010 Extremely poor 5 2 15 1 0 0 80 down
Poor 13 9 21 2 1 0
Average farmer 22 11 89 24 8 0
Above average farmer 5 0 17 6 6 0
Rich 0 0 15 4 23 0
Very rich 0 0 0 1 2 4
Total 90 up 306
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considerable instability of domestic units (with instability captured by any change 
in the paired household heads between two sequential censuses, as shown in 
Figure  5.3) there is some scope for analysing the different economic careers of 
women and men using these longitudinal data.
The distribution of all between- census transitions in wealth rankings for all indi-
viduals identified as household heads across years are shown in Figure 5.4 (IWC_
loiske is shown, but again the patterning is indistinguishable across the alternative 
indigenous wealth category rankings). Perhaps unsurprisingly this distribution 
clusters around no change, or a small trend towards positive change as averaged 
across transitions, as suggested in Table 5.3. The figure shows the indigenous wealth 
category transitions for gender. There is no obvious difference among men and 
women with respect to showing a declining, or indeed increasing, economic status. 
Again, caution is needed in interpreting this result of no sex differences in eco-
nomic status because of the constrained nature of the measure of household wealth. 
Furthermore, as noted above, more nuanced analyses incorporating a fuller range 
of individual- level measures are needed to determine whether there are really no 
within- household inequities in changing economic well- being over time.
Assets as Indicators of Well- Being
Asset holdings are increasingly becoming a widely used measure of wealth 
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Figure 5.4 The distribution of between- census transitions in wealth rankings for all 
individuals for women and men separately.
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productivity, indicators of household stress, and measures of the education and 
health of household members.
Assets and Farm Productivity
The relationship between productive assets and economic productivity is bidirec-
tional. With a bicycle a man can sell a fish in town, thereby enhancing the mo tiv-
ation to catch a surplus. With the extra cash, the gleam of a motorcycle can be 
seen in the eye of the fisherman, or more likely the farmer who will then diversify 
from maize and cassava to sunflower, a sack of which can be strapped on the back 
of the motorcycle and driven to town. Even more obviously, a farmer with oxen 
can bring more land into production than one without, and use her cash income 
to enter into a partnership over a tractor, thereby further increasing productivity, 
if land is available. Notably, items typically thought of as luxuries in some nations, 
such as a camera, a television, or a small solar panel can provide the basis for a 
business in a village—services for copying official documents, viewing sports 
events, or a mobile barber service respectively.
Recognizing then that causality is not easily specified, if assets are an important 
component to a household’s economic portfolio we would expect to see as so ci-
ations between a household’s assets and their productivity. Here we look at house-
hold assets [household assets] in relation to a key measure of productivity—the 
total number of sacks produced [total sacks] as well as the household’s ownership 
of livestock [TLU]. Bivariate correlations across years are shown in Table  5.4. 
Associations between household assets and economic productivity are positive 
and significant across all years, as are the associations between assets and livestock. 
An example of one such bivariate association, between total household assets and 
the total number of sacks produced is shown for the first census in Figure 5.5.
Table 5.4 Bivariate correlations within years of 
household assets with the total number of sacks 
produced and livestock owned. Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients and significance levels are shown
Year Total sacks Livestock in TLU
1995 .439 (154) ** .314 (154) **
1998 .507 (183) ** .268 (182) **
2000 .560 (193) ** .386 (193) **
2002 .545 (207) * .358 (207) **
2004 .607 (219) ** .464 (219) **
2006 .294 (224) ** .395 (224) **
2010 .608 (267) ** .602 (267) **
** P<0.01, * P<0.05.
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In short, household assets and livestock ownership are strong indicators of 
farm productivity, although the causality is likely bidirectional. 
Assets and Stress
If household assets protect against stress we would expect to see negative as so ci-
ations with both food insecurity and least preferred economic activities, in this con-
text conducting piecework (kuhemea) for Sukuma neighbours. The measure of food 
insecurity (months without maize) is based on the number of months without maize 
in the store, and shows strong and consistent negative associations with total house-
hold assets across years (Table 5.5, illustrated for 1995 only in Figure 5.6). Similarly, 
the engagement of one or more household members on Sukuma farms (piecework) is 
associated with low household wealth as measured by assets (Figure 5.7).
In sum, households with fewer assets experience longer periods with no grain 
in their store, placing their subsistence at the whim of the market prices, and they 
are more likely to resort to disfavoured option of working on Sukuma farms.  
Assets, Education, and Health
Ultimately as scholars we need to cast a much broader net around the concept of 
well- being, security, and satisfaction. Specifically we should combine measures 



















Figure 5.5 Bivariate plot of total sacks harvested and total household assets (in thousand 
TZ shillings). Data shown for 1995 only. For Pearson’s correlations, see Table 5.4.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 01/07/21, SPi
114 Monique Borgerhoff Mulder
both between and within households relationships, Koster 2018), and somatic wealth 
(individual endowments and capacities in health and education, Kaplan 1996). For 
example, we know that low perceived social support in Mpimbwe contributes both 
to maternal depression and food insecurity (Hadley and Patil  2006, Hadley et al. 
2007). With data on material, relational, and somatic wealth (or capital) we can begin 
to determine how and why successes (and failures) in each domain interact over time 
(Borgerhoff Mulder et al. 2009, Bowles et al. 2010). Here, as a first step, we explore 
whether household assets are associated with more distal (and perhaps more emi-
cally salient) indicators of well- being—education and growth of young household 























Figure 5.6 Bivariate plot of number of months without maize and total household 
assets (in thousand TZ shillings). Data shown for 1995 only. For Pearson’s 
correlations, see Table 5.5.
Table 5.5 Bivariate correlations within years of 
household assets with food insecurity. Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients and significance levels 
are shown
Year Number of months without maize
1995 –.536 (137) **
1998 no data
2000 –.345 (171) **
2002 –.319 (181) **
2004 –.210 (182) **
2006 –.316 (202) **
2010 –.306 (235) **
** P<0.01.
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securely identified, since healthy adults (and healthy and educated children) are 
more likely to be able to accumulate assets.
Looking first at schooling, there is a strong relationship between household 
assets in any one year and the age- specific education (educational performance) of 





















































































































































Figure 5.7 Plots showing the association between the presence or absence of a 
household member doing piecework (kuhemea) and household wealth for censuses in 
(a) 1998, (b) 2000, (c) 2002, (d) 2004, (e) 2006, and (f) 2010. T- test comparisons are 
significant or marginally significant across all years (1998: T=4.79, df=181, p<0.001; 
2000: T=2.97, df=191, p<0.001; 2002: n/a; 2004: T=5.09, df=217, p<0.001; 2006: 































Figure 5.8 Education of school- aged household members plotted on household 
assets (in thousand TZ shillings). Data shown for 1995 only. An ordinary least squares 
regression that combines data across all years, with repeated measures for subjects 
(n=1194) across censuses (<7), shows a significant positive association between assets 
and educational performance (F1,174=1.312, p=0.005).
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Turning to the health of household members, I use anthropometric data to 
look first at adults (those who have passed their twentieth birthday), whose 
growth is no longer positively associated with age. Body Mass Index (BMI) shows 
a small positive association with household assets (Figure 5.9). Finally, for indi-
viduals under 20 years, age- and sex- specific measures of heights and weights 
(Z-height) and weight (Z- weight) are more appropriate indicators of well- being. 
Again child heights and weights for age are positively associated with household 
assets (Figure 5.10).
In short, household assets are linked to good educational outcomes for school- 
aged household members, to adult BMI, and to the heights and weights of 
household members under 20 years of age.
Discussion
Changes in Economic Livelihoods over Time
With respect to my first question, it is clear that economic livelihoods have 
generally improved in Mpimbwe. Families produced and sold more crops in 2010 
than in 1995. Agricultural profits are invested in assets, including better houses, 
















Figure 5.9 The Body Mass Index (BMI) of adult household members (who have 
reached their twentieth birthday) plotted on household assets (in thousand TZ 
shillings). Data shown for 1995 only. Combining data across surveys ordinary least 
squares regression, with repeated measures of subjects (n=1,110) across 
anthropometric surveys (<7), shows a marginally significant positive association 
between assets and BMI (F1,159=1.173, p=0.082).
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men and women buy oxen). Furthermore the indigenous wealth categories clearly 
show that the poorest are getting less poor (and/or less numerous), rather than 
the rich getting richer (with a few exceptions). Interesting this was not my sub-








































































Figure 5.10 The growth of household members prior to their twentieth birthday 
plotted on household assets. Plots show standardized residuals of (a) height and (b) 
weight on age, standardized for each sex. Data shown for 2004 only. Ordinary least 
squares regression with repeated measures of subjects (n=754, n=936) across 
anthropometric surveys (<7) shows a significant positive association between assets and 
height, and assets and weight (F1,128=1.365, p=0.008, F1,134=1.729, p<0.001) respectively.
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now stand out as being particularly deprived.1 These positive changes largely 
reflect the growth in commercial farming which is no doubt contingent on 
improved policies and better marketing opportunities, including the new roads 
connecting Sumbawanga to Mbeya, and the northern Rukwa Valley to the Fipa 
Plateau. Other improvements in public services—a partially staffed dispensary in 
Mirumba since the early 2000s and a ward secondary school—are also likely 
important contributors.
A worrying concern is the large number of months families are without grain 
in their barns, reflecting a tendency for households to sell maize after the harvest 
for much- needed cash, or to convert it into beer (again for cash). Similarly, it is 
worth stressing that many households still resort to piecework farm labour, paid 
with a bowl (bakuli in Swahili) of grain for a day’s work, and that they question 
whether the arrival of the Sukuma is a net positive or negative development for 
the people of the Rukwa Valley (Seel et al. 2014). In addition in a community 
where inequalities are quite marked (Pimbwe household wealth shows a Gini 
coefficient of 0.56, see Gurven et al. 2010) increasing inequalities in crop production 
and assets ownership is an unwelcome trend.
McMillan and Harttgen (2014) find that much of Africa’s recent growth and 
poverty reduction can be traced to declines in the share of the labour force 
engaged in agriculture. These authors attribute poverty reduction to an increase 
in the productivity of labour as it moves from low productivity agriculture to 
higher productivity manufacturing and services (see also Dercon and Gollin 2014, 
who find little evidence that investments in agriculture generate improvements 
in social welfare in sub- Saharan Africa). While this may be true at the national 
level, at the local level economic advances are being made primarily through agri-
culture, as seen in Mpimbwe and other sites in Tanzania. More broadly, studies of 
social change in agrarian contexts suggest that rural labour markets fuel differen-
tiation within villages that favour only a minority (Mueller  2011, Greco  2014). 
While this had evidently not occurred in Mpimbwe by 2010, there are indications 
that such changes might be underway, with the emergence of one or two very rich 
and politically connected families (pers. obs. 2014, 2016).
The developments in Mirumba are quite similar to those at other sites in 
Tanzania covered in this volume. Most notably, concepts of wealth and well- being 
in Mpimbwe are largely congruent with those found elsewhere (but cf. Chapter 3). 
This is perhaps unsurprising given the considerable homogeneity among many of 
Tanzania’s ethnic groups, given linguistic integration under Swahili and the rela-
tively strong market incursions in much of the country. For example, as in 
Howland and colleagues’ chapter, uwezo (Swahili for ‘power, ability’) is commonly 
mentioned as an indicator of economic security and well- being.
1 I have discussed this discrepancy elsewhere http://livelihoodchangeta.wixsite.com/tanzania/blog.
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Pimbwe stress the importance of household independence and autonomy, 
again consistent with Howland and colleague’s observation that ‘dependence on 
others’ is an indicator of poverty. Indeed, even at the individual level, to set up 
one’s own household (kujipikia in Swahili, literally ‘to cook for oneself ’) marks a 
major rite of passage and success in attaining independence. A quantitative 
study of sharing between households revealed surprisingly few ties among 
households (particularly the richer households) compared to other sites globally 
(Kasper and Borgerhoff Mulder 2015) and in Tanzania (De Weerdt and Dercon 
2006) where, in contrast to Mpimbwe, the rich are more strongly networked than 
the poor (De Weerdt 2004). Yet despite this prized striving for independence, per-
ceived social support networks prove to be important for child health outcomes 
(particularly among poorer families, Hadley  2004). Clearly there is a  tension 
between the much- coveted autonomy and having to rely on the help of kin 
networks.
I did notice, however, some nuance to the discussion around the possession of 
material assets among the people of Mpimbwe, insofar as the ownership of visible 
material wealth attracts accusations of witchcraft (Borgerhoff Mulder and 
Beheim 2011, Kasper and Borgerhoff Mulder 2015). Assets can be seen as dan-
gerous liabilities, because they lure envy. In their day- to- day conversations, the 
Pimbwe appear to place more value on the means of production (access to land, 
livestock, and labour) and on the products of their labour (sacks of grain to store/
sell, and cash) than on consumer items per se, perhaps because of their fears of 
jealousy. There is less evidence of this at other sites reported in this collection. 
Furthermore, access to cash is the subject of much daily discussion in village 
life, particularly among women, again diverging somewhat from the site reports 
in Howland et al. (2021). Variation in the extent to which Tanzanian communities 
value productive capital as opposed to goods that signal status might be an 
interesting question to explore across the sites represented in this collection 
of chapters.
Finally, and consistent with other sites, education is considered an important 
aspect of wealth, although there is acute awareness that the costs invested in edu-
cating children (substantial, despite the recent availability of free secondary 
schooling at the ward level) are rarely compensated for, given the rarity with 
which secondary- educated students obtain paid employment. Education is clearly 
a gambit—it places individuals in a better position to start and successfully run 
small business ventures at the village level, but it also puts them at high risk of 
frustration, despair, and depression often because unemployed ex- students feel 
they are letting their family down.
Ultimately in Mpimbwe the path out of poverty still lies in farming (including 
livestock production), with people converting their profits into improved housing 
quality and assets, although there has also been an increase in capital- intensive 
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business activities and opportunities for wage labour. However, as noted above, 
not everyone is on the rising ship.
Assets as an Indicator of Well- Being
Turning to my second question, household assets are a useful indicator of well- 
being. Assets show consistent associations with productivity, with absence of 
measures of stress, and with education and health outcomes. As such, the general 
increase in assets over the period between 1995 and 2010 reveals a broader posi-
tive trend for peoples’ lives.
The direction of causality between assets, productivity, education, and health 
(as measured through anthropometrics) is nevertheless not necessarily one way. 
In some cases, asset are clearly causal. For example, children living in houses with 
concrete floors are more likely to avoid infections than those in mud houses, and 
therefore to grow better. The associations of assets with education and piecework 
however are less direct. Most likely, families with the cash to buy lamps, bicycles, 
and even a mobile phone are more likely to be able to purchase uniforms and 
shoes for their children’s schooling, and to avoid the food shortages that drive 
household members into daily piecework. Here the assets are not a direct cause of 
positive well- being outcomes, but rather an indicator of ability or uwezo (Howland 
et al., this volume); indeed assets likely function as important stores of value, par-
ticularly in rural areas where agricultural production is seasonal. Furthermore, 
assets may provide the additional benefit of protecting families from requests for 
cash loans—when earnings are tied up in bricks they can’t easily be solicited by 
needy relatives. Finally assets, or rather the lack thereof, act as clear signals of 
poverty or want. For all these reasons assets may be implicated in positive well- 
being outcomes for families, but through diverse pathways.
Before leaving the association between assets and well- being two caveats are 
required. First, despite the predictive value of assets in this study, it is important to 
emphasize that how poverty or wealth is best measured necessarily depends on the 
researchers’ goal. If the objective is to determine how to reduce poverty, my view is 
that it is best to take an emically informed stance on what constitutes ‘poverty’ or 
‘wealth’ in a community. In this regard my fifteen- plus years of ethnography in 
Mpimbwe would suggest that food security, child health, and education are the 
principal goals (or targets) of most Pimbwe adults (male and female). Households 
that secure these goals are not ‘poor’. Accordingly, the appropriate analytical strategy 
would be to identify the strongest economic predictors of these targeted outcomes. As 
such, we should not be focusing, necessarily somewhat arbitrarily, on any preferred 
measure (e.g., assets, income, consumption, etc.). Rather we should combine 
multiple dimensions of ‘wealth’ through the use of shadow pricing (e.g., Borgerhoff 
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Mulder et al. 2009). This procedure first calculates the regression coefficient of, for 
ex ample, livestock ownership, agricultural land, and house quality on, say, child 
survival. It then uses these estimated parameters to weight these predictors 
(livestock, land, house type) as indicators of poverty (or the absence thereof). In 
this way the predictors of emic wealth are empirically recoverable.
Second, households are aggregations of individuals whose interests do not 
ne ces sar ily coincide. Their boundaries are highly permeable, and their per sist-
ence over time is variable. Accordingly, further analysis of these data should 
in corp or ate individual- level variables, in particular age, gender, birth order, 
marital status, and number of dependents, as well as individual economic activ-
ities, to identify more precisely the factors influencing changing well- being over 
an individual’s lifetime. The inferences that can be drawn from household level 
studies are therefore limited (see also Doss et al. 2008, Randall and Coast 2015, 
Madhavan et al. 2017).
The Value of Village- Level Studies
Are longitudinal village level studies, such as reported here, worth the effort? 
And, a related question, can we generalize from case studies such as this? There 
are three points to make. First, village- level data have considerable importance in 
pointing to the paths whereby national developments affect the lives of citizens. 
Second, spatial heterogeneity in prosperity within nations is increasing, making 
locally based studies increasingly relevant for policy. Third, such studies are 
unusual.
Who benefits from national level changes in prosperity? The literature on 
African economic performance focuses on aggregate average growth rates, and 
pays little attention to the quality of that growth, the distribution of such growth, 
and the significance for the individual actors (Jerven 2010 and 2013). Furthermore 
we now know from using multilevel modelling across Demographic Health 
Survey sites in Tanzania that aggregate level statistics can both conceal and exag-
gerate associations observed at the level of individuals and villages (Lawson 
et al. 2015). In addition, national level studies typically ignore emic views on well- 
being (Tucker et al. 2011). Against this background anthropologists, geographers, 
rural sociologists, and some economists are motivated to collect and analyse 
individual- level economic data at the village level (for a pioneering example, see 
Bliss and Stern 1982), to operationalize their variables in ways that make sense 
locally, to capitalize on the quality rather than the quantity of data, and where 
possible to conduct long- term studies. With individual data taken at the village 
level we can begin to determine who benefits from national level changes in the 
economy, and (ultimately) how. In short village studies provide insights into the 
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specific pathways and mechanisms whereby developments at the national (and 
global) level impact peoples’ lives.
Specificity nevertheless trades off against generality. Is this a problem? If 
nations were relatively homogenous the answer might be no. The global pattern-
ing of inequality is nevertheless changing, with levels declining between nations 
and increasing within nations (Atkinson et al. 2011, Lakner and Milanovic 2013). 
Indeed, recent use of high resolution spatially patterned data reveals that despite 
national- level improvements in children’s growth and education between 2000 
and 2015, striking subnational heterogeneity persists, differences that are even 
widening in sub- Saharan countries (Graetz et al. 2018, Osgood-Zimmerman et 
al. 2018). To the extent that this is general, attention must shift from national to 
local patterning of inequality, if we are to address the causes, dynamics, and 
potential solutions to poverty. Here again village- level studies are particularly 
valuable.
Finally, as noted in the introduction to this collection, village- level economic 
studies are surprisingly rare, particularly those that track poverty dynamics using 
panel analyses. The present study is unusual in that it provides an immensely 
detailed longitudinal account of the fate of all villagers using repeat censuses 
across years. Censuses are preferable to samples, insofar as marginal individuals 
are less likely to be missed. Furthermore the economic circumstances of house-
holds that disappear, and that arrive, are detected. With additional analysis of 
the present data, the dynamics whereby individuals both manage and fail to 
prosper can be determined. Whether or not the effort is worthwhile will depend 
on further insights that can be gleaned from these data, although the experience 
of sharing so many of these adventures with different families has definitely been 
valuable for both the researcher and (at least hopefully some of) the community.2
Conclusion
What can we conclude more generally from case studies such as this for the debate 
over the ‘African Growth Miracle’?
Certainly this result is surprising. Rukwa, as noted above, has been peripheral 
to development consistently over the last one hundred years. It lay between 
Belgium, German, French, and British areas during the ‘Scramble for Africa’ 
period, and then served as a ‘labour reserve’ (Tambila 1981, Mgawe et al. 2013, 
2 On a personal note, this long- term economic research helped galvanized a campaign to improve 
social, economic, and ecological conditions in Mpimbwe, an initiative that has now become growing 
as a grassroots community programme http://www.lcmo.or.tz/.
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Seel et al.  2014). Even with significant development initiatives (such as ‘Rukwa 
Ruka’ (‘Rukwa Fly’ in Swahili), Jerve and Ntemi 2009), it lagged behind into the 
2000s in terms of education, food security, and productivity, especially in the 
Rukwa Valley (Wandel and Homboe-Ottesen 1992).
More generally, what do findings like this imply for the debate over the ‘African 
Growth Miracle’? Some will find vindication of their views, and others will see 
this as a localized exception that cannot be taken as representative. In reality, this 
study neither endorses nor refutes either narrative. It does not make a claim of 
that order. Rather it reveals the value of detailed data of this sort, and of measures 
with which we can understand better the dynamics of social change. Furthermore, 
with such data across sites that enjoy different levels of state investment in public 
goods, it would be possible to investigate the interactions between private wealth 
and public goods—dynamics that are critical to understand if Tanzania is to reduce 
its substantive, and in some instances increasing, regional inequalities (Maliti 2016).
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Economic Growth, Agriculture, and Intensification
There has been considerable attention and debate, at a macro- level, on the 
changes taking place in agriculture across the African continent and whether 
these changes are or can result in poverty reduction and significant economic 
transformation (Collier and Dercon 2014, Barrett et al. 2017, Christiaenensen et al. 
2011, Davis et al. 2017). Generally in Africa, economic growth has increased sig-
nificantly particularly from 2000 onwards (Jayne et al. 2010, 2018, Binswanger- 
Mhkize et al. 2010, 2017, Andersson Djurfeld et al. 2018). GDP in the region has 
grown by nearly 35 per cent between 2000 and 2014 (Jayne et al. 2018: 777). The 
drivers of growth vary but signs point to urbanization, infrastructural development, 
and tourism (Barrett et al. 2017). Annual agricultural growth, by comparison, has 
been smaller, with a growth of just 4.6 per cent between 2000 and 2016 (Jayne 
et al. 2018: 777, figures adjusted for inflation). Nevertheless, there are changes in 
this sector, with changing diets and growing urban populations demanding more 
food. Liberalized policies have led to an influx of new varieties of improved seeds 
and other agricultural inputs (Jayne et al.  2018, Reardon  2015). Barrett et al. 
(2017) suggest there is a wider structural transformation of rural economies 
 taking place with traditional forms of agriculture becoming more productive.
These differing portrayals of rural affairs have quite different implications for 
our understanding of change in rural communities. The sober view of African 
agriculture portrays rural communities that are, economically, changing little 
compared to the other sectors. The more optimistic view suggests more dyna-
mism. This chapter provides a different perspective on these debates. Here we 
focus on the micro- level to explore how changes in the wider national economy 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 01/07/21, SPi
130 Katherine A. Snyder, Emmanuel Sulle ET AL.
have affected the lives and livelihoods of a rural community in Tanzania. This 
attention to the local level expands our understanding of the impact of change but 
complicates the picture constructed by macro accounts (Mashindano et al. 2011) 
that have described stasis, if not growing poverty, in the agricultural sector, 
because the forms of growth are not benefitting the rural poor. Östberg et al. 
(2018) and Brockington et al. (2018) provide similar accounts of changes in liveli-
hoods in rural communities elsewhere in Tanzania.
We focus on the local level because, at the heart of the debate about change to 
rural economies in Africa and the agricultural sector is the question of intensifi-
cation. In what circumstances have smallholders increased their productivity—
and how readily have they done so? Yet, specifically with respect to intensification 
there is a particular deficiency of detailed studies that track communities and 
families over time. As Brockington et al. (2018) observe, the studies and data that 
inform these analyses draw upon data sets that do not provide adequate illustra-
tion of what is actually happening in rural communities. Drilling down to com-
munity level shows how varied and differentiated economic growth, agricultural 
productivity, and changes in livelihoods can be (Andersson Djurfeldt et al. 2018). So, 
local level studies, to contextualize growth as Andersson Djurfeldt et al. (2018) argue, 
are im port ant for assessing some of the conclusions that arise from the national and 
regional- level data. This research aimed to understand growth and changes in 
livelihoods and agricultural production in a rural community in Tanzania over a 
thirty- year period. We investigated the relationship between national trends, policy, 
and local farming practices and outcomes at the local level in Mbulu District.
Tanzanian Policies: Smallholder Farming and Intensification
In Tanzania, as a result of economic liberalization policies in the 1980s and 
onwards, basic consumer goods became more available in the 1990s and the 
monopoly of state trading companies and co- operatives ended. Liberalization of 
input and output markets has had an impact, particularly on maize production 
which Cooksey states ‘has been one of the success stories of agricultural lib er al-
isa tion in Tanzania’ (2011: 561). In the ’90s, overall macro- economic growth, as 
measured by GDP, was very slow. But, as Andersson Djurfeldt et al. (2018) note, 
growth picked up dramatically in the 2000s. This pattern in Tanzania matches 
change across the continent (Jayne et al. 2018).
More than 70 per cent of Tanzanians depend on agriculture for their liveli-
hoods (Msuya et al.  2018). While agriculture is critical to Tanzania’s national 
economy, its share of GDP declined from 50 per cent in 2000 to less than 24.7 per 
cent in 2014 (Msuya et al. 2018: 139). This decline reflects growth in other sectors 
of the Tanzanian economy such as construction, mining, and services. Within 
agriculture, growth can be traced to an increase in production of products like 
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tomatoes, onions, and potatoes and an increase in the staples of maize and rice 
(Coulson 2015). Various national policies from 2000 onwards have attempted to 
spur agricultural growth. The Agriculture Sector Development Programme 
(ASDP) which came out in 2001 had, as its goal, a 5 per cent per annum increase 
in agricultural growth and to reach 10 per cent by 2010 (Coulson 2015: 56). The 
focus of the ASDP was on production, rather than on marketing, which Coulson 
argues would have given more significant benefits to farmers.
In 2009, the Tanzanian government launched Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture 
First) which highlighted public- private partnerships and emphasized investment 
in large- scale agriculture and outgrower schemes that smallholders would join. In 
parallel to Kilimo Kwanza was the launching of the Southern Agricultural Growth 
Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). SAGCOT targets roughly one- third of the land 
area of Tanzania for large- scale agricultural investment, encouraging foreign 
direct investment and partnerships with smallholder producers who would 
produce on contracts (Coulson 2015: 60).
These policy responses are the latest in a long search across many African 
countries for ways of improving growth in the agriculture sector. As is evident 
from the shift in national policy in Tanzania, large- scale agriculture and signifi-
cant investment, often from foreign investors, is seen to be a key strategy to 
achieve growth. Others have argued that the smallholder sector in particular, 
because it supports most of Tanzania’s rural population, deserves more invest-
ment and support. In his review of smallholder and large- scale farming in 
Tanzania, Coulson concludes:
[O]verall, as it was for the Germans more than 100 years ago and for the 
British 60 years ago, the cheapest and quickest means to increase agricultural 
production in Tanzania is to support and trust small farmers by ensuring that 
marketing arrangements are in place that will give them fair prices for the 
crops they sell. (2015: 66)
There have been several reviews of the contributions of small farms to overall 
development and poverty reduction in developing countries, and Africa in par-
ticular (Wiggins et al. 2010, Graeub et al. 2016, Lowder et al. 2016). Proponents of 
investing in large farms claim they have greater efficiency (in terms of output per 
person) and benefit from economies of scale. Those in favour of small farms argue 
to the contrary, suggesting that small farms have higher productivity per hectare. 
There is some consensus that, depending on agro- ecological conditions and 
access to inputs and other support, extremely small holdings are unlikely to 
secure livelihoods or reduce poverty (Wiggins et al. 2010, Harris and Orr 2014). 
Indeed, there is literature which suggests that for the very poor, off- farm income 
generating activities are more critical for their livelihoods and survival 
(Bryceson 2002). In terms of reducing poverty, Wiggins et al. indicate that there 
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are still ‘few studies that directly compare the impact on poverty of agricultural 
growth from large farms to that from small’ (2010: 1344). Arguments against the 
‘unproductive’ small farm are used to justify the promotion of large farms through 
foreign or national investment.
At the heart of the question of whether smallholders can sustain a trans form-
ation in productivity is the issue of intensification. There are two components to 
this—can more food be produced (to meet future needs and sustain growth) and 
can it be produced sustainably, without environmental degradation. Through 
‘Sustainable Intensification’, it is hoped that ‘yields are increased without adverse 
environmental impact and without the cultivation of more land’ (Royal 
Society 2009, cited in Garnett and Godfrey 2012: 8). Development agencies and 
international agricultural research centres such as the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), increasingly focus on promoting 
an African Green Revolution involving increased inputs in the form of improved 
seeds, chemical fertilizer, irrigation, and mechanized agriculture. The approach of 
these programs is primarily technical and quantitative in the form of higher yields 
(Scoones and Thompson 2011, Davidson 2012, Ollenburger et al. 2019). While 
experts see intensification as the way forward for African agriculture, adoption of 
some of the recommended practices by smallholder farmers remains low. In part, 
low adoption rates reflect farmers’ real concerns with the increased risks that 
come along with dependence on the market, with growing cash crops, with using 
inorganic fertilizer, and with shifting cropping patterns. Diversification is more 
often the strategy that farmers follow as a response to the highly unpredictable 
environment in which they live.
Part of the problem in advancing this debate is the poor quality of data that are 
available. Measuring agricultural productivity is challenging in most global south 
contexts as the data can be unavailable or unreliable. While Tanzania puts consid-
erable effort into gathering credible statistics, farmer recall and estimates can be 
very challenging. Additionally, agricultural officers may feel pressed to report posi-
tive figures of growth (Coulson 2015). National- level figures also mask the signifi-
cant differences at the regional and local level. However, the lack of data does not 
stop the proliferation of truth claims. As Christiaensen observes of African agricul-
ture ‘stylized facts drive research agendas and policy debates. They provide a sense 
of importance, help frame the inquiry and are used to galvanize resources’ (2017: 1).
The Setting and Research Μethod
To explore these various themes on poverty, agricultural development and small-
holder intensification, this chapter will focus on one farming community from 
1990 to the present. It traces the factors influencing farmers’ decisions and their 
assessment of the changes in their livelihoods.
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Its focus is the Iraqw people who are an agro- pastoral, southern Cushitic- 
language speaking people who live throughout Arusha and Manyara Regions in 
northern Tanzania. This research focuses primarily on Kainam and Murray wards 
in Mbulu District, which the Iraqw refer to as their ‘homeland’. The district sits 
between Lake Manyara and Lake Eyasi and has a population, as of the 2012 cen-
sus, of 320,279 people, up from 237,280 in 2002. Both Kainam and Murray wards 
were sub- divided more recently to create two new wards, Nambis and Nahhasey. 
With the sub- division of the original two wards come further resources from dis-
trict government, in the form of schools and health facilities. This research 
includes these new wards.
The highland homeland of the Iraqw people ranges in elevation from 1,500 to 
2,300m and is densely populated at over 240 per sq km. The total population of 
this area is 36,362, up from 19,048 in the 1988 census. The Iraqw name for this 
area is Irqwa Da’aw or Mama Issara in Swahili. Migration out of the homeland has 
been taking place since the colonial era and now Iraqw are found throughout 
Arusha and Manyara Regions and, more recently, are moving as far away as 
Kilindi and Handeni near the coast, a distance of over 500km.
This chapter focuses on smallholder agriculture yet has to be taken in the con-
text of what broader purpose and livelihood these activities sustain. Iraqw defi n-
itions of poverty are bound up with wider national and global narratives around 
development (Swahili: maendeleo). Most Iraqw define wealth as a combination of 
material assets, together with the ability to educate your children, take care of 
your family’s health, and the ability to withstand shocks. Of course, the assets that 
count as valuable change over time (Green and Hulme 2005). Indeed, particularly 
when assets are considered, the measurements of wealth are constantly changing 
(Brockington et al 2019). For example, assets that people mention now as de sir-
able and important to acquire include electricity (often solar), cell phones, sheet 
metal for roofing, bricks for building, and motorcycles. Most of these were 
un attain able or unavailable in the 1990s. What enables them to acquire these 
assets varies from household to household but includes wage labour, selling crops, 
livestock, and, significantly, tree products. Many respondents suggested that if 
you work hard, use improved seeds, apply manure to your field, and take care of 
your livestock, you will achieve maendeleo.
Mama Issara is well watered with springs and streams running year- round. 
Rainfall is bimodal and averages 1,000mm a year. In the cold dry season, mist 
accumulates in this highland area making cultivation of wheat and other crops 
possible on the hillsides. Dry- season cultivation also takes place in the valley bot-
toms where irrigation, primarily by buckets or furrows, is often used.
In the homeland, farmers cultivate small plots of land (average is 2 acres) by 
hand hoe. Cultivation with ox plough is impossible as the slopes are too steep and 
the valley- bottom soils too dense and often waterlogged. Agricultural production 
focuses on maize and beans (which are both staples and sold for cash), sweet 
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potatoes, Irish potatoes, wheat, sorghum, millet, leafy greens, bananas, onions, 
and tomatoes. Some crops grown in the 1990s, such as finger millet, appear not to 
be grown today. Crops grown specifically for cash include tobacco, pyrethrum, 
and coffee. For a brief period in the early 2000s, farmers planted artemisia when a 
foreign investor came with seeds and agreed to buy the harvest. This project went 
well for a couple of years (though some farmers complained the plants, which are 
used to cure malaria, brought mosquitoes) but then the investor disappeared and 
farmers uprooted the plants. Coffee has gone through many vicissitudes accord-
ing to global prices and local marketing issues, but is now on the upsurge again 
with farmers planting new varieties.
Colonial- era agricultural officers held up the Iraqw as model farmers, extolling 
their sophisticated soil management practices (Snyder  1996). Archival docu-
ments reported on labour- intensive bench terraces, cut- off drains, contour plant-
ing, mulching, crop rotation, and intercropping. The Iraqw farming system in the 
homeland has attracted much attention over time, both from colonial agricultural 
extension officers and from scholars interested in intensive agriculture 
(Börjeson 2007). From the colonial era to the present, there has been considerable 
change in land- use practices as farmers respond to national and global markets 
and as population pressure changes how they use their limited land resources. 
According to oral history and colonial reports, Iraqw farmers in the homeland 
produced enough food to meet their needs in the colonial era and, in times of 
drought, were able to supply neighbouring, drier areas with food.
Of the authors, Snyder has been carrying out research for nearly three decades, 
for long and short periods, in this area. Sulle, Massay, Petro, and Qamara have 
grown up in the homeland and the latter two still reside there. Brockington has 
long- term research experience in Tanzania in neighbouring zones, including with 
the Iraqw. The study combined qualitative (focus groups and interviews) and 
quantitative methods and compared data across two household surveys, one car-
ried out in 1995 (n=150), the other in 2017 (n=180). Over twenty individuals were 
interviewed, including farmers, extension officers, government officials, timber 
sellers, maize traders, and input sellers. Six focus groups were held with women, 
men, and youth (separately). Long- term experience in one farming community 
allows for a unique perspective not only on specific indicators of change, such as 
production or the increase in assets, but also affords insight into the meanings 
attached to these changes and the social dynamics that such changes affect.
Findings
Changes to Agriculture
In the 1990s, some of soil management techniques were on the decline and youth 
complained they were old- fashioned practices from colonialism (Snyder 1996: 327). 
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Today, fewer people have terraces and they have instead adopted less intensive soil 
conservation practices as indicated in Table 6.1 below. Intercropping and crop rota-
tion are still widely practiced. Tree planting is widespread but, according to our 
sources, is carried out less for soil erosion control than for income generation.
In the 1990s, surplus production had declined considerably and many (90 per 
cent) relied on buying food, or exchanges with relatives and friends (kuhemea) to 
meet their needs (the majority of farmers reported only meeting 62 per cent of 
their needs). In the 2017 survey, production appears to have increased and 90 per 
cent of farmers surveyed reported that they were able to meet their food needs 
through their production (Tables  6.2 and  6.3). Today, farmers still seek maize 
elsewhere, but most purchase (92 per cent) the needed maize rather than 
exchange within social networks (44 per cent). A large proportion also ‘beg’ for 
food from neighbours (67 per cent). Respondents indicated that purchasing food 
through social networks is usually cheaper than on the market and can have 
added benefits in the present and future (such as information or help with school 
placement for children, loans, market price information, etc.). It may involve 
costs later as reciprocity of some kind will be expected.
Table 6.1 Land management practices 




Cut- off drains 14
Grass strips 31
Tree planting 99
N=180. Unfortunately, the 1995 survey did not 
include data on soil conservation practices.
Table 6.2 Household farm size and cropping patterns
  1995 2017
Mean farm size 2.5 acres 2 acres
% households selling crops 47 71
% Hhs with food deficit 47 10
% Hhs growing maize 100 100
% Hhs growing beans 78 91
% Hhs growing sorghum 57 8
% Hhs growing millet 57 12
% Hhs growing sweet potato 66 78
% Hhs growing Irish potato 26 35
% Hhs growing wheat 66 22
N=150 (1995), N=180 (2017).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 01/07/21, SPi
136 Katherine A. Snyder, Emmanuel Sulle ET AL.
While staple crops grown have remained constant over time, cash crops shift 
according to the market. As is evident from the table above, productivity of maize, 
beans, and Irish potatoes has increased significantly at the household level. 
According to farmers, this increase reflects both the use of improved seeds, pesti-
cides, and practices, but also market demand. Maize, beans, and potatoes are sold 
frequently, with potatoes, in high demand from urban markets, sold by almost all 
families growing them. Wheat is no longer a favoured crop and is now mostly 
consumed in the household, as are sweet potatoes.
The type of seeds that farmers choose to plant has changed dramatically since 
the 1990s. Then, elders were sceptical of improved hybrid seeds believing them to 
be less resistant to pests and weather conditions. Additionally, they indicated the 
taste of the food from improved seeds was not as good. In the 1990s, farmers also 
planted up to fifteen seeds in one hole and had spacing of about two feet between 
each hole. They used this technique to foil cutworms that were a serious problem 
in the area in drier years (Snyder 1993). Extension agents regularly admonished 
farmers to let go of these ‘traditional’ practices and adopt ‘modern’ ones of two 
seeds per hole and spacing of about a foot between holes.
In 2017, in focus groups and interviews, farmers all claimed to have adopted 
improved seeds (mbegu bora) as well as ‘modern’ planting practices. They attrib-
uted their greater maize production to these changes. The reservations that 
elders expressed in the ’90s about being overly dependent, and thus vulnerable to 
markets (and the rise and fall of prices), have largely been abandoned by this 
next generation of farmers. While farmers have embraced improved seeds, some 
still plant local varieties as well. One woman noted that local varieties are im port-
ant for pregnant women who like to chew on the stalk of young maize plants as 
they would sugar cane. She said ‘you can’t do this with improved varieties’. They 
also continue with local varieties to reduce risk as they think these varieties bet-
ter adapted to local conditions. In sum, production has shifted notably to 
improved maize seeds. In addition, farmers now regularly apply pesticides to 
their crops to combat cutworm and stalk borers, which has helped them main-
tain their harvests.
Table 6.3 Average annual harvest data of principal crops across households
Crop Harvest (kg) 1995 Harvest (kg) 2017 % Selling 1995 % Selling 2017
Maize 748 1621 5 39
Beans 76 164 10 54
Irish potatoes 124 306 17 90
Sweet potato 802 761 na na
Wheat 401 134 na na
N=150 (1995), N=180 (2017).
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Most respondents said that when market prices are good, they are able to make 
some small profits. However, if crop prices drop on the market, even breaking 
even can be a challenge, given the cost of labour and input purchases. While 
farmers have adopted the new and ‘modern’ farming practices of improved seeds 
and planting practices (Table 6.4), they have not been so keen on adopting chem-
ical fertilizers. Most farmers who we encountered on this survey, and indeed, in 
many years of working and living in this region, believe that chemical fertilizers 
ruin the soils and if you start using them, you will be dependent on applying them 
forever. As one man commented, ‘If you use chemical fertilizers the soil dries out 
and is ruined. You will then have to use fertilizer all the time to get any harvest.’ 
They link the application of chemical fertilizer with causing further soil fertility 
decline. As noted in Snyder (1996), farmers continue to apply and rely on live-
stock manure to enhance their soils. As manure can be scarce, they usually apply 
it only in the planting hole.
From Table  6.5 below, we can see some interesting shifts in labour patterns. 
Reliance on paid labour has increased significantly, even in labour exchanges with 
neighbours. When discussing cooperative labour, many respondents spoke about 
the past when you could just brew beer, cook some food, and people would come. 
These days, as one man emphasized, ‘You have to pay cash’.
In the ’90s, there was a certain scorn about working as a day labourer. So, farm-
ers often imported labour from neighbouring communities like the Ihanzu or 
Wanyiramba. Today disdain for day labour has gone and young men and women, 
Table 6.4 Input use
Input 1995 2017
Improved seeds 0 83 %
Pesticides 71 % 83 %
Inorganic fertilizer 0 0
N=150 (1995) N=180 (2017).
Table 6.5 Labour patterns
Labour % households 1995 % households 2017
Day labour (vibarua) 23 48
Help from neighbours 71 88
Exchange with neighbours 2 61
Payment to neighbours 0 45
Provide beer 77 10
Provide food 71 1
N=150 (1995), N=180 (2017).
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who have no plots of their own or other ways of making money, regularly take up 
day labour on local farms. One middle- aged woman explained that, while young 
men work as day labourers, they rarely save their money, ‘Young men will work as 
vibarua in the morning till around midday, get paid and then head out to kijiwe1 
to drink for the afternoon. The next day, they do it over again. They don’t ever 
manage to save any money though.’ Young people may hire out their labour as 
individuals but, as some respondents suggested, they also form labour groups.
The division of labour has been a topic of discussion for some time in Mama 
Issara. In the past, as many respondents observed, men and women had clearly 
defined responsibilities. Men were responsible for clearing the land and then men 
and women shared the work of planting and weeding. Women apply manure to 
the fields and harvest the crops. From the ’90s onwards, women have complained 
that men do less and less labour on the farm and more falls to them. Government 
officials have raised the issue in local village meetings and have admonished men 
to spend more time on the farm (Snyder 1996). The term vijiwe was not in use in 
the ’90s and there were far fewer shops and cafes around.
Livestock
Livestock have always been central to the Iraqw economy and culture. In the pre- 
colonial era and after independence until the mid- 1990s, livestock were the major 
indicator of wealth for Iraqw. Their rituals, to honour the dead or to appease the 
earth spirits, involve sacrificing animals. The Iraqw have a complex system of live-
stock loans that establish and strengthen networks and bonds between in di vid-
uals and households across the landscape and beyond to other agro- ecological 
zones (Snyder 2002 and 2005).
How community members in Mama Issara view livestock and its importance 
has changed significantly. According to respondents in interviews and focus 
groups, cattle are far less important today and many claimed that their numbers 
have dramatically declined. They noted lack of pasture as the main reason for the 
reduction in numbers. As one older man said: ‘There is no pasture today. People 
are cultivating everywhere.’ Some farmers have decided to keep fewer cattle and 
stall feed them. Decreasing pasture has given rise to the practice of planting grass 
for fodder. Farmers can also sell grass to other livestock keepers. This shift is 
noticeable across the landscape. Planted grass strips are evident along the hill-
sides (31 per cent of households reported having them) where they were rare in 
the ’90s, when pasture was still more available.
The decline in pasture has increased in the last few years as grazing land is 
converted to farmland. Local government has encouraged these shifts by urging 
1 A kijiwe (vijiwe plural) is a gathering place with a small shop or a collection of shops and small 
tea stalls where people hang out, play cards, and drink tea, coffee, or beer.
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farmers to produce more agricultural crops (Snyder 1996). Livestock keeping was 
often talked about as ‘the ways of the past’ and ‘not modern’. Projects to introduce, 
promote, and expand the use of stall- fed ‘modern cows’ began in Mama Issara in 
the ’90s and have re- surfaced in recent years.
Given local narratives about the decline in cattle numbers, it was surprising to 
find the 2017 survey results in Table 6.6 below showing little change in average 
‘traditional’ (local breeds) cattle holdings. Collecting accurate information about 
livestock numbers is always challenging as farmers are reluctant to give this infor-
mation and, for the Iraqw, they loan cattle out and receive loans as well. Thus, 
one’s cattle may be spread out over the district and beyond depending on the loan 
and the individual’s social network (Snyder 2002).
Goats are not well suited to the cold temperatures of Mama Issara and do bet-
ter in the lowlands. Pigs are very popular because there is a reliable market for 
them and they reach maturity quickly and eat a wider variety of food. Most 
households keep chickens (82 per cent).
Farmers still participate in livestock loans of traditional breeds of cattle, 
though they are not as prevalent as they were in the past. In the 1995 survey, 56 
per cent had cows on loan. From the 2017 survey, only 7 per cent had cows on 
loan but 27 per cent had cows loaned out to others. The social implications of this 
decline in the livestock loaning system are hard to interpret. Livestock were 
important for bride wealth, and cementing social relationships across the region. 
Loans allowed farmers to manage the risk of disease wiping out their herds by 
distributing their stock across a wider landscape. Additionally, reducing the 
number of stock on your compound helps ease the demand on household labour 
and resources for feeding.
Agroforestry
A notable change across the landscape of Mama Issara is the increase in tree 
cover. Tree planting was on the increase in the ’90s, but at that time, the strategy 
Table 6.6 Livestock holdings








Traditional cattle breed 5.4 84 5 77
‘Modern’ cattle breed n/a n/a 2 9
Goats 5 52 5 36
Sheep 4 48 5 59
Pigs 2 73 3 87
Donkeys 2 4 2 2
N=150 (1995), N=180 (2017).
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was to plant and harvest after fifteen years or so to meet cash needs, often for 
school fees. Farmers referred to trees as a ‘bank account’ (Snyder  1996). 
Continuous planting and planting after harvesting was less a pattern then. Now 
however, travelling through the homeland, trees cover many of the hillsides. In 
focus groups and conversations with farmers, they explained that, in some cases, 
the soils on the hillside plots are so exhausted from continuous use that they are 
more suitable to growing trees than food crops.
Fuelling the interest in tree planting is the growing demand for timber and 
other tree products, particularly with a rise in construction in Mbulu, the dis-
trict capital some 15–30km away. Farmers can sell planks of grevillea and euca-
lyptus for about TZS 3,000 per plank and the price for pines and cypress species 
is 3,500 per plank (roughly $1.30 and $1.50 at 2017 exchange rates). This demand 
has led farmers to prioritize fast growing timber species like eucalyptus, pines, 
grevillea, and cypress. Tree holdings from both the 1995 and 2017 surveys are in 
Table 6.7 below.
A total of 99 per cent of survey respondents claimed they had trees on their 
farms and the average was 227 trees. The changes in species composition primar-
ily reflects changes in local markets and in the costs of producing products (fruit 
trees like orange, lemon, and pear require more pesticide purchase). The demand 
for avocado has grown significantly along with its price over the last several years. 
Several respondents remarked, when asked why so many people are planting 
trees, ‘Today, trees are our cows’. While trees may have replaced cattle as a form of 
wealth, they do not serve the same social function as livestock. As described in 
Snyder (2002) exotic species such as those in the list above are considered private 
Table 6.7 Percentage of households with specific tree species
Species 1995 per cent  
of households
2017 per cent of 
households
Have trees on farm 83 99
Pinus sp 22 49
Grevillea robusta 94 88
Eucalyptus sp 12 93
Cupressus sp 48 30








N=150 (1995), N=180 (2017).
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resources in ways that indigenous species are not (or were not in 1995). Farmers 
purchase seedlings and trees are considered an investment, so they are not freely 
given for firewood, help with building materials, or for other household uses. 
Additionally, timber species tend to be the property of men and harvesting them 
is often the work of young men, who pursue this as a day labour job. Women are 
more in control of produce from fruit trees that they sell in local markets. In focus 
groups and the household surveys, respondents assert that farm resources are for 
the entire family. However, in practice, each household has its own system of 
access, use, and control that tends to run along gender and generational lines. 
Trees are also very useful ways to mark farm boundaries, which is increasingly 
important in times of land scarcity and competition (Snyder 1996).
Farmers consider trees an excellent investment, enough so that land that would 
otherwise be farmed is being turned into woodlots, particularly on plots where 
the soil fertility is perceived to be low. Households reported several uses for their 
on- farm trees including firewood (44 per cent of households), timber sales (32 
per cent), own construction purposes (7 per cent), fruit sales (25 per cent), and 
charcoal production (8 per cent). Black wattle, introduced in the colonial era, is 
the favoured species for charcoal. It has declined significantly since the ’90s 
largely because of heavy exploitation for charcoal production and the expansion 
of timber species. Turning land over to tree production is made possible only by 
expansion into new areas or by intensifying production on other plots. Thus, each 
household possibly pursues intensification, de- intensification, extensification, 
altogether on their farm.
Assets
While trees and livestock are certainly valuable assets that can be turned into 
cash, Iraqw households now own assets that were not present during the 1990s 
(Table 6.8). Indeed, the 1995 survey did not even ask about ownership of many of 
the assets currently counted today.
In the ’90s, Snyder knew of only one house that had a motorbike and no one 
owned a television, solar panel, or a cell phone and very few houses had sheet 
metal roofs. Electricity came to Mbulu town in 2000 and has only more recently 
made its way to Mama Issara through the government’s rural electrification pro-
gram and through the spread of solar panels, many of which are leased from com-
panies. When looking at assets such as these, it is interesting to remember a 
remark by a respondent back in the 1990s who said, ‘During Nyerere’s time, there 
was nothing in the shops. Today, there are many things in the shops but we do not 
have the money to buy them.’ It appears that more people are able to obtain the 
cash to buy commodities today. Several of those in the survey who have pur-
chased solar panels, televisions, or motor bikes have access to off- farm income in 
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the form of salaried wages. Others may be receiving remittances from children 
who have migrated out but in the household survey, no household reported 
receiving remittances. Household members may be brewing beer, selling handi-
crafts, have a small shop, or engage in some other informal income generation to 
meet cash needs. However, there are certainly households that appear to earn 
cash to purchase these assets from their on- farm activities, through either the sale 
of maize, beans, and potatoes, livestock sales, or the sale of tree products. These 
assets indicate a household’s success, but unlike cows and trees, they do not 
reproduce themselves and create more resources. Disease and climate- related 
challenges pose risks to livestock and trees so they are by no means an easy and 
certain investment.
Wealth and Poverty
In Mama Issara, social differentiation, while present, is not extreme. In focus 
groups, respondents used the criteria in Table 6.9 below to define wealth cat egor-
ies and measure their community’s status.
Aligning the household survey data on farm size and cattle ownership with the 
wealth categories from the criteria in the focus groups proved difficult. For 
ex ample, of the nineteen households who had ten or more cows, only nine of 
them had 3 acres of land or more. The household with the most cattle (eighteen) 
had 4.75 acres of land. As is evident in Table 6.10 below, by using these two cri-
teria, the majority of households would be classified as poor.
The meaning of wealth has changed over time as various resources have 
become available. Sheet metal roofs were expensive and out of reach for most 
households in the 1990s. Small businesses were few and secondary schools came 
into Mama Issara in the mid-’90s, one in each ward at that time. Now, there are 
Table 6.8 Asset ownership from 







Sheet- metal roofing 71
Cell phones 76
N=180. Data on assets such as these in this table 
were not collected in the 1995 survey because 
they were not evident at all or they were so few.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 01/07/21, SPi
‘Modern’ Farming and the Transformation of Livelihoods 143
four operating secondary schools and one in the final stage of construction in the 
homeland so significantly more students are going beyond primary level. Most of 
the households that fall in the wealthy category have sources of off- farm income, 
either through salaries from employment as civil servants, teachers, health offi -
cers, or through off- farm businesses. The very poor are often widows, those with 
physical disabilities or female- headed households.
The Wider Context
The availability of transport and inputs makes agricultural activities more profit-
able and attractive to many today. In the ’90s, bicycles and foot travel were the 
main means to reach Mbulu town. Transporting maize in and out of Mama Issara 
was challenging and relied almost entirely on donkeys. There was no public trans-
portation until after 2002.
In the last five to six years, the availability of transportation has increased dra-
matically. Today, Landcruisers and mini- buses ply the route daily from Mama 
Issara and back and people use public transportation to carry out their business 
in Mbulu and to transport their produce. Women, who regularly sell charcoal, 
particularly appreciate this change: ‘We used to carry it on our backs all the way 
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Data from focus groups held separately with men, women, and youth in Mama Issara wards in 2017.
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to Mbulu. Now we can put it in a vehicle and get to Mbulu, sell the charcoal, run 
our errands and return quickly.’
Transportation and improved roads have also made stocking shops and small 
businesses easier. There are a number of shops in Mama Issara and in Mbulu 
town that sell hybrid seeds and other agricultural inputs. In addition to small 
shops, there are many more small restaurants selling coffee, beer, and tea than 
there were in the ’90s. These developments suggest there is more cash in circula-
tion today. These developments are not exclusive to Mbulu District but instead 
reflect patterns throughout Tanzania. As Green (2015) observes for Ulanga 
District in southern Tanzania, improvements in infrastructure and increased 
demand for agricultural products from urban areas have spurred economic trans-
form ations. She describes the rise of a middle class, based primarily in urban 
centres, who increase demand for food crops and milk, pork, and chickens result-
ing in ‘innovation in the local agricultural economy’ (Green 2015: 304). In add-
ition to infrastructural and market changes, Tanzania’s decentralization policy 
has resulted in an expansion of government offices and staff to accommodate new 
administrative units (villages, wards). As a result, as Green (2015) notes, there is 
an increase in government officers in rural areas. There are more people now with 
salaries living and working in these rural areas which has also influenced 
improvements in agriculture and led to an increase in local businesses.
Electricity has come to Mama Issara and continues to expand, resulting in 
more lights in people’s homes and less reliance on kerosene. It has also allowed 
some small businesses to start up, providing access to television in particular. 
Watching football matches and foreign soap operas are popular at the vijiwe. 
Other small businesses like maize grinding mills and welding have also sprung up 
in Mama Issara.
Discussion
Contrary to reports of stagnation in the agricultural sector for the continent as a 
whole (Diao et al. 2006), in assessing longitudinal change in Mama Issara, it is 
evident, comparing household farm production from 1995 to that of 2017, that 
Table 6.10 Wealth information from household survey for 2017
Farm size No of HHs % of HHs Cattle No. of HHs % of HHs
3 acres or more 39 22 ten head or more 19 11
2 acres 57 32 five to nine head 40 22
Under 2 acres 84 46 Under five 121 67
N=180.
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agricultural productivity has increased, due to the use of hybrid seeds, pesticides, 
more standardized planting practices and the expansion of farming into what was 
formally grazing land sides. Additionally, in the northern part of the homeland, 
farmers, ignoring the restrictions on cultivating up the mountain, have expanded 
fields to the top of the slopes. While expansion of agriculture into areas previ-
ously uncultivated such as mountains may increase production, it is less clear 
whether, over the longer term, it is sustainable as natural resources are being 
degraded in the process. In focus groups, respondents expressed concern about 
these patterns, claiming, ‘People do not listen to elders today.’ Many said this gen-
eration of elders has less knowledge concerning land- use restrictions of the past 
and that they have little authority over the youth. One main concern was that 
water sources, primarily springs that used to run all year round, have dried up. 
Respondents further linked the drying up of water sources to land use changes 
including planting of water thirsty trees such as eucalyptus in water catchments. 
Many farmers are cultivating close to water sources in an effort to obtain every 
inch of available soil. The expansion onto the steep slopes in the north has not 
been accompanied by the ‘traditional’ soil and water management practices that 
were in place in the colonial era, in part because these fields are not considered 
secure as they were not granted to farmers by local government or through 
inheritance.
While respondents stated that the shift to hybrid seeds has led to a considerable 
improvement in their livelihoods, this change is not without its risks. In 2018, the 
government, in an effort to ensure national food security, banned the sale of 
maize outside of the country and farmers in Mama Issara were already feeling the 
effects. Prices for their maize dropped significantly making it difficult to cover the 
costs of labour and inputs. One farmer remarked, ‘With the prices of maize being 
so low on the market because the border to Kenya is closed, I will not be able to 
cover all the cost of labour and inputs from selling my maize’. Maize traders also 
were suffering. With the price of maize so low on the market and the inability to 
export, particularly to Kenya, traders struggled to cover their costs and faced sig-
nificant risks of pest damage while storing maize to wait for prices to rise.
In addition to maize seed hybrids, we also see a shift away from some ‘tradi-
tional’ crops like millet and sorghum. In part, this reflects the greater market 
demand for maize but also the difficulty in finding enough labour for crops like 
millet, that require constant vigilance to scare birds away.2 The demand for Irish 
potato, due in part to changing tastes and the proliferation of small restaurants in 
Mbulu, has increased. Chips, once a special treat, have become far more common 
in local restaurants. Finally, beans have also become an important cash crop and 
prices on the market have been consistently attractive to farmers. Interviews and 
2 Labour that used to be provided by children who are now at school.
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focus group participants frequently mentioned the rise in production and sale of 
horticultural crops like tomatoes, leafy greens, and onions (this is not captured in 
the surveys). With improved transport, these crops have become far easier to sell 
in Mbulu, specifically for women. As one Mbulu market vendor said, ‘all our 
prod uce comes from Mama Issara’.
Trees are a critical component of rural livelihoods in Mama Issara. Farmers 
earn cash from charcoal, timber, and fruit. Trees on farms are often overlooked in 
research and assessments of farm productivity. National policies concerning trees 
tend to focus on forest reserves and forestry and agricultural departments often 
do not collaborate. Tree products can be crucial to rural livelihoods as they serve 
as important sources of cash in times of need (Place and Garrity 2015). Miller et al. 
(2018), in their review of national household survey data, found that 54 per cent 
of rural smallholders have trees on farms in Tanzania, with 18 per cent having 
timber species and 25 per cent with fruit trees. In Mama Issara, the demand for 
timber, first documented by Snyder (1996) in the mid-’90s, has continued and 
expanded. Timber buyers in Mbulu explained that demand from Mbulu town 
but also Babati, the regional capital, and even Arusha is stimulating the market. 
They also said ‘In Mbulu, most of the timber we buy comes from Mama Issara’. 
Snyder (1996) observed that tree planting represented a less intensive land- use 
practice as, after the initial investment, labour and capital needs decrease sub-
stantially. More recently, farmers are taking whole hillsides, which they see as too 
degraded for successful crop production, and turning them into woodlots.
In the ’90s, farmers relied more on exchanges, livestock sales, and cash pur-
chase to meet their food needs. Today, the adoption of hybrid seeds and other 
inputs and practices, such as greater investments in hired labour, marks a process 
of intensification on agricultural fields that has resulted in both greater food 
se cur ity and in greater participation in the market. When farmers convert 
degraded land to tree production, they must either expand their crop production 
into areas previously used for grazing, or they must intensify production on other 
remaining plots in usually highly productive, valley- bottom land. Valleys, over 
the past several decades, have increasingly been converted to agricultural plots, 
where they used to be reserved for thatch grass and for grazing.
Pig production has held steady since the ’90s and the number of households 
keeping pigs has increased. The market for pork ties farmers in Mama Issara not 
only to consumption in Mbulu but as far away as Moshi town in the north and 
Dar es Salaam in the south. Pig production has both a fairly high and rapid rate of 
return, if compared to other livestock. Farmers rely on pigs, timber, staple crops, 
horticultural crops, and fruit sales for cash to purchase any food deficits.
Off- farm income generating activities, either through salaried work as a 
schoolteacher or health worker, or through day labour, or owning and running small 
businesses are also quite common in Mama Issara and underline the im port ance 
of off- farm work. However, while de- agrarianization may be occurring in other 
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parts of Tanzania and the continent (Bryceson 2002), the evidence from Mama 
Issara suggests a continued reliance on agriculture for local livelihoods and an 
increased investment in intensification on specific farm plots. This pattern is similar 
to that found in Andersson Djurfeld et al. (2018) work on re-agrarianization. As in 
many rural systems, diversification of livelihoods appears to be essential to make a 
living and weather the risks of any economic activity (Ollenburger et al. 2019).
In the mid-’90s, maintaining social networks, through food exchanges and 
through livestock loans were important for sustaining livelihoods and getting 
access to resources. Today, with market improvements, farmers rely more on 
cash, for purchasing food, hiring labour, and obtaining livestock. Indeed, as one 
man said, ‘You can’t get someone to help you carry a bucket of water 100 meters if 
you don’t pay them today’. However, social networks are still maintained through 
food exchanges and livestock loans, though they almost always involve cash. 
Neighbourhood groups have become an important feature of the local landscape 
today and manage a variety of social needs, such as providing help for medical 
care (transport of sick person, hospital costs), weddings and other events through 
pooling of cash contributions. In the ’90s, young men from a neighbourhood car-
ried sick people to Mbulu town. Today, neighbours simply hire a vehicle for 
transport. These neighbourhood groups address conflicts, mediate disputes, and 
sometimes serve as revolving loan groups.
Returning to the debate on smallholder versus large- scale farms, the long his-
tory of farming in Mama Issara shows where and how small farms can be success-
ful through diversification and responding to markets. It also points to the 
potential limitations of small farms, particularly the constraints presented by 
their overall size and resource base. Overall, farmers state that their livelihoods 
have improved in Mama Issara, largely through farming. However, this improve-
ment has been dependent on wider economic changes in the economy. As Davis 
et al.’ (2017) study of agriculture across twenty- two countries in sub- Saharan 
Africa shows, farming is still the sector where most households make a living. In 
Mbulu District, farming is the main livelihood of most of the population. 
Agricultural productivity is in part stimulated by the growth of off- farm eco-
nomic activities, most of which, as Davis et al. (2017) have also found, are linked 
to agriculture and natural resources. Small restaurants rely on local produce, 
youth become agricultural traders or woodcutters to make a living when the lack 
of farmland pushes them to seek other opportunities, timber traders stimulate 
land- users to plant more timber, which also results in the growth of small- scale 
tree nurseries. Finally, road improvements, the expansion of the transportation 
sector and the arrival of electrification have also supported greater investment in 
agriculture.
Because of limited farm size and topography, agricultural production in Mama 
Issara may not result in an economic transformation that ensures greater long- 
term security or a significant increase in income and assets from what is seen 
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today. However, it is clear that over the last twenty- eight years significant 
improvements in people’s lives have occurred. More children are going to and 
completing school, there are more opportunities in the informal sector for trade 
and small businesses, the timber trade continues to expand and demand remains 
high. These positive trends are also evident elsewhere in Tanzania (Brockington 
et al. 2018, Östberg et al. 2018) and in some other countries in the continent such 
as Ghana (Houssou et al. 2018). Overall, however, throughout Tanzania, off- farm 
income- earning activities still remain few and lack of capital a considerable con-
straint, both for starting businesses and for further on- farm investment. In focus 
groups and interviews, respondents often mentioned the lack of access to capital 
as a major constraint to their livelihoods.
While the changes in livelihoods in Mama Issara indicate signs of some aspects 
of poverty reduction, we would qualify what is perceived to be poverty in the 
local imagination. Residents of Mama Issara may not recognize a decline in pov-
erty because they did not think themselves to be poor originally. Snyder was con-
ducting research in Mama Issara in the 1990s, when the results of a World Bank 
report on global poverty (and Tanzania’s low ranking globally) were announced 
on Tanzanian national radio. A group of young men with whom she was talking, 
when hearing of Tanzania’s poor ranking, looked puzzled and said ‘We can’t be 
that poor. We feed ourselves, send our children to school and have decent houses. 
Why are we thought to be poor?’ At that time, many of the assets available today 
were not available then and the availability of transport or electricity was low or 
non- existent. A thatched roof house was considered perfectly decent housing and 
sending your children to primary school was viewed as sufficient.
With wider shifts in development and exposure to a globally interconnected 
world, the goals and aspirations of Mama Issara residents have changed. It is a 
common perception that young people today appear to have little desire to pur-
sue farming. Their parents claim that now that they have had an education, their 
children no longer want to farm but only want office jobs. Indeed, that, they sug-
gest, is what drives them to waste time at the local vijiwe. However, in focus 
groups with youth, they asserted that they do want to farm but that their parents 
do not give them land to cultivate and the work they do on the land contributes to 
the household but does not help them build up independent resources, ones they 
could use to marry and start life on their own. Thus, they pursue farm labour 
jobs, odd jobs for shopkeepers, transport, and a variety of other small jobs.
Iraqw have a long history of migrating out to search for other employment 
opportunities or for land on which to farm and raise livestock. This pattern con-
tinues today but it is unclear, given population growth in Tanzania more broadly, 
if these strategies will be sustainable in the future. Today, young people are mov-
ing to areas far more distant than they did in the ’90s and the many decades 
before that when migration focused on contiguous zones. In Mama Issara, given 
the size of household land holdings that will no doubt continue to decrease if 
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out- migration declines, it is unlikely that intensification alone can meet con-
sumptions demands. Iraqw farmers in the homeland are quick to respond to mar-
ket opportunities, either in new cash crops, the revival of old cash crops 
(pyrethrum, tobacco, coffee), or demand for pork or for tree products. These 
diversified land- use strategies have served farmers well and have enabled them to 
invest in assets and their children’s educations. As prices on the market for food 
crops such as maize and beans rise and fall, this diversification strategy is im port-
ant for weather ing these sometimes steep ups and downs of the market that are 
affected by national and regional trade policies.
Conclusion
As this and other studies of local farming systems demonstrate in this volume 
and elsewhere (Whitfield  2017, Brockington et al.  2018, Houssou et al.  2018, 
Östberg et al. 2018), it is important to ground truth national and international 
narratives that underscore the stagnation of rural smallholder farming systems 
and rural poverty. Local- level studies often provide a very different picture which 
is clear in Whitfield’s (2017) review of Netting’s (1993) seminal work on small-
holder farmers in Nigeria and its relevance for studies of rural farming in sub- 
Saharan Africa today. Understanding the complexity and diversity of small- scale 
agricultural systems is of continued relevance. He concludes that:
The values of smallholdings as laid out by Netting—that they are adaptive, flex-
ible and innovative—similarly encourage a rethink of dominant policy and 
research and innovation models that have sought to intervene, in a topdown 
way, within smallholder systems. (2017: 262)
This assertion is particularly important today as national policies and inter-
nation al agencies increasingly turn away from smallholder agriculture in favour 
of large- scale investment. Additionally, agricultural research centres such as the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Development (CGIAR) and 
the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) focus on a technocratic 
‘impact- at- scale philosophy’ (Whitfield  2017: 260) that may not fit well with 
the diversity of small- scale farming systems across the continent (Ollenburger 
et al. 2019).
While the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme 
(CAADP) of the African Union, which calls for a commitment of 10 per cent of 
national annual budgets to agriculture, is an important step in increasing invest-
ment, its implementation has been inconsistent across the continent. Tanzania 
has signed up to the CAADP agreement but funds allocated to the Ministry of 
Agriculture are often only sufficient for paying salaries and administrative costs. 
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At the level of the districts, agricultural staff have few funds available for op er-
ation al costs. Furthermore, district budgets tend to prioritize education, health, 
and infrastructure over agriculture.3
Regardless of these challenges, the myth that Christiaensen (2017) exposes, 
that smallholder farmers are slow to respond to ‘modern’ farming methods, is 
obviously a myth in Mama Issara. This study has shown that farmers there and 
undoubtedly throughout the country have done an impressive job at improving 
their farms, raising agricultural productivity and their households’ livelihoods 
with little support from the government especially after implementation of 
Structural Adjustment Programmes. Before shifting investment to focus on large- 
scale farming, more direct investment in smallholder agriculture and the markets 
that support it, might have a bigger impact on more people.
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Women’s Tears or Coffee Blight?
Gender Dynamics and Livelihood Strategies in Contexts 
of Agricultural Transformation in Tanzania
Christine Noe, Olivia Howland, and Dan Brockington
Epilogue pages 384–387
We are doing drive through villages in Arumeru, and stop to talk to a 
group of elders and local leaders. I get out of the car and three little 
girls, all aged about three, come to say hello to me. They have been 
studying at their teacher’s house, ‘learning to read!’ they tell me:
(one of the girls, staring at the car) ‘Do you drive that?!’
OH: Yes! Of course. When you’re older, you can also drive a car if 
you want.
‘No! Me, I’m going to be a pikipiki driver, with a bodaboda business.’
OH: Wow! (turning to one of the other little girls) What about you? 
Will you drive a car, or a piki?
‘No. I will have my own bajaji and my own business, driving to 
Tengeru market to sell vegetables and bananas. I’ve already helped 
my uncle to drive his bajaji so I know what I’m doing!’
pikipiki—motorbike; bodaboda—motorbike taxi; bajaji—a three- 
wheeled motorbike taxi used for carrying goods
Extract from Olivia Howland’s field notes, 18 October 2017
Introduction
What happens to rural societies when the economic basis of their existence is 
suddenly transformed for the worse? When crops on which they had relied for 
income and livelihoods suddenly become worthless, or smitten by diseases whose 
treatment is just too expensive to bear? And, most particularly, how are the 
impacts of these misfortunes mediated by gender relations within the societies 
they afflict, and how do they themselves alter gender relations?
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One of the most well- known instances of declining fortunes of rural producers 
is the collapse of farm gate coffee prices which reflects a mixture of over- supply 
and marketing structures. It has been particularly exasperating for development 
activists and campaigners who have seen coffee farmers’ incomes collapse and 
this juxtaposed to the rise of consumer prices in rich countries. All of this creates 
the uncomfortable contradiction of rich companies in the value chain profiting 
from northern drinking habits while southern farmers go hungry. Ponte neatly 
captured the contradictions observing that:
the global coffee chain has gone through a ‘latte revolution’, where consumers 
can choose from (and pay dearly for) hundreds of combinations of coffee var-
iety, origin, brewing and grinding methods, flavoring, packaging, social ‘content’, 
and ambience. At the same time, international prices for the raw product . . . are 
the lowest in decades. Coffee industries in developing countries are in disarray. 
Coffee farmers are losing a source of livelihood. (Ponte 2002b: 1099)
We do not dispute the enormous challenges, and injustice, that this trans form-
ation of the coffee industry has entailed. But we need properly to understand the 
complexity of the dynamics resulting. In particular before we can assume that the 
effects of these changes are necessarily negative for all rural families, and all 
members of them, we have to understand better how such dynamics play out in 
different contexts. Specifically we contend that changes in the external economic, 
political, and social environments are fought over and contested within house-
holds. Gender relations will determine what a coffee revolution looks like on the 
ground. If we are to understand well the impacts of the changing coffee economy 
then we have to understand how they intersect with intra- household dynamics. 
Exploring these changes allows us to make contributions to debates about the dif-
ferent dimensions of poverty and prosperity, and the importance of considering 
how these are contested within families (Orr et al.  2014, Ossome  2014, 
Brockington et al. 2021).
In this chapter we address this need for a better understanding of the gendered 
impacts of decline. We use a unique longitudinal data set that allowed us to revisit 
families surveyed in 1996 after a twenty- year interval. We show that for women in 
Meru in north- eastern Tanzania, the demise of coffee is not mourned as much as 
one might expect. This is partly because the gendered division of labour that pro-
duced the coffee was oppressive for women. It is also because new livelihood 
opportunities are emerging from the nearby expanding city of Arusha, which are 
more liberating in terms of opportunities for women. Accordingly many women 
in Meru welcome the demise of coffee, and the pests and diseases which have 
contributed to it.
Yet we show also that moves away from coffee to other livelihood strategies 
are still strongly gendered. Men contest the loss of power they experience 
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with the declining coffee economy as much as women celebrate it. Women 
still feel oppressed despite these changes, and this paper will examine these 
changes in the context of post- coffee Meru society. The types of crops and 
businesses controlled by men and women have changed, but this has resulted 
in new struggles for women, and not always, as they hoped, greater financial 
or social freedoms. Welcome progress in some areas has come with regression 
in others.
We proceed as follows. First, we discuss some of the literature on gendered 
divisions of labour and contests over social and economic change particularly as 
it pertains to East Africa. We then focus on the changes that have afflicted Meru 
showing how coffee once sustained growing prosperity for much of the twentieth 
century but has since declined. We argue that studies which explicitly explore the 
gendered impact of these changes are few. Next, we describe our methods in 
which we are fortunate to draw on two different intimate accounts of Meru rural 
society—the late Rolf Larsson’s detailed PhD thesis and its data written in the 
mid- 1990s (2001), and the formative years of Christine Noe, the corresponding 
author on this paper. To develop our argument we next explore gender ideologies 
in Meru and consider how they are changed by the decline of the coffee sector 
and rise of new economic opportunities. Finally we conclude by considering the 
implications of these findings for work on measuring progress using economic 
indicators.
Women, Agriculture, and Coffee
Women’s rights and freedoms matter for rural livelihoods. Over 60 per cent of 
women are employed in agriculture (Raney et al. 2011). Women are at the fore-
front of rural livelihoods in African contexts, caring for livestock and tending 
crops (Guèye 2000, Wangui 2008, Kristjanson et al. 2017). Estimates of women’s 
share of agricultural labour on the continent vary between 24 per cent (Niger) 
and 56 per cent (Uganda), with a general average of close to 50 per cent (Raney 
et al. 2011, Palacios- Lopez et al. 2017). Yet women’s work in agriculture continues 
to be neglected. Women are recognized to have less access to farming inputs, 
technologies, and, importantly, decision- making power (Kristjanson et al. 2017). 
This is in addition to the fact that structural shifts in global and local economies 
continue to alter rural women’s strategies for survival. Carolyn Sachs argues in a 
recent study that:
rural women continue to work harder, suffer greater material deprivation 
(sometimes oppressed and exploited) and have less access to income- earning 
opportunities but they have continued to create and shape rural lives.
(Sachs 2018: 3)
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This global issue is important in Tanzania, where most people, and most women, 
are employed in agriculture. Here 70 per cent of economically active women work 
in agriculture (Mbilinyi  2016). Agriculture remains the mainstay of most 
Tanzanians. Just under 70 per cent of the population lives in rural areas, and most 
are smallholders. Consumption poverty (captured by poverty lines) is dispropor-
tionately concentrated there just over 80 per cent of the poor live in rural areas 
(URT 2019). This gives the impression that rural areas are concentrations of stasis 
and inactivity and government policies (SAGCOT, Kilimo Kwanza) seek to trans-
form apparently rural communities dominated by ‘subsistence’ agriculture 
(World  Bank 2015). But this impression is misleading. Poverty- line data exclude 
peasant investment in assets and so conceal new forms of rural prosperity 
(Brockington 2021, Brockington et al. 2021). New cash crops in the form of ses-
ame, sunflowers, and irrigated crops are providing new sources of income 
(Corbera et al. 2017, Woodhouse et al. 2017, Östberg et al. 2018). Rural areas in 
Tanzania are sites of dynamism and change.
Yet this economic change is not necessarily socially progressive for women. 
Women’s status is still marginal and precarious particularly in more patriarchal 
contexts (Madaha  2014). In some instances women in Tanzania, who have in 
recent years gained rights to land and access to assets due to local change in cul-
tures and norms, report an improvement in their general position in society as 
well as empowerment and political strength (Goldman et al. 2016). But this not 
driven by national level pushes or policy initiatives. Rather, as Ossome shows, 
social practices and the customary laws which accompany them are arenas of 
contestation (Ossome  2014). Tanzanian societies can appear to resist social 
change as men and women are continually contesting opportunities and change. 
Rural women’s rights and needs in some societies are not on the sort of upward 
trajectory which measures such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
like to envision. Instead the situation may be better characterized by flux rather 
than progressive change.
For this reason it is particularly important to understand how women fare 
when sweeping changes brought about through shifts in value chains (or land 
grabbing) occur. Ossome has argued that:
Understanding the customary systems that mediate women’s relationship with 
the state, capital, and community is critical for shaping the nature of interven-
tions by feminist activists. (2014: 172)
She recognizes that much of this custom derives from patriarchal societies’ 
encounters with patriarchal capitalism and colonialism, and that its pedigree is 
poor in that respect. But she also insists that this ‘should not blind us to the demo-
crat ic and transformative possibilities inherent in the contestations taking place 
in these arenas’ (ibid.).
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The dynamics between cash crops and food crops provide useful insights with 
which to understand gender dynamics in rural African societies, and the con test-
ation and formation of custom and tradition (Ranger  1993). There is evidence 
that women’s share of agricultural labour increases with female education and 
land ownership—enhancing the possibilities of contestation (Palacios- Lopez 
et al. 2017). In particular, the cash crop–food crop dynamic can cross often trad-
ition al ly female realms of food provisioning, and realms that men seek to control 
by providing cash incomes. Orr and colleagues (2014), studied the case of Zambia 
where groundnuts are largely regarded as a women’s crop and cotton as a men’s 
crop. They suggest that women rights to control the income from certain crops 
does not matter as much as women’s share of the workload. As such, men may 
neglect women’s crops as long as theirs’ are fetching good prices, but take on deci-
sions for marketing and spending of the sales in different ways (including neglect-
ing some household cash needs). Women have greater control over food crops 
but only as long as these crops do not gain greater commercial value than other 
crops that a household produces. Or to put this differently, what counts as a food 
or cash crop, or women’s or men’s crop, can vary considerably contingent on 
whether it is sold or consumed. The shift of produce from ‘subsistence’ to ‘com-
mercial’ will be the very substance of gender disputes in many rural households.
Brockington observed similar processes in rather different circumstances in 
pastoral societies in northern Tanzania (Brockington 2001). Here men in families 
who had suffered eviction from a game reserve and lost livestock sought to use 
women’s income (from sales of milk or medicines) to provide for needs they had 
once paid for. Women resisted these moves.
In some contexts control over crops is not just about financial issues but is 
closely intertwined with the construction of gender identities that hinge on deter-
mining who undertakes what labour, how that labour is performed and at whose 
behest (Mbataru 2007, Razavi 2016). When women challenge the ownership of 
income from high- value crops such as coffee, they challenge also male identity, 
which, in most patriarchal societies, is strongly linked to household property 
ownership and control over family affairs (Orr et al. 2014).
Coffee makes a particularly interesting lens through which to explore the gen-
der dynamics of agriculture and agriculture change. The sector is fascinating and 
important because farmers’ incomes have declined, but at the same time demand 
has continued to grow. Yet it is remarkable that, amid all the attention paid to 
coffee economies, a remarkably small proportion of the literature or research 
explores the gendered dynamics of coffee production and the gendered conse-
quences of its decline.
Coffee was once the mainstay of Meru agriculture. It grew from the early dec-
ades of the twentieth century supporting a vibrant economy and much progres-
sive change (Spear  1997). Coffee sustained strong co- operative societies which 
focused on marketing of local agricultural crops while also supporting the 
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provision of subsidized farm inputs. More importantly, cooperative societies 
organized farmer’s coffee incomes to facilitate long- term investments in educa-
tional infrastructure such as secondary schools. Meru Social Development and 
Education Trust was established in 1980s and over three secondary schools were 
built through contributions made from coffee farmers. School fees were sub sid-
ized for Meru children.
The importance of coffee is clearly visible in Rolf Larsson’s extensive survey of 
over 750 households that was conducted in the mid-’90s. Larson showed that the 
vast majority of families depended on selling bananas and coffee and milk 
(Table 7.1). Every single household he spoke to had cattle and many also sold milk; 
all had smallstock which were kept in the lowlands (Table 7.2). There was consid-
erable inequality within Meru society, as the amounts of land actually farmed 
could vary considerably (Table 7.3). But the main point to note is that despite the 
inequalities of amount of land worked and goods sold, there was remarkable uni-
formity in the nature of the local economy—coffee was pre- eminent.
Since the 1990s there has been a dramatic and considerable decline in produc-
tion and coffee trade in Tanzania as it faced a series of compounding challenges. 
Coffee co- operatives which had provided important support for quality coffee 
production and marketing, and helped to subsidize inputs, began to fail 
(Hillbom 2012). This reflected price fluctuations. Maghimbi (2010) reports that 
low coffee prices in the global market caused cooperatives in mainland Tanzania 
to accumulate huge bank debts. With the lack of support from co- operatives, 
poor quality control common to individual or small- scale producers made much 
Table 7.1 The rural coffee economy of 1996




Main farm income 
source (household/
in % of column total)
Bananas 92.1 83.5 11.3
Coffee 84.4 83.3 40.8
Milk 77.8 64.6 35.7
Maize 54.7 12.1 2.2
Fodder grass 56.5 1.4 0
Beans 39.3 5.6 0.1
Sweet potatoes 27.8 15.7 0.5
Vegetables 30.4 24.5 5.8
Cassava 9.2 0 0
Irish potatoes 4.1 0.7 0
Other farm produce 3.2 3 0.3
No farm produce 0.5 3.2 3.2
Total — — 100
Total no. of households 753; Source: Larsson, 2001: 71–94.
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of the coffee produced suitable only for the local or regional market, where prices 
are lower and demand is less vigorous (Ponte 2002a: 25). Furthermore, the with-
drawal of government subsidies had a significant impact on living standards for 
farmers (Ponte 2002a: 22) and their ability to continue to grow coffee commer-
cially. This largely wiped out the benefits of higher prices in coffee in the 
mid- 1990s (Larsson 2001: 220–1). By 2001 these cooperatives had lost their trad-
ition al role in protecting coffee farmers (Maghimbi  2010). Pests and diseases 
invaded coffee as farmers could not afford direct purchase for pesticides.
In Meru two afflictions were particularly important. Leaf rust (emelea in 
Kiswahili), or hemileia vastatrix, is a type of fungus which originated in East 
African coffee plantations, but spread globally. It causes greatly reduced yields 
and poor- quality beans. Unfortunately, the only way to either prevent or cure leaf 
rust is the application of expensive fungicides or the removal of plants. As well as 
leaf rust, borer beetles (known locally in Meru as sambembe) are prolific pests, 
and many Meru farmers are affected by either, or both, of these issues. After 
emelea, sambembe, and the dramatic drop in coffee prices, many Meru men were 
forced to give up cultivation of coffee as their main source of income (Dancer 2015: 
30). The treatment for emelea and sambembe is more expensive than the price 
achieved at market1 and coffee became financially unviable for many Meru fam-
ilies, especially when government subsidies ceased.
The impact of lower prices, combined with higher prices for inputs to deal with 
pests and diseases, have been complicated in Tanzania. Maghimbi notes that price 
declines have seen production fall in the Kilimanjaro area, but increase in the 
south of the country (Maghimbi  2007). This he attributed (in a paper which 
barely mentioned gender) to improving economic opportunities in other sectors. 
In Meru, as public intervention in coffee markets had decreased, and many of the 
coffee cooperative societies and boards had either closed or were significantly 
reduced in power and size by the mid- 1990s, diseases caused a decrease in pro-
duction and stock generally. Prices became more volatile due to deregulation. As 
Ponte reports, before deregulation, prices would fluctuate by 15 per cent a month. 
Post- deregulation brought price fluctuations of 43 per cent from 1998–2000 
1 From focus group discussions, this was the main reason why people removed coffee from their 
farms, or ceased to harvest their coffee.
Table 7.2 Livestock ownership 1996
Livestock 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 14 18 Total
Cattle 3 141 179 150 48 17 2 1 2 1 1   545
Smallstock  15 13 745               2 775
























Table 7.3 Differences in wealth and farming activity 1996
Wealth 
group
a. Mean of total 
land cultivated 
(acres)
b. Mean of land 
owned on the 
mountain (acres)
c. Mean  
no. of coffee 
trees
d. Mean  
no. of dairy 
cows
e. Education 








h. Mean scores 
on wealth 
index (1–100)
Poorest 0.8 0.5 59 0.3 3.3 308 213 27
Poor middle 1.4 0.9 156 0.9 4.1 330 298 38
Middle 2.9 1.5 287 1.3 4.3 343 343 50
Wealthy 
middle
5.5 2.2 532 1.8 5.7 378 485 62
Wealthiest 10 4.2 830 2.7 8.8 538 600 79
Wealthiest 
3 per cent
13.7 6.1 1059 3.6 11.8 683 627 86
Total mean 3.5 1.6 327 1.3 4.8 361 367 49
a. Land on both mountain and lowlands. b. Resident and additional plots on the mountain. c. The ‘Standard’ no. of trees per acre is 400. d. Including heifers. e. Mean years 
in school, primary education is seven years. f. Capital goods and asserts. g. Ability to save or need to borrow money. h. Index running from 1–200 based in mean rank of 
indicators a–g. All between group differences are statistically significant at <0.001 level (ANOVA).
Reproduced from: Larsson 2001.
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(Ponte 2002a: 20). Such variability in prices led to loss of confidence for farmers 
and unreliability of the market, leading to many farmers increasingly giving up 
coffee in favour of vegetables, with a stronger local market and more re li-
able prices.
The results of this decline are clearly visible in the farms that the Meru now 
cultivate when we conducted our surveys in 2017 (see methods below). Coffee is 
only grown by a minority of families. New crops like potatoes and trees have 
become more important (Table 7.4). In some villages only half of the families own 
cattle and smallstock are infrequent (Table 7.5). In terms of occupations of adults 
in our survey who were not in education, only 50 per cent said that they were 
only farmers, 42 per cent said that they were not farmers at all but engaged in 
various sorts of business (n=367).
The contours of this story are well known, but it is remarkable how rarely gen-
der relations feature in its telling. Indeed we have been able to find only isolated 
papers which examine this explicitly.2 Bacon’s work on coffee co- operatives in 
Nicaragua has shown that these became vehicles for (contested and uneven) 
female empowerment in different contexts (Bacon 2010). This became visible in 
the leadership of some co- operatives.
2 And others which discuss farmers or smallholders but barely use (and sometimes do not mention 
at all) the words ‘gender’, ‘women’, or ‘men’ (Coady et al.  2003, Christiaensen et al.  2006, Eakin 
et al. 2006, Pirotte et al. 2006).
Table 7.5 Livestock ownership 2017
Village 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 15 Total
Cattle 58 41 30 17 8 4 2 0 1 0 161
Smallstock 118 12 11 10 6 0 0 1 1 2 161
Table 7.4 Proportion of families growing different crops 1996 to 2017







Sweet potatoes 28 2
Cassava 9 0
Irish potatoes 4 24
Sunflower 0 6
Trees 0 4
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Closer to our own study Patrick Mbataru offers a long- term perspective on the 
gendered consequences of the collapse of coffee among the Kikuyu people in 
Nyeri in Kenya (Mbataru  2007). He describes how, before the coffee economy 
women had traded grain and other goods for income which they controlled, and 
how men’s coffee income had curtailed that activity. With the collapse of coffee 
these female trading networks and opportunities have revived. Women have 
found new sources of income, and there is some evidence that control over milk 
supplies is contested by men as a replacement for coffee income. But Kikuyu 
women see this as their money. Since they provide the cattle feed, Mbataru claims 
that men who won the battle for the money, could lose the war for the cow. As he 
observes:
The control of the milk production therefore becomes one of the most contested 
areas of family production, which leads to frequent domestic conflicts.
(Mbataru 2007: 112)
Indeed men appear to be doing rather little, and suffer ‘psychological torment’ as a 
result. They have lost the ‘symbolic authority’ of being the provider and ‘their 
power was severely dented on the home front’ (ibid.: 110). While women are earn-
ing money and organizing women groups, men are doing little and, according to 
one informant, suffer an ‘inherent incapability to organise anything collectively’ 
(! ibid.).
Hillbom’s work stands in stark contrast to Mbaratu’s, and our own. She has 
researched agricultural change in Meru since the mid-’90s, although has not 
focused so much on the gendered relations of agricultural production (Hillbom 2011 
and 2014). She takes a different view as to the gendered consequences of the new 
cash crops to the work we present here. Her observations are worth quoting in full:
Few men adopt individual strategies which combine petty trading of food cash 
crops with farming. They may still be part of a household strategy where the 
husband stays at home farming, while his wife goes to the market to sell the 
household produce as well as engage in petty trading. This division of labour 
within the household makes the husband concentrate on the local community, 
while the wife has more connections to the world outside the village. It also 
strengthens the economic position of women within households, as they are in 
control of a large part, or even all, of the household’s cash income. Some hus-
bands even confess to having no insight into the incomes brought in by their 
wives, and relying completely on their budgeting for the family’s economic 
strategies.
The explanation for female dominance in trading with food crops lies in the 
local historical division of labour and incomes. Traditionally, women were 
responsible for feeding the family, especially the children. As farming food crops 
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was primarily for subsistence purposes, this was the responsibility of the wife, 
while the husband controlled the cash crop, such as coffee. The negligible sur-
plus production, particularly of bananas and milk, could be sold by the wife and 
generated some minor income from trading. Women of today have maintained 
their position as the petty traders in the family. What has changed drastically is 
the context. Farm intensification, with the introduction of new high- value food 
crops such as vegetables, and increasing urban demand, including demand for 
traditional staple crops such as maize and bananas, has significantly expanded 
both supply and demand for the trading sector controlled by women.
(Hillbom 2012: 676–7)
These statements differ substantially from our own view and we will return to 
them in the discussion of this paper. Suffice to show here that it may not be appro-
priate to see food cash crops as simply the domain of women. Rather different 
sources of family income are contested.
If we anticipate contest then we can expect the change of coffee economy to 
have a significant consequence on gender relations. In Meru, much like Nyeri, 
men traditionally controlled both the cultivation of, and the finances associated 
with, coffee (Dancer 2015). Women would be expected to do much of the labour. 
They would weed, pick, wash, dry, and clean the beans. Noe has described this in 
detail (see the Epilogue). When sold, men would retain the money from coffee 
without having to inform wives of how that money was being used. Women 
tended to exert more control over income from milk and bananas. It is precisely 
the dynamics of this division of labour, controls, and crops that we have to explore 
in order to understand what the coffee crisis has done to rural societies.
Methods
We have been revisiting the field sites and interviewees of the late Rolf Larsson. 
He was tragically killed while travelling back to Meru to conduct his own re- 
study. Fortunately we have been granted access to his data and, more fortunately, 
one of the authors, Christine Noe was herself raised and brought up on Meru—
and was in fact in senior school at the time that Larsson was conducting his 
research in the villages which bordered hers.
Larsson’s extensive research looked at Meru agricultural practices, and his 
research was conducted at a household, or domestic unit level, as well as at the 
village level. He interviewed an astonishing 753 families drawn from six villages 
along an altitudinal gradient. The value of his comprehensive work cannot be 
overstated—we are able, using his data, to go back and trace families from his 
original sample, to understand what has happened to them in the past twenty 
years. Further, his ethnographic detail at a village level has meant that we can 
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understand changes in ideologies and social concepts, vital to a longitudinal study 
like ours.
We have chosen three of these villages at the top, middle, and bottom of the 
gradient for the revisits. In addition to revisiting the families he went to (we were 
able to meet with 75 per cent of them) we have also undertaken focus group dis-
cussions (of around fifteen women and men conducted separately), participant 
observations, and key informant interviews, during October of 2016 and a later, 
follow- up visit in March 2017 and June 2018.
We also draw considerably on Noe’s intimate knowledge of the region and its 
dynamics. Noe grew up tending coffee on her family farm and at home like many 
other Meru girls. Her childhood (and young adulthood) in Meru is indelibly 
inscribed by the long hours of labour undertaken tending coffee bushes and 
washing coffee beans in cold Meru mountain streams before dawn.
Our methods reflect the two purposes which enervate our research. On the 
one hand we feel that, empirically, it is important to document the stories that we 
tell in this chapter. They are missing in the literature and their relative absence is 
troubling. And, ideologically we feel it is important for women’s voices to be 
heard and that ‘it is women’s experiences and the way women themselves frame 
their claims that should form the starting point for research’ (Dancer 2015: 19).
Nevertheless it has been a struggle. Our presence in the villages was very much 
controlled and facilitated by the male elders and village leaders. It was from them 
we gained permission to conduct our research and fieldwork, and so they assisted 
with the visiting of individual householders, and any group meetings we required. 
They explicitly told us that there was no point in having a women’s focus group, as 
women had nothing interesting to tell us and did not understand the workings of 
local Meru society: only they, the men, could provide us with reliable information 
especially because this was about coffee, which is known to be a men’s crop 
(regardless of where it draws labour from).
Gender Ideologies in Meru Society
The rural economy of Meru therefore has been transformed by the collapse of 
coffee—what effect has this had on gender relations within households? The Meru 
people are well known as being a patriarchal society. This means that men 
strongly influence women’s access to resources, finances, and their social and 
business interactions (Meinzen- Dick et al.  2011). The change in livelihoods is 
likely to have a significant impact on the status and day- to- day difficulties faced 
by women in Meru because of the ideals to which women are subject.
Meru men have a number of expectations about themselves that they had to 
fulfil to remain respectable. First, men control family wealth. Family wealth has in 
the past and at present (to some extent) been dependent on land. The control of 
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land gives men the power to determine the land use, how family labour is used on 
that land and the distribution of income generated from it. As such, men are 
expected to keep the behaviour of their wives and children in check, and to make 
sure that everyone behaves in a way considered right and proper for Meru fam-
ilies. This would include that women are disciplined to work mostly on family 
farms, take care of zero- grazed livestock and keep up the homes as opposed to 
doing ‘loose’ jobs such as business and casual labour.
Men must earn more than women, but they are not expected to have to collate 
many different projects to earn this money. It is normal for a Meru man to have 
one or two major projects and his wife will take care of many smaller roles with 
less perceived significance. Men are the primary decision- makers: any important 
decisions will be made by the man. Smaller and less important decisions can be 
made by the woman, but the final say is always for the man.
Men must never help the wife in the kitchen. Men who help their wives in the 
kitchen or who get involved in any ‘women- only’ tasks will be a laughing stock. 
Mothers will shoo their male children out of the kitchen, in case he gets a ‘repu-
tation’. Men who help their wives with ‘women- only’ tasks will be shamed by 
their peers and socially outcast. Women’s behaviour must always be regulated 
by their fathers or husbands. They are, as one man described to us, the chairman, 
and the wife is considered the deputy chairperson. A woman who is unlike this 
is known to be ‘sitting on’ her husband.
There are also strong expectations with respect to women’s social behaviour 
which affect her economic opportunities. Haram (2001) explains that two differ-
ent types of women are identified in Meru social narratives: the clean woman, 
and the dirty woman. The clean woman is the woman who stays at home and 
does not go out much. She works very hard on her domestic or farming duties, 
and wears unfashionable, or traditional clothing. She is obedient and does not 
talk to men. The dirty woman is the woman who travels outside of her home vil-
lage. She might work in town, and it could be rumoured that she is a prostitute. 
As soon as a Meru woman travels, or is out of sight of a Meru man, she is thought 
to be out of control.
These normative ways in which Meru understand and conceptualize gender 
ideology are important for understanding gender in relation to the decline in the 
coffee economy. As Haram has observed:
. . . men have experienced a dramatic reduction in income due mainly to the fall 
of coffee prices in both the local and the world markets. Thus, changing social 
and economic conditions have generated new strategies in the household 
economy . . . . (Haram 2001)
As we have seen many of these new strategies are off farm incomes, including 
small businesses, trading, and non- agricultural strategies. As income generation 
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moves increasingly to off- farm incomes, women are involved in income gen er-
ation activities which often involve being out of their homes for periods of time: it 
is then that women need to be even more controlled. They are out of sight of their 
men, and crossing geographical (and therefore also moral) boundaries. Their eco-
nomic independence makes them a threat, and it is at these times that gender 
ideology is most powerful. It reinforces social stratifications in order that social 
norms can be maintained in times of economic change or social upheaval.
How Have Gender Norms Changed because of 
Emelea and Sambembe?
It is because of our tears, the tears of women, that coffee got this dis-
ease, emelea. Many crop researchers have come to Meru to try and 
find a cure for emelea, but they cannot, because this is not caused by 
sickness, it is caused by women’s tears.
Women’s focus group discussion, Meru, 19 October 20163
With the collapse of coffee, household economies revolve around different goods 
and activities. Today, bananas are the most widely cultivated crop. Even if a family 
has no farm, they will have a banana tree in their compound. Bananas were trad-
ition al ly a women’s crop. This means that a woman is able to make money from it 
without having to reveal to her husband exactly how that money is spent although 
women explained that they mostly invest this money in the education of their 
children, and this is known by their husbands. She is still required to give a pro-
portion of this to her husband, which she will not deny, as the consequence may 
involve limited freedom for activities such as attendance to the market.
But without coffee, men were left with no primary source of income. They 
would have to ask their wives for money from the sale of bananas. To rely on their 
wives for money would be considered shameful. Women could not deny their 
husbands money even though they knew it was mostly used for drinking alcohol. 
Doing so would cause conflicts which extend as far being denied permission go to 
the market to sell more bananas. If they disobeyed and went to market, we were 
told, ‘she might as well stay there!’ They would be beaten if they returned home 
after such behaviour. We continually heard ‘Meru men must be real men!’ and 
allowing your wife to financially support you is not what a ‘real Meru man’ would 
concede.
3 Interestingly Mbataru also refers to the grain trading of Kikuyu women as being originally 
financed by the ‘tears’ of coffee money (2010). The reference is somewhat obscure but perhaps refers 
to the practice of discontinuing and devaluing women’s food production, and instead importing grain, 
during the golden age of coffee
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So in order to have a source of income for which they did not have to account 
to their wives, Meru men have begun to claim a species of banana for themselves. 
This species, mshare, is a highly commercial breed of banana, fetching higher 
prices than other types compared to kisasa/uganda and ndizi ng’ombe. The for-
mer is closely related to matoke, the Ugandan origin species of bananas that is 
mainly used for family food while the latter—as its name suggests—was in the 
past food for cows and raw material for local brew (mbege). Because mshare 
fetches higher prices, men seek to make it a men’s crop.
Women described the situation with bananas as ‘trying to turn bananas into 
Tanzanite’, They see men imagining that women get lots of money when they sell 
bananas at the market, likening bananas to Tanzanite (a high value extremely rare 
gem that is found nearby). Hence they are forced, by male expectations, to finance 
many household activities—education, health, food, and asset acquisition. This 
gives women mixed feelings about these developments. They are happy that there 
is some income coming their way but concerned that men have left everything to 
them (including provision of money for their alcohol). They complained that if 
they sell their species of banana, their husbands demand money from them. They 
will take this money and ‘convert it into piss’ because they are spending their 
wives’ hard- earned cash on alcohol.
The women lamented all the wasted opportunities that could have been created 
with this money, which they saw as especially painful since now bananas are not 
exclusively a woman’s crop. These views were the same across all three women’s 
focus groups, and women said that these changes in gendered control of certain 
crops have led to increased power struggles between men and women.
It is still primarily the woman’s job to sell the bananas in the market. A man 
can only do so if he is bringing so many bananas to market that he must (and can 
afford to) carry them in a pickup. If the bananas are only enough to carry on the 
head, then these must be sold (and carried) by a woman. Men cannot carry 
bananas on their heads, only in a pickup or on a motorcycle. The division of 
labour here is determined by the amount of income likely to be achieved by the 
quantity of bananas. More money means it is a man’s job.
Furthermore milk, we were told4 (formerly exclusively for women), has 
become divided: the milk produced in the evening is for the women. This is used 
at home for making evening and morning tea. The milk produced in the morning 
is only for the men, and it is sold. Women do not have control of this source 
of income.
Men only used to go to the farm to check on their coffee plots. This has changed 
after the loss of coffee for most families. Men, as we have discussed, control high- 
value commercial crops, and so men are increasingly going to banana farms. As 
4 Both men and women explained this to us across focus groups, interviews, and informal 
conversations.
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other crops gain commercial value (as it is with maize, potatoes, and carrots), 
men have taken responsibility for marketing.
One positive aspect of this change, say women, is that ‘you cannot eat coffee’, 
but at least you can eat potatoes and carrots. They say diets have improved, and 
despite these crops being controlled by their husbands, the women see this aspect 
as a positive change. This contributes to their belief that ‘God brought coffee 
 disease’, because of their tears.
Since the coffee market became unviable, women have diversified away from 
farming. They do not like being ‘unpaid labourers on the husband’s plots’,5 and so 
many have gone into business. SACCOs (savings and cooperative groups), and 
microfinance loans, have in recent years facilitated women’s business op por tun-
ities, but in all of our focus groups, women reported that men do not like them 
doing business. Indeed, men told us that women often misuse money from loans.6 
Women said that they have greater ability to make an income for themselves these 
days, and much more time for business, as they no longer have to work on the 
coffee farms. This is seen by men as women trying to take over from them as 
the head of the family, with control of finances, which might explain why men see 
women as misusing money. However, it is clear that men acknowledge women 
now have greater power, which comes with ownership of assets: ‘they have a place 
in decision making because they own their own capital’.7
Discussion: Contesting Change in Meru
The coffee farmers of Meru are popularly known as one Tanzania’s early success 
stories. These were, in the words of one observer, ‘the Freemen of Meru’ 
(Nelson 1967). They fought violent imperial oppression and extensive land alien-
ation to launch the celebrated Meru Land Case against the British rulers which 
foreshadowed and hastened the Independence struggle. They formed co- operative 
unions which were wealthy and co- ordinated enough to buy back farms settlers 
sold, and pay for educational trusts that subsidised the education of thousands of 
their children (Spear 1997, Neumann 1998).
Perhaps ‘freemen’, however, is the apposite term. For the untold story that 
underpinned this success was female labour—and hard female labour at that. As 
Noe describes preparing coffee required washing beans early in the morning in 
cold mountain streams before school, picking every berry from the bushes, and 
retrieving and piling the beans appropriately before sale—and all this to produce 
the revenues that men alone controlled.
5 This was reported by women whenever coffee was mentioned. 6 Men’s FG, 21 April 2017.
7 Men’s FG, 21 April 2017.
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This explains the bitter voices that we encountered in our fieldwork. Many 
female informants were pleased that there is no coffee any more as the work was 
very hard, labour intensive, and unpleasant, and they had no way of knowing how 
the money was spent from all their hard work. One woman commented, ‘I hope 
bananas too acquire diseases’. Some women have also come to hate the banana 
business, as they feel that men have taken it from them.
It may seem strange that women could be so opposed to a source of revenue 
which had driven so much ‘progress’ for their community as a whole. But com-
munities are differentiated. We have to be attentive to the misfortunes that this 
success generated and who experienced them. Indeed some women celebrate the 
demise of coffee because of the financial freedoms new economic activities now 
make possible:
. . . better these vegetables than coffee. Let coffee get lost. Men would sell the 
 coffee we toiled over, eat, spend the money with other women . . . he would not 
even bring home a piece of kanga8 It is better now that we have somewhere to 
grow vegetables.9
But we cannot see the demise of coffee as ushering in a new era of relative female 
freedom. Rather it brings in a new period of contest over the ownership and con-
trol of revenue streams and the proper domains of male and female activity. These 
disputes are a constant part of everyday life (Box 7.1). The gendered contests over 
commercial crops are central aspects of daily life and filter people’s interpretation 
of change.
Women see some progressive change amidst these economic shifts. This 
includes women having their voices heard, women accessing loans, women 
8 A cloth wrap worn by women.
9 A Meru woman, speaking at a women’s focus group, March 2017.
Box 7.1 Contestation of gender roles in Meru
‘Women have become kings!’—Meru man, 19/10/16
Husband: Men do cook!
Wife: Well, we’ve been married for more than 40 years and I don’t even know if 
you can make tea!!
Husband: I can make a cooking fire.
Wife: I have never seen that happen!
—Meru husband and wife, 19/10/16
Source: Authors’ fieldwork.
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starting businesses, and no longer working on the coffee plots: these are all seen 
as considerable steps forward. On the other hand some women feel that life is 
worse than twenty years ago, because men have taken over what were once small 
businesses for women. However, most of them agree that despite all the struggles 
in the control of family income after the cessation of coffee cultivation, they are 
more empowered today. They have more opportunity to be heard and to take 
control of the family.
Older women believe that the younger generation of women is even more 
independent and are able to ‘speak’ without the traditional consequence of vio-
lence. Younger couples are more likely to work together on tasks. However, for 
many women, the strict gender roles and control of finances remain. The cessa-
tion of coffee has not made as dramatic a change to women’s equity as men might 
believe as in their saying, ‘women have become kings’.
Our point here is not that these new income- earning possibilities for which 
Meru women are fighting provide security. As Ossome observed, growing female 
participation in informal labour markets can simply entail more vulnerability and 
exclusion (Ossome 2015). But in the context of patriarchal Meru societies, and 
small formal sectors which exclude most people anyway, they provide resources 
for which women want to fight.
In this light it is instructive to return to Hillbom’s account of gender relations 
(pages 163–4) because it is so different from our own. What could explain it? In 
between the first version of this paper being published (in Agrarian South) and 
this chapter going to press we have been able to exchange ideas with Hillbom 
(pers. comm. 21/4/20) and have updated our discussion to reflect them.10 First we 
must recognize that the sorts of gender relations she describes can and do exist. 
Hillbom is reporting her findings from the field. They come from a slightly differ-
ent part of Meru, and from a slightly earlier period. Some of the differences there-
fore may be geographical and historical.
But there are differences in the conceptual frameworks we have used. Perhaps 
the most important is that we disagree with Hillbom’s suggestion that if food 
crops were ‘traditionally’ subsistence and under female control then, when they 
acquire more commercial value, they will remain under female control. The lit-
era ture (Orr et al 2014) we have considered above suggests otherwise. Andersson 
 Djurfeldt has also recently published a similar assessment of this literature which 
draws the same conclusion:
numerous studies, both contemporary and historical, concern the male dom in-
ance over cash crop production and sales and the growing male control over 
women’s crops as they become commercialized. (2018: 83)
10 We are grateful to Ellen for the constructive and collegiate exchange our different ideas have 
prompted.
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When women’s crops become commercially valuable men seek to control them. 
Indeed in Hillbom’s other work (2011) she points to increasing competition 
within household over income from milk. This unsurprising if, following Ossome 
(2014), we should expect this sort of change in control over commercial crops 
because we need to see the gendered domains of control over land, labour, and 
their products as contested. Male and female realms are not given by tradition, 
rather these traditions are forged and re- made through myriad interactions every 
single day.
Conclusion
Sadly, it seems that these three outspoken and determined little girls in the extract 
at the beginning of the paper will face a number of challenges to their dreams. 
Female bajaji or pikipiki drivers simply do not exist in Meru society at the 
moment. If they did, their peers, parents, and fellow Meru would see them as 
‘loose’ women, with poor morals. They would be unlikely to marry, as their hus-
bands would be shamed for not adequately ‘controlling’ them, or for allowing 
themselves to be dominated by their wives. Meru women are not allowed to be in 
a more senior role than their husbands and they are not facilitated to earn more 
money than men. It would be highly unusual if these girls did manage to achieve 
their dream jobs as bodaboda drivers or bajaji drivers.
As women find new, entrepreneurial ways of making money, men seek ways to 
take them over. High- value bananas, once a women- only crop, are now controlled 
by men. Chicken businesses, also originally only seen as fit for women, are taken 
over by men, as men lose their coffee business, and search for more commercial 
ventures. We are not arguing that the men are doing this in a particularly mali-
cious way, but that this strongly patriarchal society expects men to take over from 
women, and assumes that men will control any significantly commercial, income- 
generating activities. Men used to control finances from the coffee business, but 
now that coffee has become unproductive due to a slump in the market, pests, 
and diseases, men have sought to control other commercial ventures. The trans-
ference of control by men from coffee to bananas, to chickens, to high- value vege-
table growing, is a seemingly ‘natural’ order which women struggle to avert.
Men see women as usurping their control of finances. They believe that women 
have achieved greater freedoms and financial control during the past twenty 
years. Women see this very differently; they feel that whatever small progress they 
make is rapidly followed by men taking over this control. They are happy to be rid 
of the hard physical labour coffee crops require from them, but are angry that 
many small businesses, formerly the preserve of women only, have been usurped 
by their husbands, allowing women even less financial autonomy.
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In an era of the Sustainable Development Goals we are accustomed to talking 
about progress towards those goals and setting targets and indicators of welcome 
change. Yet the case of change in the context of Meru coffee suggests this may well 
not be the best way of conceiving of these dynamics. The targets and these indica-
tors matter. But the linear thinking in terms of progress does not allow for regress. 
From the perspective of the women in Meru, any movements towards develop-
ment goals have to be viewed through a lens of contested gender dynamics which 
could reverse hard- won gains.
It may be tempting, when reading some of the other chapters in this collec-
tion to conclude that assets provide a good proxy of measuring rural well- being. 
We hope that this chapter discourages that conclusion. There are indeed cases 
where assets do correlate well with some measures of well- being (as Borgerhoff 
Mulder shows in Chapter 5). But as Borgerhoff Mulder emphasizes, these are 
local relationships, that may not be replicated elsewhere. In Meru the growth of 
assets that coffee farming enabled brought unevenly distributed costs and bene-
fits for men and women. A focus only on that growth in assets and not the 
labour which produced them will miss those vital dynamics. The light that a 
focus on assets sheds on some aspects of rural dynamics cannot blind us to the 
limits of their insights.
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At the time of writing the most recent household budget survey data for Tanzania 
have been released from the 2017/8 round of the Household Budget Survey. On 
the face of it poverty rates in Tanzania appear to have declined substantially, with 
poverty declining from 34.4 per cent to 26.4 per cent nationally between 2007 
and 2018, and extreme poverty (food poverty) declining from 11.3 per cent to 
8 per cent in the same period (URT 2019).
However, for rural researchers, this report makes depressing reading because 
these changes are driven primarily by decreases in urban poverty, far more than 
rural poverty. The proportion of people living in urban areas who were poor has 
declined from 24.1 per cent in 2007 (16.4 per cent in Dar es Salaam) to 15.8 per 
cent in 2017/8 (8 per cent in Dar es Salaam). Whereas the decline in rural areas is 
smaller in absolute and proportional terms: 37.6 per cent to 31.3 per cent. The 
respective declines in extreme poverty are 12.9 per cent to 4.4 per cent for urban 
areas (Dar es Salaam 7.4 per cent to 2.3 per cent) and 18.4 per cent to 9.7 per cent 
for rural areas. Economic growth seems disproportionately to benefit urban areas. 
Distance from the metropolis makes you poor.
As if to emphasize that point further, some of the most rural and remote 
regions of Tanzania are reported to have the highest incidences of poverty. And 
the starkest case is Rukwa Region, in which 45 per cent of the population experi-
ences basic- needs poverty—which is higher than the incidence of rural poverty 
for all of Tanzania in 1991/2 (URT 2009). Rukwa seems not only just forgotten 
by the progress that the rest of the country enjoys. It seems, according to these 
standards, to have gone backwards.
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Rukwa then provides an excellent site to examine more carefully the fundamental 
premise of this research project. As we saw in Chapter 2 poverty- line data must 
omit investment in productive assets. Yet those assets are precisely the sort of 
thing that rural Tanzanians seek to invest in. As we saw from Chapter 3, accruing 
those assets is fundamental to local definitions of poverty, prosperity, and well- being. 
This begs the question, are the measurements of consumption that constitute 
poverty lines measuring the right things? Are they counting the things that matter 
to rural Tanzanians?
We have already seen in Chapter 5 that, for one remote village near Rukwa, 
there are signs of increases in well- being, both in terms of assets, and in terms of 
the relationship of those assets with other aspects of prosperity. Here we explore a 
different case, that of Mtowisa in the District of Sumbawanga (Rural).
I argue in this chapter that the answer is equivocal. On the one hand it is plain 
that measurement of daily consumption will fail to capture the important invest-
ments in productive assets, and large purchase items like metal roofing. We can 
document clearly, by taking asset histories, how people have been able to invest in 
new assets as a result of a substantial increase in cash crop prices and a reduction 
in transport costs and improvement in transport infrastructure in the region. At 
the same time it is clear that, in the context of population growth and migration 
into the village, there are also many new families and residents who have not been 
able to join in these transformations. The majority of residents in this village 
remain poor. Moreover the land frontier has now closed, accessing new land is 
now much harder. The nature and meaning of poverty that people experience 
now will change from that they endured when I first worked in this area.
Methods
I had lived in Mtowisa, then a remote village in the Rukwa Valley, for a year in 
1999–2000 as part of a post- doctoral research fellowship in which I studied the 
consequences of the immigration of large numbers of wealthy Sukuma agro- 
pastoralists, who brought with them large herds, improved cattle, and new crops 
and farming methods and who had been integrating into the area for over twenty 
years (Brockington 2001, 2006, 2007, and 2008).
I made two return trips to Mtowisa in August 2016 and April 2018. The first to 
conduct the resurvey, the second to follow up and present findings to villagers. 
I revisited, with assistants, sixty- four families, and interviewed local shopkeepers, 
district government officials, and business leaders based in Dar who purchase 
crops there. I also travelled to neighbouring villages and fishing camps with 
friends, visited new irrigation schemes, held three village meetings (for women 
and men in 2016 and a collective feedback meeting in 2018) as well as meetings 
with local leaders. I now remain in touch by phone with friends who live there.
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The advantage of the original survey that I conducted in Mtowisa is that it was 
not a sample. I surveyed the entire central village, covering just over four hundred 
families. The central village means that it excludes outlying farmsteads that were 
predominantly the domain of wealthy Sukuma agro- pastoral households who 
lived out beyond the margins of the village with large cattle herds. This re- study 
has therefore not been able to track the changing fortunes of the families who 
were the wealthiest in this area in 1999–2000 and who appeared, anecdotally, to 
have remained wealthy in 2016. However given the focus of this paper on the 
impact of economic growth on the rural poor this gap in the survey does not 
vitiate the findings.
But having a complete original survey meant that I could conduct a much 
more thorough re- visit. In the first instance I could sample families from that 
original survey, stratifying the population into groups according to key aspects of 
wealth relevant in 2000. In the second it was easier for me to deal with the prob-
lem of attrition because, if I was unable to visit a particular family, I could then 
re- select a different representative of that group from the original population. The 
nature and targets for each group, and the actual numbers achieved, are shown in 
Table 8.1.
Since I was able to replace missing families the problem of attrition recedes, 
but note the patterns in it. First there are older families whose heads had died, 
and had dispersed by the time of the revisit. A second group were those who had 
been younger, and who had moved away by the time of the revisit. These two 
groups had opposite tendencies with respect to ownership of herds and ploughs, 
with the younger groups tending to be poorer, and the older groups richer.
A key assumption of our methods is that domestic units (aka families) were 
sufficiently stable to make a re- survey of assets owned by families worthwhile. 
This proved to be the case as there were only four incidences of divorce. The sam-
ple however contains a larger than normal group of domestic units headed by 
single women (eighteen out of sixty- four or 28 per cent), whereas only 14 per cent 
had this characteristic in 2000. This is because we interviewed a relatively large 
number of widows whose husbands had died; we also interviewed three widowers.
There is also a crucial difference between the sample taken in 2016 and the 
survey of 2000: all the domestic units heads I re- visited are now sixteen years 
Table 8.1 Sampling of different social groups








Owned livestock or a plough 157 24 5 8
No livestock or plough ownership 245 40 18 8
Total 402 64 23 16
Source: Author’s data.
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older. None was under 35 years old. The findings that I report below are therefore 
not representative of younger families in the village (we will return to this point 
later). To control for this difference all the comparisons of asset ownership 
reported below compare domestic unit heads who are over 35 now with domestic 
unit heads who were over 35 in 2000. If I simply compared the sample of 2016 
with the entire village in 2000 I would not be comparing like with like. I would be 
comparing the condition of an older sample in 2016, with that of a much younger 
population from 2000. The latter would appear poorer because if its relative 
youth, the former wealthier due its seniority (as Table  8.2 implies). This could 
lead to a false impression of improving prosperity.
There are therefore two caveats which have to be remembered when we explore 
the findings. First, this survey excludes the very wealthy Sukuma agro- pastoralists, 
who were missed in the original survey. Second, I cannot talk about the contem-
porary experience of younger domestic units.
Findings
Initial Poverty and Subsequent Transformation
If ever there was an archetypal place to examine persistent peasant poverty, then 
it would be Mtowisa. The village is not far, as the crow flies, from the regional 
capital of Mtowisa, which is barely 15km away. But the flying crow has an easier 
route than humans, as it can soar over the 1200m escarpment that separated the 
town from the village. In 2000, residents had to walk between the two. This was a 
village that felt far from anywhere.
Its residents felt they were poor. It was expensive to transport crops and so 
prices were low. Productivity was also low, with most people being only 
Table 8.2 Characteristics of surveyed, deceased, moved, and unsurveyed families 
from 2000 data
Group Average of age of 
DU head in 2000
Plough ownership in  
2000 (ppn of families)
Cattle ownership in 2000 
(ppn of families)
Died 54 31 25
Moved 36.3 4 9




Source: Author’s data. Kruskal- Wallis tests find no significance difference in the number of cattle 
(p=0.32) or ploughs (p=0.07) owned by families that were surveyed, that were missed, or that died, 
but the difference in mean of household head’s age is significant (p=0.03).
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small- scale farmers, cultivating 2 acres or so. Despite abundant unused lands, 
farming activity increased only marginally with the age of the domestic unit head, 
or with family size. It was difficult to sell surplus and some feared ‘bad jealousy’ i.e. 
retribution from neighbours that success might occasion (cf. Foster 1965). Visible 
signs of wealth were few. Most lived in simple grass- roofed houses. Only 20 per 
cent of families owned cattle and then but small herds; there were few ploughs.
I must not paint a picture of abject poverty. Just over half of residents’ adult 
men (54 per cent) had owned cattle at some point in their lifetimes. The place was 
blessed by fertile soils, plentiful lands, reasonably reliable rains, a lake full of fish, 
grasslands with low tick burdens, and a game reserve that was not well guarded 
on the other side of the lake. Mtowisa may have been hard to get to, but it was still 
only a (long) day’s walk there and back, and it was possible to headload up a bas-
ket of dried fish or chickens and earn enough in a day to pay the various govern-
ment taxes required at the time for a whole year. Some farmers cultivated rice as a 
cash crop when the rivers flooded in the wet season, and one or two had con-
structed their own irrigation ditches to channel river water to their farms more 
reliably. Moreover there was a particularly wealthy group of farmers in the region, 
Sukuma immigrants from Tabora, Shinyanga, and Mwanza, who managed huge 
herds of cattle (numbering into the thousands) and large areas of land 
(Brockington  2001). Their arrival had brought changes to farming practices 
(encouraging ploughing) as well as changes to the crops grown: maize had 
recently replaced finger millet as the main staple, sunflowers and rice were being 
grown more frequently. It had also brought tensions and greater risks for smaller 
farmers as their farms were vulnerable to livestock damage for which there was 
rarely compensation.
But the main point remains. Most people were poor. They did not have the 
means to cultivate much land, and could not earn good prices for their produce. 
It was possible to accumulate livestock, land, and other assets, but this required 
time—and good luck. I had many records of people who would spend a year or 
more of their youth as herd boys for Sukuma cattle owners, and receive in return 
one cow or ox in payment (an annual salary of about $50), only then to lose the 
animal to disease or overworking it. Many people remained orientated to subsist-
ence rather than commercial production.
What happened to such poverty in the sixteen years between my visits? This 
was a period of strong economic growth nationally, and, as we have seen, the 
bene fits of that growth are thought not to have filtered down to rural areas. Does 
Mtowisa exemplify these trends or defy them?
The village was much less isolated. There is a large phone tower in the village 
(since 2008). The road between Mbeya and Sumbawanga had just been metalled 
(completed in 2014), there was also now an improved road between Sumbawanga 
and Mtowisa with good bridges across the rivers that could be used all year round 
(this was completed in 2007). There was a regular bus service in the dry season 
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along the length of the valley, and a daily bus service to Sumbawanga (which had 
started in 2013) as well as smaller hiaces throughout the day (since 2015).
The village centre was transformed. I had known it as a sleepy place with one 
shop and a small hospital, where cars came infrequently (barely once a month), 
and motorbikes were rare. Now there were numerous shops, nearly twenty 
motorbike taxis, gas and electric welding (the latter run on a powerful generator), 
several phone shops, and a well- equipped hardware store. The hospital had an 
operating theatre and there were lots of solar- powered lights (and stereos, making 
the place a much louder one at night).
There was an abundance of metal- roofed homes, and many single rooms being 
rented. Numerous pigs roamed the streets or were kept in small compounds near 
people’s houses (these had also been unusual in 2000). The small irrigation fur-
rows I had left behind were still present, and indeed had expanded in number. In 
the dry season they were used (since about 2012) to cultivate tomatoes, cabbage, 
and onions and there were around ten petrol powered pumps which withdrew 
river water to pump to nearby farms.
But these first impressions can be potentially misleading. We cannot be sure 
if the people enjoying these trappings of wealth were poor or not without a 
more detailed revisit. And it is easy not reasonable to assume that the wealth so 
conspicuously in the town centres is shared by all residents. This is precisely the 
sort of road- based bias against which Chambers warned so many years ago 
(Chambers  1981). Twenty motorbike taxis would not indicate that Mtowisa’s 
peasants have become richer. It just indicates that twenty people now own (or 
rent) motorbikes.
The Sesame Seed Cash Injection
The survey data I collected in 2016 suggest two crucial differences between the 
wealth, in assets, of the residents of Mtowisa now compared to what it had been. 
On the one hand the older families in Mtowisa enjoy higher levels of prosperity, 
as measured in assets, than they did sixteen years ago. They enjoy higher levels 
of prosperity than their counterparts of an equivalent age expected to achieve 
in 2000. They are wealthier because of their farming, and, in particular because 
they are selling more cash crops, specifically sunflower seeds and sesame, with 
the latter providing the most substantial change.
The evidence for this change is as follows. First, with respect to key measures of 
herd and plough ownership the sample visited is wealthier than it was in the past, 
and compared to the group of similar- aged domestic unit heads in 2000 
(Table 8.3). Oxen ownership has increased by half (and if we include oxen bor-
rowed from wealthy patrons it doubles to 41 per cent). Pig ownership has 
increased dramatically, and ownership of ploughs has more than doubled.
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Second, with respect to farming activity, people are simply farming more. 
Farming activity increases more with family size than it did previously 
(Figure 8.1). All families are farming more cash crops, with proportionally less 
maize is grown than before (Table 8.4).
Third, housing quality has improved, particularly with the spread of metal 
roofing.1 Improved roofing material matters because, with the increased presence 
of cattle in the region (and loss of grassland over several decades to forest 
regrowth and farms) good, long- lasting thatching grass (lasting 5–10 years) is 
hard to get. People instead are reliant on rice straw (which lasts one year) or lake 
reeds (lasting two). Moreover thatched houses are more likely to catch fire (mak-
ing it riskier to go away), and they harbour vermin. They are also, perforce, 
smaller than metal- roofed houses, to reduce the effort of collecting the thatch 
required for large houses. Houses with metal roofs can be subdivided into a family 
home and rentable rooms (providing a useful extra income of 8,000–12,000/= per 
month). Finally a metal roof is a status symbol, a visible sign of prosperity. 
1 On Google Earth I counted the appearance of metal roofs from 8/10/2003 (the first image avail-
able) to 7/10/13 (the last image). In Mtowisa in 2003 there were ninety- one metal- roofed structures. 
A further 442 new metal- roofed structures were built by October 2013.
Table 8.3 Key asset ownership, 2000 and 2016 (percentage)
Group Oxen Goats Pigs Ploughs N
Sample in 2016 41 38 16 38 64
Population in 2000 20 35 0 17 219
Source: Author’s data. Note the population in 2000 excludes family heads less than 35 years old and 
cattle include oxen borrowed from wealthy land owners. Differences in cattle, pigs, and ploughs are 
statistically significant: cattle χ2=11.84, p=0.001; pigs χ2=35.47, p<0.001; ploughs χ2=16.04, p<0.001; 
df=2 in all cases.
Table 8.4 Land put to different crops in  







Source: Author’s data. Differences are statistically 
significant; χ2=15870.5, df=3, p=0.001. With area 
measured in acres the contingency table has too 
many low value cells, so the test was conducted on 
different units of area.
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There were increasing numbers of rather grand houses also being constructed—
distinguished by their complicated roof structures.2
The other source of evidence on housing change are the narratives that I was 
told repeatedly by many people: that they had been able to invest in their houses 
because of their farming activity, and this had taken off since about 2010 
(Table 8.5). The main reason for that growth in investment, as Figure 8.2 shows, is 
the increased sales of sesame and sunflower seeds. But, from focus group discus-
sions, it was plain that sesame seed prices were the main driving force of change. 
Sesame appeared in small quantities in 2007 and 2008 in Figure 8.2, but takes off 
significantly from 2010 onwards, at the same time as decisions to invest also 
increase substantially.
These price rises were driven by international demand and global rises in these 
commodity prices, not by changes in the marketing system (Figure 8.3). Similar 
dynamics have driven prosperous sesame seed farming in other parts of Tanzania 
(Corbera et al.  2017). Other studies have shown that sesame seed marketing 
arrangements in Lindi and Mtwara Region which use respectively the District 
2 In Swahili these are called ‘migongo minne’ (four- backed houses), i.e. not a simple ‘A’-frame roof 
structure. The presence of these houses was particularly noticeable because in 2000 I had been part of 
the communal work parties that were detailed to reconstruct the local secondary school that the par-
ents in the village had built and that the government had recently taken over. As part of the take- over 
the government ordered that the teacher’s accommodation (which had been locally designed) be 
knocked down and re- built according to government standards. Then, in 2000, there was a great deal 
of complaint that these new houses were far too big. And they were nothing compared to the fine 
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Figure 8.1 Family size and farming activity 2000 and 2016.
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Stakeholders’ Price Setting Forum and the Warehouse Receipt System have been 
instrumental in fostering demand (Mashindano and Kihenzile  2013). However 
in the case of Rukwa, there was no organization of the marketing arrangements 
by government officials. There has been no organization of producers into 





























































































































Figure 8.3 Global producer prices for sesame and sunflowers ($US/tonne).
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was merely a willing buyer in the form of a major agricultural exporter (the 
Export Trading Company).
I was able to interview the pioneer farmer of modern varieties of sesame. He 
described a situation of gradual prices rises in the 2000s with demand kicking off 
in 2009 when many sesame seed buyers appeared in the village. From that point 
on prices sky- rocketed reaching as much as 2,000/– (nearly US$1.00) per kilo. 
Farmers were able to yield fantastic returns, of, I was told, between 250,000/= and 
300,000/= per sack. This is more than enough for a roll of metal roofing, and only 
two rolls would be required to roof a standard sized house.
One story illustrates well the joy and surprise that these returns caused to 
farmers in Mtowisa. I was told that one farmer (we will call him Darius), whom 
I met in the survey work and who had not been particularly industrious or wealthy 
in 2000, went up to Sumbawanga to sell his sesame in 2011. This was a collective 
enterprise, with many farmers loading their harvest onto the lorry of the local 
shop owner to take it to the depot in Sumbawanga where better prices can be 
realized. On receiving his payment for two sacks of sesame (500,000/=) Darius 
was simply left in shock.3 He sat down in a corner of the weighing room, still full 
of the hustle and bustle of heavy sacks being moved, weighed, and paid for, 
because he had never in his life expected to have so much money. His friends had 
to guide him to a guest house where he could safely spend the night. The next day 
he had recovered sufficiently to buy metal sheets for a new house (which are also 
much less easily stolen than money). He built a new house that year and extended 
it the year after following further sales.
It is because of repeated stories like Darius’s that the appearance of Mtowisa, 
and the daily lives of so many of its residents have been so thoroughly changed. 
Higher sesame seed prices have given a substantial cash injection to many peo-
ple’s livelihoods. Moreover regional production data suggest that this was not 
3 Expressed by my respondent as ‘Amekaa bubuwazi’. This is a local version of ‘amepigwa 
mbumbuwazi’.
Table 8.5 Net asset investment
Asset Acquisition 2001–5 2006–10 2011–15
House construction 8 13 34
Metal roof 4 12 33
Oxen –1 3 8
Pigs/Goats 2 2 12
Land 0 7 4
Plough/Cart 0 4 15
Milling machine/Motorbike –1 0 2
Source: Author’s data.
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merely a local phenomenon. This crop was scarcely grown when I was working 
there in 1999–2000. Yet, if these figures are to be believed then, in the last four 
years, it has injected more than $US20 million into the local economy (Table 8.6).
Patterns in Improvement
Altogether 66 per cent of the sample had experienced an increase in assets in 
some way over the previous sixteen years—but what subtler changes does this 
bald statistic conceal? There are two general trends to note. First, the improve-
ment in assets is general across most wealth groups, but richer, more productive 
families have tended to be able to benefit from the cash crop returns more than 
families who were poorer and farming less in 2000.
The evidence for that is visible in the slightly different performance of the dif-
ferent categories of farmers I identified in 2000. Those who did not engage in 
kibarua work (casual labour), or who only performed kibarua work for other 
people, are least likely to have improved their asset base. Those with more assets, 
and more engagement in kibarua work (as sellers or buyers) are most likely to 
have improved their assets (Table 8.7).4 There are some qualifications to this pat-
tern. The richest group did not increase their assets the most, reflecting the fact 
that they were also older and more likely to retire and withdraw from farming. 
Also these differences are only tendencies, and do not denote contours of disad-
vantage. At least 50 per cent of any group improved their assets.
The second trend is that female- headed domestic units, and smaller families 
tended to improve their asset base less than male- headed larger units (Table 8.8). 
This trend reflects changes in the lifecycle of domestic units where older people 
4 Casual labour is a contested aspect of peasant studies. Performing such labour can be associated 
with demeaning work and be an aspect of class formation (Mueller 2011). I found that in Rukwa in 
2000 performing kibarua work was not necessarily associated with low status—it merged with recip-
rocal labour relations. It was possible to perform kibarua for one person, and employ kibarua yourself 
at a later date. Kibarua can also be undertaken in order to save and invest in a particular project. These 
days kibarua can be a sign of poverty—if it is the only means of support—and a means of 
accumulation.
Table 8.6 Sesame seed sales in Rukwa Region
Year Tons Tz sh/kg Tz sh $US
2013–14 5528 1950 10,779,600,000 6,610,000
2014–15 4472 2000 8,944,000,000 4,710,000
2015–16 11,218 1277 14,325,386,000 6,570,000
2016–17 3705 1625 6,020,625,000 2,740,000
Source: Regional production figures.
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farm less, where widows also farm less, and where both tend to support fewer 
dependents.
In addition, across the sample, in the midst of all this prosperity there were 
repeated, if infrequent, incidents of continued poverty or impoverishment. Some 
families seem to have been unable to benefit from the changes transforming their 
neighbours. My friends and informants explained this as an inability to plan 
affairs (kupanga maisha) such that their expenditure matched their means. 
Conversely those who had been able to improve their assets spoke also of restrict-
ing expenditure (bana matumizi, literally clamp down on uses) to do so.
Others, although they had gained in assets, had lost in other ways, suffering 
from divorce or death of partners, or simply the travails of old age, such that life 
now was decidedly unhappier. A couple of families had lost assets with which 
they began (land and/or livestock) because they had been forced to sell because of 
various hardships. There are also some incidents of apparent investment in assets 
more accurately being a case of releasing liquidity or altering asset portfolio. This 
applied to older families who sold land, or parts of their plots, to fund house- 
building. We also visited families who had invested in oxen and land, but had lost 
their herds and been forced to sell their land because of diverse misfortunes. 
Building an asset base requires good luck as well as wise decision- making.
But if the general perspective across domestic units has been positive, what 
about within them? What changes within families does the rising prosperity 
docu ment ed above conceal? Within domestic units the changes experienced 
Table 8.7 Asset growth performance by 2000 wealth group.
Wealth group in 2000 % of families improving asset base
Owns cows and a plough 63
Owns cows only 83
Owns either pigs, goats, or a plough 82
None of assets above, pays for and performs kibarua 80
None of assets above, only pays for kibarua work 62
None of assets, neither pays for or performs kibarua 56
None of assets above, only performs kibarua work 50
Table 8.8 Differences between families gaining assets and losing/showing no change 
in assets 2000–6
Asset change Mean family size 
2000 (average)
No. of female- headed 
households (av. age)
No. of dual- headed 
households (av. age)
Static/Decline 3.7 16 (57) 14 (56)
Growth 4.1 4(47) 30 (51)
Source: Author’s data.
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because of the investment in assets seem to be reasonably well shared by men and 
women. Fipa society is one where both men and women can own and dispose of 
land and livestock. Weeding workloads, I was told (and saw), are equally shared. 
The move to cash crops did not appear to have increased men’s income, but wom-
en’s work.
Women have been disadvantaged, however, by the growing population of the 
village, and the failure of water supplies to keep pace with people’s needs. Women, 
not men, collect water, and there were repeated complaints about the length of 
time required, and the restrictions on allowances per home. Cooking (also wom-
en’s work) now requires charcoal, as there are fewer trees on farms. There were 
also three cases of female- headed households who had lost access to land through 
family or neighbour disputes, or because their husbands had died leaving them 
childless, and therefore with no access to their husband’s family land. Older 
female headed households were particularly unlikely to see an improvement in 
their assets (Table 8.8).
Finally, it bears repeating that assets are but one aspect of prosperity. The fam-
ilies I visited, in the main, had enjoyed a recent cash injection from which they 
had invested in assets. But there are many other dimensions of poverty that 
remain untouched by this welcome change. The standards and ease of accessing 
health and educational services, expenditure, care for the long term sick and 
elderly, basic measures of dignity, and so on are all ignored by this survey. Our 
methods and sources do not allow us to make the long- term comparisons 
required to document the changes (or lack thereof) that have occurred here. But 
that does not make them any less important.
The restrictions of looking at assets is best illustrated by our question ‘has life 
improved for you now compared to 2000?’ In response some 43 per cent of 
respondents felt that life was improving, 40 per cent felt that it had got worse, and 
15 per cent of people felt it was as hard as ever. When 55 per cent of a sample 
insist that life is worse now, or as bad, as it was sixteen years ago, and when life 
was indeed hard sixteen years ago, then that majority is a significant finding. 
Particularly because, when answering that question, even those who felt life had 
got better usually qualified that by insisting that the improvement was marginal 
at best.
Growing Poverty and Inequality
However the other crucial difference between the state of the village now and 
earl ier is that there are trends towards class formation and inequality that indicate 
that the fortunes of new cash crops are not universally enjoyed. The primary evi-
dence for this is that there is now a substantial group of households—around 
44 per cent of the village—who are characterized as not having their own lands and 
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working for other people (Table 8.9). This is not a category of people that existed 
in large numbers in 2000. Rather almost everyone farmed, and those who did not 
have their own, but rented, were so few that we were able to organize a second 
survey in 2000 examine why they did not have their own plot.
Casual labourers earn relatively low sums. With board and lodging included it 
can be just 2,000/– per day, less than one dollar. Otherwise labourers are paid by 
the area, which means that weeding an acre of rice for 50,000 shillings can be five 
days work, or ten days, depending on the weed load. These are not sums that will 
make people wealthy quickly.
This group exists partly because Mtowisa has a relatively large collection of 
housing stock to rent rooms in. There is often casual work to be had, and the 
Table 8.9 Wealth groups and their distribution in the study site




1 Has a good house with a tiled floor and  
electricity (solar), and water inside the house
A 20- acre farm, a shop and cars;
has goats, pigs, and 100 cows;
has a huge store of crops—100 sacks;
does not do casual labour
4 <1
2 Has a good home with cement walls/floor and 
solar and water at the home;
has a 10- acre farm; a pikipiki and a bicycle;  
has around 5 cows, goats, and pigs; does not do 
casual labour
44 4
3 Has a metal roof and solar; has a 5- acre farm and  
a bicycle; owns 2 cows, 5 goats, and a plough; pays 
for kibarua work and does some kibarua work 
(ploughing with family oxen)
116 11
4 Burnt- brick house roofed with grass not  
metal roof; no electricity; no water at home;  
has chickens, goats, and pigs but no cows; has a 
bicycle but not a plough;
does kibarua work
369 34
5 Rented house; no solar; dependent on casual 
labour; some do not rent a farm; some rent a 
0.5–2- acre farm
472 44
6 Homeless and destitute 6 1
Unknown   71 7
Total   1082  
Source: Author’s data.
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recent boom in sesame seed created a good deal of work. It has attracted immigrants 
who rent rooms in the new houses sesame seed farmers have built. There are also 
migrants who are drawn to the lake—and the sometimes wealthy fishermen are 
not well captured in the wealth rankings the focus groups created. Nevertheless it 
is plain that the sesame seed boom is not a universally experienced blessing. 
Those farmers with the land and means to farm it have profited. But it is creating 
new forms of differentiation.
The sesame seed cash injection is therefore concomitant with an incipient pro-
cess of class formation in the village which has seen the differentiation of families 
into those who own their own land and those who can subsist by renting out their 
labour. The complete survey taken in 2000 is no longer a good characterization of 
the village. As inevitably happens in longitudinal and panel surveys, a new base-
line is required.
Ironically, however, at the same time as inequality appears to be increasing, 
local tolerance of it also appears to be growing. Focus groups at the feedback 
meeting in 2018 suggested that the increased wealth reflected immigration and 
mixing of different tribes and that this reduced the ‘bad jealousy’ that used to 
hold people back. The same was discussed more informally in bars and during 
casual conversation. Commentators noted that the elders used to have the power 
to control where and when rain fell, which was advantageous, but that these same 
elders would curse, and thus kill, people who became too successful. Now both 
powers are gone. Wealth accumulation that was once controlled by curses, death 
threats, and fears now faces fewer impediments.5
Conclusion
The changes we have recorded here—both the increased wealth and the attendant 
rise in inequality—derive in part because this village has become more closely 
integrated into the global capitalist system. The improved roads and communica-
tions infrastructure have seen crop prices rise at the farm gate.
The developments at Mtowisa thus fit with the fifth element of Hall’s typology 
of forms of land grabbing, that of ‘commercialisation in situ’. She describes this as 
small- scale producers being incorporated into commercial value changes 
(Hall 2011). The attendant consequences, in the context of a closed land frontier, 
is a new prevalence of landlessness that is the obverse of the local forms of accu-
mulation that we have documented here. As Hall and colleagues later observed, 
5 The specific advantages mentioned during these discussions were that when road building 
 contractors had been working on roads in the rainy season they were then able to go to the weather 
controllers and persuade them to keep the rains of specific parts of their construction sites at sensitive 
times. Whether or not this is actually true, it is a social fact, people believed it and that belief con-
strained their own personal improvement plans.
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the important issue for understanding poverty dynamics in such developments is 
not whether this shows that small or large farms are better but rather ‘how differ-
ent farming models co- exist and the ways in which poor people can navigate 
opportunities among them’ (Hall et al. 2017: 532). Accordingly as these forms of 
commercialization and in situ accumulation spread throughout Tanzania we 
need to understand how the opportunities and the misfortunes they present are 
negotiated.
In this instance we must note that the driving forces of change are also fickle. 
Sesame seed has been hit by a disease which did not respond to treatment and 
which has made the crop too unreliable to be farmed any more. The crop price 
fluctuates considerably and there is no government support mechanism to tide 
farmers over the vicissitudes of global demand. Cash hungry farmers are now 
turning to more reliable cash crops (sunflower) as well as irrigated vegetables for 
their money. The mechanisms which allowed some farmers to become less poor, 
indeed prosperous with respect to their assets, have not allowed sustained reduc-
tion in poverty.
Notwithstanding the mechanisms the point is that assets matter. They matter 
both as a means of external observers to record change, and to local de ter min-
ations of a good life. Understandings of poverty dynamics in peasant populations 
have to take account of the local definitions and meanings of wealth and the 
things that peasants themselves count as important. They are not well- served by 
measures of prosperity which preclude the possibility of counting investment 
which matters to rural people—which is clearly the case with commonly used 
consumption- based surveys. These are not well placed to track the ‘mores of con-
sumption and the utilities of wealth’ in Tanzanian contexts.6
Many of the families with whom I spoke place considerable significance on the 
major purchases that they will need to make in order to have a good life and pro-
vide for their children. They will need to buy a plot (150,000/=), build a good 
house (300,000–500,000/=), buy land (400,000/= an acre for un- irrigated land), 
buy oxen (200,000/= a head), and a plough (150,000/=). And most of the families 
in this sample were taking significant steps in building that asset base. These pur-
chases, so vital in local notions of progress, are not captured in poverty- line data.
Or to put this more generally, understanding investment in productive assets 
and houses will be central to answering three of the four questions of Bernstein’s 
haiku—‘Who owns what? Who does what? Who gets what? And, what do they do 
with it?’ (Bernstein 2010: 22). This will require more longitudinal studies which 
track and explain change in asset portfolios. Doing so will help us to understand 
what forms of poverty persist amongst whom.
6 The phrase is Steve Wiggins pers. comm. 14 March 2019. Consumption surveys are useful if they 
track the economic utility (or benefits) of expenditure, but less useful if they miss such expenditure.
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Introduction: Environmentalism in Tanzania
Tanzania’s commitment to environmentalism and conservation is essential to the 
country’s identity, politics, and economy. It defines it geographically, in that an 
extraordinarily high percentage of its land area (close to 40 per cent) is protected and 
denied to human use and habitation. The only other African country which comes 
close is Botswana, and that nation has a population approximately one- thirtieth 
the size of Tanzania’s. It matters historically in that the Arusha Manifesto, ghost- 
written for President Nyerere by the WWF, stated a commitment to maintain 
conservation policies begun in the colonial and mandate eras. It is vital politically, 
as Tanzania’s determination to pursue strong conservation policies, including 
violent anti- poaching measures and expanding its conservation estate reflects the 
enduring influence, ideological and financial, of what Brockington has called an 
‘environmental- conservation complex’ (Brockington 2006).
But Tanzania is not merely an environmental state, it is an environmental 
nation. Belief in and support for environmental protection emanates from the 
most basic levels of Tanzanian society. There is widespread belief that tree cover 
and rainfall are causally linked, with the former causing the later, even at the 
smallest scales. This does not mean that people do not cut down trees, they do so 
abundantly (McNicol et al. 2018). Tanzania loses 400,000 ha forest annually, and 
is among the ten countries in the world that has the largest net loss of forest area 
(Kideghesho 2015). There is also pressure on water and grazing resources which 
is driven by smallholder use, as well as by large- scale land alienations impacts 
on  smallholders (Bluwstein et al.  2018). But rural Tanzanians are vocal and 
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concerned about the collective consequences of these changes. It is part of everyday 
discussion (Brockington 2006). Contests over village resources are also contests 
over contrasting understandings and interpretations of environmental change.
Environmental pressures and environmental concerns are surprisingly muted 
in many of the chapters in this collection. These were villages where land frontiers 
had closed. The stories are of intensification and changing crops or social relations. 
However, in the area discussed here, environmental change, and anxiety about 
environmental change, are themes that are uppermost on many  people’s minds.
As in many other chapters we describe remarkable change in the fortunes 
of  once poor rural farmers (as measured in assets). As in other villages this is 
a qualified success, and, as in other villages, it is driven by smallholder efforts. 
However in this area the role of intensification (reduced fallow time) and exten-
sification (increased farm area) is clearer than anywhere else. Villagers have 
been reaping nature’s subsidy—the fertile soils that freshly cut forest provides. 
As we shall see this raises important questions about the sustainability of the 
trans form ations we describe.
Methods and Context: Studying and Re- studying Goima 
and Mirambu
The case study reported in the present chapter originates from environmental 
concerns. The study site is close to the Kondoa Irangi Highlands in Central 
Tanzania, infamous for its devastating problems of land degradation (Tanzania 
1977, Mung’ong’o  1995). Already the colonial government initiated ambitious 
rehabilitation interventions, which from the mid- 1970s were further intensi-
fied, leading among many other things to the radical measure to evict in 1979 
all livestock from the 125,600 ha so- called Kondoa Eroded Area. The interventions 
met with considerable local resistance (Östberg  1986 and  2000, Mung’ong’o 
1995), but they had effect; notable landscape changes were registered (Östberg 
1986, Backéus et al. 1994 and 1996, Mbegu 1996). In the early 1990s a compre-
hensive research project studied both landscape changes and the effects of the 
rehabilitation efforts.1
The Burunge Hills border on the Kondoa Eroded Area (Figure 9.1). In the early 
1990s, the starting point for this study, the Burunge Hills were notably much better 
preserved than the Kondoa Highlands. At the time, this appeared something of 
an enigma. The two areas shared many characteristics: types of soils and bedrock, 
rainfall patterns, crops grown, livestock kept. Why had the Burunge Hills fared so 
1 The ‘Man- Land Interrelations in Central Tanzania’ project, jointly run by The Institute of 
Resource Assessment, University of Dar es Salaam, and the School of Geography, Stockholm 
University (Christiansson et al. 1991, Christiansson and Kikula 1996).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 01/07/21, SPi
196 Wilhelm Östberg, Joseph Mduma, and Dan Brockington
much better than the Kondoa Highlands? It fell on Östberg, as a member of the 
research project studying ‘man- land’ (sic) interactions in Kondoa, to find this out.
Joseph Mduma, of the Tanzanian Forestry Department, which was the 
or gan iza tion responsible for the extensive land rehabilitation project in the 
Kondoa Eroded area, teamed up with Östberg. They worked in two villages, 
Goima and Mirambu, on the western slopes of the Burunge Hills, situated in 
the Chemba District, as well as in the hills. Between 1991 and 1994 they lived 
in the area for periods of two to three months at a time, interrupted by periods 
of three to four months for analysis and writing- up. In 1991–3 they carried out 
a comprehensive survey among 10 per cent of the households in the two villages 
during different times of the cultivation year (farm sizes, crops, household 
composition, livestock, etc.). The data collected formed the basis for the re- study 
in 2016 of the area.
Follow- up visits were made in 1997, 2006, and 2007. In 2005 the area was 
visit ed by a Dutch sociologist Monique Slegers, and we could draw on her find-
ings (Slegers and Östberg 2008, Östberg and Slegers 2010). When the two villages 
were restudied for the ‘Long- term Livelihood Change in Tanzania’ research pro-
ject, Mduma and Östberg were joined by the project’s team members Olivia 
















































Figure 9.1 Goima and Mirambu villages on foot slopes of the Burunge Hills, south- east 
of Kondoa town, and the Kondoa Eroded Area.
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In 2016 (two visits, with an additional follow- up visit in 2018) we tried to 
locate all the households interviewed in 1991–3. The levels of attrition are rela-
tively low (Table 9.1). Moreover, there is no tendency in the data for the attrition 
to affect particular groups. In particular, given that the villages appear to have got 
richer (as we shall see) we have to be clear that this is not due to poorer families 
who were once present having now just disappeared, through death or migration. 
Table  9.1  shows that there is no trend for higher attrition rates in the poorest 
groups across both villages: attrition is slightly higher among the poorest in 
Goima (37 per cent missing as compared to 31 per cent from wealth group 2), but 
lower in Mirambu (only 8 per cent missing when compared to 19 per cent in 
wealth group 2).
Nor could we spot any consistent trend in terms of attrition of dual- and 
female- headed households  across both of the villages, with attrition in female- 
headed households being lower than the dual- headed households in Goima 
(29 per cent as compared to 35 per cent) and higher in Mirambu (23 per cent 
compared to 9 per cent).
We have grouped the 1991/3 categories 2 and 3 into category 2 and categories 
4–6 into category 3. The 100 per cent re- contact rate for the richest families is 
misleading because there are only three families in those cells.
The changing composition of households over time has made some changes to 
the presence of female- headed households in the follow up in Mirambu alone. 
In  the original survey 50 per cent of households in Goima, and 38 per cent in 
Mirambu, were female- headed. In the revisited group the proportion changes to 
47 per cent and 20 per cent.
However we can get a deeper picture of the forms of bias that might be at work 
if we look beneath headline wealth categories to the construction of family units. 
There is a sadly long history of talking about societies using terms like family or 
household in unreflective ways. These can obscure gender or generational dynam-
ics, or simply fail to mention how a household unit was defined (Randall et al. 
2011, Randall and Coast 2015). As explored in Chapter 4 of this volume, family 
units are often essential to understand the changes in assets which we explore, but 
they have to be examined carefully.
Table 9.1 Success rates in recontacting 
original families
Characteristic Goima Mirambu
Wealth group 1 100% 100%
Wealth group 2 69% 81%
Wealth group 3 63% 92%
Male- headed 65% 91%
Female- headed 71% 77%
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For the work of the 1991 survey, Östberg and Mduma used village rosters from 
Goima and Mirambu to construct the sample frame. The basic unit, in the view of 
the village offices, was a ‘kaya’ (household) which they more specifically defined 
as a ‘house’. This was made up of people sharing a roof. This definition meant that 
an aged and/or sickly person sleeping in his/her own dwelling would count as a 
separate domestic unit, even if he/she on a daily basis was provided with food 
from relatives, or neighbours. They typically would have only a small piece of 
land, an aged house of low quality, and they did not own much more than the 
clothes they wore. In the wealth rankings, people in this category were usually 
described as ‘helpless’. The advantage with following the local practice of register-
ing them as a separate domestic unit was, from the point of view of our survey, 
that these cases of poverty were not concealed (they constituted 7 per cent of the 
sample). However, for the 2016 re- survey these units have largely disappeared—
they had died. Ours is a record therefore of what happened to the people who 
have survived long enough to talk to returning researchers.
Nevertheless it appears that Goima and Mirambu villages are rather stable 
social entities. Moreover, the households provided a useful unit to record changes 
of assets, which we use as one dimension to capture the transformation the area 
has gone through over a period of twenty- five years. Still, we must note that there 
are aspects of this story which are not told here. We do not, for instance, have data 
on the contests over what sorts of assets (cows, land, farms, houses, education) to 
invest in. Such issues must form the subject of other investigations.
Goima and Mirambu Villages in the Early 1990s
At the time of the original study, Goima was the headquarters of Goima division, 
then in Kondoa District, and should have been in a position to attract development 
interventions. It did not. Goima was being bypassed by other lowland villages 
like Chandama, Jangalo, Mrijo, Songolo, Soya, and the then recently established 
settlements in the Burunge Hills, like Madah. Those were the places that traders 
from Arusha and Dodoma visited to buy crops. There immigrants cleared in the 
forests and sure enough got bumper harvests from the virgin lands. Small shops 
and canteens were opened, new schools started, nascent churches and mosques 
appeared while Goima remained dormant.
Our original study also included Mirambu village, situated along a poor road 
heading southwest from Goima, difficult to pass during rains. Mirambu was to 
represent an ‘ordinary’ village where the administration was less obviously pre-
sent, and also because its economy was said to be more based on livestock than 
was the case in Goima.
In the early 1990s, people in both Goima and Mirambu villages were poor. Half of 
the households could not support themselves on their land (Östberg 1995: 40–4) 
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but had to take on day labour for others to make ends meet. Admittedly 1991–4 
were dry years, which of course worsened the situation, but the Burunge in fact 
had a long history of doing casual work in neighbouring areas, and mem or ies of 
famines when large parts of the population had left the area were still present.
This notwithstanding, the Burunge of the early 1990s perceived their land to be 
vast and resourceful. They envisaged their country as an almost endless expanse 
of land. This attitude rhymed with their mode of production. A field was culti-
vated for one to three years, and then fallowed for at least three years. During 
clearing, tree stumps and roots were left in the field so that vegetation would 
regenerate fast. The basic principle of farming was to capture the strength of 
newly cleared land. Soil fertility was continuously replenished by the forest.
Many Burunge felt assured that as long as the forest remains, life would return 
even if droughts bring suffering. The forest also provided meat, honey, berries, 
green leaves, and wood products (Östberg 1995: 56, 118–27). The paradox was 
that while the living conditions of many Burunge were poor by modern stand-
ards, they still felt that their forests and their land were abundant. Immigrants 
could count on a permissive attitude to land: Oaymo da hida sliimaa, ‘a field is 
for everyone’.2
The men cleared the forest, while both men and women cultivated the land. 
Hand hoes were the common agricultural implement, although some ploughed 
with oxen, or, fewer, with tractors (Table 9.2). Immigrants invariably used ploughs 
and cultivated permanent fields. The early 1990s saw the beginning of a transition 
from rotational bush fallow to permanent fields.
Drought- tolerant bulrush millet and sorghum were cultivated, as was finger 
millet. Both local demand and the beer industry at Arusha made growing finger 
millet profitable (Kawa 1993: 77, Östberg 1995: 192–4). Maize was appreciated as 
a food and was easier to market than bulrush millet, and was therefore grown 
2 This key phrase is reproduced in the Burunge language, while other terms are Swahili words, 
which was the language used in the field studies.
Table 9.2 Mode of cultivation (%) in Goima and Mirambu villages, 1991/3 (farmers) 
and 2016 (plots)
  Goima 1991/3 Goima 2016 Mirambu 1991/3 Mirambu 2016
Hand hoes 64 17 66 31
Ox plough 18 18 27 25
Tractor 18 65 7 44
n 50 54 45 127
Goima: χ2=29.84, df=2, p<0.001; Mirambu: χ2=13.07, df=2, p<0.002.
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although its water requirements made it a less well- suited crop in this semi- arid 
area.3 Yields were generally low, as was true of Dodoma region as a whole.
The Burunge traditionally lived in the hills, and on the flats surrounding the 
Burunge Hills. During Tanzania’s villagization process in the 1970s people were 
moved off the hills and settled in villages. By the mid- 1980s this policy was no 
longer as strictly enforced as before, and some families returned to their old 
settle ments and fields. They were soon followed by immigrants from other areas, 
notably the Kondoa Eroded Area, who wanted to benefit from the restored soils 
in the hills. Immigrants also arrived in Goima and Mirambu villages, and in the 
early 1990s a quarter of the population in Goima identified with other ethnic 
groups. In Mirambu village the corresponding figure was 16 per cent. In most 
neighbouring communities, the immigrants were in majority and the proportion 
of immigrants have continued to grow.
Goima and Mirambu Some Twenty- Five Years Later, 
First Impressions
The road! It is wide and with a gravel surface. In the early 1990s an old, battered, 
and erratic bus passed through Goima in the morning on its way to Kiteto, 
returning in the afternoon. Now, frequent buses link Goima to Kondoa, Babati, 
Dodoma, Singida, Iringa, Dar es Salaam, Tanga, and beyond.
Goima village has a new skyline. There is electricity, and a communication 
tower. A new spacious mosque, a newly built, sizeable church for Kanisa la 
Mungu (God’s church), a secondary school. The Catholic church is there as 
before. There are many new permanent buildings with high- raised roofs covered 
with metal sheets. One can buy stationary, photocopies, cosmetics, spare parts for 
motorcycles, cement, and diesel. Such goods were not on sale in Goima in the 
early 1990s.
Mobile phones are everywhere; buses, tractors, lorries, motorcycles travel the 
roads. Goima has become connected. It is not that there were no motorcycles 
twenty- five years ago. The Executive Officer of Goima Division had one at his 
disposal, as did the Ward Forest Officer, and the Agricultural Officer. But by 2016 
there were more than thirty- five motorcycles in the village, privately owned, and 
the number is increasing by the day.
The transformation has coincided with population growth. The number of 
households in Goima grew more than 2.5 times from 1991 to 2016, from 507 to 
1350, and in Mirambu, it almost doubled, from 350 to 672. The increase is faster 
3 Goima area has a semi- arid climate with an average annual precipitation of below 550mm. The 
rain falls between November and May with the rest of the year being very dry. Rainfall is both scarce 
and unpredictable.
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than the annual population increase in the Dodoma Region, which was 2.1 per cent 
during the last inter- censal period (2002–12).
Mirambu village does not look that different from how it was twenty- five years 
ago, although there now are more houses, and the farming areas have been 
expanded considerably. The primary school has been extended and it is well 
maintained. The village office looks just as it did twenty- five years ago. The truly 
modern houses in Mirambu are few.
In both villages, commercial life has expanded dramatically. In Goima, shops 
are almost four times as many as they were twenty- five years ago, and they are 
much better stocked. The number of grinding mills and oil presses have more 
than doubled. There are now seven tractors based in Goima as compared to just 
one in the early 1990s and 128 ploughs. Likewise, Mirambu is today better 
endowed with facilities when compared to the early 1990s. There are three trac-
tors, three power tillers, and three grinding mills in the village, twenty- eight 
motorcycles, no less than 106 ploughs (in a village of 672 households), and 
twenty- five solar panels.4
The Crucial Water Issue
One of the biggest changes to the area is the improved water supply. In the early 
1990s, the water situation was desperate. At least one member of most house-
holds, often a child, spent hours every day during the long dry season drawing 
water for household needs from wells that were dug deep into dry riverbeds situ-
ated kilometres away from home. Any discussion about farming and livelihoods 
started and ended with the comment ‘if only it rains’ (Östberg 1995: 31). What 
can you do when there is not enough water for people, crops, or livestock?
Today, there is a large water body at Adia in a valley that is just west of Goima. 
In 2016, a large earth wall was constructed leading seasonal water from a gully 
into the valley and a shallow lake developed. In November 2016, just before the 
rainy season, it still contained water. Livestock could be watered closer to home 
instead of having to be taken to distant watering points at Kelema River. People 
could also get water from wells in the sand fans immediately below the new water 
reservoir. The changes that access to water has brought to the village cannot be 
overestimated. Apart from making life so much easier, and improving people’s 
chances to enjoy better hygiene, it has also made it possible to expand livestock 
herds and to undertake new building projects. Water for consumption is further-
more ferried into Goima village, at cut cost, by two of the new entrepreneurs in 
4 Details are provided in Östberg et al. (2018, table 2), available on open access at https://www.
mdpi.com/2073- 445X/7/2/44/htm
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the village because they, as they say, see the need and want to contribute to the 
area’s well- being.
The water situation has improved also in Mirambu when compared to the early 
1990s. A Christian NGO, Compassion, has drilled a borehole for a children’s 
support centre that they have run in the village since 2014. They offer water for 
households for 100 Tz sh a jerry can (about US$0.04 at the time of writing). The 
new lake at Adia similarly eases life for the Mirambu livestock keepers.
Both villages have a long history of failed water projects. In the early 1990s, we 
documented all water projects we could find evidence of from the colonial period 
up to the time of our stay in the area. It became a catalogue of good intentions, 
plans, attempts, and failures. We learned about dams, boreholes, wells, rain cere-
monies, prayers. It seemed everything had been tried. Yet there still was not water 
in Goima and Mirambu. And now there is this large water expanse surrounded by 
low hills. What had happened was that one of the entrepreneurs/grain traders in 
Goima had hired a grader from the Roads Department, working on the new road 
in Goima, and had an embankment built which forced water to move towards the 
natural depression in the landscape. Infrastructural development initiatives are no 
longer in the hands of the authorities but happens at private initiatives.
After more than half a century’s attempts to get water in Goima, it is now there. 
The lake is shallow and two or three consecutive dry years will, people fear, make 
it dry up again. The wall leading water into the depression is anything but per-
man ent and will need to be reinforced at some time. But for the moment there is 
water reasonably close to Goima, and after all these years it seems a miracle. The 
way it happened, however, is no miracle but tells how the transformation of the 
area now happens.
The Farming Boom
Briefly put, it appears that most households in Goima and Mirambu have pros-
pered, and this is because they are able to farm more. In the early 1990s, farming 
in Goima and Mirambu was largely undertaken with hand hoes with 64 per cent 
and 66 per cent respectively of land cultivated thus. Tractors were used by 18 per 
cent in Goima5 and 7 in Mirambu. By 2016, 65 per cent in Goima and 44 in 
Mirambu used tractor (Table 9.2). The farmed areas grew correspondingly.
In both Goima and Mirambu, the median size of cultivated land had been three 
acres (1.2ha) while the mean land owned was 6.7 acres (2.7ha) and eight acres (3.2ha) 
respectively. By 2016, the mean cultivated area (not the area owned) had increased, 
in Goima to 6.5 acres (2.6 ha) and in Mirambu to 7.4 acres (3ha—Table 9.3).
5 A survey carried out by extension agents showed that by 1997, 24 per cent of Goima farmers used 
tractors (Dejene et al. 1997: 31).
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The expanded land use has been made possible by improved farming technol-
ogy. The dominance of hand hoes has been replaced by the dominance of tractors 
in Goima. Levels of ox ploughing remain unchanged. Now, only minorities 
(17  per cent in Goima and 31 per cent in Mirambu) cultivate land with hand 
hoes. This growth of farms is clearly visible in the landscape with much more 
land, on the plains and in the hills, put to use.
The expansion of land used is particularly important because the local defi n-
itions of poverty associate it not so much with landlessness as with an inability to 
use land owned properly because the families lack the capital or labour to do so. 
Working the land well requires money for ploughing, good seeds, manure, and/or 
chemical inputs. Poverty is expressed by not being able to use land as well as one 
might—by not being able to generate an income from assets. Thus, the expansion 
in land cultivated, made possible by greater access to tractors, is both likely to be a 
driver of wealth increase (it increases production and returns) and an expression 
of that greater wealth.
The farming boom in Goima and Mirambu is not associated with intensified 
production. In the early 1990s no Goima or Mirambu farmers in our sample used 
any farm inputs. The picture had not changed by 2016. Only 4 per cent of the 
farmers in the Goima and Mirambu samples for the early 1990s used manure in 
their fields, and quite sparsely at that. In 2016, 5 per cent of the Goima farmers 
used manure, while none in the Mirambu sample did. A district by- law stipulates 
that manure must be removed from the cattle enclosures and used in the fields. 
This was rarely enforced at the time of our visit. Villagers cited lack of transport 
and fear that manure increased pest incidence.
Five per cent of the Goima farmers used improved seeds, but other farm inputs 
were not used. Neither in Goima, nor in Mirambu, do any shops stock improved 
seeds. In this respect, Goima and Mirambu are still, in 2016, relatively remote 
outposts.
Although no farm inputs are used, yields of maize are much higher now than 
in the original survey (Table  9.4). The comparison is, however, unreliable as 
the  original yield data were collected during a particularly dry period when 
Table 9.3 Land farmed (acres) in Goima and 
Mirambu villages 1991/3–2016
  Goima Mirambu
Average land farmed 1991/2 4 3.7
Average land farmed 2016 6.5 7.4
n 14 26
This table only uses paired families from the original visit and 
subsequent revisit; excludes 5 outlier families from 1993. Pair 
Sample test for both villages: t = −2.279, df = 39, p < 0.029.
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respondents were bemoaning their unproductive farms. Our hypothesis is that 
there has in fact been little real change in the productivity per unit area. The cur-
rent yield figures reflect, we hypothesize, the fact that many new or recently 
opened fields are used, with their good natural fertility, and also that tractor 
ploughing can be more thorough than hand hoes (but will have more profound 
long- term impacts on soil fertility).
Cash crops have grown in importance, as has trading. In addition to maize, 
bulrush millet, finger millet, and sorghum, people also grow sunflower, pigeon 
peas, green grams, cow peas, pumpkins, watermelon, and other ‘small crops’. Cash 
crops became important in the late 1990s, and particularly sunflower has a stable 
and good market. Village focus groups discussing our findings insisted that the 
most important cash crop that was driving the new- found wealth was sunflowers.
Increased wealth in land is matched by the trends in livestock ownership 
(Table 9.5). In the early 1990s, 18 per cent of families owned livestock in both 
Goima and Mirambu. By 2016, 32 per cent of the households in Goima owned 
cows, and 38 per cent in Mirambu. Mean herd size for cattle owners has risen 
substantially to 10.5 in both of the villages, from 2.7 in Goima and 0.6 in 
Mirambu. More cattle also means more livestock- powered goods, such as carts 
and ploughs, which have increased almost five times.
There has also been a growth in the incidence of smallstock ownership. In the 
early 1990s, 23 per cent of families in Goima had smallstock. This had risen to 
39 per cent in 2016. In Mirambu, smallstock ownership has more than doubled 
from 23 per cent of families to 49 per cent. There are signs that the increased 
wealth in Mirambu has in particular strengthened the cattle economy, while the 
increased resources in Goima have been used for improved housing, farm  expansion, 
and education.
We have registered how the profits from farming have led to increased number 
of tractors and motorcycles, improved housing, more consumer goods, invest-
ment in livestock, and so on. What we do not have figures for are the sizeable 
sums that leave the area to be invested in business and real estate in Kondoa, 
Dodoma, and other towns.
Table 9.4 Yield per acre (kg) of different stable crops in the two study sites
Crop 1991/3 2016
Goima Mirambu Goima Mirambu
Bullrush millet 146 NA 420 NA
Maize 258 147 556 875
Sorghum 170 133 480 238
Goima: x2=7.85, df=2, p<0.02; Mirambu: x2=78.1, df=1, p<0.001.
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Improved Livelihoods
Asked about what the main changes during the last decades have been, people 
commonly emphasized that they now live in better houses and that all children 
attend school. Housing quality was not recorded in the original survey, simply 
because virtually all the people at that time lived in tembe  houses (wattle and 
daub houses with mud roofs). In 2016, 76 per cent of people in Goima lived in 
houses with galvanized metal sheet roofs, which was mentioned in focus groups 
in both Goima and Mirambu as a key signifier of wealth. In Mirambu, 67 per cent 
of interviewees lived in houses with roofs covered by metal sheets. This is a clear, 
and much appreciated, change to the early 1990s when only the very richest fam ilies 
lived in houses of this type.
The fact that all children now attend school is likewise a widely appreciated 
change. The fact that girls attend to the same extent as boys was highlighted in 
our focus group meetings. Admittedly this happened in a public arena where 
equality between genders is an expected attitude, but our understanding is that 
this is a widely shared sentiment, and an irrefutable change compared to twenty- 
five years ago.
In both villages, casual work (kibarua in Swahili), which was the affliction and 
economic mainstay of the early 1990s, had by 2016 been drastically reduced. 
Indeed, the proportion of people that are undertaking it has generally halved 
(Table 9.6). This major turn is, in our opinion, the most significant change over 
the last twenty- five years despite the profound material changes that anyone can 
observe in Goima village centre. That no longer half the number of households 
must rely on casual labour to be able to provide for themselves changes every-
thing. Interestingly, many in Goima and Mirambu, are not as impressed as we are, 
as we shall see below.
Moreover, the meaning of casual labour has changed. In the early 1990s, being 
dependent on kibarua was what defined poverty. Payment was low, often the load 
of grains that you could carry home after a couple of days’ or a week’s work. 
Attendance to the home fields suffered, meaning reduced harvests, in addition to 
the strain on family life with one or more adults being away from home for long 
Table 9.5 Percentage of families owning cattle and shoats, Goima and Mirambu villages
  Goima 1991/3 Goima 2016 Mirambu 1991/3 Mirambu 2016
Cattle 18 32 18 34
Shoats 24 39 18 49
n 51 34 45 41
Goima: x2=4.57, df=2, p<0.1; Mirambu: x2=12.4, df=2, p<0.005.
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periods. In 2016, the situation was different. Now some, particularly young 
 people, took on casual work ‘to better their lives’, for instance to be able to buy a 
goat, or metal sheets for roofing, and not to ‘hunt for food’.
Changing Perceptions of Wealth and Quality of Life
In the 1990s, in both of the villages, well- off families were those who could feed 
themselves. The catch- all term that villagers used to rank the households was 
uwezo (strength, ability), or their nafasi (literally ‘space’, but here, rather ‘possi-
bilities’). Those who were poor were described as people  who lack strength 
(hana uwezo). The guiding principle was a household’s ability to cultivate the 
land, rather than the size of the land holding itself. Capacity to plough with 
oxen or tractors and to hire farm labour meant that a household was regarded as 
well- off.
Note that wealth was not necessarily about owning the oxen (or tractors) per 
se, rather it focussed on the potential to produce food and to solve problems. The 
poorest families were those who had to work as farm labourers to meet their daily 
needs, and in there was also a category of people who were dependent on others 
to survive (Östberg 1995: 40–3).
Wealth rankings in 2005 provided findings that were rather similar to the 
1990s. More than half of the households could not support themselves from their 
own farms. Day labouring continued to be an important aspect of life in the vil-
lages. Farm size had now become more important as a criterion of wealth (Slegers 
and Östberg 2008: 141–2).
When focus groups defined wealth groups in 2016, two major changes were 
obvious. First, a significant majority of the families were classified by villagers as 
being of medium wealth. Poverty (locally defined) was no longer a dominant 
experience. The middle groups had expanded, while the poorest categories had 
contracted (Table 9.7). In Mirambu, our informants said that the big change is 
that many poor households have moved to the category ‘ordinary people’.









Employing casual labour 22 21 15 15
Performing casual labour 76 44 73 39
N 42 34 40 41
Goima: x2=5.8, df=1, p<0.02; Mirambu: x2=16.0, df=1, p<0.001.
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By 2016 there was a considerable shift in the meaning and definition of wealth.6 
Uwezo remained the factor upon which wealth is determined, but this now means 
new things. Now it was no longer a matter of being able to work one’s land but 
included being able to afford health care, and to pay for educating one’s children, 
as well as quality of housing. Investments, like owning a tractor or a milling 
machine, were points of reference for the wealthiest. Trading now also appeared 
as a means for people to better their lives. These all indicate a more diversified 
economy and improved livelihoods.
Also in Mirambu, the meaning of poverty had changed: the poor are now 
defined as those who have ‘only’ a few cattle, and these are put in the same group 
as those who have none and have to do casual work to keep going. In other words 
people who are currently counted as poor are designated as such because they do 
not have things that were once the property of a privileged few. So, not only are 
there more wealthy families, but the standards of what it means to be wealthy 
have risen.
Interestingly, while records of assets and farming activity show notable 
increases, people’s own perceptions of their lives are not as positive (Table 9.8). In 
Goima and Mirambu, a majority of people (56 per cent and 61 per cent re spect-
ive ly) thought that life was better before—and this particularly reflects the views 
of the female- headed households who tended to prefer their earlier lives. In some 
respects, this should not be surprising as many people were recalling the times of 
their youth when they were healthier and more vigorous. Some people also feel 
strongly about how the forests in the hills now are gone, and they worry that there 
is less land that is available for the next generation. Assets provide only a partial 
insight into the nature of social change in these localities.
6 Details are available in Östberg et al. 2018, table 11, available on open access at https://www.mdpi.
com/2073- 445X/7/2/44/htm




1993 2005 2016 1993 2005 2016
1 2 4 0.5 2 8 6
2 45 41 64 48 37 71
3 53 55 35 50 55 23
Goima 2005–16: x2=76.6, df=2, p<0.001; Mirambu 2005–16: x2=43.4, df=2, p<0.001. Wealth group 3 
follows the Mirambu classification which combines categories 3 and 4 of the 2016 categories. We have 
grouped categories 2 and 3 of the 1991/3 survey into category 2 of the 2016 survey. We have grouped 
categories 4–6 of the 1991/3 survey into category 3 of the 2016 survey. We have grouped categories 
4–6 of the 2005 survey into category 3 of the 2016 survey. Note that in 2016 Goima is based on the 
complete village lists and Mirambu from some vitongoji (sub-villages).
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Migration and Change
The population of Goima and Mirambu has more than doubled since the original 
survey was made, ahead of natural population growth. The immigrant house-
holds are thus under- represented in our restudy based on a sample of the village 
composition in the early 1990s.
The substantial growth of land farmed (Table  9.3) took place on the plains 
surrounding Goima and Mirambu villages but particularly in the Burunge Hills. 
Neither the village councils of the communities surrounding the hills nor the 
district administration were actively managing the colonization of the hills. It was 
just happening. For example, the settlement Madah in the hills had 111 house-
holds in late 1989, 142 households by May 1992, 169 by the end of that year, and 
234 by 1994, much ahead of any natural population increase. Today Madah is 
a  registered village with a Full Primary School, a village government, mosque, 
shopping centre, tractors. It has far more inhabitants than the population of the 
entire hills area in 1994.
Already in the early 1990s the area experienced a steady influx of immigrants, 
particularly of ‘environmental refugees’ from the neighbouring Kondoa Eroded 
Area. In the villages bordering on Goima and Mirambu—Jenjeluse, Igunga, 
Songolo—the Burunge were already in minority, and this was also the case in 
the  hills, which at the time were rapidly being settled. Some Burunge families 
returned to their old lands. But more than that immigrants arrived. In 1994, we 
estimated the population of the hills to 443 households, living in ten communi-
ties. The biggest group were Rangi with 187 households, followed by the Burunge 
with 165, and the Barabaig with sixty- eight households (Östberg 1995: 168).
This increase derived from several sources. Often the strategy of newly arrived 
immigrants was to plant maize and sorghum in the Burunge Hills, using as little 
labour as possible, while also retaining fields in the home area. To expand into 
new areas had for a very long time been the preferred Rangi mode of dealing with 
problems of land availability and quality (Östberg  1986: 29–31 and 2000: 249, 
Mung’ong’o  1995: 85–7). When new land now became available in the fairly 
nearby Burunge Hills, this became a favourite expansion area. In years with fair 
Table 9.8 Is life better or worse now than at the last survey, by village and gender 














Goima 4 1 11 9 1 8
Mirambu 1 2 5 11 2 20
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rains there would be something to gain at both ends. Eventually, as roads were 
improved and rudimentary schools established, families were keener to move from 
the exhausted soils in the Irangi Highlands and settle in the emerging communities 
in the Burunge Hills. A further influx came from Barabaig, Iraqw, and Maasai 
livestock keepers who seasonally arrived with their herds to graze in the hills. An 
increasing number of them also settled. Moreover, resourceful people made money 
by large- scale tractor cultivation, using hired labour for the farm operations.
We had originally arrived in Goima and Mirambu to find out why the Burunge 
area was less affected by land degradation than the Kondoa Eroded Area. Our 
report documented a movable mode of production, distinctly different from the 
permanent, de- stumped fields of the Irangi Highlands. Burunge of the early 1990s 
favoured temporary clearings in the forest (Östberg 1995: ch. 2, ch. 6). That, how-
ever, was a life that was. Now it is commercially oriented, mechanized farming 
that reigns.
Drivers of Change
The restudy of Goima and Mirambu villages brought out remarkable changes in a 
comparatively short time. We apply a twenty- five years perspective, but in fact the 
major changes date only some ten years back. During the revisits in 1997, 2006, 
and 2007, developments were registered. Goima had become connected to the 
national electricity grid, a communication tower was there. Housing was grad-
ual ly improving. Medicines were available at the Goima dispensary, which in the 
early 1990s would have been a rare strike of luck. The supply of school books had 
improved. A secondary school was being built. But ten years later, in 2016, we still 
met a totally different scenario.
Discussing the causes of the pervasive changes in Goima and Mirambu, 
our  informants were eager to discuss also another dimension of change than 
the improved infrastructure. They dwelt on changed mindsets and attitudes. One 
such change that was emphasized was the reduced alcohol consumption. In the 
early 1990s, people used to be away for days, ‘following pombe (alcohol)’, we were 
told, and we could also recall this. ‘However, they have now come to their senses’ 
(while) ‘those who continue with pombe  remain poor . . . . Less money is being 
spent on local brews than previously’ (interview, 10 November 2016). We have no 
data to test whether this change has happened or not, but if drinking has declined 
drastically there seem to be two factors responsible: one is a revivalism within the 
Christian community and the expansion of Islam. The other factor is that incomes 
have increased so much that people can afford to improve their houses, pay sec-
ondary school fees, buy better clothes, and invest in solar panels, motorcycles, 
televisions, and other consumer durables. ‘Some drink less because there are 
other things to do with their money’, we were told.
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Another prominent driver of the changes in local eyes is changing attitudes 
towards farm work. This came up in discussions about rain. In the 1990s, people 
said that if only it rains everything would be fine. But now, some informants 
objected to that view, as one put it:
What matters is that you work. Not the rains. That you all the time think that 
you can do better. People used to be content with cultivating two acres (0.8ha) 
growing bulrush millet. Yes, they got food enough to feed the family. But what is 
that? It was when people turned to commercial crops that things started to 
change. When they grasped that they could earn money, they also started 
to work, and not just roam around.
Some observers suggested that the greater desire for money reflected more social 
diversity, and specifically immigration. Immigrants, we were told, stimulate the 
community: ‘they came and they worked’. They start new activities, and they 
make use of the land and earn money from farming, in turn motivating others. 
When money is available, traders arrive, and people are stimulated to grow 
commercial crops, and the economy grows.
Another factor has been the role of wealthy entrepreneurs who dominate the 
booming grain trade in Goima and Mirambu. They have played decisive roles in 
bringing about the transformation, particularly in Goima village. Their modus 
operandi involves a mixture of good business knowledge and practices that allow 
for them to make money out of their neighbours’ poverty and poor bargaining 
position, combined with instances of more philanthropic activity. For example, as 
many farmers cannot afford to hire a tractor, they ask the entrepreneurs to plough 
for them and as payment for the service the tractor owner will get access to half 
the ploughed land for the cultivation season. In this way, the entrepreneurs get 
access to farmland at a low cost.
They also act as an informal bank. People in need of cash ask for a loan, which 
after the harvest will be repaid in grains at a predetermined price below the 
market value (up to as much as a third of the price), and the trader increases his 
margins considerably. The entrepreneurs have also invested in village infrastructure, 
and with it have built up their social capital.
Sustainable Growth?
Members of the local elite, the village officials, teachers, and entrepreneurs, are all 
optimistic about the future. More and more land is put under the plough and the 
demands for agricultural products is strong. Goima and Mirambu are booming. 
However, the entrepreneurs’ optimism contrasts with many farmers’ fears that 
their children will face difficulties in accessing land, and that the fertility of the 
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land is reducing. Signs of soil erosion were evident in many fields. This is in 
marked contrast to the situation in the early 1990s, when farmers described the 
Burunge Hills as an endless expanse of land, waiting to be cultivated whenever 
needs arose. There was a belief that soil would regenerate itself faster than it could 
be eroded.
Fifteen years later, by 2005/6, local perceptions of natural resources had not ably 
changed. Many farmers worried about increased drought, which was perceived to 
be driven by local reductions in forest cover. The opinion was shared by rich and 
poor farmers, men and women. However, the notion was particularly strong 
among female- headed and younger households, reflecting that female- headed 
households were less endowed with resources, and therefore, particularly vulnerable, 
while young farmers had a shorter memory of droughts (Östberg and Slegers 
2010: 258). Rainfall records did not tally with the perceived increased severity of 
drought, but rather reflected a local interpretation of the diminishing resource 
base (ibid.: 255).
Ten years further on, in 2016, and the extent of transformation of the local 
environment is plain. The expansion of farming has come at a clear cost—forest 
cover and trees are drastically reduced. Two maps tell the story. In the early 1990s 
the Burunge Hills were a well- vegetated area (Figure 9.2). Now the situation has 








Open land and shrubs
Water
Figure 9.2 The Burunge Hills, 1990. The forest dominates. Map by Jeppe Schou.
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To monitor land cover changes in the Burunge Hills during the period under 
study, five maps covering the years 1990–2017, were prepared. The first and the 
last of the maps are reproduced here. Landsat images taken during July, August, 
and September were used. These months provided best visibility, and also sorted 
out forest cover best. ‘ISO cluster unsupervised classification’ proved to best 
discriminate between different land types. Originally five classes were identified, 
forest, forest hillside, shrubs, open land, and water. The first two land classes were 
merged into one, as were the following two, in order to better bring out the contrast 
between forested areas and non- forested areas. This also reduced the problem of 
variation in vegetation caused by wetter and drier years. The images from the ISO 
cluster unsupervised classification were compared with Google Earth images to 
check if they matched, which they did.
It is not surprising therefore that in 2016, the worry that clearings would result 
in diminishing rains persists. People argued that rain clouds gather over forests, 
and with the forests largely gone, the area will no longer attract rains. They felt 
that they were now facing a changed environment. Over twenty- five years, the 







Open land and shrubs
Water
Figure 9.3 The Burunge Hills, 2017. The forest has been decimated to about 5 per cent 
of the area, and only remains on steep mountain sides. Map by Jeppe Schou.
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area’s current farming bonanza may soon be over. The Burunge used to talk of 
good land as being ‘cold’, which when over- exploited turns ‘hot’, describing an 
environment where rains could be expected to a new situation where rain clouds 
pass without delivering. They describe the ‘hot’ land as ‘pushing’ the rains away.
The changes that we have documented are in accordance with country- wide 
patterns, indeed with Africa- wide experiences. Current agricultural growth is in 
particular characterized by increasing the farmed area (Fuglie and Rada 2013). 
Only 17 per cent of increased agricultural productivity can be attributed to 
increased use of inputs and technical change (IFAD, 2016: 138). One assessment 
is that in Tanzania ‘agricultural productivity has remained stubbornly low’ and 
that the use of agricultural inputs is quite low (ESRF 2015: 64). Another way of 
putting this is that the improved livelihoods that we documented in Goima and 
Mirambu are based on resource extraction and extensification. This situation is 
unlikely to be sustainable under current forms of land management.
Conclusion: Challenging a Dominant Discourse  
on Rural Change in Tanzania
Our findings run contrary to widespread views that the agricultural sector is rela-
tively stagnant and unresponsive to change. They likewise contradict pessimistic 
interpretations that argue that Tanzania’s 7 per cent growth in GDP in recent 
years bring little return to rural people. Using local measures of wealth and 
measures of assets, however, it is obvious that Goima and Mirambu people have 
become substantially wealthier.
We reiterate that a most striking change since the early 1990s is that most 
households can now support themselves on their land, and many do this on a 
substantially improved living standard, while twenty- five years ago, half the number 
of households survived only with the help of underpaid day labour.
Living standards were very low in the early 1990s. By 2005/6 the pattern of 
social stratification remained similar, as noted above, while by 2016 many 
 people had moved up the local ladder of progress. If this is sustainable or not will 
depend on the extent to which farming productivity can be raised, how off- farm 
income possibilities develop, and how farmers manage their environment. This 
notwithstanding, the experiences from Goima and Mirambu suggest that the 
critics may be overlooking important forms of local economic dynamism in 
their arguments.
Rural societies in Tanzania, even in its poorest regions, are more varied than 
the theories of persistent poverty suggest. Our work suggests that by using local 
measures of wealth, far more dynamism becomes visible. Moreover our informants 
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insisted that it was precisely the local dynamism and initiative that was ul tim ate ly 
responsible for the change their villages experienced. They emphasized that the 
local initiatives had mattered. Many pointed to the driving role of locally based 
entrepreneurs, and they emphasized a new local ethos of hard work, in a way 
that reverberated with sentiments from the socialist post- independence era. 
Infrastructural change (new roads and transport facilities), as well as the abun-
dance of land, provided enabling conditions. Similarly, the growth of the 
Tanzanian economy, with its greater demand for agricultural goods, and its 
cheaper provision of things, like motorbikes and metal roofing, stimulate growth. 
But, they are merely that: stimulants. They are not, in themselves, responsible for 
the improvements we have documented.
We do not have the data to test the power of this interpretation, but it is im port ant 
to note it. Further research to distinguish between exogenous factors such 
as infrastructure and marketing arrangements, and endogenous factors, such as 
attitudes to wealth and work, are required.
In a twenty- five- year perspective, the changes are dramatic, as we have reiter-
ated throughout this article. However, when comparing the village to other 
Tanzania villages, Goima and Mirambu look ordinary. What is so special with a 
good range of shops, a communication tower, buses, a secondary school, and a 
new spacious mosque? Well, perhaps little. But, this is our point. For it is precisely 
this mundane but widespread change that might tell a wider story of improved 
livelihood conditions in other peripheral parts of rural Tanzania. Goima and 
Mirambu are, as Tanzanians would put it, ‘catching up’, and becoming ordinary, 
whereas just twenty- five years ago the story was quite different. If Goima and 
Mirambu are just like any Tanzanian villages, then we need to look at the stories 
that their mundane asset growth portray in order to get a richer picture of the 
nature of social and economic change in the country as a whole. 
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Perspectives from Gitting and Gocho, Manyara Region
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Introduction
Reading The Village That Vanished was a strange experience. The book was based 
on three years of research by Vesa- Matti Loiske in the early 1990s and describes 
the village of Gitting, in Hanang District in Manyara Region. One of the most 
prominent facts about Gitting then was its poverty. Loiske found high levels of 
destitution and dependence on day- labouring (32 per cent of families). A further 
27 per cent of families were poor, living in inadequate houses, with few assets, no 
livestock, and dependent on daily labour.
Reading the book was strange because the reader (Dan Brockington) was then 
studying the book twenty years after Loiske’s work, while living in the village of 
Sagong, a few miles away from Gitting. Brockington was perplexed because he 
simply could not recognize such high levels of poverty. He was then surveying 
residents of Sagong and knew from that work, and the previous thirteen years of 
visits, that the levels of deprivation that Loiske reported were rare. Nor could his 
in- laws, all lifelong Sagong residents, relate to the picture that the book described.
Brockington contacted Loiske to discuss his confusion. Our conversation then 
led to a series of visits to Gitting and Gocho (which split from the original village) 
by Brockington in 2013 and later re- visits of the families in Loiske’s original 1993 
survey in 2016. This was in fact the pilot study, from which the broader project 
that has led to this book was conceived. This entire collection stems from that 
exchange.
We found in Gitting remarkable improvements in prosperity, as locally meas-
ured. Families which had been poor were now richer (and families which had 
been wealthy had dissipated somewhat). But the really interesting thing about 
this study is why that should be the case. Gitting experienced no substantial 
improvement in road infrastructure between Loiske’s study and Brockington’s 
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revisit. Local technologies improved (more ploughs, tractors, and lorries), and 
provision of some services also got better (water points, clinics, and schools). But 
much of the change in Gitting seems to have been endogenously driven. If exter-
nal factors have made a difference then they have done so because of a re organ-
iza tion of Gitting society that made it possible to benefit from these changes.
Our work in Gitting and Gocho is also interesting in that we have been dis-
cussing the differences we have found and our findings with villagers for some 
time. Dan Brockington circulated summaries of the early findings that were writ-
ten in Swahili, as well as holding public meetings to discuss these findings in 
2013. Loiske returned two years later, and subsequently, to talk through the same 
changes. There are signs that public discussion in Gitting and Gocho of this 
research has got richer over the years, in that the focus groups Loiske held has 
provided a more thorough set of insights and reflections than those Brockington 
encountered. We will return to this issue at the end of this chapter.
We proceed first by explaining our methods, then we examine what changes in 
assets we found in Gitting. Finally we try and explain the changes we found, 
drawing up on the findings of Loiske’s focus groups to do so.
Methods
To undertake this work we have taken a one- off survey conducted in the early 
1990s and turned it into a longitudinal survey by re- surveying the same house-
holds. Gitting was surveyed by Loiske between 1991 and 1994 as part of his PhD 
(Loiske 1995).1 Loiske’s first step was to explore the distribution of wealth in his 
study area. His unit of analysis was the ‘household’, which was defined as any 
homestead registered on the village lists.2 The categorization system of wealth 
that he used, and its accuracy, is fundamental to the argument of this paper and it 
is important to dwell upon it.
Loiske’s informants divided households into seven groups—two poor, two 
average, and three varieties of wealthy farmer. The criteria they used are shown in 
Table 10.1. From this table it should be instantly apparent that the local classifica-
tion of wealth was fundamentally a measure of use and ownership of assets, as has 
been observed elsewhere. Lest this ranking scheme should now appear dated, we 
have included for comparison the criteria used in the work of Higgins and da 
Corta, for research in the same country (Higgins and da Corta 2013). With some 
1 Gitting was subsequently split, for administrative purposes, into two contiguous villages named 
Gitting and Gocho. For simplicity’s sake we shall simply refer to ‘Gitting’ in the text.
2 This household list included all families in the village but omitted itinerant agricultural labourers 
from the neighbouring region of Singida who were given temporary accommodation on farms. The 
omission is important because it means that this survey and its long- term findings are no guide to the 
changing fortune of itinerant labourers. It is a guide to the fortunes of land- owning farmers.
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Higgins and Da Corta
1 Immensely rich;
knows no barriers; has 
cars, lorries, etc.
Rich (tajiri); significant assets and local power; 
involved in large- scale or employment of labour
Owns large- scale non- farm assets; may lend 
money
2 Very rich; many cattle  
and much land; owns a 
tractor but not a lorry;  
has businesses and land  
in towns
3 Rich; employs many 
vibarua; has many cattle; 
has businesses
4 Above average farmer; 
some cattle; farms  
their own land and  
uses vibarua work 
occasionally
Resilient (tajiri kiasi, mwenye uwezo); sufficient 
capacity (e.g. assets, social networks) to prevent 
significant downward mobility relative to overall 
productive wealth; may employ small amounts 
of labour on the farm or be involved in small- 
scale trade
5 Average farmer; a few 
cattle; farms their own 
land without using  
vibarua work
Vulnerable but not poor (tete ila siyo maskini); 
more productive assets which take the family 
through the year; during good times can save; 
during bad times will reduce family consumption; 
vulnerable to downward mobility with a 
significant shock
Poor (maskini); access to limited productive assets 
(land and livestock); cannot earn enough from 
farming or trade to take family provisioning 
through the whole year so will reduce family food 
consumption; cannot save much in good years; 
must sell assets in order to cope in a crisis; 
vulnerable to downward mobility to ‘very poor’ 
category but not to ‘destitute’ category
6 Poor; rents land out to 
others; depends on casual 
vibarua work for daily 
needs; few if any livestock
Very poor (maskini sana); no clear livelihood 
source; no significant productive assets; 
dependent on selling labour and/or scavenging; 
erratic income and food access; very vulnerable to 
becoming destitute with shock
7 Extremely poor; unable to 
get work easily; hard to 
rent their land out to 
others; suffering from 
alcoholism and/or illness
Destitute (maskini hohehahe); depends on others 
for basic needs; cannot work; tends to be socially 
excluded
Vibarua work refers to casual labour. Source: Loiske 1995; Higgins and Da Corta 2013: page 17.
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differences they match reasonably well. The importance of assets in local measure 
of prosperity in rural Tanzania is enduring.
Loiske established these wealth categories, and the distribution of households 
within them, with some rigour. He began by taking a list of all households in the 
village which had been allocated land in the villagization operation. He then 
arranged for eighteen separate key informants to rank these households in order 
of wealth. All the key informants were men, and were aged between 25 and 45, 
and were mostly themselves middle- ranking farmers; 609 households were 
ranked in this way. From this ranking exercise emerged the seven categories of 
wealth which are shown in Table 10.1. Loiske then randomly selected 20 per cent 
of the households of each wealth group (122), of which he was able to interview 
and/or visit ninety- four for his research.
Brockington revisited the original families in 2013 to explore how livelihoods 
had changed, and what might explain these changes. Of the ninety- four house-
holds Loiske surveyed we were able to identify eighty- six, of which Brockington 
visited seventy- seven. This was part of a year of sabbatical research during 
which he was based in the neighbouring village of Measkron. He conducted 
his work in part with one of Loiske’s former research assistants, and with the 
assistance of a former village executive officer, who was identified by the  village 
leadership as a useful assistant, and who was old enough to remember the 
 condition of families when Loiske was conducting the research. Interviews 
were conducted in a mixture of Swahili and Iraqw, which sometimes required 
translation into Swahili.
‘Household’ surveys should ring alarm bells among Africanist researchers who 
are familiar with longstanding critiques of all that households can conceal 
(Guyer 1981, Moock 1986). Our reasons for using this social unit are complex, 
and covered in paper length elsewhere (Brockington et al. 2021 and see Chapter 4 
of this volume). Suffice to say here that we hope we do not use ‘households’ in the 
cavalier way that has too often characterized social surveys (Randall et al. 2011, 
Randall and Coast  2015). Rather we explore the changing fortunes of families 
because these are the appropriate unit of analysis with which to explore trends in 
assets. Land, livestock, and homes in Gitting are not individually owned, but the 
collective wealth of families. Decisions to sell or rent out any assets are discussed 
and fought over. Children’s education is generally supported by a larger network 
of relations. It is because we are exploring trends in assets that we need to talk 
about households and families. For the same reason, we do not attempt to explore 
changes in fortunes per capita—this would not be socially meaningful in this 
context. We realize that this method is limited because it risks obscuring chan-
ging gender dynamics and intergenerational dynamics.
When meeting with villagers we used a mixture of quantitative and qualitative 
methods, building on our own experience, and others (Lawson et al. 2003, Adato 
et al. 2007, Howe and McKay 2007, de Weerdt 2010, Shaffer 2012). The quantita-
tive element re- surveyed households visited earlier, and individuals who have left 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 01/07/21, SPi
Prosperity, Equality, and Power 221
original households to set up their own homes. The qualitative included a discus-
sion of any changes with household members that become apparent in the re- 
survey as soon as that survey was completed. In addition we took more detailed 
oral histories from a representative sub- sample of households to explore important 
events and changes that have taken place in the intervening years. We took  village, 
crop, and economic histories (including crop prices) from key informants and 
district and regional records to build up a picture of the general changes in the 
area. There were two community- level methods that complemented these tasks. 
First we undertook a participatory wealth ranking of all households in the village 
(conducted with the village executive officers, village chairs, and sub- village 
chairs) in order to compare how wealth distributions now compare with the past, 
and to see whether the households we have re- surveyed are still representative of 
their broader communities. Finally we shared summaries of findings and changes 
in public village meetings so that community members can discuss our findings 
and offer improvements or correction to them.
Results
Gitting should be a good place to be a farmer; it is well- endowed for agriculture. 
The village is close to Mt Hanang, a large extinct volcano. Soils are generally fer-
tile, and Gitting sits on the wetter side of the mountain. It is predominantly com-
posed of the Iraqw ethnic group whose proclivities for agriculture were 
commended by British colonists (Snyder  2005). Gitting has a slightly unusual 
history, in that the British supported a select few families in the village to pur-
chase tractors and other implements in an attempt to create an agricultural yeo-
manry (Raikes 1978). This led to some fabulously wealthy families in the village, 
farming hundreds of hectares annually (Loiske 1995). All this land was redistrib-
uted in the villagization operation of the early 1970s, with every household 
receiving four acres each.
The most significant finding from Loiske’s research, however, despite these 
endowments, were the very high levels of poverty that he reported (Table 10.2). 
This table makes for depressing reading: it shows that over 56 per cent of house-
holds were poor in some way (shaded in dark grey), meaning that they were either 
destitute (the single largest category), or dependent on uncertain and variable day 
labour for their livelihood. Indeed it is possible that these levels of poverty are 
higher than those found in the HBS nationally in 1991/2, for this found less than 
40 per cent of people were below the basic needs poverty line.
The most important difference our re- survey found from past conditions is 
that most people seem to be much richer. 85 per cent of families are in the average 
wealth categories (shaded in light grey in Table 10.2). The destitute are now as 
rare as the rich, and the poor as a whole constitute just 10 per cent of people.
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There are three possible scenarios that could explain this change. First, it is 
possible that the poor people of twenty years ago have simply left the village. 
Alternatively the poor families could have got richer. Or there may be a mixture 
of both factors.
When Brockington revisited the families surveyed by Loiske, he found that few 
people had left the village. Those that had gone tended to belong to richer families 
whose wealth lay in livestock. They moved to areas where there was more space 
for grazing. Instead, the reason why there are more wealthy families is because 
people who were poor have now become richer. This can be seen in Table 10.3, 
this shows the same general movement of households out of the poorest cat egor-
ies (in dark grey), and into the middle categories (in light grey).
But this is not a simple story of greater prosperity for all. The actual dynamics 
are more complicated, and these are shown in Table 10.4. Here the two columns 
on the left show where the families were in the early 1990s, and the columns on 
the right show where they were at the time of resurvey. Notice two things about 
this table. First it shows that most families from the poorer families category have 
become richer. Those who started off in the poorest categories (5, 6, or 7) have 
tended to move up to richer groups. But notice that the families which started off 
in richer categories 2, 3, and 4, have tended to get poorer, or stay the same. There 
are therefore two sets of changes to explain—why have the richer families gotten 
poorer, and why the poorer families richer? Both issues were discussed in inter-
views with families and two village discussion groups.
Focus groups and oral histories suggested several driving forces behind the 
demise of the wealthy. Rich families have become poorer because of illness, 
because of family troubles (divorce, or the expense of seeking or maintaining a 
Table 10.2 Social stratification in Gitting in the 1990s
Wealth group 1990s 2013
No. of H’hlds % of H’hlds No. of H’hlds % of H’hlds
1: Immensely rich 5 1.0 4 0.4
2: Very rich 6 1.0 15 1.3
3: Rich 18 3.0 20 1.8
4: Above average 106 17.4 678 59.4
5: Average 116 19.0 297 26.0
6: Poor 163 26.8 101 8.8
7: Very poor 195 32.0 27 2.4
Total 609   1142  
Source: (Loiske 1995) and Participatory ranking exercise with village leaders and executive 
officers 2013. This table compares all residents in 1990s with all residents in 2013. The difference is 
highly significant: χ2=529.21; df=6.
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second wife), through taking to drink or simply because they are older and have 
lost their powers. Rich families appear poorer simply because they are moving 
through the later stages of life cycles which sees them allocate assets to their chil-
dren. Some once richer families are headed by elderly couples who are simply less 
able to manage large farms than they were before.
In other cases the demise merely reflects the inadequacy of the categorization 
system. Investments in education did not appear in Loiske’s original scheme. Yet 
some of the wealthy families in the village have done just that, investing returns 
from agriculture, and selling agricultural assets (livestock, tractors), in order to 
fund their children’s training. This means that they appear to be less wealthy than 
before, but they are compensated by their children being employed as teachers or 
government officers and benefitting from the regular salaries resulting.
With respect to the move out of poverty, four explanations were offered in 
focus groups and interviews. The most frequently voiced was that people have got 
richer because they have worked hard at their farming. They have been able to 
invest in cattle, modern seeds, and farm implements. This work has been more 
rewarding because local terms of trade for farm produce has improved. Table 10.5 
shows that crops have generally increased their farm gate prices by between 160 
per cent and 300 per cent in the last twenty years. Moreover, as Table 10.6 shows, 
some cash crops are now yielding considerably greater returns, relative to maize, 
than they were in previous years. Thus whereas two sacks of beans used to be able 
to purchase three of maize, now they can purchase almost five.3 Thus families 
who farm cash crops have been able to secure their subsistence needs more easily 
3 These prices and terms of trade have not been altered by reduced transportation costs due to road 
improvements. Road links to the main towns of Babati and Arusha have been generally unchanged for 
the period under study, half being paved, and the other half unmetalled. The tarmac road between 
Arusha and Singida (which passes near Gitting) was only completed in 2012.
Table 10.3 Change to visited households 
1990s–2013 part 1








Source: Loiske 1995 and Brockington’s fieldwork 2013. 
This table compares the status of households visited in 
the 1990s with their status in 2013.
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and, possibly, generate a surplus. Another way of putting this point is that the 
villagers we surveyed demonstrated substantial improvements in prosperity, 
founded upon retention of assets, and improved returns to them (due to crop 
price increases), as well as growth of assets (herds) and investment in homes and 
education.
A second cause of poverty that many families reported was alcoholism. 
Accordingly poverty has declined as some have been able to stop drinking, or, in 
other cases, children have taken over the farm from alcoholic parents (generally 
fathers) who merely rented their land out each year for enough money to keep 
them in drink. Loiske’s work shows that this was a serious problem in the 1990s. 
Conversely those poor families who stayed poor during the years of our survey 
were often unreformed alcoholics.
We cannot tell whether alcoholism was the cause or consequence of poverty. It 
was probably a mixture of both. We should also note that alcohol sales are often a 
means by which women (who make and sell alcohol) gain access to money which 
is controlled by men (who are the main consumers of the drink). Our data do not 
allow us to comment on the social dynamics of the relative demise of alcoholism. 
The point is simply that fewer families in this survey now suffer as a result of it 
than was the case before.
A third possibility that could explain greater prosperity is that local ex ploit-
ation of poor families by rich families in the village has decreased. Loiske’s work 
and local history makes clear that some of the wealthy farmers in the 1990s (the 
yeomanry families the British supported) were able to rent much land while pay-
ing poor families little money for it. They controlled the tractors required to 
plough up large areas of land, and particularly some of the heavier clay soils 
which dominated some families’ farms. Now, however, as more people have 
ploughs, oxen and tractor ownership has broadened, it is harder for the richer 
Table 10.4 Change to visited households 1990s–2013 part 2
Households in 1990s Wealth distribution in 2013
Original wealth  
group
Number of households  
in each group
3 4 5 6 7
2 2 2        
3 5 1 2 1 1  
4 18 5 4 6 1 2
5 12 2 5 4 1  
6 21 2 12 6 1  
7 19   6 7 3 3
Total 77 12 29 24 7 5
Source: Loiske 1995 and Brockington’s fieldwork 2013. This table compares the status of 
























Table 10.5 Average farm gate price in Hanang
Deflation by Years averaged Maize Beans Wheat Potatoes Sunflowers Pigeon peas
Purchasing power parity 1990–3 34.70 56.21 35.18 40.86 28.23 29.35
2009–12 70.74 169.69 114.62 136.84 58.46 105.10
Increase 204% 302% 326% 335% 207% 358%
Consumer price index 1990–3 14,135 22,958 14,340 16,683 11,538 11,997
2009–12 22,605 54,300 36,039 42,228 19,139 35,026
Increase 160% 237% 251% 253% 166% 292%
Source: Hanang District Council Records
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families to dictate terms. Investment in assets has broadened the productive base 
of the village as a whole.
Fourthly, in a number of ways, some of the tasks that women have undertaken 
have become, relatively speaking, easier. There are now readily accessible diesel- 
powered mills to grind corn (as opposed to grinding by hand using stones) and 
water is more easily available at village stand pipes. There are more clinics, which 
was reported in the focus groups to have improved maternal health. All these 
measures will have enabled women to put more of their time into more remu-
nerative work. Infrastructural improvements in their lives may have led to more 
productive use of agricultural assets.
Relating These Findings with the Literature
Our data do not allow us to determine which of the causes of change described 
here is most important. Our sample size is not large enough, nor the measure-
ment of assets precise enough, for that sort of modelling and correlation. However 
the value of this sort of research is to suggest hypotheses for testing in larger stud-
ies, and useful avenues of enquiry that may be pursued further, as well as suggest-
ing methodological insights. In that spirit we discuss four challenges that this 
research poses.
The first challenge is the relationship between rural economies and national 
level GDP. What are we to make of the fact that rural prosperity in Gitting has 
risen alongside national GDP growth? Does this suggest that rural economies are 
well tied to national economic growth? Could counting assets reveal unrecog-
nized growth?
We feel such speculation is premature. We believe that exploring assets makes 
it possible to tell more stories about the nature of economic and social dynamics 
in rural areas. But we do not think that the findings from Gitting necessarily 
prove that a rising national GDP has reduced poverty in this village. That assumes 
that national GDP figures and local incidences of rural prosperity or poverty are 
well connected in the first place.
It is, however, possible that GDP figures are only weakly related to livelihoods 
in remote rural areas. We know that GDP has risen as a result mainly of growth in 
Table 10.6 Relative price of 100kg of maize to 100kg of other crops in Hanang
Years averaged Beans Wheat Potatoes Sunflower Pigeon peas
1990–3 162% 101% 118% 82% 85%
2009–12 240% 159% 187% 85% 155%
Source: Hanang District Council Records. Prices have been deflated by the Consumer Price Index.
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the manufacturing, mining and service sectors. Agriculture contributes only 
30 per cent of GDP (World  Bank 2015). Thus, depending on the composition of 
GDP growth, it could be misleading to expect a good relationship between GDP 
growth and rural livelihoods if the change in GDP does not derive from 
agriculture.
We must also recall that the statistics used to estimate agricultural contribu-
tions may well be weak and unreliable (cf. Jerven 2011). They simply do not cap-
ture much of the activity in the informal sector which dominates life in rural 
Tanzania. Edwards reports the well- known case of the drought of late 2005 in 
Tanzania, the worst for twenty years, in which food crop production is estimated 
to have declined by between 10 and 15 per cent in 2006. Nevertheless government 
statistics show that agricultural GDP grew by 4.1 per cent in that year 
(Edwards 2014: 244–5). Official figures for the agricultural component of GDP 
may not be accurate enough to explain village- level growth.
Thus it might be possible for the agricultural sector to thrive, and for the 
broader economy not to and vice versa. If, in fact, most farmers contribute rela-
tively little to the crop sales measured in GDP calculations then it is likely that 
their own livelihood dynamics could be quite separate from the changes sug-
gested by GDP. As Dercon and Gollin have observed, poor spatial connectivity 
can increase the heterogeneity of countries’ agricultural sectors and render some 
areas effectively closed economies (Dercon and Gollin 2014: 483).
Viewed thus we should not be surprised that GDP increases seems poorly 
reflected in the consumption patterns of the rural poor, as we discussed in 
Chapter 2. Nor in fact should we read too much into the fortunes of Gitting (as 
measured in assets) appearing to match those of the nation. Rather than trying to 
explore the connections between the two scales of activity (village and nation), we 
would require separate sets of explanation for change in each.
The second surprising result from this work is the proposition that people 
could have become more prosperous as a result of greater agricultural activity and 
higher crop prices (shown in Tables  10.5 and  10.6). This is surprising because 
most accounts of Tanzanian agriculture emphasize its low productivity and stasis 
(Gollin and Goyal 2017). Investigations suggest that most rural households are 
net consumers, not producers, of food and therefore any increase in crop prices 
should make most rural people poorer. Jayne and colleagues have shown that for 
numerous countries in the region, most agricultural surplus is produced by a 
small minority of relatively large farms and prosperous farmers (Jayne et al. 2010). 
We have reproduced their findings in Table  10.7 and supplemented it with 
Tanzanian data from the LSMS. The Tanzanian data show the same levels of 
in equal ity as other countries, and suggest the same basic point. Because most 
rural households in Tanzania buy more food than they sell, increasing crop prices 
should make most families poorer not richer.
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Similarly Bryngelsson and colleagues have expanded Jayne and colleagues’ 
analysis using the 2004 KDHS and by including all foods, and not just the main 
staples (Bryngelsson et al. 2012). They found that 87 per cent of the rural popula-
tion are net buyers of food. Smaller farmers both produce less, and are often 
required to sell any surplus when the price is particularly low. Therefore, if this 
was the case in Gitting, then the increased prosperity we record in assets will have 
happened despite food price increases, not because of them. Higher food prices 
would not make the rural poor richer, it would add to their troubles.
But we must be careful with such national- scale generalizations of rural econ-
omies. Analyses of their dynamics must allow for more complexity, as Dercon 
and Gollin put it ‘[t]he central fact of agriculture in sub- Saharan Africa is enor-
mous heterogeneity’ (Dercon and Gollin  2014: 483), and this includes within 
country heterogeneity (ibid.: 485). Kagera, from where Bryngelsson and col-
leagues’ data came, is a major coffee- growing area, which has a particular dynamic 
reflecting changes in the coffee economy, and a long- term decline in coffee prices. 
In Hanang, which depends on cultivating wheat, potatoes, maize, and beans, 
there will be a different history.
We also have to factor in livestock whose economic contributions have 
been consistently under- estimated (Behnke and Metaferia  2011, Behnke and 
Muthami  2011, Behnke and Nakirya  2012, Behnke and Osman  2012). In 
Table 10.7 Distribution of farming activity in selected African countries
Country and
year of survey






















































































Source: Jayne et al (Table 10.7) and LSMS 2011 data (for Tanzania). Tanzanian data includes all 
households, urban or rural, who farmed land. All sales figures have been converted to 2011 $US$, 
using the CPI deflator available on at http://www.measuringworth.com.
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Tanzania, livestock sales are more important than crop sales for households with 
smaller farms (Table 10.7, bottom row). This reflects the fact that many pastoral 
families may not cultivate much land. Their poor crop sales are not a good indica-
tion of the returns they experience from participating in the rural economy. They 
participate through selling livestock and milk (Brockington 2001).
In addition to the complex geography of rural economies, the dynamics of 
economies over time will have variable impacts upon poorer households. 
Bryngelsson and colleagues argue that while food price rises in the short term 
may be harmful to households who spend most of their money on food, and who 
are net purchasers of food, in the longer term the consequences are more compli-
cated. Higher food prices can lead to higher rural wages and to increased agricul-
tural productivity, such that more families become net producers not net 
consumers.
Finally it is important to consider what variety of foods households produce 
and the extent of their dependence on purchased produce. This variety, the 
diverse changes in costs of each food relative to others, and the multiple margins 
on which consumption can be adjusted lead Dercon and Gollin to conclude that 
the welfare implications of food prices changes are very complicated (Dercon and 
Gollin 2014: 481). Bryngelsson and colleagues emphasize that households which 
produce a significant proportion of their own food can benefit from both increas-
ing and decreasing food prices. They explain this as follows:
by altering their consumption basket they can . . . increase their welfare . . . . If 
food prices go down, they can shift towards better quality food or more food 
consumption at the expense of a relatively small decrease in non- food consump-
tion. If food prices go up, on the other hand, they can similarly shift towards 
more non- food consumption at the cost of a relatively small decrease in food 
quality or quantity. These new options should increase their total welfare.’
(Bryngelsson et al. 2012: 131)
This point matters because LSMS data for Tanzania shows that, with respect to 
staples, most families, most of the time, are net producers, not net buyers of their 
staple food (Table 10.8).4 66 per cent of rural residents in this survey enjoy sur-
pluses almost all year round. They could belong to those households who produce 
significant proportions of their own food and thus benefit from all food price 
changes, both increases and decreases.
It is therefore possible to explain how smallholders could prosper from small 
farms and rising food prices. Nevertheless, given the starkness of Jayne and col-
leagues’ findings, the prosperity we have recorded in Gitting remains surprising. 
4 The consumption data in the LSMS survey are collected for only one week. We have taken that 
























Table 10.8 Net production and purchase of staple through the year
Land
quartile
J F M A M J J A S O N D % of
rural ppn
No land –6.8 –9.8 –7.7 –8.3 –8.7 –8.8 –6.8 –5.6 –2.5 –8.8 –7.2 –6.5 16
Lowest –2.4 –4.2 –5.2 –3.0 7.9 2.0 2.5 1.9 11.0 –1.5 –3.8 4.1 17
Second –0.1 4.0 6.3 21.5 13.1 16.5 12.6 3.5 12.3 6.0 2.9 6.0 18
Third 1.4 2.6 8.0 20.7 16.3 12.4 9.5 9.2 12.8 13.1 7.3 8.2 22
Richest 5.3 9.6 16.0 17.6 17.4 15.9 9.1 10.0 9.2 7.6 7.8 4.2 26
Households visited 216 210 177 179 241 192 229 275 126 186 307 245  
Source: LSMS 2011. Table includes all rural households and shows net weight of staple produced (+) or purchased (–) in the week sampled. Grey cells indicate net deficit of 
staple food.
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But comparative data that would allow us to compare our finding with others are 
few. Our suggestions do not fly in the face of hundreds of studies because ad equate 
survey data simply do not exist, beyond this collection. We venture it therefore as 
a possibility which requires more investigation.
The third surprise is that asset accumulation seems to have reversed processes 
of rural differentiation. Studies from elsewhere in Tanzania show that wealthy 
rural families are able to maintain their wealth through exploitative labour prac-
tices, or through using their wealth to provide political influence to facilitate land 
acquisition (Mueller  2011, Greco  2015). Gitting complicates this picture. 
Exploitative land hiring arrangements have declined, as has the extremes of 
in equal ity that British support had fostered. In part this may be due to the fact 
that we considered a broader bundle of assets other than just land. In part it may 
be because land was still relatively plentiful and so it was harder for inequalities to 
grow and deepen. Unworked land was still cheaply available during Brockington’s 
fieldwork within a day’s bicycle ride of Gitting. Hardworking, but poor, families 
could thus accumulate assets through agricultural activity. The class dynamics of 
Tanzanian villages are complex. The form and level of inequality that are found 
will vary according the measurements used to determine prosperity and poverty, 
the distribution of the means of production, and the accessibility of the different 
engines of productivity (land, labour, credit, productive assets).
Finally there is the question of the gender dynamics of the increasing prosper-
ity we have recorded. Our study has focused on families and domestic units, 
which necessarily obscures the gendered distribution of benefits within them. 
Given that most of these domestic units in this area are led by men, who will 
ostensibly own many of the assets, in some respects we have documented most 
clearly improving male fortunes rather than general fortunes. As one anonymous 
reviewer of the submitted MS put it ‘some households may have acquired more 
assets and improved on them because of the labor and investment of female mem-
bers who are not entitled to dispose of them or use them for collateral.’ This recalls 
processes described in Meru in Chapter 7.
There is much truth in that observation, and, at the same time, we must recog-
nize (as in Chapter 7) that male control over these assets is not a given. It is con-
tested, and husbands and fathers can lose those fights. In some instances families 
were able to prosper because (male) children and their mothers conspired against 
their fathers to stop them renting out family land in order to feed a drinking 
habit. In other instances family disputes are played out in competing attempts to 
control assets. Women for example will own and breed pigs, whose sale they con-
trol. Their husbands will try and usurp control of the animals, and, on occasion 
fail to do so.
Nevertheless the point remains that if our study has shown the importance of 
studying change in assets, then it has also highlighted the need to explore how 
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rural men and women separately use farm and off- farm income to invest in assets. 
The way in which women invest it in land, improved equipment, livestock, and 
the education of children is not well described in the literature. This will explain, 
in part, why the changing fortunes of some rural families are still hidden to some 
researchers, economists and government planners.
Discussing Changes in Gitting and Gocho
Following Brockington’s research, Loiske, with Olivia Howland, conducted further 
work in Gitting and Gocho to discuss changes, and the earlier findings in more 
depth. This consisted of two focus groups, with four women in one group, four 
men in one group, who were all selected for being knowledgeable of the history of 
the villages. They were between 60–75 years of age and had all had political posts 
during the early 1990s and after. The findings were then discussed with two key 
informants, one from Gocho village and one from Gitting. This work was con-
ducted in October 2018.
These accounts are interesting because they are much more detailed and com-
prehensive than those that emerged from Brockington’s focus groups that were 
undertaken when the research was first concluded. They bring up a mixture of 
endogenous, specific to these villages, and exogenous change which has been 
happening across Tanzania.
With respect to exogenous changes, the most important change, is the deregu-
lation of the market for crops. Markets now functioning much better, the prices 
are generally much higher, market availability is not a problem and not mon op ol-
ized by the elite in the village as many actors comes to the village and offer trans-
port of products, buy products straight from the farmers and pay market prices as 
prices can be checked through cell- phones and the Internet. In this respect the 
improvement in communications from cell- phones is also important because it 
makes market knowledge available in the villages. Similarly transport facilities are 
improved (there are more lorries to transport goods) so that market availability 
for goods is improved as is travel in general.
These informants also noted that farmers have better inputs leading to more 
outputs for sale. Specifically the introduction of modern seeds and pigs increased 
productivity and income, for pigs mainly for women that are empowered eco-
nomically and got higher status in the village. This, they claimed, more than com-
pensates for the economic consequences of land fragmentation due to population 
growth and heritage. The importance of pigs is illustrated by the decline of the 
African pig virus which had disrupted the production of pigs that was so im port-
ant for women’s income. The outbreak of the virus was generally over by the early 
2010s and the pig production has recovered as has the economy of women.
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Other infrastructural changes informants mentioned was that electricity in the 
villages had improved many things: communication, studies, electrically powered 
machines, fridges, and freezers. The improvement of the schooling system has 
had effects on the general education level in the village but has also given young 
people hope for the future. Finally they noted that health care has also improved 
and the villagers have better health conditions than before; this also makes it pos-
sible for people to work harder.
But note of this list that many of these changes (the improvement in transport 
infrastructure and secondary schools) are relatively recent—they cannot account 
for the longer- term changes. Also recall Östberg and colleagues’ Chapter 9—the 
external changes count for nothing unless people have the mindset, social skills, 
and network to effect these opportunities in their own lives. The external changes 
provide an enabling environment that require more local changes to bring into being.
In this respect, on endogenous changes informants noted that awareness of the 
structures of exploitation of the poor by the elite grew. This became possible 
because of political change in which the old leaders, linked to those elites, lost 
power. As a result the behaviour of the poorer farmers changed. Instead of allow-
ing the elite to use the poor farmers land the poor farmers started to cooperate. 
Women were crucial in this process of raising awareness, especially when it came 
to cooperation between farmers.
Loiske’s informants, all of whom had held public office in these villages at the 
time that the changes began to come in, also noted that the change in leadership 
was instrumental in re- forging social relations within the villages. They observed 
that the new village leadership was more professional, better educated, more 
democratic, and supports the efforts of the poor villagers as well as the tee- total 
movement among women. The leaders managed to attract various projects to the 
villages, introducing better seeds and other harvest improving technologies. They 
encouraged private investments in shops, restaurants, and all kinds of entrepre-
neurship especially transport businesses. The strength of the new leadership elites 
also coincided with a moment of weakness in the old elites as these groups tried 
to transfer their economic activities from the exploitation of land and labour in 
the village to external economic activities where they largely failed.
Perhaps most interesting of all was the fact that in the focus groups, and with 
the key informants, there were long discussions as to how these changes have 
affected people’s minds. People (both men and women) feel more self- reliant, are 
more self- confident, they are prepared to cooperate to become free from the elite’s 
patriarchal bonds that dominated before and there is a belief that the future is 
bright. People do work harder and agree with the late President Magufuli that ‘Hapa 
Kazi Tu’ is the way forward. The final comment from one of the key informants 
(who was a strong supporter of Nyerere’s policies in 1991) was that ‘during 
Nyerere we had Ujamaa, but now we have the real Ujamaa’.
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Conclusion
It is premature enthusiastically to welcome Tanzania’s recent decades of economic 
growth if that growth has not included the poor. It is difficult to see what purpose 
growth serves if it is not inclusive. Equally, before condemning its lack of connec-
tion to the rural poor, we have to know how to measure the benefits (or other-
wise) that economic growth might have. Current misgivings about Tanzanian 
economic growth excluding the poor have been based primarily on measures of 
consumption. This is an important aspect of poverty, as it shows in a basic ma ter-
ial sense that the economic growth the rest of the country enjoys is not well 
shared. But nevertheless this measure overlooks change in assets. We cannot con-
clude from the stasis in poverty lines that economic growth is not assisting house-
holds to move out of poverty (more broadly defined).
The findings from this paper suggest that it is important to explore change in 
assets, as well as change in consumption, if we are to understand how inclusive 
economic growth is for the rural poor. The families described in this village have 
experienced a remarkable change of fortunes in the last twenty years, as measured 
by their assets. Measures of household prosperity which ignore assets will be 
unable to capture the sorts of dynamics described in this survey.
The data presented here suggest that determining the inclusivity, or otherwise, 
of economic growth in the absence of understanding trends in assets is prema-
ture. Current poverty lines rely solely on consumption indices of a restricted 
range of goods. They exclude productive assets, as we have seen in Chapter 2. But 
understanding poverty dynamics during times of economic growth requires 
incorporating a notion of the dynamics of asset use and ownership. Rather than 
asking why growth is not inclusive, it is important first to ask what patterns in 
inclusivity and exclusivity are visible according to different definitions of wealth 
and poverty and different sources of data.
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Introduction
Smallholder- based rice- led agricultural growth through farm intensification and 
paddy specialization is a development path that has commonly been associated 
with the South East Asian Green Revolution experience of the 1970s (Hayami 
and Ruttan 1985). In sub- Saharan Africa, only Madagascar and West Africa have 
been traditional paddy- producing areas, but over recent decades, rice has gained 
increasing popularity throughout the region and is gradually taking over from 
alternative grain staples such as maize and millet. With growing consumer 
demand, new income earning opportunities are opening up for domestic paddy 
producers (Balasubramanian et al. 2007). With both rice consumption and paddy 
production increasing substantially, Tanzania provides an example of this rela-
tively recent trend and the country is now the fourth largest rice producer in 
Africa, in terms of tons harvested (FAOSTAT 2018).
In this chapter, we provide an in- depth study of two villages in Kilombero 
District in south- central Tanzania, one of the rice baskets of Tanzania. Here, agri-
cultural growth and farm- intensification dynamics are based on the expansion of 
the production of paddy rice over the past decade and a half. Relying on a mixed- 
methods approach we show that over the time period from 2002 to the present, 
smallholder farmers have significantly increased the area under paddy, total rice 
production, and land productivity. Similar to the South East Asian examples, the 
intensification dynamics in the two villages are based on a combination of techno-
logic al change through new rice varieties and farm in- puts as well as mech an iza-
tion, and improved producer incentives transmitted through expanding markets. 
Experience suggests that the possibilities for enhancing agricultural productivity 
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in an African smallholder context are not quite as bleak as is sometimes assumed 
(see e.g. Collier and Dercon 2014).
Meanwhile, the two villages offer a couple of unique twists to this conventional 
pattern of technology and market- induced intensification, related to the develop-
ment of the broader Tanzanian spatial economy and the evolution of gender- 
based land control patterns. The traditional theoretical literature on intensification 
pathways has commonly focused on agrarian transformation and linkages to the 
non- farm economy. Such perspectives posit an evolutionary path away from 
agrarian livelihoods in rural areas to non- farm occupations among an increas-
ingly urbanized population (see Timmer 2009). However, in Tanzania as well as 
in other sub- Saharan countries, we currently see the unfolding of a multifaceted 
rural development path wherein different economic activities, e.g. agriculture and 
services, mix in the same locations. Further, we need to add an analysis of the 
gendered patterns of this transition as these aspects have commonly been omitted 
in models that seek to explain structural transformation as a gradual macro- level 
movement of economic activities and people from the rural to the urban, initi-
ated by an intensification in staple crop production.
Our aims in the following are therefore several. At an overarching level we 
demonstrate and quantify the increases in agricultural productivity in paddy pro-
duction specifically and link these to changes in technology as well as commercial 
incentives to illustrate the potential for a rice- based intensification process in a 
Tanzanian context. Moreover, we elucidate the features of this process in the two 
villages in question qualitatively to reflect on the pre- conditions and broader con-
text for intensification provided by shifts in rural- urban economic opportunities 
and gender- based changes in access to land. A final, theoretical aim therefore is to 
further the understanding of rural transformation, and intensification processes, 
from the vantage point of these dynamics. Here we link to recent bodies of litera-
ture that acknowledge rural- urban linkages in a more general sense and norma-
tively point to the importance of gender inclusivity in reducing poverty and 
enhancing growth, but do not offer either as explanations of rural transformation 
dynamics.
The following section contains a description of the trends of rice production in 
the larger Tanzanian context. It is followed by a theoretical framework and there-
after the methodology, data sources, and sites are described. The analysis of the 
data is presented in four theoretically motivated themes, before we conclude.
Rice- Led Agricultural Growth in Tanzania
Arab traders first introduced rice to the coastal areas of Tanzania and during the 
nineteenth century the crop spread along the caravan routes to the inland. It was 
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considered more productive although less reliable compared to millet and sor-
ghum, and from the 1960s it grew in importance as a subsistence staple crop 
(Iliffe  1979: ch. 3). Production did not, however, really take off until after 
Structural Adjustment Programmes were introduced in the mid- 1980s (see 
Figure 11.1). Following the policies of economic liberalization the depreciation of 
the exchange rate made imported rice more expensive and opened up trade in 
domestic production. Rice went from being a subsistence crop to becoming a 
food cash crop characterized by increasing commercialization. From 1985 to the 
turn of the millennium it was the fastest growing food crop in the country with 
an annual production increase of almost 11 per cent making it the second most 
important food and commercial crop after maize (Amani 2006: 8). An indication 
of the importance the Tanzanian government attaches to the rice sector was the 
launching of the National Rice Development Strategy in 2008. The vision was to 
transform the existing sector, thought to be focused too much on ‘subsistence’ 
production, into something deemed more commercially orientated. The produc-
tion target was set at a doubling of rice production by 2018 (RLDC 2009: 23), a 
goal that appears to have been reached already in 2016 (see Figure 11.1).
Initially rice was primarily consumed in rice producing areas and urban 
 centres, but with changing consumption patterns and increasing incomes, 
demand has spread throughout the country (Amani 2006: 8, RLDC 2009). Market 
expansion has led to additional land being put under rice cultivation and increas-


























































Figure 11.1 Rice paddy—production (tonnes) and area (ha) in Tanzania, 1961–2016.
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This is a fast- moving sector with substantial increases in both large- scale farms 
controlled by overseas investors (see e.g. Sulle  2017), commercial Tanzanian 
farmers (see e.g. Greco 2015), and a growing number of smallholders. The latter 
likely constituting the vast majority of rice producers. Some reports suggest that 
around 70 per cent of all rice grown in Tanzania is produced relying on rain- fed 
farming systems, while 30 per cent takes place within small village- level trad-
ition al irrigation systems (RLDC 2009: 6). Census data suggest that between 3 per 
cent of farmers growing rice in the Living Standards Measurement Survey of 
2012/13 used irrigation, and 6 per cent of rice farmed in the 2007/8 agricultural 
census was irrigated (Woodhouse et al. 2017). However, using new radar data 
Bowers et al. (2018) suggest that FAO data on irrigation activity in rice growing 
areas in central Tanzania may be underestimated by up to two orders of magni-
tude. This shows that data on informal and unrecognized irrigation is unreliable 
and that accurate figures are difficult to obtain.
Women participate in all aspects of the rice value chain, particularly planting, 
weeding, harvesting, and threshing although to a lesser degree in trading which is 
traditionally considered to be men’s domain in many Tanzanian societies. 
Nevertheless, since men in Tanzania generally have better opportunities for 
accessing and controlling key inputs such as land, water, credit, and technology, 
they are commonly understood to constitute the core group of producers 
(RLDC 2009: 13).
As we can see in Figure 11.2 the expansion of the rice sector is not only taking 
place in terms of increasing production and area under cultivation, but yields 
















































Figure 11.2 Land productivity in rice cultivation (kg/ha) in Tanzania, 1961–2016.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 01/07/21, SPi
Ricing Fortunes 241
improvements in land productivity lie in technological change, e.g. mech an iza-
tion, irrigation, improved crop varieties, and fertilizers, as well as better farming 
methods introduced by extension services.
Rice cultivation is particularly successful in the Central Corridor consisting of 
Tabora, Shinyanga, and Morogoro Regions. Half of all land under rice cultivation 
is found here (RLDC  2009: 6). Rice paddy cultivation in Kilombero Valley in 
Morogoro Region goes back to the mid- nineteenth century. Initially, it was 
 centred along the Kilombero River, depended on run- off water, and was primarily 
farmed for subsistence purposes. Since the turn of the millennium, however, 
technological change in the form of the introduction of new machinery has made 
it possible to expand the areas under cultivation and increase production. 
Agricultural growth has been further encouraged by market expansion and rice 
has been turned into an increasingly commercialized crop (Kato 2007).
Farmers either sell their produce as paddy or take it to the local mill to be 
hulled and sold as rice. The buyers are usually local agents and prices fluctuate 
depending on season, location and market channels. Milling, i.e. the de- stoning, 
husking, polishing, and grading involved in turning paddy into rice, is growing as 
a processing industry in the rice- producing areas. The industry is largely dom in-
ated by small and medium scale enterprises (RLDC 2009: 14–15).
Theoretical Perspectives on Agricultural Transformation
Agricultural transformation contains a great variety of different development 
pathways. To understand their specifics and to typologize and draw generalizing 
conclusions about their mechanisms and drivers, we look inside the processes 
themselves and conduct in- depth investigations at the micro level (Timmer 2009). 
In the present study we examine two villages that could be potential examples of 
an ongoing national trend of rice- led agricultural growth characterized by 
increasing production, expansion of land area under rice production, and land 
productivity improvements. The process appears to contain both extensive and 
intensive growth at the same time.
The Green Revolution in South East Asia in the 1970s was a classic case where 
high population density drove a process of rice- led agricultural intensification 
primarily based on the use of abundant labour resources, the introduction of bio-
logical technological change, and subsequent improvements in land productivity. 
Meanwhile, sub- Saharan Africa has been characterized by land abundance and 
labour scarcity; agricultural growth has primarily taken place in the form of 
extensive growth (Austin  2008). The exception has been pockets of so called 
‘islands of intensification’, which to a higher degree have resembled Asian land- 
labour ratios (Widgren and Sutton  2004, Hillbom  2014). With population 
increase and changing land- labour ratios in sub- Saharan Africa generally, the 
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land frontier has been reached, or is about to be reached in a growing number of 
regions (Djurfeldt et al.  2005). This transition phase means that the old gap 
between the typically Asian and African agricultural growth experiences is slowly 
eroding.
The classic theory for understanding how land- labour ratios shape and drive 
agricultural growth is found in the induced innovation literature represented by 
Binswanger, Hayami, Ruttan, and others (see e.g. Binswanger and Ruttan 1978, 
Ruttan and Hayami 1984, Hayami and Ruttan 1985). The fundamental hypothesis 
is that change in factor endowments, particularly the relative price of land and/or 
labour, determines the way that farmers participate in processes of technological 
and institutional change. The assumption is that actors within a system of pro-
duction use technology to substitute the scarce production factor. When the 
scarce factor is labour, mechanization is a rational technological solution to raise 
labour productivity. When it is land, technological change aims to increase land 
productivity through e.g. irrigation, bio- chemical technology, and introduction 
of high- value crops. The primary empirical dichotomy used to illustrate the the-
ory is land- abundant USA and labour- abundant Japan (Hayami and Ruttan 1985).
The development of the rice sector in Tanzania appears not to lend itself to 
either one of these two extremes, but rather consists of a mix of them. The area 
under rice cultivation is expanding and increasing mechanization plays an 
important role as an enabler. Commonly capital has been the truly scarce factor 
of production for African smallholders, a circumstance that has prevented the 
large majority from investing in machinery. The rising profitability of rice farm-
ing, however, allows for increasing use of tractors and other machinery leading to 
extensive growth and improving labour productivity.1 Meanwhile, improving 
yields are partly explained by access to new machinery, but also to biological 
innovation in the form of e.g. fertilizer schemes and access to new crop varieties.
Notwithstanding the induced innovation theory’s focus on technological 
change, it recognizes that the use of technology is conditioned by institutions and 
that the two are intertwined (Ruttan 1978). While the Tanzanian state has set up 
national rice strategies, its farm in- put subsidy programs and local extension ser-
vices have more direct effects on smallholders’ production (Msuya, Isinika, and 
Dzanku 2018).
Despite significant increase in domestic rice production, Tanzania is far from 
being self- sufficient (FAOSTAT  2018). Consequently there is scope for further 
marketable surplus production, commercialization, and specialization. Matching 
demand with supply requires well- functioning markets providing incentives for 
further productivity increase and technological change. In sub- Saharan Africa, 
1 This can be illustrated by the work of Woodhouse and others who surveyed hundreds of irrigat-
ing farmers in Tanzania in 2017. They found that power tillers were increasingly reported by respond-
ents as a means of land preparation (Woodhouse pers. comm.).
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market expansion and the integration of smallholders have encountered numer-
ous difficulties and hindrances, particularly high transaction costs due to e.g. 
poor information and inadequate market infrastructure. Such market failure in 
turn cements low agricultural productivity (Barrett 2008, Shiferaw et al.  2008). 
However, there are also studies showing that African smallholders, given the right 
incentives and resources, will commercialize and deliver surplus production for 
agricultural markets (see e.g. World Bank 2007, Hillbom 2012).
Increased knowledge and better understanding of development challenges 
adds new perspectives to the existing theoretical discussion. While the induced 
innovations theory with its concern for bottom- up change and local stakeholders 
address the issues of inclusion in agricultural growth processes, it lacks a gender 
perspective. In rural Africa, men access and control agricultural resources to a 
substantially higher degree than women. What explains the unequal formal con-
trol is debated, if there are generalizable gender gaps that regularly favour men 
over women (FAO 2011, Quisumbing and Pandolfelli 2010), or if such outcomes 
rather depend on the local context (Andersson Djurfeldt et al.  2013). 
Notwithstanding, studies have proposed that improved female control over agri-
cultural resources would be positively related to both securing agricultural liveli-
hoods and initiating broad- based pro- poor growth (FAO 2011). Enhancing 
women’s control over agricultural resources is associated with efficiency gains 
such as greater possibilities for securing credit and access to technologies that 
require capital (Agarwal 2003), managing shocks such as natural disasters or eco-
nomic crises (Duflo and Udry 2004), and enabling households to surface from 
poverty traps (Doss 2006).
Finally, in induced innovation theory, processes of farm intensification are 
understood to be endogenous rather than exogenous to the economic system and 
each region’s pathway is different as it is dependent on local factor endowments. 
This does not mean that we hypothesize that these systems are isolated or without 
exogenous influx (Binswanger 1978). In the broader transformation process 
urban areas have for instance been important as nodes of knowledge transfer and 
providers of input- and output markets to raise agricultural productivity (See 
Hazell, Haggblade, and Reardon  2007). Recently, a growing literature on rural 
transformation at a general level recognizes the importance of rural- urban link-
ages to agricultural growth, but the shifts in economic opportunities between the 
two sectors and its effects on capital flows and technology transfers has not been 
recognized.
A better understanding of the interplay between local- level factor endow-
ments, institutional dynamics, and broader commercial opportunities both 
within and outside agriculture contextualizes the process of structural trans form-
ation in our case study. We will now move on to see how these factors—changing 
land- labour ratios, mechanization, biological innovation, state- led skill training, 
market expansion, and changing gender roles—play out in the two case villages. 
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To what extent have these factors been influencing trends in rice production over 
the years 2002–17? Can changing gender relations—especially related to control 
over land explain intensification patterns? How do endogenous and exogenous 
forces intersect and explain the nature of intensification processes in the two 
villages?
Data Sources, Site Selection, and Description
The point of departure for this study is a quantitative dataset—the Afrint data-
base, which has been collected in fifty-six villages in six African countries in 
three rounds since 2002. Site selection for the qualitative fieldwork that consti-
tutes the qualitative segment of the data, was carried out on the basis of trends 
identified in the quantitative dataset. The analysis draws on both sources of data, 
however.
Quantitative Data
The larger Afrint database contains data from six countries, Ghana, Kenya, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia, collected in fifty-six villages in fif-
teen regions. Data were collected in three rounds, 2002, 2008, and finally in 2013 
(Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia) and 2015 (Tanzania and Mozambique). The 
cross- sectional data cover 2544 households for the final round of data collected, 
and the full panel for the period as a whole (rounds I to III) comprises of 1566 
households. Our focus in this chapter is the final data collection round 2008 to 
2015, since the data suggest that entry into paddy production has occurred rap-
idly in the past decade.
The research design was based on multiple stage purposive sampling, with the 
original aim being to select countries, regions, and villages that held the potential 
for agricultural intensification at the start of the project (see Djurfeldt, Holmén, 
et al. 2005 for a discussion of the original principles for site selection). Within the 
broad context of this criterion, one dynamic and one less dynamic region was 
purposively selected in each country. In the case of Tanzania, Morogoro and 
Iringa Regions were selected, with Morogoro being the more dynamic region. 
Households within the villages were sampled on the basis of a random stratified 
sample, with the data being statistically representative at the village level. A bal-
anced panel design has been used to maintain the representativeness of the data-
set between the rounds of data collection, making up for attrition and changes in 
village populations by sampling additional respondents.
The focus of the project, and thus the contents of the survey, have shifted 
somewhat since the first phase of the project. The first round of data collection 
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focused on production and technology related to the major grain staples (maize, 
rice, sorghum) and cassava, the second round added more detailed information 
on commercialization and also for the first time included cash income data. 
Finally, the third round captured some intra- household aspects of income gener-
ation not covered in the first two rounds. While one general challenge in captur-
ing change over time relates to the addition of variables along the way, in the case 
of production dynamics related to rice specifically, longitudinal data is available 
throughout the project cycle. Interviews were carried out with the farm manager.
A couple of general caveats relates to the survey methodology used: interview-
ing the farm manager is problematic for a couple of reasons—on the one hand it 
presumes perfect information on the part of the respondent and on the other 
(especially important from a gender perspective) this approach may hide intra- 
household inequalities related to food security and income distribution for 
instance. The survey samples at the village level, are small and it is therefore not 
generally possible to compare the data for male- and female- managed households 
at the village level since the limited sample size raises the risk for type 2 errors 
(false negatives). The chapter uses the village data from the two villages for the 
years 2008 and 2015, predominantly using data for the rice farmers covered by 
the dataset. The total number of rice farmers in 2008, was thirty- six for Idete and 
forty- three for Katurukila. For 2015, the number of rice producers was thirty- six 
for Idete and forty- one for Katurukila. While the dataset can tell us something 
about production trends and technology use, it cannot therefore provide suffi-
cient explanations for these changes. For this purpose we need qualitative data.
Site Selection
As mentioned above, the two study villages were selected based on trends in the 
quantitative dataset. This is described in more detail in another publication 
(Andersson Djurfeldt 2017), but briefly, site selection was based on an interest in 
understanding and unravelling the gender- based patterns of what in the literature 
is described as ‘pro- poor agricultural growth’—that is an inclusive, commercially 
driven process of agricultural expansion. In the dataset as a whole eighteen vil-
lages were selected, where household livelihoods had improved on the basis of 
increased agricultural commercialization between the last two rounds of data col-
lection (short- term growth) or between the first and the last (long- term growth). 
Five of these villages were found in Tanzania, with three selected for qualitative 
fieldwork, Idete and Katurukila in Morogoro (Kilombero District) and Kitelewasi 
in Iringa District. During the course of fieldwork it became clear that Kitelewasi 
was a case of urbanization gradually enfolding a rural hinterland rather than an 
example of dynamic agricultural growth. The chapter therefore focuses on 
Idete—a village whose growth has occurred between the second and third round 
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of data collection, and Katurukila, a village that has seen an uninterrupted growth 
trend since 2002.
Qualitative Data Collection
Qualitative data were collected between 17 and 27 of November 2017 by a team of 
researchers consisting of the three authors of this chapter and five research as sist-
ants who were trained in a workshop before the start of data collection. The 
research assistants did separate interviews with both spouses in twenty- five 
households in each village to gain an understanding of intra- household dynamics 
related to control and decision- making in agriculture and income generation. 
In addition, women heading their own households were sampled and interviewed. 
Households were selected among the surveyed households and stratified by 
income per adult equivalent.
A set of key informant interviews and focus group discussions were also car-
ried out in the villages. The purpose of these were to gain an understanding of the 
broader dynamics of change that had occurred since data collection in 2015 and 
to elucidate the reasons behind the trends in the quantitative data. These inter-
views were carried out by the authors. For the qualitative analysis, this chapter 
focuses strongly on the data from the key informant interviews and focus group 
discussions.
Site Description
Idete village is located about 21km from Ifakara town and is one of the four vil-
lages in Idete ward. It is serviced by public transport and thus easily accessible. 
The population is estimated to 2,802 individuals staying in 682 households. The 
main grown crop is paddy, which is used as both a cash and a food crop. The main 
rice varieties are local varieties (Zambia, Super India, Kalimata, Mbawa mbili) 
although there is an increase of farmers opting for the hybrid variety SARO. Maize, 
bananas, sweet potatoes, and some vegetables are also grown for subsistence. 
Chickens are the most popular livestock. Teak- tree farming is starting to gain 
popularity among villagers although it is an activity mostly pursued by outsiders 
(i.e. people not living in the village). Kilombero Valley Teak Company is the big-
gest buyer and supporter of teak- tree farming.
Katurukila village has an estimated population of 2,786 individuals and is 
found between Kilombero town and Ifakara town in Mkula ward. It is located 
60km from Ifakara town and does not have regular public transport. Villagers 
relies on motorbikes (known as bodaboda) for transport to the Kilombero- 
Ifakara main road. Agriculture is the main economic activity. Being close to 
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Kilombero Sugar Company means that farmers in the village participate in the 
out- grower contract farming scheme, growing sugarcane (cf. Sulle  2017, West 
and Haug 2017). Sugarcane is however available as an option only for a minority 
of farmers as the initial capital requirements are high. Rice is cultivated by nearly 
all households in the village and is the main food and cash crop. Due to the sur-
rounding sugarcane plantations, available land area for farm expansion is limited.
Like most of Kilombero area Idete and Katurukila have a tropical climate with 
bi- annual rainy seasons. The short rainy season falls between December and 
March and the long rains (known as Masika) fall between April and June. In total, 
the area receives an annual rainfall ranging from 1,200mm to 1,400mm. Most 
farmers primarily rely on rain, but in Katurukila there are also small- scale, farmer 
constructed, water- control devices for irrigation.
The dominant marketing systems in the two villages is an open free market for 
agriculture and livestock whereby prices are determined by supply and demand. 
Farmers in the two villages have access both to the internal market and the export 
market. Harvested paddy is either stored at home or at warehouses adjacent to 
nearby milling machines, at a cost. In addition, farmers in Katurukila have an 
option of selling paddy through the warehouse receipt system. This system 
increases farmers bargaining power and thus the price they receive.
Empirical Analysis
Production and Land Use for Paddy
As a first observation, we note that the trends of both extensive (increasing area 
under production) and intensive (improved yields) agricultural growth found at 
the national and regional levels are mirrored in the development of rice paddy 
cultivation in the two villages, as such data from the study sites confirm broader 
national trends. In some respect they also show the potential of yield improve-
ments through a classical grain- intensification- based trajectory also in the case of 
sub- Saharan Africa.
All households except one grew rice in 2008, by 2015, all households except 
three (two in Idete and one in Katurukila) grew rice. The importance of rice as a 
driver of intensification dynamics is confirmed by the quantitative data, but there 
are differences between the two villages. First, while in Idete the mean cultivated 
area under rice has increased by 70 per cent, in Katurukila the area under paddy 
remained unchanged (see Table 11.1). Second, production volumes also increased 
dramatically in Idete. The change in Katurukila is more modest (see Table 11.2), 
but still sizeable in relative terms.
A closer look at the yield data (Table  11.3) reveals that intensification has 
occurred primarily in Idete since 2006–8, which has caught up with and outpaced 
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the yields in Katurukila since the previous round of data collection. Nonetheless, 
also in Katurukila yield increases have been pronounced.
The increases in rice production is a general feature, not driven by outliers. It 
was reported by respondents in the qualitative interviews in both villages. The 
share of the median as a proportion of the mean increased slightly in both villages 
meaning that median production rose faster than average production, pointing to 
slightly improved prospects for the bottom half of the sample (see Table 11.4).
The point that commercialization was one of the main drivers of production 
increases was repeatedly stressed in focus group discussions and by key inform-
ants. In Idete, for instance, the participants in the male focus- group discussion 
argued that not only had market access improved in general, but also that the 
production of several varieties of paddy was a competitive advantage in attracting 
wholesalers to the village.
Table 11.1  Mean cultivated area under rice (ha), three- year average, by village
  2006–8 N 2013–15 N Difference Sig.
Idete 0.74 36 1.26 35 0.52 ***
Katurukila 1.07 42 1.04 41   
Total number of cases 2006–8: Idete 36, Katurukila 43; total number of cases 2013–15: Idete 36, 
Katurukila 41. One extreme case was removed in Katurukila for 2006–8 and one extreme case in Idete 
for 2013–15.
Table 11.2 Mean production of paddy (kg) per household, three- year average, 
by village
  2006–8 N 2013–15 N Difference Sig.
Idete 1127 36 3186 36 2059 ***
Katurukila 1708 42 2422 41 714 **
One extreme case was removed in Katurukila for 2006–8.
Table 11.3  Yields (kg/ha) 2006–8, 2013–15
  2006–8 N 2013–15 N Diff. Sig.
Idete 1433 36 2464 36 1031 ***
Katurukila 1529 42 2222 41 693 ***
One extreme case was removed for Katurkila for 2006–8.
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The role of commercialization is confirmed also by the quantitative data—the 
share of households participating in the paddy market is near universal, and sale 
volumes have on average increased dramatically as suggested by the data in 
Table 11.5. A marketable surplus has emerged between the two rounds of data 
collection. The qualitative interviews also mentioned the importance of rising 
prices. The quantitative data suggest that price improvements are part of a long- 
term trend: the data on price perceptions shows that already in 2008, twenty- two 
out of twenty- eight respondents in Idete perceived prices to have improved since 
2002 and thirty- one out of thirty- eight households in Katurukila agreed. By 2015, 
nineteen out of thirty- four, and thirty- one out of thirty- eight respondents in Idete 
and Katurukila respectively were of the opinion that prices had improved since 
2008. Steadily improving prices and better market access may therefore offer part 
of the explanation for what appears to be an agrarian- based process of livelihood 
improvements, generated by increases in production and yields.
Table 11.4 Median three- year average household production (kg) and 
three- year average cultivated area (ha), paddy, by village 2006–8 and 2013–15
  Production Area
 2006–8 2013–15 2006–8 2013–15
Idete 840 2693 0.62 1.01
Katurukila 1400 2080 0.93 0.81
Table 11.5 Share of households who sold paddy (market 
participation) and average amount sold by household, by 
village, 2008 and 2015
  Market participation (%)
 2008 2015   
Idete 0.83 0.94   
Katurukila 0.86 0.93   
  Average amount of paddy sold per household (kg)
 2008 2015 Difference Sig.
Idete 559 1947 1388 ***
Katurukila 755 1569 814 **
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Technology Use and Modes of Technology Transfer
Improved technologies as an explanation for production increases and rising 
yields was a cross- cutting theme in all interviews—the institutional mechanisms 
behind this are based on a combination of group dynamics, extension services, 
immigration, and extension services provided by local level government officials, 
NGOs, and other organizations. In both villages, the formation of groups for pur-
poses of technology transfers was actively encouraged.
The use of extension services has been largely unchanged in both villages—in 
the case of Idete 55 per cent of the households in 2015, reported receiving exten-
sion, either from government services or private organizations, such as NGOs, 
during the past year. The corresponding share for Katurukila was 52 per cent. 
While, there were no statistically significant changes in the extent to which farm-
ers received extension, the increasing formation of groups is reflected in the data 
for Idete: 10 per cent of the sampled farmers belonged to a local farmer’s group in 
2008, compared with 29 per cent in 2015 (a difference that was statistically sig-
nificant at the 1 per cent level).
Indeed, in the rice- growing areas where we have worked especially, the method 
of working through farmers groups had been propagated by a local government- 
employed female extension agent. In the past, there had been accusations of lazi-
ness and inactivity directed at her by the male farmers. In response, she had 
sensitized farmers into forming groups, while others had been mobilized by the 
government through the distribution of subsidized fertilizer, which was based on 
the formalization of groups. At the time of the interviews in November 2017 there 
were forty- eight active groups involved in livestock and farming in one village. 
These groups are self- organized but assisted in drafting constitutions and finally 
formalized through the approval of the extension agent. The main purpose of the 
groups in both villages, apart from accessing fertilizer, was to farm collectively on 
demonstration plots, where the visual effect of production improvements could 
be exhibited, inspiring change in the village.
Despite the emphasis on improved technologies, as a starting point it can be 
noted that seed varieties grown are mainly traditional types used for dry rice 
production. In both villages farmers primarily rely on rain, although in 
Katurukila rain is complemented with a low- technology farm- led irrigation 
system. In Idete, in 2008, a handful (six) of households reported that the main 
variety of rice that was grown was an improved variety, a number that actually 
dropped by 2015. In Katurukila, by contrast, nine households out of forty- one 
planted improved var ieties as their main variety in 2015, compared with one 
in  2008. The qualitative data, however, contains detailed information on the 
types of varieties (SARO and Iyara64) being disseminated by the extension 
services also in Idete. The mismatch between the quantitative data in this 
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case,  therefore may suggest a mis in ter pret ation of the question or the term 
‘improved seed’.
The use of inorganic fertilizer varies between the villages, largely a result of 
differences in soil conditions. In 2015, less than a third (ten) out of thirty- six 
respondents in Idete used chemical fertilizer. For the remainder, the majority 
stated that their soils were fertile and therefore they did not need fertilizer, while 
the rest could not afford to buy fertilizer. In Katurukila, by contrast three- quarters 
of the households used chemical fertilizer and only one household did not do so 
because of high soil fertility. Here, also the use of fertilizer has increased since 
2008: only seven households used fertilizer on rice in 2008, compared with 
thirty in 2015. The use of pesticides varied between the villages—in Idete 14 per 
cent of the households used pesticides on rice, whereas in Katurukila 46 per 
cent did in 2015 (sig. at the 5 per cent level). Data for herbicide use was not 
collected during 2008, but it should be noted that farmers in both villages, and 
Idete especially make use of herbicides—81 per cent of the households in Idete, 
and 46 per cent of those in Katurukila used herbicides on paddy in 2015. 
Increased use of herbicides was also put forth as an explanation for rising 
yields in the case of Idete.
Shifting Rural- Urban Economic Opportunities as 
Explanations of Technology Transfer
An important, if not the main, driver of intensification may come from beyond 
the villages. The proliferation of relatively inexpensive agricultural machinery is 
clear in both villages, and also along the roads leading into the villages. The grow-
ing availability of tractors and combine harvesters are mentioned as an ex plan-
ation both for increasing farm sizes as well as higher productivity in both villages. 
This could be a result of the government Kilimo Kwanza (which translates to 
‘Agriculture First’) initiative in which Pillar No. 7 aims at industrialization to pro-
mote agriculture by addressing the needs of agricultural producers. Backward 
linkages through supply of agricultural machinery and implements was a govern-
ment priority in this context. Moreover, through the agriculture window of the 
Tanzania Investment Bank, individual farmers and farmer groups could access 
finance for machinery and implements to enhance mechanization.
Investing in tractors and agricultural machines that can be rented to small- 
scale farmers has become a business opportunity in Morogoro and other smaller 
urban centres. Informants in Katurukila argued, that opportunities for making 
money in the urban economy have gradually dwindled as part of the govern-
ment’s clamp- down on corruption and tendering procedures and this has led to 
investments in the agricultural sector.
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Changes in land preparation are striking, especially in Idete, where less than a 
quarter of the households used tractors for land preparation in 2008, compared 
with 83 per cent in 2015. In Katurukila, tractor ploughing was more frequent in 
2008, but also increased during the period, with 70 per cent of the farmers pre-
paring their land by using a tractor in 2015. Labour shortage in the villages could 
also explain this shift. The secondary education system from 2004 to 2009 
through the Secondary Education Development Program (SEDP) phase 1 tripled 
the number of secondary schools in the country. This meant that more youth in 
the villages could now attend secondary school, thus withdrawing them from 
engaging in farm activities. The second phase of SEDP with assistance of the 
World Bank started in 2010 and further increased the access of many youth to 
secondary education. The farming population is thus ageing, and replacement is 
minimal. Mechanization and productivity improvements are a response to demo-
graphic change that is driven partly by the expansion of education.
Land Use Changes—Growing Demand, Formalization, 
and Individualization
Further explanation for broader livelihood changes and the dynamics between 
productivity increase are related to two aspects noted in the qualitative data: on 
the one hand the growing commercial prospects in paddy raise the value of land 
and enable poorer households to rent out land to urbanites or farmers from other 
villages keen to explore such prospects. In turn, it was suggested that this raises 
incomes and living standards among the landholders.
A second change that was noted was the individualization of farming, espe-
cially for women, either through renting land or through land rights that were 
being individualized through the titling schemes being rolled out in the vil-
lages. At the time of the quantitative data collection the latter had not been 
completed, nor is it possible to trace intra- household control and access to land 
through this dataset. The argument was nonetheless made in focus group dis-
cussions with both men and women as well as in the interviews with extension 
staff, that the possibilities for women individually to cultivate land, especially 
through renting land, was improving productivity. The incentives for women’s 
production on such land were higher than on family land, given the general 
understanding that the income generated from sale of produce from land that 
women themselves were renting would be kept by the wife. The re- investment 
of incomes into improved housing by women and the general demonstration 
effect of women engaging successfully in agriculture were also noted as sources 
of rising productivity in discussions with male respondents. Husbands would 
gradually be convinced by the improvements being made, overcoming their 
hesitation to adopt new technology.
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While the growing value of land cannot be captured in increases in prod uct iv-
ity among the sampled households, for 2015, we have nonetheless documented 
the existence of a rental land market. In both villages, renting out land was less 
frequent than renting in land: in Idete, 32 per cent of the households rented land, 
while 26 per cent rented out land, compared with Katurukila, where 40 per cent 
of households rented in land and 19 per cent rented out land. The average total 
cultivated area is the same in both village, 2.1 hectares. The share of rented land of 
total farm size (which includes both cultivated area as well as land under fallow) 
points to a strong reliance on the rental market: 55 per cent and 57 per cent 
respectively of total farm size consisted of land rented in for the twelve house-
holds in Idete and the seventeen in Katurukila who stated that they rented land. 
There is a strong negative correlation (–0.39 significant at the 5 per cent level), 
between the share of rented land and total farm size, raising concerns about the 
vulnerability of small- scale households in the rental market. Losses of land were 
also frequent in Idete, where 26 per cent of the respondents stated that they had 
lost land that they considered they had the right to cultivate. Unlike the qualita-
tive data, the quantitative data, do not suggest that land is being rented out by the 
poorer households for the benefit of both parties, but rather that the poorer 
households are reliant on the rental market for the bulk of their cultivated area.
Concluding Remarks
This case study from two Tanzanian villages in Kilombero District shows the 
potential of a rice- led, smallholder based agricultural transformation process in 
an African context. Rice production on average had increased more than area 
under cultivation in both villages pointing to processes of both intensification 
and expansion. They demonstrate that remarkable increases in productivity are 
possible in small- holder farming systems. Some interventions recently have 
insisted that only step changes which move labour out of unproductive agricul-
tural sectors can bring about the growth poor countries need (Collier and 
Dercon  2014). This may be the case in the long term, over the decades those 
authors were considering. But the productivity gap between agriculture and other 
sectors may be over- estimated (McCullough 2017). The transformations possible 
we have documented in smallholder farming suggest that routes to higher prod-
uct iv ity can be built on this sector.
We identify four factors that have been of importance as main drivers of these 
growth processes. First, commercialization and market expansion due to diversi-
fication of paddy varieties and improved prices have provided economic incen-
tives for farmers to specialize in paddy and increase production. Second, 
technological change in the form of mechanization and new farm in- puts, e.g. 
up- graded rice varieties has increased land productivity. Thirdly, improved access 
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to extension services and the introduction of new farming practices has also con-
tributed to these dynamics. Finally, an individualization of production, where 
family members work on their private fields rather than on jointly owned land, 
has motivated intensified efforts to increase production.
While technological change and the diffusion of innovations was a pivotal 
aspect also of the Asian Green Revolution, in the case of Idete and Katurukila, 
this rests on the uptake and transfer of technology through group dynamics and 
immigration, which may be unique to the villages. A key question in this con-
text is whether such processes are replicable to other geographical and institu-
tional settings?
Linkages to the outside economy have been a mixed blessing: on the one hand 
the relative benefits of investing in rural areas have enhanced or even sparked 
mechanization in the areas, on the other hand, growing pressure and demand for 
land could cause stratification as already vulnerable segments of the population 
become even more vulnerable (Greco 2015).
Meanwhile, the growing pressure on land and the government push for for-
malizing land titling has had the unintended consequence that farming is becom-
ing increasingly individualized, which has had a positive effect on women farmers 
especially. Individualized tenure is also prompted by the will to benefit from 
improved prices among both women and men. In the event, the ability to engage 
in individual farming on rented land is put forth as an explanation of the rising 
productivity among women.
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Introduction
The character and prospects of market- driven agrarian change in Tanzania has 
provoked considerable foreboding. Issa Shivji’s predictions are probably the most 
wide ranging and depressing (Shivji  1992). As we have seen in Chapter  2, he 
envisaged that the inroads of capital and advent of more industrial agriculture 
would produce ‘starving middle and poorer peasantry’ (Shivji  1992: 129) and 
even a ‘landless peasantry’ (Shivji 1992: 128). He made these predictions in the 
late 1980s, and, revisiting them in 2017, felt he had been sadly vindicated 
(Shivji 2017).
As should be clear in this collection, we do not share this assessment of change 
in rural Tanzania. The middle and poorer peasantry are not starving. Levels of 
food poverty are in fact declining (albeit too slowly). There is greater dif er en ti-
ation between the middle and poorer peasantry, with the middle peasantry accru-
ing assets. We do not see a merging of rural groups united in their want.
Shivji’s prediction not only flattened social diference between rural groups in 
particular societies, lumping middle and poor together. It also erases geo graph-
ic al diference. It tells one story across a whole nation (indeed nations). This is 
also something we find hard to recognise. The stories in this collection speak of 
diversity and variation.
However, if Shivji’s account is mistaken because it is too totalizing, it may still 
be true in particular places and specific locales. Indeed the misfortunes that Shivji 
feels are widespread have been recorded in places. Some of Brockington’s early 
work documented disadvantage and vulnerability that arises from land loss to 
conservation and large- scale farms in pastoral areas (Igoe and Brockington 1999, 
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Brockington 2002). More recent moves to alienate lands for capital threaten the 
livelihoods of thousands of farmers (Maganga et al. 2016, Bluwstein et al. 2018). 
Even if the scale of the threat may have been exaggerated (Locher and Sulle 2013 
and 2014), the dangers are still plain and real for many families.
It is therefore important to take seriously detailed case studies from particular 
places, particularly when the nature of change and its local consequences, are dis-
puted. Studies of change in the Uluguru Mountains in Morogoro region provide 
an excellent opportunity to do so. Here we revisit a series of debates in the late 
1990s and early 2000s which have examined the long- term prospects of peasants 
in this region.1
In the first instance there were two rather gloomy predictions for farmers in 
these mountains. Hadjivayannis conceived of market penetration, the sub or din-
ation of Uluguru society to the external world, and commoditization as the fac-
tors shaping agrarian change, making farmers passive recipients of structural 
change (Hadjivayannis 1993). He envisaged a vicious cycle of subordination to 
market forces which undermines the reproduction of the peasantry.
Van Donge in contrast emphasized social and actor- oriented determinants of 
agrarian change to explain an area where agriculture, and indeed the broader 
social fabric, was ‘in decline’ (van Donge 1992). Yields were static or declining, 
with soils exhausted, or sufering from erosion (cf. Jones 1996) and fertilizer use 
limit ed. But people in the area ‘refuse[d] to contemplate switching to crops other 
than maize and using the cash earned from such crops to buy more food’ 
(Jones 1996: 90). Agriculture was a risk- minimizing activity, not profit orientated. 
A disproportionate number of young men migrated to find work while women 
stayed at home looking after (unproductive) farms. Van Donge even suggested 
that the Luguru may have become demoralized, or somehow have lost belief in 
their own lifestyle. Decline such as this arose not from outside forces, but 
en dogen ous ly, from internal dynamics (van Donge 2002).
The processes these observers envisaged operating are diferent in their detail 
and structures. The one is driven by external forces, the other by internal dynam-
ics. But they have in common the notion that population pressure and land scar-
city combined to produce a crisis of agriculture looming dauntingly over the 
future of rural livelihoods.
In contrast Ponte’s doctoral research clashed with the predominant depictions 
of the Uluguru Mountains being in a ‘multiform crisis’ (Hadjivayannis) and to 
farmers being ‘trapped in decline’ (van Donge). On the basis of fieldwork carried 
out in 1996/7, Ponte argued that the impact of market liberalization on rural live-
lihoods had been relatively positive in the area—where the rise in non- farm 
1 Morogoro Region has aroused much interest because of large- scale land alienations in Kilombero 
District and associated large- scale capital investment. Here however we are concerned with longer 
term trends within small- scale farming societies.
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incomes has compensated for the general fall in farm incomes (Ponte 2001). The 
involuted mindsets van Donge had found seemed not to have persisted.
The progress farmers made still had to overcome multiple challenges. In Mgeta 
in the late 1990s, although agriculture was not going through an easy transition—
especially for poorer farmers—new possibilities were being skilfully utilized 
(Ponte 2001). Land scarcity (especially for horticulture) were the main feature of 
agriculture. Deforestation and soil erosion were problems, and inputs had become 
increasingly expensive. In these circumstances, the main ways households could 
improve their quality of life—short of leaving the area altogether and in addition 
to relying on remittances from outside—were to expand land cultivated in other 
locations, to experiment with alternative farming systems, and to increase non- 
farm incomes.
Some of the changes observed at that time suggested an ongoing process of 
commercialization of agriculture—such as the increasing importance of vegetable 
cultivation, the growth of pig rearing, the substitution of hired labour for 
exchange labour, and an emerging market for land. Food security however was 
still a key factor influencing planting decisions and input allocation. Farming 
households showed a remarkable degree of flexibility and innovation—demon-
strated, for example, by the emerging transition from cabbage to Irish potato cul-
tivation. Wealthier farmers were benefiting from these changes, as increasing 
amounts of capital were needed to ensure food security, get access to land, hire 
labourers, and engage in commercialized pig rearing. Poorer farmers, especially 
those relying exclusively on agriculture for their livelihoods, were becoming more 
marginalized. The inhabitants of Mgeta were doing all the above, with a certain 
measure of success. Instead of being helplessly caught in a poverty trap, rural 
dwellers were reacting to marketing changes, demographic pressure, and land 
degradation in multiple and innovative ways, and in a majority of cases managed 
to improve their quality of life.
Importantly for the argument of this chapter, these changes were not general to 
Tanzania. Rather they stood out as diferent from other locations Ponte had 
researched ‘since farmers’ adaptations to changing markets had not led to higher 
incomes in other areas that [he] had researched in Tanzania’ (Ponte 2002b: 313). 
In this respect his account accords with van Donge who deliberately tried to 
explore how the specific internal dynamics of a particular place could account for 
stasis and decline.
The case of the Uluguru Mountains therefore provides an excellent op por tun-
ity to provide a longer- term place- specific study, and a counterpoint to the gener-
alizations with which we began. Our work is based on revisits to Mlali (first 
surveyed by Ponte in 1996 and by Ellis and Mdoe in 1999), a lowland village with 
relatively good land and favourable conditions for tomato cultivation. We re- 
surveyed thirty- two households from this village (out of fifty from the original 
samples) in 2016. Nyandira and Langali are neighbouring mountain villages in 
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Mgeta ward, a ninety- minute drive up the road from Mlali. The former was sur-
veyed by Ellis and Mdoe in 1999, the latter by Ponte in 1996. Cumulatively, we 
revisited forty- three households in Mgeta (out of fifty from the original sample), 
also in 2016. We also undertook six focus groups in three villages as well as a 
number of key informant interviews.
Findings
Change in the Uluguru Mountains
The general trends we found in Langali and Nyandira are of continued eforts to 
engage in commercially orientated agriculture. There are some changes to the 
manner in which they are doing so. While cabbage was the top cash crop in Mgeta 
in the past, it has now been almost entirely replaced by Irish potatoes. A variety of 
other vegetables (from carrots to cucumbers) are still cultivated. Due to diferent 
altitude and climatic conditions, tomatoes ripen later in Mgeta than in Mlali, so 
they do not compete in the same seasonal market, making them profitable even 
in the smaller plots and harder terrain of the highlands. Root diseases are afect-
ing cabbage cultivation, and fertilizer needs to be applied to any crop (even 
maize) to obtain decent yields. In other words, reliance on farm inputs, although 
not new, has increased. Relatives who have moved down to the plains or in urban 
areas are key sources of cash or loans to purchase inputs. The other source is small 
livestock (pigs, goats, chicken, farmed fish) that can be sold according to need. If 
all else fails, households rent out their plots to those who have funds to prepare 
the land and buy inputs, and work as farm labourers. Land preparation, given the 
terrain, is exclusively done by hand. Other researchers have found that, when 
combined with techniques of sustainable intensification, agricultural- based strat-
egies can yield substantial improvements (Mdee et al. 2018).
Elders and focus groups participants did not report a massive outmigration 
flow, as portrayed in the 1990s literature, although they highlighted the lack of 
inward migration. In 2016, they also reported, surprisingly, that most households 
had access to land through inheritance and use- rights from their clan, although 
plots have become increasingly fragmented in time. Also surprising (but sup-
ported by field observations) was their claim that land per se was actually avail-
able, but mostly in locations far away from the village and where transport costs 
may not justify the efort after all. Focus group participants and interviews with 
elders suggested that the apparent availability of land can be explained as follows:
 • plots may lack enough natural fertility and need to be left fallow for a 
few years;
 • they may be too far away to be cultivated;
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 • the household may not have the resources to prepare and tend for the land, 
including farm input purchases; and
 • even in this case, they may not want to rent it out for fear of not being paid 
at the end of the season.
Revisits to interview the original households that were originally surveyed in 
1996 suggest a more complex picture of livelihood trajectories than in Mlali. 
While there are examples of upper mobility that emerged in the past twenty years, 
they are related to inheritance and a mixture of good management and good luck 
(lack of disease outbreaks in vegetable cultivation and favourable prices), at least 
in the first few years of cultivation after inheritance. These are accompanied by 
numerous instances of relative stagnation or decline, which are related to disease 
outbreaks, lack of resources to buy inputs, and only limited support from 
migrated household members. Housing conditions, even in these instances, have 
improved, and some of the children who have left and migrated elsewhere have 
found permanent employment or opened a business, thus sending remittances 
back to Mgeta. It is not easy to make a living on the Uluguru Mountains, but the 
people living here were not, and still are not ‘trapped in decline’.
Transformations on the Plains
In previous work on rural livelihood change under market liberalization in Tanzania, 
Ponte argued that to understand rural transformation and processes of accumula-
tion it is important to pay attention to the nature of the crops farmers grow 
(Ponte 1998). In particular, it is important to look at farmers’ choices of ‘fast’ versus 
‘slow’ growing crops because they use diferent marketing strategies for each. Most of 
the major fast crops grown in Tanzania (for example tomatoes, cabbage, or carrots) 
are susceptible to quicker deterioration; therefore, they have to be sold right after 
harvest at whatever price the market allows. Slow crops (most export crops, but also 
staples like maize and rice) can be sold before the next harvesting season arrives, if 
the household can wait that long, but the time interval is shorter than for slow crops.
In 1996, people talked about maisha magumu to refer to the problems encoun-
tered in post- liberalization rural life in Tanzania. The literal translation is ‘hard 
life’, but the meaning went beyond a mere sense of hardship and combines rising 
levels of contractual vis- à- vis ‘traditional’ social negotiations over access to 
resources such as land, labour, markets, and food (Ponte 2002a). Maisha magumu 
also reflected higher cash requirements for farming households because of:
 • higher school fees and higher health expenditures;
 • incentives and copying efects which make people buy, or feel they need to 
buy, more consumer goods;
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 • the establishment or the changing demands of an increasing number of of- 
farm enterprises;
 • higher prices for agricultural inputs;
 • increased use of hired labour; and
 • the need for cash to ensure services which in the past were provided through 
social negotiations and the exchange of favours and labour (Ponte 2001).
Because cash requirements had become higher and spread throughout the entire 
year, farmers opted to grow crops with faster returns and/or with multiple or con-
tinuous selling seasons. In this way, they could get faster returns for their eforts 
and/or a continuous flow of cash. If farmers cultivated slow crops, they had to 
wait longer from land preparation to sale. They might distribute sales throughout 
the year, but then they had to deal with storage problems, social demands on their 
food stocks, and theft.
The ‘fast crop’ phenomenon was particularly distinctive in Mlali in the 
mid- 1990s, a village located about 45km from Morogoro town, on the plains 
below the Uluguru Mountains. Mlali was, and still is, easily reachable via tarmac 
road as far as Mzumbe University, and then a short well- graded dirt road. The 
village is now served by many minibuses trawling back and forth from Morogoro 
town, while it was served by a few minibus lines in the mid- 1990s. The centre of 
the village has literally boomed. There is a new market area and over fifty shops of 
all kinds, including two dedicated shops for agricultural inputs and various food 
joints. In 1996, there were fewer than ten, much smaller, shops. One of the most 
obvious changes we observed is the ubiquitous presence of young men on their 
pikipiki (motorbikes), a swarm going back and forth along the main road and 
larger footpaths, or hanging around waiting for their next client. Many of the 
pikipiki in the village are owned by well- of farmers. They are operated by young 
men, who pay a daily rate until they can buy it from the owner (a form of lease). 
Twenty years ago, only the very rich usually government employees had a 
motorbike—totalling less than five in Mlali. We counted eight out of thirty- two 
households who owned motorbikes in our sample. There are now also several 
private cars, parked in front of well- built houses with porches and electricity, 
and even a private truck. There were no private cars in the village in 1996.
Mlali was not a place where collective action was particularly strong even in 
1996—by then the local primary cooperative society had already gone under, and 
the village farm had already been divided up and distributed to residents. The 
local economy at that time was driven by tomato cultivation, which had been 
introduced already in the early 1980s. Twenty years later, tomato cultivation is an 
even stronger driver of rural livelihoods in Mlali (with over 11 acres cultivated by 
the households we revisited), at least for those who have enough resources to buy 
farm inputs, own land or can rent it, and can draw household labour, hire farm 
workers, or use tractor services for this intensively cultivated crop. This also 
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includes labour to carry water for irrigating tomato plants (a few wealthy farmers 
have installed drip irrigation). While paddy and maize are still farmed in the vil-
lage, sorghum (the traditional food crop in this area) is less so. Sorghum grows 
more slowly than maize, and is not ready to harvest early enough to free up plots 
for the main tomato cultivation season. Therefore, farmers prefer to plant maize 
and then tomatoes after the maize harvest. There is a vibrant land rental market in 
Mlali, with plots being rented twice a year, depending on the planting season and 
with rental prices linked to the type of crop planted (premium prices are charged 
for the main tomato season).
Focus groups in Mlali, said that a key indicator of wealth is the amount of land 
put under tomato cultivation, not merely the amount of owned land. Ownership 
is not as important as the ability to use land—in our recent survey 30 per cent of 
land farmed to grow vegetables was rented. The key issue is thus access to capital 
or credit to rent land, buy inputs, and employ workers or, occasionally, use tractor 
services for cultivating tomatoes. The current use of tractors for land preparation 
(reported in 11 per cent of plots in the survey) is particularly interesting, as there 
was no sign of this service twenty years earlier.
Households in the top two wealth layers, as defined in focus groups, seem to be 
able to use tractor services for all their cultivated land, with at least five tractors 
available in a radius of a few kilometres. But even those in the middle wealth 
ranks, who prepare land by hand, seem to fare relatively well (as indicated by the 
quality of housing), as long as they have either accumulated funds, can sell an 
asset or borrow from relatives or from their social network to buy inputs, and on 
occasion hire labour. Without fertilizer and agrochemicals, tomato yields are 
much lower, and those who cannot aford them tend to rent out their plots to 
others. These tend to inhabit the lower wealth ranks, followed by those who, for 
health or other reasons, cannot take care of themselves.
A Rising ‘Rural Middle’ and Inequality
One of the challenges in tracking changes in poverty and prosperity using locally 
determined measures of wealth is that the meaning of wealth changes over time. 
People who were rich by the standards of twenty years ago might be considered 
poor now (cf. Mushongah and Scoones 2012). The good and assets that people 
aspire to (education, phones, financial services) are all diferent. It is thus difficult 
to compare like with like.
Houses however have long been a marker of social diference.2 It is useful to 
explore changes in house condition over time. This shows that mud walls and 
2 Van Donge reported, based on fieldwork from 1985–7 that ‘housing is the most notable indicator 
of wealth’ (van Donge 1993: 83).
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sunburned bricks were quite common then, while now baked bricks are the 
norm. Cement floors, plastered walls, and indoor sanitation were only for the very 
rich then; they now have spread to the upper- middle ranks as well. As Table 12.1 
shows, the clearest change is in roofing material, but also in the quality of walls 
(indicated in the highlighted cells).
In both Mlali and Mgeta housing condition suggests a rising group of middle 
wealth villagers, generally suggesting a movement from a pyramidal wealth struc-
ture in 1996 to more of a pointed egg structure nowadays (Ponte and Brockington 
2020 and see Noe and Brockington this volume).3 Inequality between the top and 
bottom categories seems to have increased in the past two decades. At the same 
time, the size of the ‘middle ranks’ (in local terms) seems to have increased 
substantially.
These changes have considerable implications for levels of inequality in the 
 villages we have worked in. The range of wealth has increased. The poor and 
3 Note that in one site, Nyandira, Ellis and Mdoe found a larger middle group in their research in 
this village in 2001. Nyandira was also reported to be relatively commercialized by van Donge (1992).







1996 mud brick cement
mud 9 14 1
brick 5 38 6
cement  1  
Total 14 53 7
Note the bricks can improve in quality if burned rather than sundried 
bricks are used, however the type of brick used in the earlier surveys 
was not always recorded. Grey cells indicate improved housing 
condition. So fourteen homes which had mud walls in 1996 now have 
brick walls in 2016/17. Twenty- five houses which had organic roofing 
material (commonly thatch) in 1996 had metal roofs in 2016/17. 
Most houses have maintained their condition (57 per cent with 
respect to roofing, 63 per cent with respect to walls), but 34 per cent 
have improved their roofs, and 28 per cent their walls. A smaller 
minority have declined in quality, thus four houses had metal roofs in 
1996 but organic roofing material in the revisit.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/06/21, SPi
266 Stefano Ponte and Dan Brockington
destitute of today will share many of the characteristics of the poor and destitute 
of twenty years ago. The forms of poverty from which they sufer (no assets, poor 
houses, clothing, diets, and health) remain the same. However, at the upper end, 
the wealthy can now be much more wealthy, and in more ways, than they previ-
ously could. Their homes can be larger, with more amenities and finer finishing 
than what was common twenty years ago. Their means of transport are more 
modern, they can have more forms of power (solar and mains electricity), their 
children can go to private schools, and they can earn more money from more 
diverse sources than a generation ago.
Livelihood Trajectories
In both Mlali and Mgeta, many more non- farm activities, businesses, and transport 
services are available than two decades ago. And infrastructure (roads, market-
places, and electricity provision) has improved markedly. Does that imply a general 
improvement of all livelihoods? Our re- visits to the original households in these 
Morogoro sites suggest four trajectories, the first of which is the most common.
 • Trajectories of agriculture- based improvement based on expansion and 
intensification of tomato/vegetable cultivation—translating into much 
improved housing quality, more assets (including means of transport), 
diversification into other economic activities, ready availability of funds to 
solve health problems, and some of the children having gone through sec-
ondary education (or even tertiary) and formal employment in urban areas. 
This trajectory characterized 44 per cent of households we re- visited in the 
two Morogoro sites.
 • trajectories of marginal improvement or ‘getting by’ in tomato/vegetable cul-
tivation (less land, lower use of inputs) that suffices to: improve living condi-
tions and types of assets; sometimes diversify in small business; access 
health services when needed (even if it entailed the sale of livestock or other 
small assets); and invest in some of the children’s education (secondary 
school). In some cases at least one child landed a government job or set up a 
profitable business, sending remittances that further improved access to 
working capital for farming. This trajectory characterized 27 per cent of 
households we re- visited.
 • Trajectories of stagnation and decline, where households could not get access 
to enough capital to purchase inputs, and thus limit their farming activities 
to food for partial self- sufficiency; members of these households tend to 
work in other people’s fields as daily labourers; while their housing condi-
tions may not have become worse, these households tend to send their chil-
dren to primary school only, and to have little or no diversification into 
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non- farm activities; they also tend to struggle to find resources to take care 
of health problems. This trajectory described about 14 per cent of house-
holds we re- visited.
 • Trajectories of pauperism, where people are not able or willing to take care 
of themselves, are not able to work for others, and rely on their household’s 
help or other people’s handouts. This is typical of ageing households and 
afected around 10 per cent of households we re- visited.4
With all the provisos we highlighted earlier, what seems to be emerging is a 
process of rural transformation based on smallholder agriculture. This is more 
clearly the case in Mlali, where the mainstay cash crop has remained the same, 
but the intensity of its cultivation has increased. This seems to have provided 
enough resources for further investment in retail activities and transport ser-
vices—at least for a substantial proportion of the population. In Mgeta, rural 
transformation is less clearly rooted in smallholder agriculture, although it is 
happening for a minority of households. Farming systems are fairly similar to 
those observed twenty years ago, but with a diferent mix of cash crops. Input 
use is increasing and now necessary to obtain sufficient yields even for food 
crops, thus increasing risk and vulnerability in view of recent crop disease out-
breaks. On the Uluguru Mountains, rural transformation seems to be stemming 
from a more complex combination of economic diversification, remittances, and 
marginal productivity gains for farmers who have enough access to capital to 
buy inputs. These processes are of course not universal, even within villages, but 
in general it seems fairly reasonable to suggest that wealth segmentation has 
switched from a pyramid structure to a ‘pointed egg’, with Mgeta having a larger 
base than Mlali. We explore this further in Chapter 17.
Conclusion
Research into the long- term dynamics of rural transformation in Africa is handi-
capped by a lack of good longitudinal and panel data which can reveal some of 
the poverty and prosperity dynamics. This deficiency is particularly glaring in 
countries like Tanzania, which has enjoyed substantial economic growth in the 
past two decades or so. It is difficult to specify what consequences this growth has 
had in rural areas, particularly when data about rural economies are poor and 
these rural spaces and resources are heavily contested.
On the basis of a diverse set of case studies from diferent parts of the country, 
a unique database and some in- depth examples we have shown that a diversity of 
processes and outcomes characterize diferent instances of rural transformation 
4 For the remaining 6 per cent of households we could not determine a clear trajectory.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/06/21, SPi
268 Stefano Ponte and Dan Brockington
in Tanzania. At the same time, when improvement occurs it seems to be fuelled 
by small- scale agriculture. These economic ‘success stories’ defy the predictions 
of the champions of large- scale agriculture and externally induced ‘green revolu-
tions’. They also challenge the more gloomy predictions that held Tanzanian 
small- holders as helpless prisoners of larger structural problems.
We cannot refute claims that land alienation is afecting poverty dynamics in 
some locations of Tanzania. None of the sites we have revisited sufered recent 
land loss due to agricultural investment, conservation, or mining. But, if any-
thing, this reinforces the arguments that land loss will be harmful, because losing 
land removes the driver of relative prosperity—small- scale agriculture.
It is important to recall the limits of our methods. They have allowed us to cope 
with an important feature of rural life that is excluded by common measures such 
as poverty- line data. But looking for change in assets is a poor way of understand-
ing the changing fortunes of migrant or itinerant labour. It can make it hard to see 
changes within domestic units, or between socio- economic groups and thus class 
dynamics. For that, the insights of the ethnographer which accompany the survey 
work, and the oral histories of change, are required.
With these provisos in mind, the main policy implication of our observations 
is that while there may be a role for large- scale commercial agriculture for rural 
transformation in Tanzania, it is not necessarily the only or best option in terms 
of poverty reduction at the village level. Even if there is land for it, it is not at all 
clear that large- scale commercial agriculture yields more benefits to rural house-
holds than those based on smallholder accumulation we reported here. The cur-
rent focus on ‘corridor investments’ and large- scale commercial agriculture, such 
as that visible in Tanzania, with its deliberate renunciation of small- scale agricul-
ture, may thus be misplaced.
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This chapter tells the past thirty- five years of the histories of Maliwa, 
Mammongolo, and Ngamanga villages, located in Njombe Region in the Southern 
Highlands of Tanzania. It is based on a longitudinal study revisiting the sixty- six 
domestic units that participated in the original study undertaken in 1983–5. The 
aim of the original research was to understand changes in land tenure and land 
use since Tanzania’s nationwide ‘villagization’ programme that took place in 1974, 
ten years previously (Friis- Hansen 1987).
An important feature of these three villages was that they were marginal in 
relation to the rest of Njombe Region. At the time of the original study Njombe 
was the centre of a green revolution in the 1980s based on maize production 
and using subsidized and loan- based technology packages containing hybrid 
seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides, turning the region into the country’s food basket 
(Rasmussen 1986). The three villages in this study were marginal in four respects. 
Physically, poorly constructed and maintained roads left them relatively isolated 
from interaction with the outside world. Developmentally, they had little influ-
ence over the allocation of state resources and were largely out of reach of devel-
opment policies and institutions. Technologically, they had very little access to 
inputs and advice for improving agricultural enterprises. Finally, two villages 
were disadvantaged environmentally, Maliwa being too cold for maize, the main 
crop in Njombe, because of its location at 2,100m altitude, and Ngamanga being 
too dry for maize, being located in semi- arid zone that only received 600mm of 
rainfall annually.
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When I revisited the three villages three decades later, they were no longer 
marginal. It was clear that major socio- economic developments had taken place. 
The first part of this chapter will therefore examine the agrarian and rural trans-
form ation of the three villages and the pace in which they took place in relation to 
three overall historical periods. The second half of the chapter examines the 
extent to which these agrarian and rural transformations have proved socially 
inclusive by analysing changes in well- being among the participants (primary 
units) in the original study and their descendants (secondary units). Using farmers’ 
own perceptions of well- being, combining assets and entitlements/relationships, 
changes in the ranking criteria of well- being are discussed. However, first the 
section will recapture and summarize the prior situation at the time of the original 
study and discuss the research and fieldwork methodologies used during the fol-
low- up study.
Fieldwork Methodology
I revisited the three villages several times. In 2011 group interviews and qualita-
tive interviews with key informants and participants in the original study were 
carried out in all three villages using a semi- structured questionnaire. The focus 
was on agricultural and rural change during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s.
Re- interviews with the original domestic units (households) using quantitative 
survey tools were undertaken in 2017/18. The original study sample comprised a 
total of sixty- six households in the three villages. The re- interviews only managed 
to identify and re- interview thirty- four of the original domestic units and sec-
ondary units. This amount to ten to twelve cases in each village which I judged to 
be too low to generate meaningful data. I therefore decided to analyse the ques-
tionnaires qualitatively and to follow them up with additional interviews when 
required. Following up qualitative in- depth interviews was carried out with vil-
lage officials, key informants, and selected domestic households in 2018.
In 2017 I carried out focus- group discussions with key stakeholders and with 
separate groups of men and women in all three villages to explore local percep-
tions of well- being and changes in well- being over time. Asset- based indicators as 
a measure of relative well- being have been shown to be more relevant than the 
consumption- based indicators used by the World Bank and many national statis-
tical departments in the Global South (Abraham and Kumar 2008, IFAD 2016, 
Chapter 2 this volume). Kumar used ranking indicators of asset- based well- being 
to compare how rural people fall into and out of poverty across countries. 
Recently asset- based indicators have used to compare livelihood changes over 
time (Mushongah and Scoones 2012). However, using asset- based indicators alone 
to assess levels of well- being has been criticized (Sen 1993, Ravnborg et al. 2004). 
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This suggests that aspects of social relations and entitlements to indicators of 
well- being should be taken into account as well.
Over the past two decades, DIIS researchers have used well- being ranking, 
methodology- based perceptions of well- being among groups of local key inform-
ants (Friis- Hansen and Duveskog 2005). This methodology was first developed 
by Ravnborg (1999) and later adapted for use in East Africa (Ravnborg et al. 
2004). The resulting well- being ranking was developed with the aim of making it 
generally valid over the whole region. Therefore, outlying context- specific indica-
tors were removed, leaving only the generic well- being ranking indicators that 
proved to have general validity.
The outcome of the 2017 focus- group discussions was thirteen well- being 
ranking indicators, of which six are asset- based indicators (land, animals, house, 
food security, quality of food, and quality of clothing), three are social relations- 
based indicators (working as casual labour, hire casual labour, and non- 
agricultural enterprises), two relate to access to social services (health and 
education), while the final two are social indicators (gender status of household 
and age). The qualitative interviews with key informants resulted in three current 
well- being indicators that include context- specific indicators for each of the 
three villages.
Prior Situation
Villagization, or the nationwide compulsory resettlement of the rural population 
of Tanzania into nuclear settlements, was implemented in the Southern Highlands 
during the dry season of 1974 as part of President Nyerere’s Ujamaa policy. In the 
southern highlands the original study identified three main types of village settle-
ments, two of which are represented by the original study villages. In the first 
settlement type, represented by Maliwa and Mamongolo villages, two or more 
smaller settlements have been amalgamated into a village with a minimum of 150 
households. In both villages, farmers lived scattered in the valley bottom before 
villagization, with easy access to natural resources, such as the three types of fields 
located on the hillside, valley bottom and wetland, water and forest resources, 
and hilltop grazing land. In the case of Maliwa village farmers who lived in the 
smaller Unege Valley, located three and a half hours walking distance from 
Maliwa Valley, were forcefully resettled in Maliwa, where they were allocated half 
an acre each to build a new house. The farmers from Unege were all resettled in a 
nuclear settlement on a hillside, while the original inhabitants of Maliwa were 
allowed to continue to live in their scattered houses. In the case of Mamongolo 
village, three settlements, each with fewer than 150 households, were amal gam-
ated into two villages. The resettlement pattern was similar to that of Maliwa vil-
lage. Farmers from Makoo Valley were forced to resettle on small plots located 
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close to each other, while the native people of Mamongolo were not resettled. 
In  the second settlement type, represented by Ngamanga village, people living 
scattered were all resettled in a nuclear settlement, in houses organized in rows. 
Ngamanga is located in flat semi- arid area, and before villagization farmers lived 
scattered with relative large distances between households because of the extensive 
character of their agropastoral farming systems. In the third type of settlement, 
not represented by any of the three original study villages, farmers living scattered 
in a valley along a ridge were all resettled in houses organized in rows along a 
road on top of the ridge (Rasmussen 1986, Friis- Hansen 1987).
The original study found that while villagization had forced some families to 
be resettled long distances from their original homes, others had been affected 
less or not at all. While villagization changed rural settlement patterns, it was only 
accompanied by reforms to land tenure to a limited extent. Land located in the 
centre of the new village settlements was appropriated by village governments 
from their owners and allocated as small plots for those who had been resettled 
so they could build a house and cultivate for their own subsistence. However, 
those who had been resettled over long distances and therefore were no longer 
able to cultivate their fields located back in mahami (the areas they originally 
inhabited) were not given sufficient new land to cultivate close to their new homes.
The original study was carried out a decade after villagization and showed 
how those who had been moved long distances had become marginalized, as 
compared with those who were moved shorter distances or not moved at all. 
‘Newcomers’ either had to spend hours walking back to their old fields or had 
to rent land from those who were ‘native’ in the village settlement, either of 
which limited their levels of agricultural production. More frequently they 
worked for other farmers and became politically marginalized. Available house-
hold labour time for productive work in the fields was not only constrained by 
the increased walking distances to agricultural fields, water sources, and fire-
wood, but also by the withdrawal of child labour into education and the large 
amount of time spent on compulsory communal village projects and village 
meetings (Friis- Hansen 1987).
The original study analysed the impact of villagization on changes in land use 
and agricultural production. The study concluded that in general fields close to 
the village settlements were cultivated more intensively, especially by farmers 
who had been resettled by villagization, with inadequate use of fertilizer resulting 
in the already low yields declining even further. Agricultural intensification took 
different forms in the three study villages, including reductions in fallow periods 
(Mamongolo), more crops being grown through intercropping (Maliwa) and 
shifts in cropping patterns (Ngamanga).
Poverty was abundant in the three villages at the time of the original study in 
the early 1980s, with up to 85 per cent of households being poor (the concept of 
poverty is discussed later). Agricultural production in the study village was 
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primarily focused on subsistence, with sales of surplus production when available 
to pay for social reproduction, including school fees and clothing (Friis- Hansen 
1987). The traditional food system, comprising three overlapping subsistence 
food bridges, as described by Branner Jespersen (1971), was still being practised 
at the time of the study. The three subsistence food bridges were: (1) crops and 
vegetables planted in August (early dry season) in fields located adjacent to 
streams in the valley bottom using residual moisture (vinyungu), and harvested 
green little by little in March–April and mature/dry in May; (2) rain- fed crops 
(beans, peas, sorghum, and maize) planted at the start of the rainy season in 
December and picked little by little green from the fields in May–June; and (3) 
harvesting mature, dry, rain- fed crops in July and consuming them in July–February. 
The total harvest of dry rain- fed crops was very low and recorded by the original 
study in debe (twenty- litre tins) rather than bags. The poor, who were numerous, 
frequently experienced food deficits during the third food bridge. During the 
four months from November to February many poor only had food for one meal 
a day and had to access food through social networks.
At the time of the original study, major agricultural labour tasks were carried 
out by means of an informal collaboration between farmers (called migoe in the 
local Kibena language) and the traditional farming system, which ensured that 
labour requirements were equally distributed throughout the year, was still in 
place (Branner Jespersen 1971). During the main rainy season from November to 
May, farmers worked in the fields located on the slopes and ridges. The key labour 
input was for clearing fallow, while labour requirements for planting, weeding, 
and harvesting were limited. Harvests took place at the start of the dry season 
(June–July), while after August to October farmers cultivated the valley bottom 
(vinyungu) taking advantage of the residual moisture in the soil along the streams. 
These valleys were highly fertile and yields were higher than elsewhere.
Farmers in the three villages had very limited access to services or manufac-
tured products. Mamongolo and Maliwa villages had a small, poorly stocked 
government- owned village shop with basic items such as tea, sugar, soap, and a 
limited selection of clothing, while agricultural inputs and implements, such as 
hoes and ploughs, were unavailable. Ngamanga village had no shop.
The original study found that in all three villages ‘Ujamaa’ fields were culti-
vated collectively, all households in the village being obliged to participate. 
Political leaders decided what should be grown, often reflecting national cam-
paigns urging farmers to work harder and cultivate specific crops (Raikes 1987). 
Communal production was directed by village managers appointed by the ruling 
Chama cha Mapinduzi party. Households who failed to show up during the bi- 
weekly cultivation of the Ujamaa field were subject to stiff fines or sometimes 
even imprisonment. With some notable exceptions, the productivity of most 
Ujamaa fields in Njombe was low. In part this was because of low work morale 
and passive resistance, as part of the surplus was appropriated by the village 
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officials, and in part because of mismanagement by village managers, who were 
politically rather than agriculturally motivated (Friis- Hansen 1987).
Agrarian and Rural Transformation: Spatial and 
Social Differentiation
In the past decade the African continent has experienced agrarian and rural 
transformation. There are, however, large spatial and social variations in the 
intensity and pace of these changes, both between and within countries (Haggblade 
et al. 2010, Berdegué et al. 2013, IFAD 2016, Agergaard et al. 2019). Agricultural 
transformation, including ‘rising agricultural productivity, increasing com-
mercialization and marketable surpluses, and diversification of production 
patterns and livelihoods’ (IFAD 2016: 23), is included in a broad socio- economic 
process of change embodied in the wider concept of rural trans form ation. 
Rural transformation ‘involves expanding decent off- farm employment and 
entrepreneurial opportunities, better rural coverage and access to services and 
infrastructure, and greater access to, and capacity to influence, relevant policy 
processes’ (ibid.). Furthermore, rural transformation involves diversifying 
rural livelihoods, with reliance on agriculture gradually being replaced by 
 reliance on off- and non- agricultural activities associated with a decrease in 
rural poverty (Ellis 2005).
In economic history one of the dominant debates of the past decade has 
been whether long- term economic change is driven primarily by institutional 
change or changes in factor endowments (such as land or labour availability). 
National economic and agricultural policies are influencing the socio- economic 
and institutional situations in rural areas and may be important drivers for 
either economic growth or stagnation (Hillbom and Svensson  2013). On the 
other hand, the changes in endowments of natural resource factors, such as 
population growth and pressure on natural resources, may stimulate local 
technological innovation and long- term productivity growth (Fischer- 
Kowalski et al. 2014).
Analysis of fieldwork data from the three villages in Njombe suggests that both 
agrarian and rural transformations have taken place during the thirty- five- year 
period (1983–2018). In terms of agrarian transformation, many but not all farm-
ers in the three villages have shifted from subsistence farming to being engaged in 
commercial agricultural enterprises, for example, potatoes in Mamongolo and 
Maliwa, pine trees in Mamongolo and Maliwa, and tomatoes in Ngamanga. 
Similarly, evidence from the three villages indicates that a rural transformation 
has taken place, including an increase in commercial non- agricultural enter-
prises, a shift towards a formal labour rural market and improved access to social 
services and infrastructure.
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Historically in industrial countries agrarian transformation has resulted in 
rural and structural transformations, with the emergence of a highly productive 
agricultural sector employing a small share of the total labour force. The rural 
population otherwise rendered surplus by these changes was absorbed by indus-
trialization in urban centres (Hillbom and Svensson  2013). Evidence from the 
three villages indicates that rural transformation has largely been financed by 
government and development partners, rather than increased agricultural prod-
uct iv ity. Moreover, the timing and sequence of agrarian and rural transformation 
differ, evidence from the three villages indicating that rural transformation preceded 
agrarian transformation.
Based on group discussions with key informants in the three villages and lit-
era ture on the political history of Tanzania (Boesen et al. 1986, Friis- Hansen 2000, 
Coulson 2013) three very broad historical periods can be identified, each with a 
distinct set of economic and agricultural policies and associated socio- economic 
and institutional contexts: (1) 1984–9, characterized by economic crisis, adjust-
ment, and state- sponsored agricultural modernization; (2) 1990–9, characterized 
by privatization, liberalization, and market failure; (3) 2000–18, characterized by 
economic growth and the emergence of private- sector institutions. In the following 
sections we will analyse agrarian and rural transformation in the three villages 
during each of these historic periods.
Economic Crisis, Adjustment, and State- Sponsored Agricultural 
Modernization (1984–9)
Tanzania experienced an economic crisis in the early 1980s with significant 
macro- economic imbalances and, as a consequence, shortages and the erratic 
supply of most basic commodities (Boesen et al. 1986). In 1982 the country 
received emergency loans and was placed under an Economic Structural 
Adjustment programme by the World Bank. However, in spite of the economic 
crisis, the government continued to promote ‘state- sponsored agricultural mod-
ernization’ through its parastatal institutions, which enjoyed monopoly status 
(Coulson 2013). Villages in the Southern Highlands that were located in high- 
potential areas and with access to the main roads benefitted from pan- territorial 
minimum crop prices, subsidized loan packages containing hybrid maize seed, 
fertilizer and pesticides, and general subsidies for input prices. The Southern 
Highlands shifted from being an area that was self- sufficient in food and mar-
keted production of 2000 tonnes per year in the 1970s to becoming the nation’s 
food basket in the 1980s, with annual marketed maize production of 250,000 
tonnes (Rasmussen 1986). However, because of the economic crises, sub sid ized 
inputs only reached about one- third of the farmers in the Southern Highlands 
(Friis- Hansen  1987). Qualitative group interviews during the revisits indicate 
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that, because of their marginal status, the three study villages did not receive state 
support and were excluded from the green revolution in the rest of Njombe.
The socialist Ujamaa policy gradually weakened during the 1980s, as was 
reflected in the three study villages. The forced collective cultivation of Ujamaa 
fields, which was still practised during the original study, was abolished in 1985 
and the former Ujamaa fields subdivided into private bega- kwa- bega (shoulder- 
by- shoulder) plots, where farmers were forced to cultivate the same crop, as 
directed by political campaigns. Although farmers were now able to keep the 
proceeds, the system of bega- kwa- bega production quickly became equally 
unpopular, as farmers were forced to grow cash crops for which there was no 
market. According to group interviews in the three villages, the bega- kwa- bega 
system was also abolished at the end of the 1980s.
As another indication that the Ujamaa era was coming to an end, restrictions 
on village settlements were quietly lifted in 1986, and farmers were allowed to 
move back to their former homes if they wanted to. However, none of the 
domestic and secondary units interviewed in the three villages had moved back 
to their former homes. Farmers explained that, after living in nucleus settle-
ments for twelve years, they had become accustomed to having access to social 
services, such as schools, water supplies, and health clinics, and to living in close 
proximity to others. Primary education for the children and access to a dis pens-
ary were given as reasons for people choosing to remain in the village settle-
ment during the follow- up survey. However, group interviews indicate that 
some farmers moved back to their old homes (Mahami), in particular in 
Ngamanga village, as the consequences of inadequate access to land were most 
severe in this village.
Privatization, Liberalization, and Market Failure (1990–9)
By the end of the 1980s, the Tanzanian state was bankrupt and had no choice but 
to accept a structural adjustment loan from the World Bank. The formulation of 
the adjustment policy was based on the report ‘Sub- Saharan Africa: From Crisis to 
Sustainable Growth’ (World Bank 1989). The report argues that to push agriculture 
on to an upward path, it was necessary to ‘get prices right’ by making exchange 
rates more competitive and by reducing public marketing margins in order to 
allow producers a higher share of the world market price. The focus in these argu-
ments was on export crops. In terms of food- crop marketing the reform argued for 
liberalization by eliminating ‘distortions’ such as pan- territorial pri cing, subsidies 
on inputs and restrictions on private trade (Friis- Hansen 2000: 25–6).
A review of the performance of agricultural policy in Africa after adjustment 
(Friis- Hansen 2000) concludes that, while the elimination of state and parastatal 
intermediary organizations to some extent increased cost effectiveness, it left a 
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number of areas uncovered, as private entrepreneurs found the returns too low or 
the risk too high in the absence of institutional or infrastructural support. Friis- 
Hansen (2000) argues that in Tanzania structural adjustment has been socially 
and geographically skewed, favouring the better- off farmers and those living in 
areas where there is good market access. While in part this has been a deliberate 
attempt to let market forces determine where it is most profitable to produce, 
these policies have had serious costs, in particular for farmers living in areas with 
high transport costs to market who previously cultivated food crops using sub sid-
ized inputs.
This is exactly the situation for green revolution farmers in the Southern 
Highlands of Tanzania. Structural adjustment reforms envisaged diversification 
of production in such areas. However, this did not take place in the 1990s. The 
abolition of fertilizer subsidies and the cancelling of pan- territorial pricing meant 
that it was no longer economically viable for farmers in the Southern Highlands 
to cultivate hybrid maize using bio- chemicals. From maize yields above three 
tonnes per ha using bio- chemical inputs, yields were reduced to half a tonne per 
ha without the use of inputs. Market production of maize from the Southern 
Highlands collapsed from one year to the next, while maize production shifted to 
Morogoro and other areas closer to the Dar es Salaam market.
Maliwa village experienced an unexpected change in the 1990s. The village was 
a net buyer of maize, as no one grew maize in Maliwa because of overnight frost 
in the growing season. However, because of the collapse in maize production in 
Njombe Region as a whole, there was no longer any commercial maize available 
to purchase. In 1998 some farmers therefore decided to cultivate maize using 
small amounts of fertilizer bought from remittances send back by family mem-
bers working outside the village. Farmers explained during a group interview that 
it had become possible to cultivate maize as it had become warmer (perhaps due 
to climate change) and that it was cost effective for them to grow maize using 
small amounts of fertilizer, compared with buying maize at high prices from 
Njombe town.
During this decade many donor- financed development programme experi-
mented with new approaches to agricultural development such as tree planting. 
Several agricultural and environmental development programmes were intro-
duced in the Southern Highlands, in particular the Hifadhi ya Mazingira (Protect 
the Environment) Natural Resources Conservation and Management Programme 
in Tanzania (HIMA) that promoted sustainable agricultural production, natural 
resource management, and forestry production among farmers, by utilizing par-
ticipatory approaches that involved the local population and relevant ‘indigenous 
knowledge’ (Danida 2007).
During this decade, farmers from Mamongolo and Maliwa villages engaged in 
planting pine and cypress trees on mountain tops and steep slopes. Farmers learned 
about tree planting from the Danida- supported HIMA project implemented in 
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parts of Southern Highlands. In Ngamanga farmers started  combining cow 
manure with limited amounts of fertilizer to grow sunflowers intercropped with 
cowpeas for marketing.
The biggest change for the three study villages during the 1990s was a dramatic 
increase in migration to urban centres in search of work. A group of young men 
moved from Mamongolo village to Tunduma, a town on the border between 
Tanzania and Zambia, in the late 1990s. They started out as migrant labourers 
and thereafter settled permanently and became engaged in business activities 
such as small shops and money- changing. Later they attracted many others to 
join them (interview with secretary Mamongolo village 2011).
This migration to Tunduma has been accompanied by other out- migration 
such that the pressure of population and production on resources in the three 
study villages indicates that population- land ratios have not increased signifi-
cantly. The number of permanent residents in the villages has remained more or 
less constant over the three decades, as the surplus population has migrated to 
urban centres. During an interview in 2017, the village chairman stated: ‘The 
number of people living in Maliwa should have doubled during the past thirty 
years, but instead it has stayed at the same level as in the 1980s.’
However, other demographic changes have taken place: most importantly, the 
fertility rate has fallen by 50 per cent from around 7 to 3.5 children per woman. 
The secretary of Maliwa village estimated that more people from Maliwa now live 
outside the village than in the village, with consequences for both remittances 
and investments. While many resident households in Maliwa have relatives out-
side the village, only some receive remittances to the extent that it changes their 
livelihood.
Economic Growth and the Emergence of Private- Sector  
Institutions (2000–18)
All three villages have since the turn of the century initiated a process towards an 
agrarian transformation by engaging in commercial agricultural and silvicultural 
enterprises. This change has predominantly been market driven under liberal 
trade policies with limited influence or support from the state. Four factors seem 
to have stimulated this change. Firstly, a consistent strong urban demand for 
agricultural and silvicultural products spurred by high economic growth, averaging 
6–7 per cent increase in GDP a year (World Bank 2019). Secondly, that the three 
previous marginal villages became much better physically linked to the market. 
This is illustrated in Table 13.1 below. For Ngamanga and Maliwa the construction 
of improved roads made a huge difference in terms of connecting to the outside 
world. In all three villages private traders now accessed the villages with trucks 
and competed to buy farmers products.
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Thirdly, the availability of industrial goods from China in Njombe Region from 
2005, including PVC irrigation pipes (for potatoes and tomatoes) and mobile saw 
mills (for pine trees), motorbikes, and solar electricity systems, made another 
huge impact that stimulated agricultural and silvicultural enterprises and as well 
as general rural development. Specialized private shops, daily bus service and 
mobile phones further revolutionized farmers’ access to agricultural inputs and 
market information.
Fourthly, the net emigration of young people out of the three villages during 
the 1990s has during the 2000s turned into a net immigration of people and/or 
resources. In the past five to ten years, there has been an increasing tendency for 
young people to stay in the village. Furthermore, an increasing number of those 
who emigrated are returning to villages and bring with them resources to invest 
in improved houses and high- cost agricultural enterprises such as irrigated pota-
toes, tomatoes, or pine trees, or invest in non- agricultural enterprises such as 
guesthouses, specialized shops, or restaurants. Ngamanga village, in particular, 
has experienced population growth after the construction of a new road con-
necting it directly to Makambako town. Maliwa and Mamongolo villages have 
experienced a considerable increase in investments in establishing woodlots of 
pine trees by emigrants from the villages who now live in urban centres.
The three main agricultural and silvicultural enterprises are: (1) irrigated 
potato green revolution in Mamongolo and Maliwa, (2) rush to establish 
Table 13.1 Rural transformation of Maliwa, Mamongolo, and Ngamanga villages
  1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s
Primary school X 0 #        
Community shop   X 0      
Community milling machine   X 0      
Dispensary   X 0 #    
Community water supply     X 0 #    
Secondary school in next village     X 0 #    
Iron sheets on houses     X 0 #    
Private shops     X 0 #    
All season road   0   X #  
Solar electricity in houses       X 0 #  
Mobile phones       X 0 #  
PVC irrigation pipes       X 0 #  
HIV dispensary unit       X 0 #  
Specialized shops and services       X 0 #  
Competing traders in village       X 0 #  
Private mobile saw mill       X 0  
Motorbikes       X 0 #  
Daily bus service       # X 0
Improved market place       # X
Note: X=Maliwa, 0=Mamongolo, and #=Ngamanga.
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woodlots of pine trees in Maliwa and Mamongolo; and (3) irrigated tomato pro-
duction in Ngamanga. Together they are the main drivers of an agrarian trans-
form ation in the three villages.
The Potato Green Revolution
Njombe Region has experienced a second green revolution since the turn of the 
century (Koizumi 2007, Njombe Regional Commissioners Office 2016). The first 
green revolution in Njombe was based on subsidized packages of hybrid maize 
seed, fertilizer, and pesticides during the 1980s, as described by Rasmussen 
(1986). The potato green revolution is based on the use of fertilizer, pesticides, 
and to some extent irrigation. However, 99 per cent of farmers continue to use 
locally retained potato seed varieties, given the limited availability of planting 
material for the improved potato variety (kikondo) because of the absence of an 
effective seed industry. Nevertheless, the potato green revolution has been one 
of  the main forces driving agrarian transformation, in particular over the past 
decade. The follow- up study found clear evidence of this in Maliwa and Mamongolo 
villages. Potato cultivation is not new in the Southern Highlands, having been 
introduced by German missionaries as early as the 1920s (Macha et al. 1982) and 
have good growing conditions there because of the high elevations (1,700 to 2,800 
meters above the sea level) and high rainfall.
The potato green revolution in the Southern Highlands has been driven by the 
private market, with limited direct state support. Over the past decade annual 
production of potatoes has varied between 500 and 900 thousand tonnes (Njombe 
Regional Commissioners Office 2016). A recent PhD thesis on the potato value 
chain in Njombe (Daniel et al. 2018) shows that Njombe farmers grow an average 
of 1.6 acres of potatoes per household, with a harvest of 6–10 tonnes per year. 
With post- harvest producer prices for potatoes similar to those of maize, and 
yields twice those of maize, potatoes have become a highly attractive enterprise 
for farmers in Njombe, in particular in villages that are marginal for growing 
maize (see Box 13.1).
Forestry Driven by Private- Sector Investments sk944
Many pine trees were planted in Maliwa and Mamongolo villages with the dual 
aim to protect the environment and as a cash crop during the 1990s, with sup-
port from donor agencies, such as Danida. However, because of difficulties with 
phys ic al access to markets, the planting of woodlots progressed slowly until the 
mid- 2000s. To access the market, small- scale tree growers had to fell their trees 
using manual saws, manually transport the four- metre- long tree trunks to the 
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road, and hire a private truck to transport them to sawmills, which were located 
some 300km away adjacent to Sao Hill state forest. The availability of cheap 
mobile sawmills and chainsaws from China in Njombe from 2005 allowed tim-
ber traders to buy trees from farmers while still in the field and process them 
into timber in situ. During the late 2000s many farmers sold the trees they 
planted in the early 1990s and earned much higher income than from crop pro-
duction. This spurred a timber rush among farmers. On the one hand many 
farmers planted pine trees on part of their land and on the other land village 
governments in both Mamongolo and Maliwa reclassified common grazing 
areas into land for tree planting. This land was either allocated to villagers or 
sold to outside investors who were interested in establishing wood plantations 
in the village. One example is in Maliwa village, where the village government 
in 2012 sold 100 acres grazing land to a group of six shop keepers from Njombe 
town. The income was used to build a new village government office (see 
Box 13.2).
Tomato Production in Ngamanga
The construction of a direct road from Ngamanga village to Makambako in 2000 
cut down travelling time from four hours on a difficult road to fifteen minutes 
Box 13.1 Case study: Charles’s potato production in 
Mamongolo village
In Mamongolo village potatoes are mainly grown by young men. One example 
is Mr Charles Sanga, the son of Tobias Sanga, who participated in the original 
study. He inherited land from his father and planted 1.5 acres located in the 
valley with potatoes in 2005. He used his savings (350,000 TZS) from work as 
a migrant in Dar es Salaam to buy local potato seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, a 
fifty- metre PVC water pipe, and two sprinklers. Connecting the PVC pipe 
from a small stream to sprinklers has enabled Charles to produce a second 
potato crop during the dry season. The potatoes are sold to traders, who collect 
the crop in trucks. In 2017 the farm- gate price for rain- fed potatoes in 
Mamongolo village was 30,000 TZS per bag, while the price for irrigated 
potatoes was 55,000 TZS per bag. Charles’s total income from the sale of 
 potatoes was approximately 4 million TZS, of which he spent around half a 
million on inputs. Selling potatoes has been the main income for Charles’s 
household, paying for school fees, building a new modern house and acquiring 
a motorbike. (Interview, December 2017)
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on  tarmac. By cultivating tomatoes in the wetland areas (vinyungu) farmers in 
Ngamanga are able to supply Makambako with tomatoes during the off season 
where prices are much better than when rainfed tomatoes are in season. In 2017, 
when the study team revisited Ngamanga, tomato production had become the 
main commercial enterprise in the village and a tomato market had developed 
in  the village, where traders came in trucks from Makambako to buy tomatoes 
(see Box 13.3).
Box 13.2 Case study: William, remittances and investments in 
Mamongolo village
In 1983 William, one of the farmers who participated in the original 
study in Mamongolo village, lived in a poorly constructed mud hut with his 
family, his children being in primary school. Today he is old and lives alone 
in a new modern house with solar electricity, a fridge, a satellite TV, and a 
water tap inside the house. The house was built by one of his sons Joseph, 
who left the village, but is supporting him financially. Joseph emigrated in 
1993 to Tunduma, a town on the Zambian border, where he worked for 
ten  years as a black- market currency trader. In 2003 Joseph moved with 
his  family to Dar es Salaam, where he built a business that imports used 
cars from Dubai. With the help from his farther, Joseph bought 50 acres 
of  grazing land in 2010, on which he has planted pine trees. (Qualitative 
interview 2017)
Box 13.3 Case study: Richard, once poor now a well- off tomato 
farmer in Ngamanga village
Richard was 17 years old in 1983 and the son of one of the domestic units in 
the original study. He also worked for the original study as a research assistant. 
He was in his early thirties when the tomato boom started in Ngamanga vil-
lage. He did not own land himself at the time and for some years he cultivated 
tomatoes on fields that he rented for a year at a time in the vinyungu. Eventually 
he has accumulated sufficient surplus to buy land of his own. He also managed 
to buy six oxen and a plough that he uses to cultivate rainfed sunflowers. 
Income from irrigated tomatoes has also paid for building a new modern 
house with solar electricity and paying school fees for his children. His tomato 
production is intensive and he used expensive F1 hybrid tomato seeds, fer til-
izers, and pesticides that produced high yields.
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Main Social Changes
This section discusses the extent to which agrarian and social transformations 
have been socially inclusive by undertaking a comparative analysis of well- being 
and well- being ranking criteria in 1983 and 2017 based on farmers own relative 
perception of well- being then and now. Overall, the analysis finds a significant 
reduction in poverty in all three villages. As for the change in people’s perception 
of poverty, the analysis indicates minor changes in type of ranking criteria that 
farmers identify as important for well- being, with significant changes in each 
individual criterion’s value/content. Through group discussions the study identi-
fied fourteen unique well- being ranking criteria based on farmers’ perception of 
well- being. Six of these criteria are based on assets, two are based on relation-
ships, while four are social, i.e. food security, food quality, gender, and age. After 
identifying the well- being criteria, the groups were asked to assess the what pro-
portion of people in the village belonged to each of the three wealth categories. 
The results were triangulated and inconsistencies between different assessment 
were questioned and adjusted accordingly. The result was three sets of well- being 
assessments to which there was agreement among villagers. The analysis uses 
Maliwa village as an example.
Table 13.2 indicates a very high level of poverty during the time of the original 
study, which is consistent with the author’s observations at the time. The table 
further indicates that the poverty level has been reduced to less than a third, while 
the average well- being category has grown most. The present study does not have 
information about social mobility between the three categories, which is likely to 
be considerable given length of the period (thirty- three years). Qualitative obser-
vations indicate that the main source of income for upwards social mobility are 
whether the household are engaged in commercial agricultural enterprises or 
high- entry non- agricultural enterprises. As shown earlier, the growth in these 
enterprises has mainly taken place over the past ten to fifteen years, pre dom in-
ant ly driven by younger farmers.
Meanwhile the study observed a clear downward social mobility for old farm-
ers, as reflected in age being identified as a well- being ranking criteria. I further 
observed in the revisits that many farmers above 60 years old in the three villages 
were poor, as they were no longer able to work sufficiently in the fields and did 
not receive adequate support from their children. One example from a domestic 
Table 13.2 Well- being change in Maliwa village, 1984–2017
  Well- off Average Poor
1984 10% 5% 85%
2017 25% 50% 25%
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unit in the original study is Mr Edward. In 1983 he was in his forties, chairman of 
Maliwa village and well- off in terms of land and livestock. During the revisit in 
2017 the study team interviewed him, now in his late seventies and still living in 
his old traditional house. He was poor and food insecure, being too old to grow 
his own food and with no relatives to support him. Mrs Rozina is another ex ample 
from a domestic unit in the original study in Maliwa village. She is now 90 years 
old and the study team met her busy weeding in a field with beans. Also she was 
alone, outliving her husband and children. She survives by selling pine trees 
which were planted by her late husband in the 1990s and uses the money to pay 
for casual labour in fields. She told the team that she had only ten trees left to sell 
to support her as a pension.
Farmers’ perceptions of well- being have changed from 1983 to 2017, as indi-
cated in Table 13.3. Overall, the biggest changes have happened in the substance 
of the well- off well- being category, however it is nevertheless also correct that 
those who were poor in 2017 were better off that those who were poor in 1983. 
We will discuss this in detail below.
The six asset- based criteria for well- being ranking used are: ‘land’, ‘agricultural 
enterprises’, ‘livestock’, ‘non- agricultural enterprises’, ‘housing’, and ‘clothing’. 
Land for cultivation as an important well- being criterion has not changed. 
However, land for tree planting, the main economic enterprise in Maliwa village, 
has become a new important well- being criterion. Trees are in part planted on 
former village grazing land that is allocated to ‘capable farmers’ (interview with 
village secretary Maliwa village 2017). Secondly, some farmers who own more 
land than they cultivate convert some of their land to woodlots with pine trees. 
For this reason it has become more difficult for poor farmers to rent land for 
cultivation. The importance of ownership of livestock as a well- being criteria 
has  decreased, in part because of the non- commercial character of livestock 
keeping, a decrease in access to grazing land, and also due to the expansion of 
tree planting.
The well- being ranking criteria for housing have changed dramatically. In 1983 
there were no houses with roofs made of corrugated iron sheets. In 2017, such 
roofs were common among all households. Housing well- being values have 
shifted to appliances within the house, such as water taps, toilets, and solar- based 
electricity. Similarly the content of well- being criteria for clothing has improved 
for all.
The two relational well- being criteria, ‘work as day labourer’ and ‘hire labour’, 
are the criteria that have changed most during the period. At the time of the ori-
gin al study in 1983 both well- off, average, and poor were equally involved with 
reciprocal labour arrangements (called migoe), although well- off farmers tended 
to arrange more migoe than others (as they had more land under cultivation), and 
poor tended to attend more migoe to eat the food and drink the beer served after 
























Table 13.3 Well- being ranking criteria in Maliwa village
  Maliwa WBR Well- off Middle Poor  
    1983 2017 1983 2017 1983 2017  
A Land 5–10 acres 5–10 acres 2–5 acres 2–5 acres Less than 2 acres Less than 2 acres. 
Renting land
 
A Animals 30–50 cows <20 cows, 30–50 
goats
5–6 cows 2–3 cows, 5–10 
goats




















NA 5–10 acres pine 
trees planted
NA 1–5 acres pine trees 
planted
NA No trees planted  
A House Most unburned 
bricks, thatched 
roof; few burned 
bricks, few iron 






satellite TV, water 
tap
Unburned bricks 
or mud walls, 
thatched roof, no 
glass windows
Burned bricks, iron 
roof, not plastered, 
some glass 
windows, some 
solar, no private 
water tap
Mud walls, 
thatched roof, no 
glass windows
Mud or unburned 
bricks, some iron 
roof, no plastering, no 
glass windows, no 
solar
 
A Clothing More than one set 
of clothes; wear out 
clothes before 
buying new; own 
shoes
Buy new clothes 
frequently; follow 
fashion
Few items of 
clothes only; 
some own shoes
Buy new or second 
hand clothes when 
needed
Own one worn out 
kanga only; no 
shoes
Buy new clothes when 
old worn out; do not 


























  Maliwa WBR Well- off Middle Poor  
    1983 2017 1983 2017 1983 2017  










Only work for 






Work year- round for 
others or whenever 
they need money or 
food
 
R Hire labour Call for reciprocal 
labour 
arrangements
Hire day labour 
for all tasks 
year- round
Call for reciprocal 
labour 
arrangements
Hire day labour for 
specific tasks
Sometimes call for 
reciprocal labour 
arrangements





S Food security Self- sufficient 
through three food 
seasons
Food secure 
year- round; net 
sale of maize
Food insecure in 
some years






Income from day 
labour used to buy 
food during periods 
of food insecurity
 
S Food quality Eat meat during 
special occasions 
e.g. weddings or 
funerals
Eat meat 
year- round once a 
every week or 
when available
Eat meat during 
special occasions, 
such as weddings 
or funerals
Occasionally eat 
meat, when access 
to cash income
Never eat meat Eat meat during 
special occasions, 
such as weddings or 
funerals
 
S Access to 
health






village if required; 
buy medicine 
when needed
Travel to outside 
public health 
centre when 
needed if money 
is available
Use public hospital 






No access to health 
services in village, 
cannot afford to 
travel outside 
village
Use village health 





























  Maliwa WBR Well- off Middle Poor  
    1983 2017 1983 2017 1983 2017  

















Some not in public 
primary school 
only
Some not in primary 
school; some public 
secondary school; few 
tertiary education if 




S Gender Male- headed 
households
NA Male- headed 
households
NA Female- headed 
households
NA  
S Age Below 55 years old Below 60 years 
old
Below 55 years 
old
Below 60 years old Above 55 years old Above 60 years old
Note: A=asset- based WBR criteria, R=relational WBR criteria, S=social WBR criteria. Land for cultivation has not changed as a well- being criterion.
Table 13.3 Continued
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farmers can hire day workers year- round for all agricultural tasks and poor may 
work as day labourers year- round or whenever they need cash income.
The social well- being categories ‘food security’ and ‘food quality’ have 
improved for all three categories of farmers. In 1983 poor farmers were food inse-
cure for five months every year, while poor farmers in 2017 have the opportunity 
to work as day labourers and earn sufficient income to buy 20kg of maize. 
‘Gender’ as a social well- being category played a more dominant role in 1983 
compared with 2017. During a focus- group meeting it was mentioned that 
female- headed households can today engage in economic enterprises on equal 
terms with male- headed households. That was not the case in 1983, when female- 
headed households were an indicator of poverty. Finally, two social well- being 
categories are concerned with access to public health and educational services. 
There has been a clear improvement in access to health and educational service 
between 1983 and 2017. However, the well- being criteria reveal a remarkable 
social differentiation in access to social services.
Conclusion
Because of the marginality in terms of physical access and political and institu-
tional relationships with the state through which development was mediated, the 
three villages were excluded from taking part in the green revolution that 
occurred elsewhere in Njombe during in the 1980s. Most farmers within these 
three villages were at the time not able to provide for their own subsistence and 
were food insecure during large parts of the year. This was in part because of the 
failed Ujamaa policy that placed restrictions on where they could settle and what 
they could do. While structural adjustment during the 1990s had dramatic con-
sequence for the green revolution farmers in the Southern Highlands, the conse-
quences for agricultural development were less dramatic for farmers in these 
three study villages and characterized by continued stagnation. Seen through the 
eyes of these farmers, the major change in the 1990s was that they became less 
controlled by the state. A large part of the youth in the three villages, and 
Southern Highlands as a whole, emigrated to urban centres to find work and 
send remittances back to their families. These first two decades were character-
ized by an emerging rural transformation in terms of improved access to social 
services financed by the state and development partners but no agrarian 
transformation.
Major changes occurred at the turn of the century in all three villages. Within a 
period of a few years they shifted from being marginal to being in the centre of 
agrarian transformation driven by potato and tomato green revolutions and a 
timber rush. The study explains this remarkable market- driven shift away from 
marginality as a combination of different but related events, including: 
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construction of roads combined with better means of transport and communica-
tion; growth in urban demand for agricultural and silvicultural products; and the 
availability of a few essential agricultural equipment, in this case cheap PVC water 
pipes and mobile saw mills. The past two decades in these three villages were 
characterized by a combination of mutually interlinked rural and agrarian 
transformation.
The study finally shows that these rural and agrarian transformations have 
been largely inclusive through a combined reduction in the proportion of people 
who are poor and a higher threshold for what it means to be well- off, average, or 
poor. The study reveals that changes in people’s perception of well- being is not 
just about changes to the criteria used, but about the content of the individual 
criteria. However, the improvements in what it means to be well- off are much 
greater than the improvements in what it means to be poor. An example of the 
changes in the content of an asset- based well- being ranking criteria is ‘housing’, 
where the ‘well- off ’ category is no longer about whether the house is built with 
burned bricks, but availability of amenities such as glass windows, private water 
tap, solar electricity, and satellite TV. Meanwhile the content of the ‘poor’ category 
has only changed slightly, from mud walls and thatched roof to walls of mud or 
unburned bricks and some iron roofs. Changes to relational well- being criteria 
have been dramatic for both the ‘well- off ’ and ‘poor’ categories, as the system has 
totally transformed from an informal reciprocal labour exchange relationship 
towards a formal rural labour market. One consequence of this change is that 
able- bodied poor people are more food secure, as they now have the opportunity 
to work as day labourers and earn sufficiently to buy food for their family. Finally 
an example on changes in a social well- being criteria is access to health services 
where people in the ‘poor’ well- being category now have access to village health 
centres and HIV units, but cannot afford expensive medicine, while people within 
the ‘well- off ’ well- being category use private hospitals outside the village and can 
afford medicine if required.
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Introduction
The debates over the consequences of economic growth, upon which this volume 
is founded, have a long history. In the late 1990s Tibaijuka and Cormack argued 
that despite the achievements in economic growth indicators of poverty in Africa 
continued to rise both in incidence, depth, and severity (Tibaijuka and 
Cormack  1998: 7). Economic reforms of the 1990s had led to impressive eco-
nomic growth rates, but the social sectors that provide for the basic needs have 
deteriorated. Their arguments found support from a later World Bank report 
(2000) which found that the number of poor people in sub- Saharan Africa 
increased from 217 million in 1987 to 219 million in 1998, leaving almost half of 
the residents of the continent poor (World Bank 2000). This has necessitated a 
call for redistributive policies and welfare programmes.
Tanzania seems to provide a test case for this debate. The Tanzanian economy 
and the agricultural sector grew in the 1990s, but little benefit was, apparently, felt 
by the rural poor (URT 2011). Adjustment policies seem to have led to a widen-
ing gap between the rich and poor. Chachage (1993: 242) argued that the majority 
of the people who were poor before Structural Adjustment Programmes have 
become poorer. This is likely to be so in rural areas where the agricultural 
 sector has been exploited to support the formation and growth of a small 
group of private capitalists outside the sector itself. National reforms and related 
economic achievements may leave out the majority poor especially those living 
in rural areas. As Sokoni (2001) observed, for example, the  marketing reforms 
of the 1990s constrained agricultural intensification by smallholder farmers. 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 01/07/21, SPi
294 Cosmas Sokoni and Verdiana Tilumanywa
Rutasitara (2002: 1) noted that some socio- economic groups or sectors gained 
while  others lost as evidenced through persisting poverty. This necessitated a shift 
of development policy and strategies towards more inclusive growth and broad- 
based growth.
The tension between a growing economy and the uneven distribution of its 
benefits has continued in recent years. Tanzania has recorded impressive eco-
nomic growth, with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) annual growth rate of 7 per 
cent over the past decade (Table  14.1) in contrast to an average annual GDP 
growth rate of 3.3 per cent between 1960 and 2005 (Wuyts 2008: 5). For example, 
the per capita income grew from Tsh 628,259 in 2008 to 693,185 in 2009 (URT 2011). 
A review of the Five Year Development Plan 1 (FYDP1) (2016/17–2020/21) notes 
that while other sectors of the Tanzanian economy re gis tered impressive growth, 
the agricultural sector grew at 3.4 per cent in 2014 in comparison to 2.7 per cent 
in 2010. Although the National Five Year Development Plan 2016/17–2020/21 
reported that poverty is becoming more responsive to economic growth, there is 
still a concern that economic growth is not inclusive.
The mismatch between growth and poverty reduction in Tanzania has been a 
subject of research interest. On one hand research has focused on explaining the 
reasons for limited trickle- down (Mashindano et al. 2013). On the other hand, 
researchers question the adequacy of the methodology of using nation- wide stat-
is tics for capturing what actually transpires at the village level. For example 
Wiggins (2000) contested the conventional wisdom that Africa has been experi-
encing agrarian crisis as presented in national statistics by using village- level stat-
is tics that showed little evidence of decline, and concluded that the crisis was 
exaggerated as national statistics underestimate farm output. Moreover, other 
ways of depicting people’s welfare, apart from national statistics, can shed more 
light on the change in livelihoods and welfare of rural families. As other contribu-
tors to this volume have argued (Brockington and Noe in Chapter 2) measures 
of poverty which are derived from measures of  consumption, may only capture 
some of the dynamics of rural poverty.
This paper identifies long term changes in rural families’ welfare basing on 
change in family assets in context of the cropping systems of the Uporoto 
Highlands in southern Tanzania. It is based on a longitudinal study of households 
studied in 1997 (Sokoni 2001) and a revisit to the same households in 2016 and 
2018. Family assets can show the wealth status of a family as they are a 
Table 14.1 Annual growth rates of gross domestic product mainland Tanzania,  
2006–15
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Rate 6.7 7.1 7.4 6.0 7.0 7.9 5.2 7.3 7.0 7.0
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manifestation of savings and accumulation of wealth among families. Where data 
on income are not readily available, tracing family asset change serves as an alter-
native means of understanding wealth dynamics of rural households. It further 
seeks to explain the changes and establish the extent to which they are related to 
broad/nationwide policy changes. Lastly the paper intends to draw out the impli-
cations of the changes in asset to the general welfare of rural communities.
The chapter presents interesting paradoxes. In terms of actual assets people 
own, most families have experienced a decline, or relatively little change, with the 
possible exception of Shibolya village. However, in terms of qualitative narratives, 
most families appear to have improved their asset base. Here we present the find-
ings and try to explain the patterns.
Description of the Study Area and Methods
The Uporoto Highlands extend into three districts of Mbeya Rural, Rungwe in 
Mbeya Region, and Makete in Njombe Region (Figure  14.1). The Uporoto 
Highlands are endowed with a wide range of natural resources including fertile 
volcanic soils and natural forests. Most of the remaining forests are reserved. 
These forest reserves include: Poroto Ridge, Ikhoho, Bange, Sawago, Ilungu, and 
Livingstone Mountains. The establishment of the Kiwira Forest Plantation (2,784 
hectares for sawn timber) in 1960s (Ngaga 2011) and the extension of pine tree 
plantations near Igoma village affected the availability of rangelands for livestock 
keeping.
The recent enforcement of restrictions to access and use the forest reserves on 
the Uporoto Highlands has again limited local people’s access to land resources. 
Some villagers on the Uporoto Highlands did access land for crop cultivation on 
the former Kitulo Dairy Farm. However the Kitulo National Park established in 
2005 covering an area of 413km2 has engulfed the Kitulo Dairy Farm which fur-
ther limited access to arable land on the Uporoto Highlands.
An earlier study (Sokoni 2001) covered six villages that were representative of 
the ecological zones of the Uporoto Highlands (Figure 14.2). This follow- up study 
revisited three villages out of the six, namely Shibolya, Igoma, and Ulenje.
Shibolya village is located on the middle zone, on the plateau, with altitude of 
2,100–2,300m above sea level. The dominant farming systems in the village have 
been wheat and maize on the lower parts and Irish potato, maize, and cabbage on 
the upper part. The village is close to the Mbeya–Kyela–Malawi highway.
Igoma village is also on the middle zone, on a dissected plateau, with altitude of 
2,200–2,300 metres above sea level. The cool climate in the village has been 
favourable to farming system dominated by Irish potato, maize, and cabbage. The 
village is a rural market centre that serves other villages on the highlands. It has 
regular transport service to the urban centres of Mbeya, Tukuyu, and Makete.
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Ulenje village is on the lowland, below the escarpment that separates the 
Uporoto Highlands and the Usangu Plains on the rift valley. It is warmer than 
other villages, with an altitude of 1,900–2,100m above sea level. Two main 
farming systems of wheat and maize; and coffee and bananas were traditionally 
practised.
This study explores changes in cropping systems and asset such as houses, land, 
and livestock as these matter to the local definition of wealth. The research was 
undertaken in 2016, giving a span of nearly twenty years from 1997 when the 
earlier study was conducted. Methods used in data collection include separate 
group discussions with men and women in each of the villages and interviews 
with key informants. Also a household survey using a questionnaire was con-
ducted to actual families of the selected villages that were covered by the earlier 
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Figure 14.1 Location of the Uporoto Highlands, Tanzania.
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intention of probing reasons for the observed patterns of change from the data 
collected in 2016. This involved conducting group discussions at each of the three 
study villages, interviewing key informants, and revisit to some families. As with 
the other surveys we focused particularly on family assets because these are often 
used to categorize rural families into wealth groups, for example housing (Sokoni 
and Shechambo 2005).
Changes in Cropping Systems and Household  
Assets on the Uporoto Highlands
Agriculture is the mainstay of the villages visited for this survey with families 
relying on crop farming and livestock keeping. Changes in crops grown reflect 
variations among families in their response to emerging opportunities arising 
Figure 14.2 Location of the study villages.
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from nationwide development initiatives and policy. The Uporoto Highlands 
have witnessed change in key crops that drive change in family asset accumula-
tion and decline.
There has been considerable change in the farming system in this area. There 
are notable declines in Irish potatoes, wheat, and coffee. In 1997 Irish potatoes 
were grown nearly by all families, and now are grown by 60 per cent of families. 
Other crops including wheat, green peas, and beans are grown by fewer families 
while coffee is no longer grown by any of the surveyed families. While the above 
crops are grown by fewer families now, some other crops have gained importance. 
Pyrethrum for example, was grown by only 6 per cent of the families in 1997 but 
in 2016 the number has increased to 30 per cent. Trees were not grown in 1997; 
however 6 per cent of the families are growing trees now. Food crops such as 
onions, finger millet, tomatoes, sunflower, and millet are no longer grown by any 
of the surveyed families. Growing of cabbage has remained stable (Table 14.2).
Patterns vary across different villages. In Ulenje and Shibolya villages, growing 
of Irish potatoes has increased at the expense of declining cultivation of wheat 
and green peas. In 1997, wheat was a key cash crop in these villages. Sokoni 
(2001) noted the importance of wheat crop, especially with the adoption of a 
wheat variety known as juhudi that replaced traditional varieties that were not 
demanded in urban markets. Decline in wheat growing in Ulenje and Shibolya 
villages is attributed to lack of markets. Furthermore, in Shibolya village wheat 
has been taken over by pyrethrum.
Although Irish potato is a dominant crop, there is a notable decline in the 
 proportion of families growing it. Reports from group discussions in the three 
villages acknowledge that Irish potato is a key cash crop, however it is highly 
demanding in use of external inputs and in terms of capital. Wealthy families are 
Table 14.2 Change in proportion of families growing different crops, 1997 to 2016
Crop % of households growing 1997 % of households growing 2016
Maize 96 99
Irish potatoes 91 60
Wheat 61 12
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likely to engage in Irish potato cultivation while poor families find it difficult to 
afford. Whereas Sokoni (2001) reported a decline in pyrethrum cultivation, 
twenty years later, it is apparent that pyrethrum is grown by more households. 
This is due to improvement in the marketing and prices of the pyrethrum flowers. 
For example the price for 1kg of dried pyrethrum flowers increased from Tz shs 
1,500/= in 2014 to 2,500/= in 2018. Private agents procure pyrethrum flowers 
from farmers and there were no problems reported on payments. Pyrethrum 
flowers are taken to Mafinga, Iringa, where a processing factory is located. In 
addition to better marketing services and good prices, growing of pyrethrum 
does not require use of external inputs. Pyrethrum is re- emerging as a key cash 
crop by replacing other crops. It was reported in group discussions that that pyr-
eth rum replaces maize fields at Igoma and wheat fields at Ulenje and Shibolya 
villages.
Sokoni (2001) reported a coffee banana farming system in Ulenje village. 
However, coffee cultivation appears to have declined tremendously among the 
households studied (cf. Chapter 7 of this volume). Coffee is a perennial crop that 
requires a long period to yield output and is capital intensive. Farmers at Ulenje 
reported that coffee marketing and prices have not been attractive. Coffee farms 
are being replaced by Irish potato fields.
Another crop that has experienced decline among households is onions. 
Sokoni (2001) did report garlic as an emerging cash crop on the Uporoto 
Highlands. However, it seems its cultivation has not been sustained and it is no 
longer grown by any of the revisited households. Farmers at Igoma reported that 
although garlic is high value crop, its market was not certain. There was no local 
market as it is not commonly used by the local people of Uporoto Highlands. 
Lack of reliable external markets may have been due to the very small scale of its 
cultivation that might have not been able to attract traders from urban markets.
Another change on the Uporoto Highlands is an emerging conversion of agri-
cultural land into woodlots. This is apparent from the current landscape of the 
Uporoto Highlands depicting crop fields interspaced with woodlots (Figure 14.3). 
This increase in the conversion of farmland into woodlots is not solely found on 
the Uporoto Highlands. Tilumanywa (2013) observed the same practice on the 
Rungwe Mountain Ecosystem. During group discussions in the three revisited 
villages, farmers explained that in 1990s sale of pine trees for timber was paying 
well following a growing demand for timber from rapidly growing urban centres. 
Key informants explained that this development was influenced by the harvesting 
of trees from the nearby Kiwira Forest Plantation that proved to be a lucrative 
business for private traders. The Kiwira Forest Plantation undertook large- scale 
planting of pine trees in the 1970s which matured for harvest in the 1990s. Private 
traders were allowed to procure woodlots and harvest timber for transportation 
and sale in urban markets. It was reported by key informants from Igoma village 
that some farmers who were engaged as labourers in the tree- planting exercise of 
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Figure 14.3 Woodlots on farm land in Shibolya village.
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the Kiwira Forest Plantation the 1970s managed to take some seedlings for planting 
in their own farm land. At this time trees were planted on marginal lands including 
areas adjacent to streams and river valleys. As marginal lands became scarce with 
time, tree planting was extended into pyrethrum fields because the crop had 
declined in its importance. These farmers who planted pine trees in the 1970s also 
benefited from harvesting and sale of timber to urban markets.
Pine tree planting as practiced on the Uporoto Highlands appears not to be 
well integrated with the prevailing farming system. Pine trees take ten to fifteen 
years to mature. Farmers did not report any significant direct benefit of pine trees 
on other crops grown. Instead, pine tree woodlots are reported to force other 
farmers to plant trees because shade effects from woodlots lowers crop productiv-
ity of adjacent crop fields. A farmer at Shibolya reported that he was compelled to 
plant trees on his farm because two fields on either side of his farm were planted 
with trees and shaded his fields. Tilumanywa (2013: 137) observes the same phe-
nomenon in the Rungwe Mountain ecosystem. Group discussions acknowledged 
that this phenomenon has contributed to the increasing conversion of farmland 
into woodlots in the revisited villages.
Other reasons for converting fields into woodlots include: exhaustion of a 
field’s fertility, fields being located too far for the household to grow crops, inabil-
ity of a household to use all its land for growing crops, unsuitability of land for 
growing crops, as an investment for future income, and as means of hoarding 
land. Furthermore, tree planting is attractive because it does not require external 
inputs. Many of the villages on the Uporoto Highlands were affected by villagiza-
tion of the early 1970s and which resulted in people living a long distance from 
their farms when they were moved to new village locations. Such distant fields are 
often targeted in pine tree planting exercises.
However, over the years, as shown by the households revisited in 2016/17 
farmers seem to have realized that the returns to woodlots are less than use of the 
land for crop cultivation. Informants at Igoma reported that a decline of the mar-
ket for timber has encouraged farmers to consider clearing woodlots and replace 
them with other crops. Reverting from woodlots to use of the fields for crop culti-
vation reflects Ponte’s view (1998, and Chapter 12 in this volume) that farmers 
abandon slow crops and adopt farm enterprises that yield cash quickly. It was 
further reported in the group discussions that the high demand for timber from 
urban markets led to a higher rate of tree harvesting than planting among small-
holder farmers. To meet the demand some farmers harvested immature trees. 
Immature trees are no longer demanded in the market as they produce wood 
products of poor quality. This has led to enforcement of regulation that requires 
farmers to harvest trees of the age of at least ten years. While farmers who are 
better- off can afford to wait until tree mature as required by the regulation, poor 
farmers opt to remove immature trees and replace them with crops. At Ulenje 
and Igoma villages it was reported that now farmers are removing trees, and 
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woodlots are replaced with potato fields. At Shibolya village, it was reported 
that the pace of planting trees has gone down. As Ngaga (2011: 37) observes for 
Mufindi District, often woodlots are established without adequate consideration 
of profitability of timber growing per unit area and in comparison with other 
crops. Group discussions with small- scale farmers in the study villages reported 
that pine trees are not paying.
The importance of green peas had already shown a declining trend in the 1990s 
as indicated in Sokoni (2001). Green peas were grown in ridges and terraces. This 
had dominated the landscape of the Uporoto Highlands. Sokoni (2001) reports 
that on the Uporoto Highlands terracing disappeared with the decline of cultiva-
tion of green peas. This is yet another feature of the Uporoto Highlands where 
apparently land management practice are tied to a crop grown rather than to a 
land conservation practice for conservation’s sake alone. Sokoni (2008) relates the 
dominance of Irish potato cultivation and its land management practices and 
its  replacement of other crops to increasing land degradation on the Uporoto 
Highlands. This implies that as farmers change crops and cropping systems in 
search of better incomes from farm produce land conservation practices may 
have to be re- learned.
Hired Labour
A well- recognized form of wealth is the ability of a farmer to employ others. 
Wealthy families are those with the liquidity to employ others, poorer families 
are those who have to work for others (cf. Chapter 3 in this volume). The study 
villages in 1997 demonstrated a wide variety of employment patterns—with one 
village hardly employing other people and another with many employers—but as 
a whole was relatively balanced in favour of employing people. Currently, in the 
revisited villages a common system is to hire labour for a piece of daily work or 
on daily basis where payment is Tsh 5,000 per person per day. Sokoni (2001) 
noted this as a sign of increasing commercialization of labour on the Uporoto 
Highlands. It is also noted elsewhere in rural areas of Tanzania that with increas-
ing agricultural commercialization, hired labour has substituted exchange labour 
(Ponte 1998).
However, data collected from households revisited in 2016 show that balance 
noted earlier in household use of hired labour has now shifted. A clear majority of 
people are no longer hiring farm labour (Table 14.3). If we compare individual 
families we can see that the picture is not all negative—a small number of families 
who were not hiring labour now are (Table 14.4). But these tend to be the wealthier 
families; most families rarely employ others.
Sokoni (2001) noted increasing commercialization of labour replacing trad-
ition al ways of soliciting farm labour through a reciprocal labour system. Irish 
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potato growing is the major crop that requires labour in all of its stages of produc-
tion of field preparation, planting, weeding, putting fertilizer, harvesting, and 
packing for transportation. As noted that production of Irish potato demands 
high capital investment, it is grown by a few well- to- do rural families. The decline 
in potato farming may explain why there seems to be a drop in the use of hired 
labour among the households. A further reason may be that as families get older 
they become less vigorous in their farming activity and so have less cause to hire 
in labour.
It was further noted through focus group discussions that there has been a shift 
from use of hired labour from outside the villages to greater use of local labour. 
In-migrant labour that was commonly used in the 1990s is considered now too 
expensive and not suited for the kind of labour required in the different stages of 
growing Irish potatoes. In-migrant labour requires accommodation and food, 
even for days they are not engaged in paid labour.
Assets
The first notable change in the study area is that farmers are cultivating less land 
than they were in 1997. It is important to note that the variables compared are not 
exactly the same. The 1997 study recorded plots owned while the 2016 study 
recorded plots farmed. It is thus possible that people were not farming all the 
Table 14.3 Change in hiring labour on farms, 1997 to 2016
  1997 2016
Village Hired labour No hiring Hired labour No hiring
Iwalanje 16 14 – –
Nyalwela 26 4 – –
Kikondo 2 28 – –
Shibolya 13 17 7 16
Ulenje 16 14 7 13
Igoma 19 11 8 13
Total 92 88 22 42
Table 14.4 Number of families who began and ceased to hire labour, 1997–2016
Village Ceasing hiring labour No change Began hiring labour Total
Shibolya 7 13 3 23
Ulenje 5 13 2 20
Igoma 7 12 2 21
Total 19 38 7 64
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plots they owned in 1997 (thus land owned in 1997 is larger than land farmed). 
We have excluded this possibility by not counting fallowed land. Or that they 
were renting other plots and farming them (thus land owned in 1997 is smaller 
than land farmed).
The differences between land owned and farmed in 1997 and land farmed in 
2016 are substantial, with reductions in land farmed of between 45 per cent and 
66 per cent, as shown in the Table 14.5 above.
During the follow up visit in 2018, in all the three villages, it was confirmed 
that reduction of land cultivated was real. This was attributed to land scarcity on 
the Uporoto Highlands whereby as families grew in size part of the same land 
owned by a family was given to sons/daughters. A respondent at Igoma village 
reported: ‘I used to have 3 acres of farmland long time ago, but now I only have 
1.5 acres, the rest has been given to my children.’ Generally it was reported during 
group discussions that there was no new virgin land for expanding farms. Sokoni 
(2001) did report increasing use of land along rivers/valleys in the study area due 
to increasing population pressure of land resources. The Uporoto Highlands are a 
dissected plateau with numerous river and streams which used to be covered by 
natural vegetation but are now cleared. Farm families in Ulenje and Igoma 
reported that use of land along river/stream valleys for agricultural production 
has become more restricted as regulations pertaining to environmental manage-
ment are enforced. The Kitulo Dairy Farm and the numerous forest reserves that 
were in the 1970s to 1990s used for cultivating crops were no longer accessible 
due to more strict enforcement of the regulation on their use. A greater part of 
the formerly Kitulo Farm that was used for farming is now part of the new Kitulo 
National Park where farming is prohibited.
At Igoma village farmers reported loss of agricultural land by converting it into 
woodlots. The landscape of the Uporoto Highlands is currently dominated by 
woodlots mainly of pine trees grown for timber. This holds land that would have 
been used for agricultural production for too long and yet the returns from 
woodlots are not impressive. Group discussions held in the three villages reported 
that in most cases the decision to convert farmland into woodlots was not well 
conceived and already some farmers consider removing trees to make the land on 
woodlots available for crop cultivation.
It was also reported that some households have lost part of their land assets by 
selling in order to earn some income required to access basic services such as 
Table 14.5 Land farmed (acres) in 1997 and 2016
Village Land owned and farmed 1997 All land farmed 2016 Change in %
Shibolya 2.6 1.0 −61.5
Ulenje 5.1 2.8 −45.0
Igoma 4.1 1.4 −65.8
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health, education, and household groceries. This was reported in a group discussion 
at Igoma, Ulenje, and Shibolya. It is evident that transaction of land is still in 
practice as Sokoni (2001) reported.
Poorer households sell land when they need to raise money to address social 
problems they encounter (sickness) or needs they develop (education). Some 
poor households are likely to lose land while those well- off have the opportunity 
of accumulating land through such transactions. A respondent in Igoma village, 
for example, had to sell half an acre of his farm in order to pay for hospital costs 
after his wife had a motorcycle road accident. Another respondent in Ulenje 
 village sold half an acre of his land in order to raise money for taking his mother 
to hospital as she suffered from heart disease.
Among richer households, investment on land assets is considered of great 
importance. Land values appreciate and having more land gives opportunities for 
diversification of crops cultivated. In some cases richer households procure more 
land and plant trees as a means of keeping land for future use.
Communal village farm land that used to be a source of land assets for families 
in the 1960s to 1990s has disappeared. None of the villages, except Shibolya, had 
village- governed agricultural land that could be given freely to its people. Shibolya 
village has some agricultural land that is hired out to villagers per season. This 
enables families that can afford it to hire land from the village for crop cultivation. 
However, the small amount of land available to the village government and cost of 
hiring does not guarantee access to the land by poorer families.
Like land, livestock is an important matter for understanding change in 
rural welfare and livelihoods. Trends in livestock ownership from 1990s to 
2010s are mixed. Smallstock ownership has declined in all villages. But in 
Shibolya and Ulenje cattle and pigs have increased. Cattle ownership includes 
two trends. First average herd size has increased marginally in Shibolya and 
more substantially in Ulenje. Second, it has decreased in Igoma (Table 14.6). In 
a group discussion at Igoma village it was explained that cattle keeping has 
declined from 1990s because areas that were used for free- range grazing are no 
longer available. The extension of the area planted with pine trees by the Kiwira 
Forest Plantation in the 1970s took a significant portion of land that was used 
by villagers for open grazing. Sokoni (2001) describes the traditional livestock- 
keeping system that involved movement of large herds of livestock from villages 
to areas far away (mainly to the open areas of Kiwira Forest Plantation and of 
various natural forest reserves) where livestock was kept for some months to 
allow crops on fields to grow and mature. During the dry season herds of live-
stock were allowed back to the villages to feed into crop fields after crops had 
been harvested.
This system of livestock keeping is no longer viable after Kiwira Forest 
Plantation extended its area planted with trees. In addition, access to the numer-
ous forest reserves has become more restricted by the Forest Department. 
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Furthermore, the establishment of the Kitulo National Park in 2005 has also 
reduced land accessible for free grazing. Villagers were of the opinion that open 
grazed livestock will be liable to poor health and susceptible to diseases. This 
means that the only viable livestock- keeping system is keeping a few livestock 
that are stall- fed. But farmers considered this system of livestock keeping very 
costly. Poor families are not likely to afford zero grazing, and often if they do they 
encounter conflicts with other farmers when livestock trespass into other persons’ 
farmland and residences.
Shibolya village appears to be an exception with a recorded increase in cattle 
ownership. In a follow up visit in 2018, villagers in Shibolya indicated that on 
average a household has four to five cows. Proximity of the village to Mbeya city 
is likely to be an added advantage. This village is located about 15km from Mbeya 
City and is accessible through a tarmac road that connects Mbeya City to Tukuyu 
town and the Malawi border to the south. Recently there has been a more organ-
ized collection of milk from the small- scale farmers for supply to the Mbeya city 
market. Also farmers indicated that extension services to farmers had improved. 
Proximity to Mbeya City is therefore an opportunity to the families of Shibolya 
villages. Furthermore, upcoming young families use income from Irish potatoes, 
cabbages, and motorcycles commonly known as ‘bodaboda’ to invest in livestock.
If we trace herd ownership among actual herd owners, rather than an average 
village herd, we can see that cattle owners have increased in Shibolya, stayed con-
stant (but with clearly larger herds) in Ulenje, and declined substantially in Igoma 
as indicated in Table 14.7.
Average smallstock herd size has decreased in all villages as shown in Table 14.8. 
This reflects the fact that more families have seen their herds decline than increase 
(Table 14.9) except for Ulenje, which shows an increase in smallstock.
Pig ownership has increased in the villages of Shibolya and Ulenje (Table 14.10). 
It is not certain that this was influenced by growing demand from towns for pork. 
It was noted however, there was significant local consumption of pork within the 
villages. With the decline in cattle herds, pork has become a substitute for beef. 
The relatively greater decrease in pig ownership at Igoma village is partly associ-
ated with the development of the village settlement to a large centre with some 
Table 14.6 Change in 
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urban characteristics. Households keeping pigs have often encountered conflicts 
with neighbours and often have been required to pay dearly where pigs have 
 trespassed to neighbours’ premises. A respondent in Igoma village sold three pigs 
in 2014 because they kept getting sick and the individual could not afford to 
treat them.
House ownership is an important indicator of wealth status of rural house-
holds. A number of studies have used types of rural houses (based on building 
materials for walls, floor, and roof) to identify wealth groups (see for example 
Sokoni and Shechambo  2005). This study examined the changes in quality of 
houses as a means of identifying welfare of households. One of the reported 
achievements that had made livelihoods better is the improvement in housing. 
Table 14.7 Change in incidence of cattle ownership
Village Decrease Same Increase
Shibolya 3 12 8
Ulenje 5 10 5
Igoma 9 11 1






Table 14.9 Change in incidence of smallstock ownership
Village Decrease Same Increase
Shibolya 7 12 4
Ulenje 9 5 6
Igoma 4 14 3
Table 14.10 Change in incidence of pig ownership
Village Decrease Same Increase
Shibolya 0 17 6
Ulenje 3 13 7
Igoma 7 11 3
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Narratives of respondents depict a high proportion of households that improved 
housing. Typical houses made of bamboo walls (with mud) and bamboo or grass 
roof that were common in the villages in the 1990s have been replaced with 
houses with brick walls and corrugated iron sheet roof (Figure14.4). Many 
respondents attributed the better lives that they feel they enjoy now to living in a 
modern and spacious house. Sources of money for improving houses included 
sale of livestock, land, and key cash crops. In quite a number of cases support 
from family members living in town helped households to build new houses. 
Recently access to electricity is likely to make housing even better. None of the 
villages had electricity in 1990s, but all the study villages were connected to the 
national grid of electricity by 2016. However, many of the poorer families do not 
have connection to electricity in their houses as they cannot afford the fees for 
connection.
In probing the disappearance of bamboo and grass houses, group discussions 
at Igoma and Shibolya informed that these building materials are not available 
any more. The diminishing of forests and grassland accessible by farmers, men-
tioned earlier, contributed to this situation. This means use of the house roofed 
with corrugated iron sheets for distinguishing wealth categories of farmers is no 
longer valid as this is almost the only means of roofing houses that almost all 
families use.
Figure 14.4 Typical bamboo- roofed house of the Uporoto Highlands of 1990s.
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Other Notable Changes
Through discussion groups, villagers acknowledge change in access to services. 
There is a significant development in health infrastructure in the study villages 
from 1997 and 2016. In 1997 only Ulenje had a dispensary. By 2016, health 
fa cil ities had been established including a public health centre and a private 
dispensary a run by the Roman Catholic Church at Igoma, and a dispensary 
at Shibolya.
Access to secondary education has also improved. In 1997 there was only one 
private secondary school among the three villages. In 2016 each village had a sec-
ondary school. However, for the rural households this has meant greater demand 
for cash in order to access education and health services. As mentioned earlier some 
poor households have been compelled to part with some of their assets in order to 
access health and education services. The government of Tanzania has from 2016 
offered free primary and secondary education. However, this does not mean there 
are no costs to families pertaining to provision of education to their children.
Improvement in transportation has contributed to a better life on the Uporoto 
Highlands. All three villages are now served with regular transport service to the 
nearby urban centres of Mbeya, Kiwira, and Tukuyu. In 1990s, Ulenje village was 
disadvantaged because of lack of transportation services to the nearby towns. 
However, in the 2010s a regular bus transport connecting the village to Igoma 
and Mbeya City has been maintained.
The introduction of bodaboda for commercial transport has greatly facilitated 
movement of people and goods in rural areas of Uporoto Highlands. Being a 
mountainous region, the use of bicycles had not developed as in other flat areas. 
Motorcycles serve in the collection of produce from farm to homes or collection 
points for delivery to urban markets. Sokoni (2001) identified long distances 
from homesteads to farm as one of the constraints of the farming systems of the 
Uporoto Highlands. In this context the use of motorcycles to transport produce 
from farm to homes and markets is a great improvement in rural transportation. 
It was reported that there were about one hundred motorcycles in Igoma village 
alone and around ten each in Ulenje and Shibolya villages. However, poorer 
farmers are disadvantaged because they often cannot afford the cost of transpor-
tation through bodaboda.
Another major change in rural livelihoods on the Uporoto Highlands is in 
communications. Most families do own, access, and use mobile phones for com-
munication. This has facilitated interactions among family members within and 
outside the village and has enhanced the ability of rural families to overcome dis-
tance constraints. Local administration work has also been eased through mobile 
phones. Improvement in communication is likely to have enhanced production 
and marketing of agricultural produce.
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Restricted access to forest reserves in the study area has to a great extent 
 influenced villagers’ livelihoods. At Shibolya village, informants reported more 
strict restriction on access and use of Ikhoho Natural Forest Reserve. Similar 
observations of restricted access to Livingstone Mountain Forest Reserve and 
Bange Forest Reserve were reported at Igoma village and Ulenje village. The 
establishment of the Kitulo National Park has in particular been reported to have 
brought encounters between small- scale farmers with the park officials as they 
enforce the restriction of access and use of resources within the national park and 
forest reserves. In addition to restriction of access to the remaining natural forests 
in the Uporoto Highlands, it was reported in a group discussion at Ulenje village 
that there is greater enforcement of the requirement not to cultivate 60 metres on 
either side of rivers or streams.
Change in Wealth Status
With respect to people’s perceptions of how life has changed there are some sur-
prising differences (Table 14.11). Shibolya, with its increased herd sizes contains 
more people who think that life is better now than before. Igoma, despite its 
decreasing herd sizes, has a roughly equal split, and in Ulenje most people think 
life was better in the past, at the time of the original survey, compared to now.
The final data we have derived from qualitative accounts of changes in assets 
and important events in people’s lives. We used these histories to determine 
whether peoples’ assets were increasing or decreasing. The summary of that work 
is presented in Table 14.12. In terms of the asset histories we were able to collect, 
the majority of families in all villages appear to be improving their lives a lot.
Table 14.11 Is life better now or at the time of the first survey?
Village Before Now Same Total
Shibolya 9 14 2 25
Ulenje 12 7 2 21
Igoma 9 8 4 21
Total 30 29 8 67
Table 14.12 Change in assets of households (excluding land)
Village Better Same Unclear
Shibolya 13 5 4
Ulenje 17 2 2
Igoma 12 7 2
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It is difficult to reconcile these different perspectives. But they are not com-
pletely incompatible. It is possible for people to become richer despite farming 
less land if farming large areas is no longer the mainstay of their livelihood. 
Likewise it is possible that people may be recovering status to what they used to 
have in 1997—thus they are on an upward trajectory now, having declined in 
intervening years. During the follow- up visit to the villages in 2018, attempts 
were made to probe further on the findings of these narratives.
Having a better house was considered a reason for greater prosperity. Certainly, 
a good quality house opens up more opportunities in health and hygiene, and 
with access to electricity benefits are even greater. Many respondents felt prosper-
ous by living in decent house. Declining prosperity was linked to the increasing 
burden of taking care of families where resources were limited. Incidences of ill-
ness, disability, loss of household bread winner though death, or out migration 
overburdened some households to the extent that prosperity was hard to realize. 
From the narrative about a quarter of the households had lost parents due to 
death. Such households had often to sell the few assets they had in order to sur-
vive. This unfortunately compelled them to more misery. Such disadvantaged 
groups are not likely to realize benefits of economic growth.
Drivers of Prosperity
Assets are not only indicators of prosperity but also drivers for prosperity. Land is 
an important asset for wealth creation among rural households. It is clear from 
the study villages that land is scarce due to increasing population density. The 
typical landscape of the Uporoto Highlands is of farmland fragmented into small 
fields with no or little indication of untouched land for agricultural production.
The key crops that drive change to prosperity in the study villages are Irish 
potatoes for all villages and cabbages for Shibolya. Ulenje village is trying to catch 
up with Irish potato production after losing coffee and wheat as important cash- 
earning crops. However, Ulenje is constrained by scarcity of land and a more dis-
advantaged location in relation to accessing urban markets. Unfortunately, 
growing Irish potatoes is capital- demanding and not easily affordable by poor 
families. Such families find it difficult to realize prosperity through cultivation of 
Irish potatoes.
The Uporoto Highlands are experiencing rapid population growth amidst land 
scarcity for expansion of agricultural activities. In theory this scenario is expected 
to encourage agricultural intensification. However, this has not been realized. 
While poor families find it difficult to adopt agricultural intensification technolo-
gies, better- off families find it easy to rely on acquisition of more land for increas-
ing agricultural production rather than intensifying use of agricultural inputs and 
technology. This explains what Sokoni (2001) called partial agricultural intensifi-
cation on the Uporoto Highlands.
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Availability and access to urban markets is an important driver of change in 
welfare of rural families on the Uporoto Highlands. With improvement in trans-
port and communication infrastructure and services, rural families have more 
opportunities for reaching urban markets. Demand for agricultural produce 
influences what farmers choose to grow and accumulate as asset. Changes in 
market conditions do influence change in the farming system and crop com pos-
ition. Farmers’ response to opportunities arising from this improved access to 
markets varies with their economic status. The process of integration to the mar-
ket however marginalizes poorer families who are compelled to lose rather accu-
mulate assets such as land and livestock.
The Uporoto Highlands are rich in natural resources that have been under for-
est reserves. Some of the development in livestock and crop farming in the 1990s 
were influenced by access to and use these natural resources for agricultural pro-
duction. Recent developments and the national emphasis on conservation of the 
natural forest including the establishment of the nearby Kitulo National Park 
have brought greater restrictions on use of reserved land for agriculture. This has 
seriously affected the livestock- keeping system of open grazing. The option of 
zero- grazing system, though desirable, is difficult for poor households as it 
requires more capital and energy for livestock management. All in all further 
restrictions on use of natural forest reserves has contributed to the increase in 
zero grazing of cattle and smallstock.
Conclusion
In general terms some aspects of life are better now than in 1997. However, 
according to the qualitative information gathered the status of welfare varies 
remarkably among families. While well- off families on one hand have benefitted 
much from changes in the socio- economic environment by accumulating more 
wealth and assets that enhance their welfare; poor families on the other hand 
seem to have been disadvantaged by being compelled to sell their assets in order 
to meet the increasing cost of accessing social services. Consequently some of the 
latter have lost land and turned to selling labour to other farmers.
Between 1990s and 2010s, there have been improvements in availability and 
access by families to social services including education, health facilities, trans-
portation, and communication. However, this has meant increasing need for 
cash. Improvement in rural infrastructure for transportation and communication 
has meant greater opportunities for rural families to interact with urban markets 
that have encouraged greater production of crops and animal products needed in 
urban markets. Increased access to electricity from 1995 in Igoma and Ulenje 
 villages and from 2015 in Shibolya village has opened up opportunities for better 
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life and means of earning a living for the well- off families. Access to water has 
improved in the villages except for Shibolya village, whose villagers are still 
fetching water from rivers and streams.
Changes in household assets such as land, livestock, and housing do show 
long- term changes for better welfare among rural communities. However, poorer 
families appear to have not fared well in saving and building an asset base for 
improving their well- being. Improvement in conditions of housing is one of the 
indications of change to a better welfare among rural households.
The observed changes in families’ welfare are driven by a number of factors. 
Fast cash- earning crops (Irish potatoes, cabbages, carrots) have played a major 
role. This has been facilitated by a better access to urban markets and the prevail-
ing liberal market that gives families flexibility to decide what to grow. Better 
transportation and communication has been instrumental towards this develop-
ment. However, cultivation of most of these crops requires more energy and 
external inputs. Many poor families have been disadvantaged.
The improvement in access to electricity is a driver to farmers’ engagement in 
non- farm occupations for earning extra incomes outside agriculture and building 
their asset base. The socio- economic environment has opened up more op por-
tun ities for women to engage in production and own assets including land.
It is worth noting that drivers to prosperity are not static. In the 1990s the 
importance of pyrethrum had declined but appears to have re- emerged in the 
2010s, particularly for the poorer families that cannot afford the expensive pro-
duction of Irish potatoes. Once a driver to prosperity, tree planting seem to have 
lost its importance in recent years. It is apparent that conversion of crop fields 
into woodlots is in the long run not cost effective.
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Improved Livelihoods on Less Land
The Case of Ilambilole and Ikuwala Villages in Iringa 
Region, 1996–2017
Torben Birch- Thomsen and Esbern Friis- Hansen
Epilogue pages 417–420
‘Origin of the Story’
This chapter takes its point of departure in an interdisciplinary strategic en vir on­
men tal research programme Centre for Research on Sustainable Agriculture in 
Semi­ Arid Africa (SASA), financed from 1994–9 by the Danish Environmental 
Research Programme (Ministry of Environment). The collaborative venture 
involved researchers from the Centre for Development Research, the Royal 
Veterinary and Agricultural University and Roskilde University (Department of 
Geography and International Development Studies, RUC). The research referred 
to in this chapter is linked to the two sub­ projects entitled ‘Changing resource 
utilization and livelihood strategies’ and ‘Sustainable management of natural 
resources through local institutions’, undertaken between 1996–8 in two villages 
(Ikuwala and Ilambilole) within the semi­ arid parts of Iringa Region in Tanzania 
(see Figure 15.1). Ikuwala is located in Mazombe Ward close to the local centre of 
Ilula, a ward headquarters in 1997 and proclaimed a township in 2002 (Lazaro 
et al. 2019) with relatively easy access along a dirt road. Ilambilole, on the other 
hand, is located in Ismani Ward, and in 1997 was only accessible over rough dirt 
roads with limited access (4WD) during the rainy season. This was changed with 
the upgrading of the Iringa–Dodoma highway in 2013 and the connection 
between Kising’a and Ilambilole (see later for further details).
The original results of this research, reported in SASA (1999), Birch­ Thomsen 
et al. (2001), McDonagh et al. (2001), and Birch­ Thomsen et al. (2007), were 
based on data collected in a two­ stage process of fieldwork in the two villages. The 
first stage focused on land use and cover, settlement patterns, and environmental 
change through a combination of remotely sensed data (aerial photography 
and  satellite images), field observation and group and individual interviews. 
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The second stage concentrated on a socioeconomic baseline survey with a random 
sample of thirty­ four households in each village (including data on sources of 
income, agricultural production, and marketing) and qualitative information on 
the diversification of sources of income and the nature of decision­ making within 
ten households (for more details see Birch­ Thomsen et al. 2001). In 2016–17, the 
original research was followed up with a revisit to the two communities and 
households included in the first research with the aim of reporting and analysing 
changes in livelihoods and well­ being within the past twenty years.
Methods of the Revisit
During the revisit to and restudy of the two villages, several methods were used. 
First, focus­ group discussions were held with men and women respectively, also 
representing different age groups, to explore local definitions of wealth, wealth cat­
egories, and development progress in the villages. Second, a restudy of the original 
domestic units (households) using the ODK quantitative survey was undertaken 
(see Box 15.1). Third, a separate wealth­ ranking exercise of the current households 
was conducted using the current wealth criteria. Fourth, qualitative interviews were 
conducted to collect information on the history of the domestic households, their 
internal dynamics, history of land use, mobility of household members, etc. Fifth, 
the expansion and densification of settlements in the study villages were analysed 






































Figure 15.1 Location of study villages.
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Prior Status and Conditions
Findings of the Original Study (1996–8)
As part of the SASA project, a wealth­ ranking exercise was undertaken in all 
study sites, including Ikuwala and Ilambilole villages, as part of the baseline sur­
vey based on locally identified indicators of inequality (for further discussion of 
the wealth­ ranking criteria, see below). Based on the argument that livelihood 
divisions say more about resource management than socioeconomic divisions 
(the wealth ranking), the sub­ project developed a livelihood classification focus­
ing on ‘changing resource utilization and livelihood strategies’ (see Box 15.2). 
One of the results was that households that were otherwise classified as part of the 
intermediate wealth group were actually following more enterprising strategies 
more closely related to the well­ to­ do households (for more details, see Birch­ 
Thomsen et al. 2001).
An important aspect of the research findings was the significance of agricul­
ture as the resource base for households within all the strategy groups. This was to 
some extent contrary to the deagrarianization process reported in other studies 
(Bryceson 1999: 174). Although income diversification was taking place, agricul­
ture remained the most important sector to which other income­ earning oppor­
tunities related. The study identified four factors as important in explaining 
patterns of resource utilization and degradation:
Box 15.1 Success of identifying the original domestic units in 
the two villages
Ikuwala
•  Revisit to twenty­ six households out of thirty­ four, of which three house­
holds had moved from Ikuwala to Ding’inayo (4km), close to the urban 
centre of Ilula, and in one case the head of HH had passed away; now 
headed by the old wife.
•  Of the eight missing households, three no longer exist (passed away, 
age above 55 at the time of the original survey—all classified as ‘poor’ 
in 1997), and five could not be located (two ‘poor’, two ‘medium’, one 
‘wealthy’).
Ilambilole
•  Revisit to twenty­ one HH (+ one secondary domestic unit—son, Charles) 
of thirty­ four.
•  Of the twelve missing households five no longer exist (passed away, age 
above 60 at the time of the original survey—one ‘wealthy’ and four 
‘medium’), and seven could not be located (two ‘poor’, four ‘medium’, one 
‘wealthy’).
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 • The dominant resource management practices, in place since the mid­ 1950s, 
were still influenced by opportunities of farm expansion, reinforced by 
opportunities for accumulating farmers with access to technology (oxen and 
plough) and local, regional, and national markets for their commercial crops 
(tomatoes, sunflowers, and maize, particularly in Ikuwala, located close to 
the local market in Ilula; see Figure 15.1), potentially generating substantial 
incomes.
 • Poverty on a massive scale (extremely low land productivity, food insecurity, 
and reliance on piecework) influenced resource management among both 
the poorest and the lower middle households (approximately one­ third of 
all households; dominated by peasant­ labourers). Their management cap­
abil ities and their efforts to introduce intensification were reduced. The 
strategies embarked upon indicate that these households struggled to remain 
farmers.
 • The fact that the areas of Mazombe and Ismani were scarcely populated in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s indicate that population growth (natural 
increase plus in- migration) and intensified land use (shortening of fallow 
length) occurred over one generation. Knowledge and capacity still had to 
catch up with the process of intensification—intensified land use with low­ 
level use of chemical fertilizers and improved seeds.
Box 15.2 Characteristics of identified livelihood strategy 
groups in Ikuwala sub- village
Peasant- labour coping strategy (n=10)
•  Low agricultural income
•  Piecework (within farming)
•  Income from sale of fuelwood, grass, baskets
•  Beer­ brewing
Peasant strategy (n=11)
•  Some agricultural income (tomatoes, sunflower)
•  Additional income from piecework, natural resources, crafts, and petty 
commerce
Accumulating farmer strategy (n=13)
•  Substantial agricultural income (tomatoes, maize)
•  Additional income from business, craft, and rent
•  Employers; predominantly for weeding
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 • Political and institutional changes were observed to be important in explain­
ing unequal access to land and forest resources, often explained by institu-
tional ambiguity and lack of enforcement of rules at both village, ward, and 
district levels.
Historically, economic growth in the study area has been achieved by moving 
the agricultural frontier. The expansion of agriculture from the 1950s to the late 
1990s was documented through analyses of remote sensing data and interviews 
with key informants in both sites and villages (Birch­ Thomsen et al. 2001, Birch­ 
Thomsen et al. 2007; see also Figure 15.2). Land use changed from approximately 
5 per cent of land under cultivation in the mid­ 1950s around the few early settle­
ments (between ten and fifteen households) to 55 per cent by 1966. This dramatic 
expansion of agriculture and the clearing of forest was a common trend in the 
area (including Ikuwala) and created an agricultural frontier during the 1950s. 
Through interviews with the daughter of one of the early commercial farmers, we 
learned how the newcomers (people of the Wabena ethnic group from Njombe 
District/Region) employed kinsmen to assist in the land­ clearing and cultivation, 
leading many to decide to settle and start farming themselves. An example was 
given where ‘three hundred acres was cultivated and two hundred workers 
employed’. Settlement continued to be dispersed. The reduced area of land under 
























1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Year
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Figure 15.2 Land use change: expansion of agriculture and intensified land use from 
1956 to 2000, exemplified by Ilambilole village land data (cultivated land as 
percentage of total arable land within the village). 
Source: Birch­ Thomsen et al. 2007, based on land use classifications of aerial photographs (1956, ­59 
and ­78); USGS­ declassified satellite photography (1966); and Landsat satellite images (1986, ­96, 
and 2000).
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movement of people into villages, and government­ driven intensification. Land 
was abandoned or left fallow for a long time, either because it was claimed by the 
new village government (some disputes were still ongoing in 2017) or because of 
distance the new settlements were from the fields. The slower increase observed 
after 1978 included re­ cultivation of some of the fallow fields from the 1950s and 
1960s, but also through the inclusion of land in the hills and border areas in the 
seasonally flooded lowlands (Mbuga). The intensity of land use observed in 2000 
showed that hardly any more land could be transferred to cultivation.
Accessing land by renting or buying it became increasingly common as land 
became scarcer within the village. As shown in Figure 15.3 this practice extended 
beyond the village administrative boundaries (often related to more fertile land 
on the edge of the seasonal flooded areas), but another conclusion was that there 
was limited scope for the continuation of this process (SASA 1999). The expan­
sion of agriculture and conversion of grassland into farming increased conflicts 
between farmers and agro­ pastoralists (from the Maasai group).
In summary, the SASA study in the 1990s of livelihoods and resource manage­
ment showed the following:
Figure 15.3 Location of houses and fields of nine households selected for in­ depth 
interviews and field visits during the 1996–8 research. In addition to the landscape 
units of the study area, the dotted white lines indicate approximated village borders.
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 • a case of more people, more erosion (and loss of productivity) countering 
small­ scale farmers’ potential for intensification and the underlying forces 
driving this development (the so­ called Neo­ Boserupian school, as argued 
by Tiffen et al. 1994);
 • a case of land degradation (the neo- Malthusian school of thought), which on 
the community level was more related to the livelihood strategies of the 
poor (coping) than to the better off farmers who had the ability to pursue 
expansive and accumulating strategies.
These two ‘schools of thinking’ might fruitfully relate to each other, especially in 
marginal semi­ arid areas, where the dynamics of population increase and en vir on­
men tal change are often factors to consider in relation to changes in farming practice.
Overall Changes
When the SASA study ended in 1998, Ilambilole and Ikuwala were sleepy dusty 
villages located in semi­ arid areas. While Ikuwala was located relatively close to 
the main road, Ilambilole was only reachable on a poorly maintained unpaved 
road. Social services were limited to rudimentary primary schools, health dis­
pens ar ies, and a few small shops. Public water taps existed in Ilambilole, but in 
Ikuwala village water had to be collected in buckets from nearby Ilula village.
In the mid­ 1990s crop cultivation had recently been mechanized as a result of 
an NGO operating an ox­ training centre in the area. The SASA household survey 
shows that 71 per cent of households in Ikuwala and 91 per cent in Ilambilole 
used ox­ ploughing, of whom 63 per cent and 35 per cent respectively owned their 
own ox­ ploughs. Yields were very low, and maize was the main crop that was 
grown for subsistence, with surplus production being sold. The SASA household 
survey showed that 47 per cent of households in Ikuwala and 65 per cent in 
Ilambilole sold maize. Forty per cent of those who had surplus production 
for  sale sold fewer than five bags. Seasonal household food insecurity was 
common, and it was common that the young left for the city in the hope of a 
better future. Besides selling maize, both tomatoes (by 68 per cent of households) 
and sunflower (by 50 per cent of households) were sold by households in 
Ikuwala, and for Ilambilole only sunflower was sold (by 71 per cent of households)—
no tomatoes.
These agricultural activities however took place in the midst of considerable 
poverty. They were relatively spartan and generally small scale and were associ­
ated with land degradation. Opportunities for accumulation and wealth creation 
were limited. The two authors were therefore surprised when they returned two 
decades later to find both villages in the midst of dynamic socio­ economic 
change. A new tarmac road between Iringa and Ilambilole had reduced the travel 
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time from half a day to less than an hour. There are now eight scheduled trips 
with a minibus everyday between Ilambilole and Iringa and numerous motor­
bikes for hire. The improved road has also greatly improved market access. Today 
Ilambilole village has numerous trucks for hire and a newly established guest­
house where external traders can stay during the marketing season. Social ser­
vices have improved considerably, with the building of a new secondary school, 
upgrading of the dispensary to a hospital, and not least access to electricity in 
2015. In 2017 more than a third (231) of households had an electricity connec­
tion, and one out of every ten (fifty­ six) had a private water tap.
Population Increase, Change in Direction of Migration,  
Change in Importance of Remittances
According to a population census from 2017 (village office), Ilambilole village has 
a population of 3,928 persons (1,868 men and 2,058 women). Mr Muhanji (chair­
man of Ilambilole village during the time of the original study in 1990s) estimates 
that the population of Ilambilole has doubled over the past two decades. Fifty per 
cent of this increase happened over the past five years (the 2012 population cen­
sus recoded 2026 people in Ilambilole village). According to Mr Muhanji, migra­
tion of young people to urban centres has declined since the turn of the century 
and young people today see a future for themselves by staying in the village. In 
addition, because of the good public transport, every month new houses are con­
structed by people living in nearby Iringa town, who stay in the village during 
weekends and holidays—cheap access to land and potential to grow food crops 
for the family were mentioned as some of the reasons.
This immigration is in sharp contrast to the net emigration that characterized 
Ilambilole during the SASA study decades ago (Interview with former chairman, 
Mr Muhanji in 2017). In the 1990s Tanzania was experiencing the consequences 
of structural adjustment programmes that had eliminated subsidized markets and 
inputs for agricultural products. The consequences in Ilambilole and Ikuwala 
were the disruption of maize production and widespread household food in se­
cur ity that fuelled emigration to urban centres (Friis­ Hansen 2000).
The shift from emigration to immigration has also affected the importance of 
remittances. While 27 per cent of households in Ikuwala received remittances in 
1996, this had fallen to 17 per cent in 2016. The reduced importance of remit­
tances was even greater in Ilambilole village, where 22 per cent of households 
received remittances in 1996 and only 4 per cent in 2016.
The case below illustrates the importance of migration and remittances during 
the late 1990s and early 2000:
Andreas is thirty­ three years old and the son of Moses who was interviewed in 
1996 for the SASA study. Moses died in 1998 and left 7 acres (plus a 1­ acre plot 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 17/06/21, SPi
Improved Livelihoods on Less Land 323
with the house) to the three children. Andreas, being the only boy and the oldest 
child (16 years old at that point), had a meeting with his sisters regarding what 
to do with the land. Normally, in 1998, the son would inherit all land, but he 
wanted to change this, so he negotiated with his two sisters that he should get 3 
acres and the sisters 2 acres each. This is a change from the traditional way of 
dividing land when parents leave land to their children (normally only to the 
sons). This practice was also observed in another case of a ‘secondary domestic 
household’ in the village and seems to be an important gender­ related change in 
land inheritance!
Soon afterwards (in 1999) one of his sisters migrated to Dar es Salaam to find a 
job and earn an income to give her a living. She was lucky to get a job and a few 
years later got married—she still lives in Dar and keeps in regular contact over 
telephone. He and another sister, who is married and lives in the village, culti­
vate the 7 acres (including the fields of the sister in Dar). Because of the hard­
ships in Ilambilole he decided to move to Dar to stay with his sister in 2011, 
leaving his wife and two small children behind in the village; the wife’s family 
supported them and looked after them. His brother­ in­ law is a fundi, a handy­
man and builder, and Andreas worked with him for a year through which he 
learned construction skills and earned and saved some money, sending some of 
it back to his wife as a remittance.
Increased Pressure on Land Resources and Intensification 
of Agriculture
Population increase has contributed to increasing the pressure on land resources, 
especially for the poorer farmers. Dramatic increases in livestock numbers in 
Ilambilole have further contributed to the pressure on land. The increase in live­
stock occurred after the establishment of a cattle dip in 2006 that reduced live­
stock mortality. According to statistics on the wall of the village office, the number 
of cattle was about 8,000 in 2017, largely owned by Masaai agro­ pastoralists, who 
are settled in their own part of the village south of the village centre and separated 
from most of the cultivated land. All attempts by the village government to 
impose bylaws to limit the number of livestock have failed due to resistance from 
these herders. The large wetlands (mbuga) that extend to neighbouring Ikuwala 
and Vitono villages provide grazing for this increased number of cattle. However, 
according to the village chairman, the overstocking of cattle in the sub­ village 
populated with Maasai households has caused a high pressure on access to 
grazing and fodder. During the dry season this pressure spills over into con­
flicts with farmers in the rest of the villages, as Maasai­ owned cattle will graze 
on crop res idues in post­ harvest maize fields without permission from the 
owner (interview with village chairman 2017). The study did, however, not 
focus on this conflict.
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As a result, cultivated land is used more intensively and with reduced use of 
fallow. Since around 2010, many more farmers have been following the advice of 
agricultural extension officers to apply improved seeds, mineral fertilizers, pesti­
cides, and recently also herbicides increasingly for maize cultivation. This has 
increased yields and allowed some well­ off and emerging farmers to produce the 
same or more using less land—average land cultivated per household has declined 
from 6.2 acres (1997) to 4.5 (–27 per cent), and a similar trend is seen in Ikuwala, 
with a change from 9.2 acres to 6.9 (–25 per cent). Meanwhile others have continued 
using traditional methods of farming, though with low and stagnant yields. 
Another response to decreasing soil fertility has been a change in cropping pat­
terns, with a decline in the cultivation of beans and an increase in the cultivation 
of sunflowers (group interview 2017).
Whereas land for agriculture in Ilambilole and Ikuwala villages in the 1990s 
was mostly prepared by ox­ ploughing, two decades later, during the follow­ up 
study in Ilambilole, no farmers were using hand hoes for cultivation, ownership 
of ploughs and oxen was common, and more than one hundred ox teams and 
twenty­ six tractors were operating.
Enterprise Innovation and Access to Competitive Markets
The increased production capacity among the well­ off farmers who used seasonal 
inputs and enhanced access to competitive markets—in particular the new all­ 
weather road connecting Ilambilole with Kising’a village at the Iringa–Dodoma 
highway (see Figures 15.1 and 15.4)—through increased transport opportunities 
(buses, lorries, cars, motorbikes) have led to increased sales of crops, especially 
for traditional crops, e.g. maize and sunflowers, as well as new crops, e.g. toma­
toes in Ilambilole.
Maize has remained the main stable crop that almost all farmers are cultivating. 
While production and prices for maize have always varied both within and 
between seasons, according to farmers these variations have become stronger. In 
farmers’ perceptions, the rainy season has become more unpredictable, and the 
maize crop is frequently affected by drought. Even though market institutions 
have matured (i.e. more competition between crop traders in the village as their 
number has increased), the large inter­ seasonal variations in price that existed in 
the mid­ 1990s are still present today. Farmers’ needs for cash incomes are high 
immediately after the harvest, and most farmers sell to middlemen and hawkers 
at low prices. In addition, maize prices varied considerably from season to season. 
Because of the combination of high vulnerability of production and low prices 
post­ harvest, cases were observed where the farmers who have stuck to growing 
maize as their main commercial enterprise have been unable to accumulate or 
improve their well­ being.
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The most important new commercial enterprise in Ilambilole village is tomatoes. 
Tomatoes were already being cultivated in the area in the mid­ 1990s, in particular in 
Ikuwala village, located near Ilula along the Iringa–Dar es Salaam road. What is new 
is the innovative way in which early­ season tomatoes have been grown in Ilambilole 
since 2014. The rainy season starts three to four weeks earlier in Ilambilole village 
compared with Ilula village, where most tomatoes are grown. Tomato farmers in 
Ilambilole produce tomato seedlings in small nurseries ahead of the rainy season 
(see Figure 15.5). These nurseries are irrigated with buckets of water collected from 
public domestic water taps. To mitigate the risk associated with the uncertainty of 
when the rainy season starts, farmers produce a sequence of two sets of tomato 
seedlings, one week apart. This allows them to replant tomatoes if the first set of 
seedlings fail because of early­ season drought. Early­ season tomatoes fetch up to 
35,000 TSh per tenga (the basket used to carry tomatoes in, equivalent to about 
60 kilos), compared with prices as low as 2000 TSh per tenga during the peak  season. 
Successful tomato farmers cultivate up to 6 acres of early­ season tomatoes, from 
which they can earn several million TzSh (several thousand $US) each season.
Diversification and Upgrading of Non­ agricultural Activities
Diversifying from agriculture to non­ agriculture enterprises is a key socio­ 
economic change that has occurred over the past two decades. In the mid­ 1990s 
Figure 15.4 Construction of the metalled surface of the all­ weather road between 
Ilambilole and Kising’a, November 2017.
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agriculture dominated along with low threshold non­ agricultural activities such 
as brewing and selling a drum of millet or maize beer (pombe), charcoal burning, 
traditional handicrafts, and petty trade. Today non­ agricultural activities play a 
much more important role and comprise four different types of high­ threshold 
enterprises, namely shops and bars, processing of agricultural products, hiring of 
tractor and transport services, and trading in crops. While non­ agricultural activ­
ities were an occupation of the poor in the 1990s, it is today an occupation of the 
wealthiest. Table 15.1 below shows the extent of non­ agricultural enterprises in 
Ilambilole village today.
Two forms of enterprise, tractors and shops, are dominant. In 1996 there were 
no tractors in Ilambilole and only one in Ikuwala. Today there are twenty­ six 
tractors in Ilambilole (Table 15.1). In 1996 there were only a few poorly equipped 
shops and a small teahouse in Ikuwala and Ilambilole villages. Today there are not 
only more shops, twenty­ eight in Ilambilole village as shown in the table, but also 
a range of different shops offering specialized services, such as household items, 
furniture, bicycle repair, mobile phone and electronics, mechanic and not least 
agricultural input supply and tools.
Another large­ scale non­ agricultural activity that a small group of well­ off 
farmers have become engaged in is trading in crops. These crop traders rely on 
the historical intra­ seasonal variations in the price of maize. They buy maize at 
low prices immediately after the harvest, store the maize safely for three to six 
Figure 15.5 Home garden tomato nursery in Ilambilole.
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months and sell it to urban customers when prices are higher during the rainy 
season. Historically they have been able to double their capital over a six­ month 
period. To be successful, crop traders need start­ up capital to buy crops, have 
safe storage and access to the hire or ownership of a truck, and be trustworthy 
and respected in the community. Successful crop traders often combine this 
activity with the cultivation of early­ season tomatoes, as the timing of these 
htwo activities are complementary (tomatoes in February–May, crop trade in 
July–December).
Towards a Commercial Rural Labour Market
In the mid­ 1990s, the labour markets in Ilambilole and Ikuwala villages were in 
transition, with a decline in traditional reciprocal labour arrangements—in 
Kibena/Kihehe called migoe or ‘beer party’—towards increased use of casual 
labour. In the traditional migoe system, a farmer can call on her friends and 
neighbours to help carry out a specific task that can be done by a group of farmers 
in one day, such as weeding a field. Locally brewed opaque finger millet or maize 
beer is served after the work. In return, you are expected to send a family member 
to participate if or when someone who had worked on your field previously 
organizes their own beer party. At the time of the SASA study, well­ off farmers 
had abandoned the migoe system and were using casual labour paid in cash or 
kind (food or ploughing services) during periods of labour peaks (land prep ar­
ation and weeding). Poor farmers had begun to work as casual labourers during 
these periods, with negative effects in respect of delaying land preparation and 
weeding on their own cultivated fields.
Today, two decades later, the labour system has undergone yet another transi­
tion. Increase in casual labour use was observed in a study of the rural hinterlands 
of Njombe town (Ørtenblad et al. 2019). The traditional migoe system is no longer 
practised and has been replaced by hiring casual labour paid with cash. Use of 
casual labour instead of relying of family labour has also become much more 
Table 15.1 Private shops and business in Ilambilole village 2017
Enterprises and services Number
Tractors 26
Sunflower oil mill 2





Source: Interview with chairman and secretary of Ilambilole village.
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widespread among the wealthiest farmers. Well­ off farmers hire casual labour for 
all tasks all year round, while some poor farmers rely on casual labour work as 
their main occupation all year round. For early­ season tomato farming, the 
labour market has been even more formalized. Tomato farmers hire labour from 
outside the village on contract for the duration of the tomato­ cropping season. 
These contract labourers usually stay and eat with their host family. For a more 
detailed discussion of the emerging rural labour market in Iringa, see 
(Mshote 2012).
Trajectories
Ikuwala and in particular Ilambilole have experienced considerable socio­ 
economic development over the past two decades. A good indicator of this eco­
nomic growth is the construction of new houses and improvements to existing 
houses. In what follows we discuss this using the case of Ilambilole, the map 
below, which covers the central settlement, showing a dramatic increase in the 
number of new houses between 1995 and 2008 (sixty­ four houses, or 5.3 houses 
per year) and even higher growth rate of houses from 2008 to 2014 (forty houses, 
or 6.7 houses per year; see Figure 15.6 and 15.7 below). One should note that the 
newly constructed houses are considerably bigger than the houses that existed in 
1996 and that a number of larger houses with communal functions (guesthouse, 
bars, shops) have been constructed along the main street.
Qualitative group interviews, moreover, indicate that the quality of houses has 
improved considerably across all three well­ being categories (see Table 15.2). In 
1996 the main difference between the houses of the well­ off farmers and those of 
the poorer farmers were whether they had burned bricks and corrugated iron 
roofs (see Figure 15.7). In 2017 many of the houses of the poor have iron­ sheet 
roofs, while the houses of the well­ off and middle group have improvements such 
as electricity, television, piped water, windows with glass, etc.
Change in Rural People’s Perceptions of Well­ Being
In 1996, well­ being was assessed using three asset­ based indicators (ownership of 
land, ownership of livestock, and crop production) combined with three social 
indicators (household food security, work for others, hire of labour).
In addition to these six indicators, another six indicators were added in 2017, 
namely three more asset­ based indicators (ownership of implements, access to 
electricity, and quality of house) and three more social indicators (use of seasonal 
agricultural inputs, access to education, and access to health services). Adding 
new indicators of well­ being is in part the result of methodological differences 
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(number indicators were deliberately kept low during the 1996 survey, as they 
were based on quantitative data) and in part because farmers perceive some indi­
cators as becoming more important for well­ being. Examples of indicators added 
by farmers because of their increased importance to well­ being are access to 
health and educational services, where service levels have increased considerably 
(e.g. upgrading of health clinic to hospital and building of secondary school in 
Ilambilole village) and where access to these services to a large extent depends on 
the well­ being status of the household. See Table 15.2 below summarizing farm­
er’s perceptions of well­ being in Ilambilole in 2017.
Qualitative individual and group interviews with farmers indicate, moreover, 
that for some indicators the content has remained constant, while the gap between 
the poor and well­ off has increased for others. Examples of this increase in social 
differentiation are the two indicators relating to labour relations. In 1996 one or a 
few casual labours was used by the well­ off during agricultural labour peaks, e.g. 
for land preparation and weeding. According to SASA data (1996) twelve house­
holds out of thirty­ four (35 per cent) worked as casual labour. In 2017, the well­ 
off hired ten to twenty casual labours all year round for all agricultural tasks, and 
as a new development, average farmers also now hire casual labours. Moreover, a 
new labour arrangement has developed whereby workers from outside the village 
Ilambilole village centre in  2005
New houses in 2008
New houses in 2014
N
0 100 200 meters
Figure 15.6 Expansion and densification of settlement in Ilambilole village, 2005–14. 
Source: Google Earth time series of satellite images: 2005, 2008, and 2014.
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are employed by the well­ off or average farmers for two to three months during 
the tomato season. The content of the ‘work as casual labour’ well­ being indicator 
has also changed. In 1996, poor farmers typically worked as casual labourers for 
well­ off farmers for short periods a few times yearly. In 2017 casual labour had 
become the main occupation for some poor farmers.
Change in Well­ Being, 1996–2017
Table 15.3 below show the change in well­ being over a twenty­ year period, based 
on re­ interviews of the participants of the 1996 SASA household survey (or their 
Figure 15.7 Housing standard in (A) 1996 and (B) in 2017.
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secondary units). Both villages have experienced a significant decline in the num­
ber of poor (an approximately 30 per cent decline in both Ikuwala and Ilambilole 
villages; see Table 15.3). In Ikuwala, the decline in poverty has translated into a 
corresponding increase in the middle well­ being ranking category, while in 
Ilambilole village the number of well­ off has almost doubled.
These changes in the relative numbers belonging to the three well­ being cat­
egor ies hide a more complex picture of both upward and downward social mobil­
ity (1) between the well­ off and the middle, and (2) between the middle and the 
poor. The evidence also shows that no one who was a well­ off farmer then is poor 
today and no one who was poor then is well­ off today.




Land >20 acres 5–20 acres <5 acres
Agriculture 
production
25 MT maize/>3 tonne/
acre; large­ scale tomato 
production
12 MT maize/<2 tonne/
acre; some engaged in 
tomato production
1.5 MT maize/1/3 
tonne/acre; not 
involved in tomato 
production
Use of inputs Improved inputs on all 
of the fields every year; 
use herbicide
Partial use of inputs; 
combined use of 
fertilizer and rotation of 
fields
Use local seed; rotate 
fields and occasional 
fertilizer of manure
Livestock >300 cows, 150 goats, 
100 pigs, and 50 
improved chickens
10 cows, 10 pigs, 10 
goats, and 15 local 
chickens




Hire 10–15 workers for 
all tasks; seasonal 
labour for tomato 
production
May hire workers for 
some tasks; hire 
seasonal labour for 
tomato production




Never work as casual 
labourer
Occasional work as 
casual labourer, when in 
need of cash to pay of 
expenditure
Shift between 
working as casual 
labourer and working 
in own farm
Implements Own tractor, oxen/
plough, donkey­ cart, 
car/lorry, and/or 
motorbike
Some own oxen/plough, 
donkey­ cart others hire; 
own motorbike
Hire tractor or oxen 
for land preparation; 
some own bicycles
Electricity All have solar/
electricity; electric light, 
satellite TV, and fridge
Solar and some access to 
electricity; electric light 
and some satellite TV
No solar or electricity
House Burned bricks, tile, or 
iron roof; some have 
inside water tap, toilets, 
glass windows
Unburned bricks, iron 
roof; not plastered; 




thatched roof; no 
glass windows
Source: group interview with key informants and individual follow­ up interviews.
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The 1996 SASA study found that farmers’ perceptions of well­ being categories 
based on criteria relating to assets and social relationships and entitlements did 
not provide a clear picture of the types of resources from which wealth was 
derived or how resources were allocated. In particular, among the middle well­ 
being category one finds different patterns of resource use and allocation, where 
some resemble the well­ off business­ oriented farmers, while others are more 
defensive in their strategies, like the poor well­ being category.
Changes in Livelihood Strategies
As discussed in the introduction, the SASA study identified three livelihood strat­
egies, the accumulating strategy, the peasant strategy, and the peasant­ labour 
coping strategy. During the follow­ up study, through qualitative case­ study inter­
views with selected households we explored how these three livelihood strategies 
have evolved over two decades.
The original accumulating strategy comprised a diverse group of both young 
and established households with high incomes from both agriculture and sources 
based on business, crafts, and rents. They sought to invest incomes derived from 
agriculture in expanding the cultivated area and in non­ agricultural income­ 
generating activities such as running kiosks, masonry, the maize trade, or invest­
ments in housing (Birch­ Thomsen et al. 2001). Through discussions with farmers 
in 2017, we found that this had been further developed and transformed into an 
integrated market and agriculture strategy with two key characteristics. First, these 
households view agriculture as a business and base their decisions and focus their 
activities on what is demanded by the market and is profitable to produce. 
Secondly, these households are able to combine and create synergies between 
agricultural activities during the rainy season with the crop trade and other busi­
ness activities in the dry season. The follow­ up study identified two groups of 
people following this livelihood strategy: first, farmers who were accumulating 
Table 15.3 Changes in well­ being, 1996 to 2017, in Ilambilole and Ikuwala villages
Village Well- being category 1996 2017
Ilambilole Well­ off 16% 29%
Middle 38% 33%
Poor 47% 38%
Ikuwala Well­ off 21% 19%
Middle 46% 57%
Poor 33% 23%
Source: SASA household survey 1996 and follow­ up survey of primary and secondary 
households 2017.
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two decades ago and who gradually used their resources to build synergies 
between agriculture and business, as in the case of Augustini discussed below; 
and secondly, a group of young male graduates from secondary­ school with 
limit ed capital, but wide social networks (using mobile phones) and the ability to 
exploit business opportunities.
Augustini, who lives in Ilambilole village, is an example of a well­ established 
and innovative farmer who has successfully integrated her business and farming 
activities. Augustini explained that she had managed to build a reputation as a 
shrewd crop trader to organize farmers to deliver their maize harvest to her ware­
house, where she stored the crops for three months before reselling it to urban 
wholesalers or resident tomato farmers. She has twelve children, and the whole 
extended family helped each other with trading. One of her daughters owned a 
four­ tonne lorry, which she used to transport the maize. There are today clear 
synergies between the trade in crops and agriculture. She started growing toma­
toes as a cash crop in 1998, but the poor road made it a high­ risk enterprise, and 
prices were as low as 1000 TZs per tenga. The opening of a new and improved 
road in 2015 provided an opportunity to introduce tomato production in 
Ilambilole village. By preparing tomato seedlings before the first rains (using 
water from the public domestic water supply), Augustini has been able to harvest 
tomatoes three to four weeks before the main tomato season and earn premium 
prices. In 2016 she sold 200 tenga of tomatoes for 30,000 TSh each, giving her an 
income of six million TSh. She used this income to buy maize from other farmers 
at 70,000 TSh per bag, which she sold on to wholesalers at 100,000 to 130,000 TSh 
per bag three months later. Some of this income is used for home consumption 
and inputs for tomato production, while the remainder is used to support sec­
ondary and university education for her children.
Charles’s father practised a peasant­ labour coping strategy in 1996 and is today 
engaged in an integrated market and agriculture livelihood strategy. When 
Charles (see Box 15.1) returned from Dar es Salaam to Ilambilole village in 2012, 
he used his savings to invest in cultivating tomatoes as a high­ input enterprise. 
He stated, ‘tomatoes have changed our living, it is the reason for our develop­
ment’. Similar to established sell­ off farmers, he is able to grow an early­ season 
tomato crop. He prepares irrigated tomato seedlings using expensive improved 
seeds ready for planting with the first rains and applies fertilizer and pesticides. In 
the 2016/17 season he produced 145 tenga of tomatoes from 1 acre, from which 
he earned 3.6 million TSh. Some of this he transported on a hired truck and sold 
in Ilula wholesale market, and some was sold to local middlemen.
The original peasant strategy was associated with neither taking too much risk 
nor engaging strongly in the market economy. This group combined intermediate 
agricultural incomes with making craft items from natural resources and petty 
business. This peasant strategy has today been replaced by a conservative 
production- oriented livelihood strategy in which households focus on agricultural 
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production, e.g. cultivating maize, sunflowers, and other traditional crops. The 
follow­ up study found that farmers who adhered to this livelihood strategy were 
less interested in marketing or linking up with outside traders, but simply sold 
their surplus production to local traders in the village.
Mr Justin Wilson in Ikuwala village is a farmer who twenty years ago was one 
of the wealthiest in the village, engaged in a strategy to accumulate as much land 
as possible and cultivate maize using a tractor bought with a bank loan. When he 
was revisited in 2017, Mr Wilson gave the impression of being a conservative 
middle­ aged farmer with a stagnant farm. He had persisted with a production 
focus, e.g. the extensive cultivation of maize, and had not been able to success­
fully respond to dry season market opportunities such as growing tomatoes or 
trading crops. The risks associated with cultivating maize have increased signifi­
cantly over the past two decades. On the one hand, climate change has increased 
the variability of the rainfall pattern and maize production, leading to crop loss in 
early or mid­ season droughts, as was the case in 2016/17, when Mr Wilson har­
vested only twenty bags of maize from 14 acres. On the other hand, maize may 
also be loss­ generating during good rainfall seasons, when all the farmers have 
good harvests, resulting in low market prices. This was the case during the 
2017/18 season, when the prices paid by local crop traders was less than 10 $US 
per 90kg bag, insufficient to cover the seasonal input costs. While Justin Wilson 
was clearly still well­ off, he was perceived as stagnant compared with younger and 
more dynamic farmers/traders in the village.
Finally, the original peasant- labour coping strategy was associated largely with 
poor farmers pursuing subsistence farming and occasional casual work for  others, 
as well as earning an income from the collection of natural resources, e.g. thatch­
ing grass and fuelwood. During the follow­ up study in 2017 we found that this 
strategy had been replaced with what we identified as a poverty- trapped livelihood 
strategy. These farmers are for a variety of reasons poor and unable to produce a 
significant surplus for marketing. An important element in this strategy is taking 
work as casual labourers. Some are trapped in poverty because of the poor yields 
of the field crops (predominantly maize), poor crop husbandry and insufficient 
money to buy mineral fertilizer or cow manure. Others are engaged in working as 
casual labourers for other farmers as their main occupation. Today work as day 
labourers is available year­ round, and the pay has increased to 3 $US per day, 
which allows workers to be food secure. However, others are too old or sick to 
cultivate their fields properly or to work as casual labourers.
Luben from Ikuwala village was poor when the SASA project interviewed him 
in 1996 at the age of 33 and was in spite of some progress still perceived as poor 
today twenty years later. He is still cultivating the same 4 acres he owns along with 
also renting a field in the wetlands. He grows a mixture of maize, sunflowers, and 
cowpeas. During the 2017 season he harvested 3.5 bags of maize, which was 
insufficient to feed his family. The explanation for the low yields was poor rain 
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and poor crop husbandry. He also grew tomatoes on his rented wetland fields and 
in 2017 harvested 15 tenga in the first week, which he sold for 13,000–15,000 TSh 
per tenga at the main market in Ilula Township. After the first week, prices were 
so low that he gave up selling any more. Other sources of cash income come from 
selling ten bags of sunflower at 50,000 TSh per bag and looking after other peo­
ple’s livestock. Luben has experienced two major improvements to his livelihood 
over the past twenty years. First he managed to build a new house with burned 
bricks and iron roofing. Secondly, he has managed to buy or otherwise accumu­
late twelve cows and fifteen goats, which he keeps in a boma next to his house, 
assisted by a young boy who lives with his family. The income he receives for 
looking after an additional twenty cows includes keeping the milk and manure 
produced by the animals. Access to grazing is a major challenge, and he was fined 
100,000 TSh by the village government in 2016 because his cows were grazing on 
other people’s land. He had to sell three loads of cow manure at 50,000 TSh per 
load to pay the fine, even though he needed it for his own fields. Even though 
ownership to assets in terms of twelve cows and fifteen goats place him in the 
average well­ being category (see Table 15.2), he is nevertheless perceived by him­
self and others as poor because of low scores in other well­ being categories. For 
example, he told us during the re­ interview in 2017 that he had no money to buy 
inputs for improved crop production, including fertilizer and hybrid tomato seeds.
Conclusion
Change in the Role of Land
At the time of the SASA project (1994–9), access to land was seen as the most 
important asset across all household categories. For the well­ to­ do households 
the focus was on expanding their land holdings by either buying or renting land 
outside the village area. This strategy of land accumulation was seen as an invest­
ment in improving overall livelihoods. For the medium­ wealth group, farming 
was important as a strategy sustaining their livelihoods. This included renting 
land, which allowed the household flexibility according to its needs and availabil­
ity. For the poorer households land was constrained to small and low fertility 
plots, which was compensated through working as casual labour for other 
farmers.
In 2017 land was no longer seen as the only or most important source of accu­
mulation. As entrepreneurial households stated in particular, it was now seen as 
more important to use land efficiently based on better land management through 
the use of external inputs (improved seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides/herbicides). 
The accumulation strategy had shifted from extensive land to intensive land­ use 
practices (using less land with increased yields). Furthermore, strategies 
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combining farming with other business activities (e.g. crop trading, shop­ keeping, 
and other income­ generating activities) were seen as a way of improving livelihoods.
Changes in Well­ Being
Based on the follow­ up study, we find indications of a general improvement in 
well­ being across all categories. However, at the same time social differentiation 
has increased within communities, as illustrated in Figure 15.8 below. One should 
note that, while all have become better off, the rate of improvement in well­ being 
has been higher for the well­ off than for the poor.
While the overall trend is increased well­ being, there are variations between 
the two villages. In both villages the percentage belonging to the poor has 
declined. In Ilambilole the percentage who belong to the well­ off well­ being cat­
egory has increased, while it is the middle well­ being category that has increased 
in Ikuwala village. Moreover, qualitative fieldwork revealed considerable upward 
and downward social mobility between well­ being categories, in particular 
between the middle and well­ off well­ being category and the middle and poor 
well­ being category. Qualitative interviews indicate that downward social mobil­
ity is experienced when two or more major expenses (e.g. sickness in the family, 
secondary education, investments in improvements to the house) and/or tem por ary 
reductions in income (e.g. drought, failure in business and trade) occur at the same 
time. Upward social mobility seems increasingly to be associated with education.
Change in Livelihood Portfolio
The 1990s study concluded that the dominant overall strategy was related to 







Figure 15.8 Relative overall changes in well­ being from 1998 to 2017.
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In contrast to the livelihood strategies identified in the original study (see Box 
15.2), the follow­ up study revealed much more diversified livelihood strategies. 
The revisit study indicates that some farmers have become much more business­ 
oriented and engaged with what the follow­ up study called an integrated market 
and agriculture strategy. Farmers who have managed to establish synergies 
between agricultural, non­ agricultural enterprises and trade are among those 
who have experienced the highest increases in well­ being. Farmers who are 
engaged in a conservative production- oriented livelihood strategy have not experi­
enced any upward social mobility. This group includes some of the farmers who 
were following the ‘accumulating farmers’ strategy’ in the 1990s and have continued 
their extensive farming practices. Farmers who follow a poverty- trapped livelihood 
strategy are fewer today compared with the 1990s, even though many of the 
mechanisms are the same. Working as casual labour for other farmers or busi­
nesses has become much more important for this group.
Part of the change in livelihood compositions has been enabled through 
increased rural­ urban linkages spurred by the transformation of Ilula over the 
past two decades, from ‘village’ to ‘township’ status (Agergaard et al. 2021). These 
changes includes improved infrastructure (roads, public transport, communica­
tions), access to profitable tomato markets (local traders, lorry rental, TASAF 
market in Ilula Township), and improved access to education and health services 
(see Lazaro et al. 2019).
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Stepping out of the bus in Uchira in 1996 the first thing that you noticed was the 
dust. The highway stretching from Nairobi to Dar- es- Salaam, unpaved at this 
point, split the village in two. Clouds of red dust hurled into the air by the lum-
bering lorries, crowded dala- dala, and the occasional DFP- plated1 Landcruisers 
and tourist vehicles created a thick blanket that shrouded the village during day-
light hours. Despite (or because of) the dust, the economy of Uchira grew as a 
market and transport town. I arrived there, with two friends, in the summer of 
our second year at the University of Cambridge as undergraduates. A chance 
meeting in Cambridge, of a Tanzanian doctor, had drawn us there for a six- week 
period. Working with the village council, we produced the ‘Uchira Village Report’, 
based on an archaeology of aid- funded projects and public infrastructure. We 
lived with a farmer and part- time Pentecostal pastor and his family, in the neigh-
bouring village of Kirua, a further 6km up the hills that rose beyond Uchira. Our 
energetic and wily guide, village councillor Ernest Msuya, escorted us, naïve stu-
dents, in the politics and rhythms of the place. These are the roots of this chapter: 
a first attempt to delineate a narrative of change and continuity in Uchira over a 
period of twenty- two years.
I explore here two broad brush aspects of Uchira during this period: liveli-
hoods patterns and public and private infrastructure. Part of the basis for these 
1 Dala- dala is Swahili for the small minibuses that provide most short- range transport. DFP is an 
acronym for ‘donor- funded project’ and is the official licencing designation for vehicles imported 
through aid projects.
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observations is several discrete anthropological interactions generating data from 
multiple methods (my PhD field work and a DFID funded project 2004–6, work 
with a local NGO from 2002–11, research for a Bill and Melinda Gates funded 
study in 2016). But Uchira is not just a research site, it is a place that is indelibly 
woven into my life, personally and professionally. There are two accounts of 
change woven into this chapter—change to Uchira, and change in the way I see 
Uchira. I have seen it as a student of anthropology in the 1990s, as a young mother 
and new academic in the 2000s, and in the last decade as maturing academic, aid 
critic, wife, in- law, and mother of a village Chairman’s grandchildren.
Uchira defies a single narrative of change, and all this chapter attempts to do is 
to comb out one or two of the threads. The Nigerian novelist, Chimamanda Ngozi 
Adichie, argued in her influential TED talk 2009 that there is danger in trying to 
tell a single story: it necessarily reduces and simplifies.2 Yet, some development 
academics and the aid industry tend to want a simple narrative, and it is in ev it-
able that this book, a collection of diverse stories will be read and interpreted by 
some who are looking for ‘evidence’ to support their preferred narrative and 
assumptions. The careful and thoughtful analyst will always be cautious in mak-
ing conclusions, but the claim- making simplification monster of the aid business 
will not (Hickel 2016, Chambers 2017, Yanguas 2018).
I take inspiration in this chapter from anthropologists in political ecology, and 
the work of Tania Murray Li (2014) and Paige West (2016) in their explorations of 
conjunctures: the factors and forces that shape social relations, lives, and liveli-
hoods, but that do not determine them. Maia Green’s (2014) longitudinal 
an thropo logic al exploration of civil society in southern Tanzania also gave me 
confidence that my own observations on the cultural force of the concept of 
maendeleo (development) were justified. This chapter is a first attempt to give 
form to some of the ways Uchira has changed since 1996.
To some degree, Uchira can be read as a story of a frontier, in the sense that 
Li (2014) uses it. It grew as a settlement (1950s) when land was easily available to 
those who would settle there. By 1996 there was no more spare land, it was all 
claimed, and owned in one way or another. This structured relations between 
people: between the generations, and between incomers and the settlers. Since 
that time, water infrastructure and availability intersect with urban spread and 
rapid population growth. Climate dynamics, new technologies, the patterns of 
Tanzanian economic growth, the evolution of the CCM state, fervent religiosity, 
aid, and development interventions all influence Uchiran lives. Yet there is also 
considerable consistency here. For many life and livelihoods are not significantly 
different in the period from 1996 to the present time. Livelihood characteristics 
remain remarkably similar, even if there is some change in the assets that people 
2 https://www.ted.com/talks/chimamanda_adichie_the_danger_of_a_single_story?language=en.
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hold. The provision of health and education services is recognizably consistent 
(with changes in access, but not in quality), and surely supports a narrative that 
the economic growth seen in recent decades has not translated into trans form-
ation in public service provision, except in quite ad hoc and aid- dependent fash-
ion (see Kessy et al. 2013).
The chapter is divided into three sections: the first maps how Uchira has 
changed physically through comparing observations on infrastructure and insti-
tutions from points in 1996, 2004, and 2016 using maps which detail institutions 
and noteworthy features of ‘development’ (as defined by the village council). The 
second part explores the nature of services provision in more detail, based on 
detailed observations and interviews throughout the period of 1996 to the pre-
sent time. Finally, the nature of dynamics of livelihoods patterns in Uchira are 
reviewed through comparative analysis of life history and livelihoods interviews 
in 2004 and 2016, supplemented with interview and observation data from across 
the entire period. Finally, the chapter concludes by highlighting key observations 
of change, but also of continuity and decline.
A Village on a Frontier
Uchira is a village settlement, 15km east from Moshi on the Dar- es- Salaam main 
highway. A village (kijiji) in Tanzania refers to the lowest level of the local govern-
ment system, and is a geographical unit comprising a number of smaller hamlets 
(kitongoji). Hence the village area of Uchira covers the area of settlement around 
the highway (comprised of small shops, public institutions, and bars), but also 
extends some 6km upland to border the next village of Kirua and 6km into the 
flat plains to Miwaleni Springs, covering a total area of around 100 km2.
Uchira evolved as a settlement in the 1950s–60s as land shortages on the slopes 
of Kilimanjaro and the Pare Mountains encouraged migration (of younger sons) 
from both Chagga and Pare ethnic groups. These plains were frontier land for 
those willing to settle. Originally land allocations were presided over by elders 
from these areas, but with the abolition of ‘traditional’ authority under Nyerere 
control of lands came under the control of the village council. Land ownership 
patterns dating back to the original settlers are still present, and an active market 
for land leasing was evident in the 1990s.
By the 1990s, Uchira was an active market town around the highway—small 
grocery shops, hardware stores, carpenters, mechanics, and barbers lined the 
roadside (Figure  16.1). The weekly livestock and vegetable markets attracted 
Maasai cattle traders from a wide area and contributed to the local economy, and 
particularly the establishment of pubs and bars to serve the market- day trade. 
Away from the roadside trading activities, Uchira’s agricultural economy was 
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based on the rain- fed cultivation of maize and beans primarily for food, with 
some additional cultivation of ground nuts and sunflowers as cash crops for those 
with the capital to invest in agricultural inputs. The 1996 study identified various 
attempts were made over the decades to tap local water sources for irrigation. In 
the 1970s FAO built a series of irrigation reservoirs with boreholes (labelled on 
Figure  16.1 as boreholes 1, 2, and 3), but they were never fully operational as 
designed (see De Bont  2018). At this time, the diesel pumps and boreholes 
attached to these sites were being used on a small scale, but this was highly limit ed 
due to the cost of fuel. The village council of Uchira had a plan to dam the sea-
sonal Uchira River for irrigation and was actively seeking funds for the project.
The other significant livelihood activity in Uchira was quarrying stone and 
gravel for building—local people say that ‘Uchira grows stones’, and there was one 
significant large quarry site (run as a co- operative) where the volcanic rock was 
cut by hand tools into bricks. The large blocks were also broken up for sale as 
aggregate, with this activity being done by individuals and family groups.
By 1996, Uchira was a heterogenous settlement in terms of wealth. Its setting in 
Kilimanjaro Region makes it part of one of the most socially and educationally 
mobile areas of Tanzania. Early missionary activity in education led many Chagga 
and Pare to important positions in newly independent Tanzania. Hence in Uchira, 


















































































Figure 16.1  Uchira village map, 1996.
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successful migrants, eager to demonstrate their success in their home village. 
Uchira is further heterogenous in terms of ethnicity (primarily a mix of Pare and 
Chagga, but with small numbers of other groups) and religion (various Islamic 
and Christian denominations). Religious identity appeared to be quite fluid and 
people changed religion/affiliation and intermarried. In 1996, the Catholic and 
Lutheran churches were significant providers of health services.
The village council were active in pursuing local development projects. Market 
activities generated local revenue through taxation and fees, and the council 
mobilized villager’s contributions and labour to begin the construction of a sec-
ondary school. Three primary schools served different areas of the village, and the 
government- operated Karamsingii dispensary offered health services. The biggest 
problem for Uchira, according to the village council, was domestic water. Uchira 
did have the remnants of a piped water system, constructed in the late 1960s, but 
this had ceased to function. In the rainy season, irrigation channels, rainwater 
collection, and the seasonal rivers served domestic water needs. However, in the 
dry season women and children had to walk significant distances to the hills, or 
down to Miwaleni Springs to fetch water. Private tankers also brought water to 
the village for purchase.
Uchira in 2004
I did not return to Uchira in the years between 1996 and 2002; however, Ernest 
Msuya, my first guide, wrote regular letters to me concerning village council pro-
jects. They were seeking assistance to build a hospital ward at the Karamsingii 
dispensary. GtZ (now part of GiZ) had come with a project to rehabilitate the 
water supply through community- based management, and the villagers had com-
pleted the building of Mashingia Secondary School. They were just awaiting the 
adoption of the school by the district council, and for the Ministry of Education 
to supply teachers. The main highway had been paved by the central government 
using loan finance from the World Bank. The red dust no longer choked the vil-
lage during daylight hours.
My PhD research (Cleaver and Toner 2006; Mdee 2008, Toner 2008) forms the 
basis of my observations in 2004–5. My focus was on the community- based man-
agement of the water supply but sought to embed this in an analysis of participa-
tion and power in the collective life of the village. I spent extended periods living 
in the village in 2004 and 2005 working with Ernest Msuya. Figure 16.2 maps the 
village infrastructure in 2004.
The most significant physical changes in the village between 1996 and 2004 
were increases in the number of religious institutions, particularly Pentecostal 
churches (see Mdee 2013); and an expansion in quarrying activity, with five large- 
scale sites. The completion of the water project led to the construction of the 
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Uchira Water Users’ Association (UWUA) office, and this organization had 
become a significant political force in the village. The village council had become 
noticeably weaker. The village chairman in 1996, was now the chairman of 
UWUA and remains so to the present time. Twenty- four public water points were 
operational, selling water to villagers. Many of the wealthier families had private 
metered water connections. However, the water supply could still not meet 
demand throughout the year, and was rationed in the dry season.
The livestock market was closed suddenly, by the district government, in 2004 
due to an anthrax outbreak and this had a significant impact on Uchira’s roadside 
trading economy. It has never re- opened. The decline of several of the bars since 
the early 2000s followed. 2004 and 2005 were drought years, agricultural produc-
tion was severely affected, and hunger was visible in Uchira. Some families were 
receiving food aid, particularly those caring for large numbers of dependents 
driven by the HIV/AIDS pandemic which impacted, to some degree, on most 
families.
Uchira in 2016
I returned many times to Uchira between 2004 and 2016, having married the son 
of the village chairman, and being actively involved with Ernest Msuya in a local 




























































































Figure 16.2 Map of Uchira village, 2004.
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and Thorley 2016), and other projects. However, I did not map changes in the 
village until 2016, when I revisited livelihoods interviewees from my 2004 PhD 
fieldwork. Figure  16.3 was drawn by Yusuph Mfinanga (one of the original 
research assistants from the 2004/5 fieldwork, and who led the 2016 fieldwork).
The expansion of religious building and quarrying appeared to have stabilized. 
A new private girls’ Islamic secondary school has opened, and the Angel’s Gate 
Children’s Village for children with special needs is operating on the road to 
Kirua. The new dynamics of change in the physical nature of the village were now 
through private farmer- led irrigation, with local investors irrigating plots from 
bore- holes and the Miwaleni Springs. There is also an increasing population of 
urban incomers buying up village plots. These immigrants are relatively wealthy. 
Uchira is an attractive location for urban commuters from Moshi, as it is on the 
main road, has mains- grid electricity connection, and a reliable water supply. 
They find a ready market of affordable (for wealthy urbanites) land in the older 
generations of Uchirans who are eager to sell their plots to meet the cash demands 
of a ‘modern’ life. With the recent in- migration the number of ‘modern’ houses—
larger dwellings in their own compounds—has increased. Even in the 1990s the 
numbers of unimproved so- called ‘traditional’ houses were relatively low and 
numbers of these dwellings have further declined since 2004. They are more likely 
































































































































Figure 16.3 Map of Uchira and Koresa villages, 2016.
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In 2015 Uchira was split into two villages—Uchira and Koresa due to the popu-
la tion growth. Koresa is the western portion of former Uchira and incorporates 
the Miwaleni Springs settlement. It is in the process of the developing the infra-
structure and institutions required of a village—a village council, assembly, and 
village office. The village chairman of Koresa, my father- in- law, is still seeking 
funds to dam the river for irrigation.
Dynamics of Service Provision
The nature of my first interactions in Uchira has enabled me to present a detailed 
longitudinal assessment of public and social service provision. My academic 
focus in the years since 1996 has been on a holistic and integrated view of local 
governance and collection action on these aspects of village life. Table  16.1 
attempts to capture the nature of service provision at data points of 1996, 2004, 
and 2016, although my regular interactions in intervening years also allow me to 
comment on the dynamics of the changes that are observed.
In 1996, the village council was firmly in control of collective village life. The 
council collected the national development levy and head taxes in the livestock 
market, and mobilized villagers to make additional financial and labour contribu-
tions. It had resources and power. It was able to build a secondary school 
(Mashingia) and had begun work on the ward building (with the primary aim of 
providing maternity services, and response to the health demands of HIV/AIDS) 
at the dispensary site in the Karamsingii hamlet. Uchira was already a highly 
differentiated settlement in terms of wealth in 1996. The wealthy village residents 
did not use local services, as they could purchase better health and education in 
the urban areas. 
The three primary schools were full to bursting in 2004. Fees had been abol-
ished and enrolment had surged. Although parents complain about the contribu-
tions that are still required for school: uniforms, food, water, and firewood. New 
classrooms were constructed through a nationally funded programme. There are 
not enough teachers to meet the government requirements for pupil- teacher 
ratios—Miwaleni primary revealed three teachers attempting to manage 510 
pupils. In 2016 the primary schools still look the same as in 1996 and 2004, but 
with some new classrooms built by NGO funds. There are more teachers, but the 
population now necessitates running two schools from the same buildings—they 
operate in shifts.
Mashingia Secondary School was adopted by the district council and began 
operations in the early 2000s. In 2016 it had more female pupils than male (330 to 
180), with hostels for girls built with Australian NGO funds. Secondary school 
























Table 16.1 Overview of public and social services provision.
 1996 2004–6 2016
Health, 
Government
Public dispensary; few medicines; all 
fever recorded as malaria;
no water or electricity connection;
medical assistant (MA) present
Ward building funded by V2V at request 
of village council; promise of staff from 
DC; gas- powered fridge donated from 
Japan; all fever still recorded as malaria; 
no doctor/MA present
Rapid test for malaria available; ward building still 
not finished or staffed; still no water or electricity 
connection; basic medicine availability; no doctor/
MA present
Education Secondary school being constructed 
by VC with contributions;
3 primary schools;
1 private secondary
Mashingia sec. operational; little change 
observed in classrooms format but more 
kids in school and classroom building 
under PADEP
Mashingia sec., girls outnumber boys; very high 
failure rates; girls’ dorm built; few teaching 
resources; new Islamic girls’ secondary established
Water Rehabilitation of old system desired; 
plan for dam on Uchira River
UWUA established; cost recovery (see 
Toner 2008)
UWUA still functioning; demand increasing; 
supply challenge
Funds still being sought for dam; new boreholes 




Religious institutions; HIV pandemic 
impacting through migration
Religious institutions; increasing economic 
and care burden from HIV pandemic; 
KIWAKKUKI, women’s HIV org. 
(implicated in corruption over food aid)
Angel’s Gate Children village, https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=KYUbTyR45as; Miwaleni 





Lutheran, health centre; very 
dilapidated
Catholic; new health centre and 
borehole, high cost; Bakwata Islam; 
popular Dr Lyimo and good service
Lutheran, minor improvement (painted); 
Catholic, as previous—considered better 
quality but high charge; large Catholic 
Cathedral being built;
Dr Lyimo moved on to another place; all 
RIs have attached chekechea 
(Kindergarten); several new churches, 
Pentecostal
Lutheran, same as previous; doctor unimpressed; 
new church being built; Catholic, as previous; large 
Cathedral established; Dr Lyimo returned, 
operating independently; new mosques; ‘boko 
haram’
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Tanzania government secondary schools, Mashingia has a high failure rate in the 
national examinations. Eighty out of 134 students failed completely at form 4 in 
2014/15, and forty- one scored division 4- also regarded as failure in terms of pro-
gression to later stages of education. Division 1, 2, or 3 is required to progress to 
A- levels. The teachers at Mashingia are disillusioned. The school is struggling, it 
has to pay very high bills for water to UWUA, the pregnancy rates for female 
pupils are high, and there are few good prospects for employment for pupils 
who fail.
In 1996 the private Uchira secondary school already catered for education 
demand amongst the more financially able village residents, who could not afford 
more expensive urban schools, and whose children had failed to win access to 
government schools. In 2016 it continues to operate, but it is a low- priced school 
with poor infrastructure and also struggles to get students to pass at form 4. The 
new private Islamic girls’ secondary is popular and attracting day pupils from 
surrounding areas.
In 2004 numbers of boys and girls were not significantly different in primary 
school. But in 2016 both primary and secondary schools reported better per-
form ance by girls. Boys are seen as lazier and only interested in quick money.
Different health providers, from local healers to sophisticated, and expensive 
facilities owned by the Catholic Church, catered to different financial abilities in 
the village. We found that, in 2016, health service provision has not changed sig-
nificantly since 2004. The government- funded Karamsingii dispensary is still not 
connected to the water supply or to mains electricity, and staffing levels are simi-
lar to those in 1996. A hospital ward constructed by the village government has 
never been fully completed or operational. The Lutheran dispensary is almost 
identical in 2016 as it was in 1996, one medical assistant, a small collection of 
dilapidated buildings, and a medicine cupboard featuring little more than packets 
of Panadol. Most people just buy what drugs they can through at the small phar-
macies on the main highway. Those with the means to pay look beyond the village 
for services.
By 2004, the power over the collective life of the village was shifting and frac-
turing. The village council was weakened in 2004. With the livestock market gone, 
and the development levy abolished, it had few resources. This remained the case 
in 2016, when it could only collect some revenues from land registration and sales.
Religious identity was intensifying, but also diversifying. Pentecostal churches 
of various natures and foundation were springing up, some as individual projects, 
some supported through overseas patronage. The struggling farmer, who hosted 
me in 1996, became a successful pastor living in a nearby town with children at a 
private secondary school. The Catholic Diocese of Moshi was demanding labour 
and contributions from villagers to build a huge church at the junction to 
Miwaleni Springs, and the foundations had already begun to take shape. Most of 
the religious facilities offer Kindergarten services on a fee- paying basis.
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The new community- based water management organization (UWUA) was 
commanding control of village labour and financial contributions. With GtZ 
funds, it had a new office, meeting hall, and transport. It generated revenue 
through payments for water at public and private taps and demanded that the 
village council ensure that villagers give two days labour per week in communal 
labour (an obligation which fell on the poorest, see Cleaver and Toner 2006). In 
2016 UWUA is still in operation, but has to some degree been absorbed by a more 
strategic district- wide approach to water provision. The system of water collec-
tion at the public taps has changed. More people have private water connections 
and sell water to those without their own connection.
Livelihoods Patterns in Uchira 2004–16
Finally, I examine changes in livelihoods patterns and wealth ranking in Uchira. 
During my 2004/5 fieldwork we mapped wealth and livelihoods patterns in 
Uchira, through sixty- seven detailed life history interviews, and a further 150 
livelihoods interviews (see Table 16.2). The local research team designed a three- 
category wealth ranking for 2004—they argued that the three categories (the 
have- nots, those getting- by, and the big shots) captured essential differences in 
assets and livelihoods in the village population. Life history interviewees were 
purposively selected to cover the three locally identified wealth categories, and 
taking into consideration differences in gender, religion, and ethnic origin.
The ‘have- nots’ (estimated at around 30 per cent of total population in the 
 village) were those households with small land holdings (an average of 1.7 acres) 
that were dependent on their own labour to process natural resources, e.g. through 
Table 16.2 Wealth ranking for Uchira, 2004–5.
Category Attributes
Poor /  
‘have nots’
Only one meal per day; house with thatched roof and in state of disrepair; 
torn and dirty clothes; poor health; malnourished children; poor and 




2 meals per day; buys second hand clothes; owns 2–5 acres; gives children 
primary education and secondary if possible; has reasonable house (iron 
sheets, volcanic block walls); can afford to go to hospital if necessary; has 
chickens, goats, and 2–3 cows; has business activities/some employment 
(teachers/nurses); most use public taps, some private taps
Wealthy / 
‘big shots’
Farms 5–50 acres; good houses; dresses smartly; children at expensive 
secondary schools; uses private hospitals; owns bars, minibuses, tractors,  
and cars; well- paid employment (regional government/private companies/
development activities)
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the crushing of aggregate, weaving baskets, or gathering grass from cows, or 
through selling their labour for low- waged agricultural activities. Their agricul-
tural activities depended on low input production of maize, which formed the 
bulk of their food, but was also sold to meet cash demands such as paying for 
water and village contributions. These were households with high levels of 
dependents, such as grandparents caring for children orphaned by HIV/
AIDS. These households struggled and could suffer from shortages of both food 
and water. They frequently tried to alleviate their needs through seeking as sist-
ance from kin and wider social networks.
The majority of the village (an estimated 60 per cent) were viewed as ‘getting 
by’, and had the resources to feed, clothe, and educate themselves within their 
networks. This category covers considerable differentiation in terms of assets, 
income, and expenditure. Landholdings for this group were slightly larger, and 
agricultural activities more diversified. Off- farm activities were also highly sig-
nificant for this group and included a wide range of skills- based small enterprise 
such as tailoring, carpentry, and bicycle repairs, as well as trading and retailing 
activities within local markets. Employment in this group could also include pri-
mary school teachers, bus drivers, and conductors. This group was highly heter-
ogenous in terms of income and expenditure, and wealth could be pre car ious. 
The loss of employment, an illness requiring expensive treatment, alcoholism, or 
the theft of critical productive assets could all cause rapid declines in wealth and 
well- being.
The most powerful group in collective village life were the ‘big shots’, compris-
ing perhaps 10 per cent of households/kin networks. These tended to be families 
of the original frontier pioneers who had relatively large landholdings (up to 50 
acres). They had the capital to invest in large business ventures such as building 
bars and hotels, running transport businesses, or practising capital- intensive agri-
culture such as irrigated horticulture. Such households also benefitted from 
remittances from family members for whom early investments in education had 
yielded well- paid employment in the cities or overseas.
2016—What Has Changed?
In 2016, members of the original 2004 research re- visited the residential locations 
of thirty of the sixty- seven life- history interviews. This was combined with key 
informant interviews on livelihood characteristics and dynamics in Uchira. The 
2004 wealth- ranking categories were still viable. The three categories and profiles 
developed in 2004 remain as a useful explanatory typology (see Table 16.3). There 
































Diversification/Income- generating activities Expenditure Shortages/Assistance
Poor/‘have- 
nots’ (n=24)





Basket- making (2); fetch firewood (1); make 
aggregate/gathers stones (4); carry volcanic 
blocks (8); day labour (5); selling sugar cane (1); 
sells herbs (1); makes mbege (1); repairs utensils 
(1); sells fodder grass (3)
Primary school contributions 
(cash + food); water, public 
taps (5–10 Tsh per bucket); 
food (250–1000 Tsh per day if 
money available); village 
contributions
Miss food (11); miss water (13); 
no medical treatment (5); 
assistance from family (11); 
assistance from neighbours (5); 
assist family (3); school fees 
paid by government for 










Employment (2); tailoring (1); selling livestock 
(2); making mbege (3); selling secondhand 
clothes (2); horticulture (2); milk production 
(2); sign- writing (1); bicycle repairs (1); 
electrical repairs (1); selling kerosene in Kenya 
(1); wood business (1); selling vegetables (1); 
crop dealing (1); day labour (6); mason (1); 
selling food (1)
Primary school contributions; 
Kindergarten; village 
contributions; food (1000 Tsh 
per day); water, public tap/
private tap (5–10 Tsh per 
bucket); secondhand clothes; 
private health costs
Miss food (11); miss water (13); 
no medical treatment (5); 
assistance from family (11); 
assistance from neighbours (5); 
assist family (3); school fees 
paid by government for 







Own bar (2); salaried employment (1); 
transport business (2); wholesale shop (1); 
selling herbal medicine (1); horticulture (2)
School fees; village 
contributions; supporting 
relatives; health expenses; 
water, private taps; electricity; 
vehicles/consumer goods; food, 
3000 Tsh per day
School fees (HE & FE); capital
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Nobody in Uchira/Koresa will tell you that the area is getting richer, or that 
poverty is reducing. Life is still hard is a familiar refrain, as it was in 1996 and 
2004. Certainly, livelihoods patterns look remarkably similar to those mapped in 
2004, for those who are resident in Uchira. The new dynamic is an influx of ‘out-
siders’ coming to build residential houses, but these people remain largely as con-
nected to the urban area.
An overview of livelihood patterns in Uchira in 2016 is summarized in a key 
informant interview as follows:
People depend on small- scale agriculture and small business, agricultural crops 
are maize, beans, groundnut, tomatoes, onions, and watermelons, and residents 
in most cases cultivate 1 to 2 acres, those who cultivate more than 2 acres most 
of them are people from outside the village. In small business people are 
en gaging in activities like shops, selling of vegetables especially for women, 
transportation i.e. bodaboda (motorbike taxis). Some are involved in bricks cut-
ting, stone digging, and aggregate crushing and these people who are engaging 
in these activities most of them are poor (low- income earners) who also depend 
on manual labour to make their daily earning. (Village executive officer: Koresa)
Table 16.4 shows an overview of livelihoods in 2016 and captures key areas of 
expenditure.
There is a universal view (in every interview and focus group) that agriculture 
is getting harder due to declining rainfall and declining productivity due to crop 
and livestock diseases. In addition, sales of land for residential build have 
decreased the availability of grazing land for livestock. Whilst overall cropping 
patterns are largely unchanged since 1996, there is some visible increase in irri-
gated production in the Miwaleni area, which began around 2008.
Not enough rains, not enough crops and livestock keeping has decreased due to 
drought caused environmental destruction and other human activities, this 
problem started more in the year 2006. In the past, almost the land in Uchira 
was covered by trees but now there are few trees—almost all are destroyed due 
to human activities. (Women aged 54)
Agriculture these days has become so costly, it needs a lot of money to invest as 
diseases have increased and you cannot get enough crops if not using modern 
seeds and fertilizers, while the cost of inputs is high. There are some people leave 
agriculture but there are a few who invest a lot of money in farming activities 
and end up with no harvest. A successful farmer is the one who is doing an irri-
gation farming. (Man aged 28)
The agriculture situation is not good, productivity has declined, the rain it rains, 
and it is heavy but it rains for a short period of time. Animal diseases have 
Table 16.4 Livelihoods and expenditure, 2016.




Digging toilets; cutting 
stone and crushing 
gravel;
day labour; making 
mbege; trading vegetables
1 acre (9 bags in a good year, 
1 in 2016)
1 acre (2 bags in 2016, 1 for 
food and 1 for school)
80,000–95,000 for 
Kokoto lorry (7 weeks)
Non- western medicine or local dispensary; 
primary school, 8,000 Tsh, 1 bucket maize and 





Selling land; farming, 
maize and beans;
trading cattle; public 
employment; border 
trade;  pikipiki driving; 
hairdressing; remittances
2 acres (can be 40 bags, 2016: 
1 bag); 2.5 acres (15 bags 
good year, 2016: 5);
2 acres (2016: 6 bags maize, in 
past 20 bags)
Ag. inputs subsidy 





Loans and savings groups (1,500–5,000 Tsh per 
week); food per day 7,000–8,000 Tsh; has a 
phone, from entry level to basic smart phone; 
primary/sec. school contributions: books, exams, 
boarding; local dispensaries; private tap, 50 Tsh 
per bucket (20L)





wholesale shop; bars; 
capital investment: 
motorbikes, dala- dalas; 
remittances
5+ acres (mix of ownership/
rental 50,000 Tsh per acre 
2016); some irrigation (1 acre 
of tomatoes can yield 60 bags 
twice per year)
 School fees: 2 million Tsh+ per year for good 
secondary; local development projects;
religious contributions; family support; capital 
investment: motorbikes;
medical: urban facilities; food expenditure; 
10,000 Tsh+
Incomers Employment in town; 
business in town
Residential plots Plot price: 7 million for 
1/4 acre (20 million for 
1.5 acre by road side)
Education; capital investment;
all urban- focused
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increased and the area for grazing has now decreased—the reasons for these 
changes are due to the impact of climate change including deforestation and air 
pollution. (Man aged 67)
In both 1996 and 2004 farmers viewed agricultural production profits as being in 
decline. In 2016 only those who can irrigate are thought to be guaranteed good 
production, producing tomatoes, onions, and other horticultural crops. Certainly, 
there is some increase in farmer- led irrigated agriculture in proximity to Miwaleni 
Springs. This has been increasing since 2008 (See De Bont  2018, Mdee and 
Harrison 2019). Individual capitalist farmer- investors lease the land from the 
original settler residents. These investors require significant capital to invest in 
pipes, pump, diesel and seeds, pesticides, fertilizer, and labour and many take 
loans to establish this production.
However, the returns from this agriculture are also uncertain. In late November 
2016 all of this irrigation activity was shut down by government officials; as it 
turns out farmers were drawing water without a permit and their activity was 
illegal. A national news story was featured on ITV, with farmers complaining that 
they were now in a terrible position as their fields had already dried up and they 
still had loan liabilities.
Whilst those who are not cultivating crops such as tomatoes see such produc-
tion as easy in comparison with rain- fed maize and beans, those who do cultivate 
tomatoes suggest it is more difficult to get a good return.
If you decide to cultivate lets say tomatoes with irrigation, at the end of the day 
tomato is ready for harvest but there is no market due to inflation, do you think 
this person will be back again in the farm for this situation? Because all the cap-
ital has already evaporated. (Young man in focus group)
As in 1996 and 2004, in 2016 Uchira had a mixed agricultural/non- farm econ-
omy. A large range of other activities contribute to local livelihoods. Interviewees 
mentioned: fattening and selling cattle, digging toilets, making local brew, buying 
and selling vegetables, operating small grocery shops, importing and selling soap 
from Kenya, hairdressing, cutting bricks, and cutting aggregate. Some households 
also have members who are employed as teachers, and police officers. All these 
activities were present in livelihoods in 2004. One significant new activity is driv-
ing motorbike taxis, although this is available to a small proportion of young men 
and competition is high. The motorbikes are owned by those with more capital 
and leased to drivers for a daily fee.
Inflation and the escalating costs of services are cited as reasons why life does 
not feel any easier. Mobile phone purchase and airtime are also significant new 
costs since 2004. Ownership of a smart phone, and the capacity of the user to 
access new mobile- based and internet services is a new axis of differentiation, as 
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is education. Education is a major family investment and the costs of private 
schooling are racing ahead of inflation. This is not just an expense for the wealthy, 
but many of those who are ‘getting by’ will sacrifice expenditure and take loans to 
put their children into private secondary school, but the rewards of this invest-
ment are a lottery. There are few formal employment opportunities, and many of 
the educated youth and their parents are disillusioned with the outcomes.
There are two trends in Uchira in 2016 that draw further attention for their 
impact on the dynamics of the local economy and social relations: the thriving 
and active land market, and the nature of residence and remittance through kin 
networks.
The rehabilitated water supply, and increasing expansion of urban Moshi, 
has made Uchira an attractive place to purchase land. Land leasing was also com-
mon in the 1996 and 2004 interviews so extends over the twenty- year period. 
However, land sales and transfers are now intensifying. Currently there is a pat-
tern of land sales by original residents. These sales are often executed by older 
men with original land allocations selling family land for daily consumption 
needs, such as medical treatment, or to build housing and pay school fees. This 
can lead to family disputes, as the next generation see their anticipated inherit-
ance disappearing. The market prices for this land are rapidly increasing. My hus-
band bought a small plot adjacent to his parent’s home in 2008 for 1 million 
shillings. Similar plots at the road side in 2016 might reach 7 million shillings.
Remittances from family members who have migrated to other parts of 
Tanzania are a significant component of livelihoods in Uchira, but Uchira is also a 
place of refuge and retreat when required. This was certainly the case in 1996 and 
2004, although wider economic, political, and social forces change how these 
dependencies shift. The life history interviews in 2016 suggest a picture that 
 echoes that presented by Ferguson (2013) or Neves and Du Toit (2013) in South 
Africa, where land distribution is highly differentiated, and the rural economy is 
dependent on the urban, and local livelihoods provide little more than a means of 
getting by for most. Dependence on kin relations to negotiate and manage the 
challenges of existence extend to those who are at ‘home’ and those who now live 
elsewhere.
This demonstrates a critical shortcoming of the methodological approach of 
longitudinal household surveys as it can miss how these networks operate and 
change (see Chapter  3 this volume). The majority of interviewees mentioned 
remittances from absent kin as an important source of income, and this extends 
to all groups: for the struggling it is how they meet their basic needs, for those 
who are getting by, it is the source of capital for business, for meeting health 
expenses and school fees; and it is also the same for the big shots whose expenses 
for health, education, and capital investment are much higher. However, 
 family networks may also encompass members who could fit into each of these 
 cat egor ies. Family remittance networks are now intensified through ease of 
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communications (mobile phones, Whatsapp) and mobile banking. Expenditure 
claims can be rapidly and easily shared, contributions sought, and monies remit-
ted. The form and pattern of family decision- making and disbursement varies, 
remitting members may come and go depending on their means, as may recipi-
ents. Typically, those with the most income will make the greatest contributions, 
but this will also depend on their own personal inclinations and the extent of 
their connectedness to home.
These examples from the data show the diversity of remitting arrangements:
Among these children two have permanent government jobs, one employed as a 
lawyer in Lushoto and one as a soldier in Dar es Salaam, the others are self- 
employed in small businesses like shops, and some in farming activities. They 
send some money to support family expenses and health services. There is 
no limit to contribution, everyone contributes the amount of money he/she has. 
If we have a problem then we sit together as family members and sort it out.
(Man aged 45)
In 2008 I stopped doing small business activities in the market due to a health 
problem. After my children got jobs in 2010 they opened a shop around home 
for me and I am involved in the shop selling up to this moment, as well as doing 
farming activities. I get assistance from children for home expenses. I receive 
50000tsh per month. I then also aid the son of my sister: food, clothing, and 
shelter and school food contribution 82000tsh per year My sister cannot pay for 
her son due to low income—her husband is drunkard and careless.
(Female age 54)
Family members who establish themselves in the urban areas or overseas, who 
have progressed in education are expected to contribute to wider family activities. 
The boundaries of these networks are dynamic and shifting, obligations are 
almost continually in negotiation.
Yet, at the same time, the rural home can also be a place of refuge from the 
harsh urban economy. It is common for younger migrants to return home after 
the completion of studies, whilst waiting to find work or further opportunities. 
Girls who have become pregnant will often remain at home and be expected to 
contribute to agriculture and family business activities—such as serving in shops. 
Equally, they can also leave their children behind with grandparents and other 
family members and migrate if opportunities for employment or business arise.
The following examples illustrate these patterns:
In 2011–2013 I joined the College of Agriculture at Himo In Moshi Rural 
District. After completing the college I didn’t get a job and I am now at home 
doing private work, providing animal treatment services to the villagers when 
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their cattle get sick as well as advising them on how to take care of their cattle 
and other advice. I am also engaging in farming activities, seasonal farming. 
I am working hard but have very little achieved. I have studied, but there is no 
vacancy for employment. (Young man aged 28)
I came to live with my mother and joined secondary education in 2011 at Uchira 
girls’ Islamic secondary school and completed in 2014. The performance was 
not good and at the same time I got pregnant and have a son. I still live with my 
mother and she is the one who supports with my kid. The father of the kid is still 
in school therefore cannot support him. I expect that I will go back to my studies 
but for now I am just assisting at home. (Young woman aged 20)
Conclusion
Uchira tells many stories. It tells of a frontier settlement where livelihoods became 
increasingly differentiated by the 1990s as land ownership patterns were locked 
down. Where increasing population intensify the market price for the land, 
favouring those who own and control it, and disadvantaging those who rely on 
their own labour.
It tells of a village government in charge of collective village life in the 1990s, 
actively collecting taxes and mobilizing around village projects. Yet this capacity 
appears to be eroded, and village government in 2018 is rent seeking from prop-
erty taxes. ‘Development’ since the 2000s is increasingly NGO and religious led. 
Is this a fracturing of local governance? Why was it easier to mobilize funds to 
construct an enormous Catholic church, rather than to finish the ward building at 
the government dispensary? This governance deficit is not an Uchira problem, 
this is ironically a result of shambolic decentralization policies (see Mdee and 
Mushi 2020).
It tells of agricultural struggle, to subsist and persist; of livelihoods freed to 
struggle in the winds of neoliberal markets, after the collapse of co- operatives; of 
the overexploitation and degradation of land and water resources. The new agri-
cultural boom for those who can produce with irrigation is possible for a handful, 
but they must also be lucky with the markets, and be able to access capital. Life 
does not feel as though it is easier—the environment is worse, needs for ex pend-
iture intensified.
It tells of kin networks and connections that have to support, care, build, and 
invest. This is not a romantic tale; these networks are only as strong as their 
members—and their resources have limits. Life in the urban areas is also harsh 
and expensive. Educational success is no guarantee to well- paid employment or 
income. Perhaps Uchira tells a story for other places, where economic and social 
differentiation on frontiers is still in process. 
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Telling the Stories of Asset Accumulation
Christine Noe and Dan Brockington
Explaining Change and Observing Its Consequences
The repeated tendencies of the chapters in this book are of growth in assets and 
increasing prosperity according to local definitions. This is not the universal 
story. It is not true for all groups or in all places. But it is the general trend. The 
trend is replicated in other recent research from the country (Keane et al. 2020).
The strength of this tendency is plain in the way that so many of the re searchers 
who have conducted these revisits have been surprised by what they found. They 
were expecting persistent poverty, they found unexpected instances of particular 
forms of prosperity. This was the case not just with our own case- studies but also 
those of Vesa- Matti Loiske, Willie Östberg, Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, Esbern 
Friis- Hansen, Torben Birch- Thomsen, and Stefano Ponte. These are all seasoned 
researchers, and they were not expecting the trends they found.
Lest it not be obvious already, we do not conclude from these findings that 
Tanzanian peasants have been portrayed as poor but are ‘really’ wealthy. That 
would be wrong. Wealth, and poverty, are multi- facetted. Wealth cannot be 
equated with assets, or somehow reduced to it. Rather, as we explained in 
Chapter 2, the methods used to measure poverty based on consumption surveys 
omit important dimensions of rural prosperity. Poverty derived from consump-
tion data must, of necessity, exclude investment in the productive assets that are 
so important for rural people’s own definitions of prosperity. We cannot have a 
complete understanding of change in rural poverty and prosperity without atten-
tion to assets.
Attention only to assets will not give us a complete understanding of rural pov-
erty and prosperity dynamics because change in assets can be poorly correlated 
with other measures of well- being. Indeed it is conceivable that the savings 
required to invest in assets means that other measures of well- being may dimin-
ish as assets grow. When peasants tighten their belts to build assets bases they 
may have to do so literally, not metaphorically. Moreover where assets do track 
other measures of well- being in particular places (as Monique Borgerhoff Mulder 
found in Chapter  5) then that relationship may be specific to those places and 
those people. It is unwise to extrapolate too broadly.
Christine Noe and Dan Brockington, Telling the Stories of Asset Accumulation In: Prosperity in Rural Africa? Insights 
into Wealth, Assets, and Poverty from Longitudinal Studies in Tanzania. Edited by: Dan Brockington and Christine Noe, 
Oxford University Press. © Christine Noe and Dan Brockington 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198865872.003.0017
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Is there a general pattern or explanation that can be gleaned from these diverse 
case studies? At one level it is clear that the different case studies that cut across 
Tanzania have demonstrated how these farmers have made investments on agri-
cultural and non- agricultural assets that have driven significant changes in rural 
livelihoods over the past twenty years. But in another respect one of the most 
salient points across these different case studies is their diversity. The proximate 
driver of rural transformation, and its timing, has varied in every single location. 
In some instances it arises from changes in sesame seed prices combined with 
infrastructural improvements (Chapter  8). In others it links to rising prices of 
potatoes and wheat relative to maize, without infrastructural change, and with 
decreasing inequality (Chapter 10). In another the cash crop is sunflower seeds, 
and the growth in farming activity has been hastened by growing inequality in 
the form of entrepreneurs bringing in tractors (Chapter  9). In yet more 
instances the changes derive from tree plantations (Chapter 13), or there may 
be too many such plantations (Chapter 14) or prosperity is found in swapping 
coffee cultivation for vegetables and market gardens (Chapter  7). Diversity 
reigns. If there is a story to tell in all of this, it is only, perhaps, that there is no 
one story.
Farmers’ investments have ranged from new seeds and fertilizers to replacing 
hand hoes with oxen and tractor services. This has also meant letting go some 
traditional crops and farming practices to adopt new crops which have high mar-
ket value and which require investing in fertilizers and pesticides. Decisions to do 
so and to replace low- return traditional crops (such as coffee in Meru) with sea-
sonal crops such as carrots and Irish potatoes lead to higher returns, with small 
plots of land providing two harvests per year. Investments in new cash crops such 
as sunflowers, tomatoes, and sesame have involved risk- taking due to their 
requirements for modern farming practices and market instabilities. Other cases 
such as in Njombe and Mbeya where crops are replaced with pine trees have 
meant putting labour on non- farm activities while the trees continue to grow. 
Across the study villages, we have seen farmers navigating the change to increase 
their farm outputs mostly by investing in better practices, farm inputs, and 
more labour.
Children’s education has increasingly gained importance in the definition of 
wealth. While the government policy of no fees for secondary schools and the 
availability of secondary schools in every ward have certainly driven changes in 
the sector, farmers are full of aspirations for their children to go beyond basic 
education. This has meant trading crops, livestock, and even working as kibarua 
(casual labour) for school fees which are expensive in private schools. The sites in 
Meru have demonstrated exceptional trends. Even with the shrinking of land 
sizes for most households and loss of coffee as a cash crop, parents have invested 
heavily in education. Almost one in five children (19 per cent) have gone to 
university, against a national average of just 1 per cent.
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The data for our different sites suggest that rural people have invested a great 
deal in education and off- farm business (Bryceson 1999). They are no longer just 
farmers but also business women and men. The role of remittances may be shift-
ing in some areas from assisting families to feed and improve housing conditions 
to investing in high- value crops, trees, shops, and guest houses, as Friis- Hansen’s 
work in Chapter 13 shows. The rural has become a site where emigrants of the 
1990s look back to for expansion of their investment portfolio.
There are other interesting trends too with significant impacts on our under-
standing of livelihood changes. For example, money for kibarua work can be 
directed towards investment in people’s own farms and businesses, rather than 
basic provisions and just getting by. People find motivations to work and produce 
from their own land because harvests can also generate the needed cash. In Meru, 
for example, through kibarua work, the landless of 1990s have acquired land, 
milk cows, and have educated children. They are no longer poor by their own 
definitions. We know this is not normally the case; the dictates of poverty drive 
people to sell labour (Homewood et al. 2020). But aspirations of prosperity can 
also be an aspect of this behaviour.
However it is unsatisfactory simply to assert that diversity reigns, that there are 
no patterns or tendencies which we can derive across these case studies. It is pos-
sible to derive a generalized model of how growth in assets has occurred in 
diverse sites across rural Tanzania. Figure  17.1 shows the variety of causes of 
investment in rural assets, in the form of growing rural incomes which derived 
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- Changing and contested
   gender relations
- More complex village
   economies
- Cheaper cost of assets
- Reduced consumption costs
- Free Education
- Lower interest on debt (Village loan
   groups)
Figure 17.1 Explaining asset investment.
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costs of some of the assets people wish to purchase (such as education and 
cheaper motorbikes). However underlying these changes are a series of develop-
ments in the public sphere, following investment by local and national govern-
ments and by the private sector (in phones for example). There are also changes 
in the way that people have responded to these opportunities—the changing out-
look with respect to more commercial practices, the readiness to risk the oppro-
brium of their neighbours should they get richer (Chapter 8), the willingness to 
wrest farms from the hands of elders whose drinking habits made it harder to put 
them to productive use (Chapter 10).
We recognize that this model may recall one of Julius Nyerere’s more passion-
ate speeches about the need for agricultural, rural, and social modernization. It 
may appear to advocate the whole- sale transformation of rural society to a more 
modernist form. But our point is not that this is what rural Tanzanians need to 
do, or should be doing. Nor is it a description of what has happened to rural 
Tanzanians generally. It is simply a compilation of the factors and reasons that we 
have been told by our informants have brought change.
Our data do not allow us to determine which of these factors are most im port-
ant nationally—neither the survey design nor the granularity of the data (the 
number of data points from each location) make that possible. But the diversity of 
the studies suggests that placing single weightings on individual variables across 
the country would have limited worth. We have sites where road infrastructure 
has changed very little, and social relations within the village become more equal 
(Gitting and Gocho), to sites where infrastructure has been transformed and rela-
tions are less equal (Mtowisa), to sites where greater inequality in the form of 
wealthy philanthropists is transforming village infrastructure. A single story in 
such circumstances is difficult.
Instead we recommend that it would make more sense for future researchers to 
focus on the circumstances by which different individual cash crops have brought 
prosperity to different sorts of villagers in the long durée. By focusing on particu-
lar commodities (rice, sesame, carrots, potatoes) it will be possible to see what 
mixture of physical infrastructure, marketing, commodity chain developments, 
and social and cultural change has been necessary to produce these productiv-
ity gains.
If it is hard to generalize about the anatomy of the causes of the changes we 
have observed it may be easier to point to one common consequence that is 
emerging in some (again not all) of our study sites. In many of the communities 
we carried out research in the 1990s and early 2000s, wealth was characterized by 
a pyramid distribution in rural villages. Most people were, by local measures, 
poor. The rich were few and rare.
This was, we believe, a general characteristic. Poverty distributions in many 
communities in low- income African countries have long been skewed: the 
wealthy were few, there is only a small middle group, and most people were poor. 
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Most land holdings are small (2 hectares or less). Most people are young—children 
or young adults. Most people have no herds, and of those that do, most herd 
sizes are small (fewer than five animals). Most people live in poor quality 
houses, few in fine dwellings. Most people only complete primary school, not 
secondary school; formal employment is rare, and so on. The importance of 
explaining these distributions is one of the most persistent challenges of economic 
and social research.
One of the more striking patterns to emerge from this collection of studies is 
that the prevalent domination of the poorest farmers that characterized Tanzanian 
villages for so many decades is beginning to shift. In just over half of the locations 
(eleven out of eighteen) where we could assess asset distribution during our re- 
visits in 2016–18 the predominance of the poor in a classic pyramid distribution 
has changed.1 It has been replaced by a ‘pointed egg’ distribution, with the largest 
segment constituted by ‘middle’ or ‘average’ farming households. This pattern is 
shown in the black graphs in Figure 17.2.
We have to be careful about generalizing this claim. First, a substantial minor-
ity (39 per cent) of sites for which we have data do not conform to this pattern. 
There poverty predominates. Second, our sites are not drawn from a representa-
tive sample, and so we cannot be certain which of these distributions, the pyra-
mid or the pointed egg, is more generally representative of the country. Third, 
even if there are fewer people in the poorest groups, this does not necessarily 
mean that a new era of prosperity has been unleashed in these villages. Not being 
poor does not raise the bar very high. The poorest people are characterized by 
their basic dwellings, their lack of basic daily provisions, the fact that they have to 
work for other people whenever they need money, and cannot rely on their own 
farms. Access to slightly better housing, less dependence on daily wage labour, 
and more reliable access to daily provisions hardly denotes wealth. Nonetheless 
the tendency of these data does suggest the hypothesis that in diverse communities 
in rural Tanzania, village communities feel that they are getting wealthier by their 
own standards. We would like to see this proposition explored in further studies.
The Surprises of This Work
Despite all the qualifications the appearance of relative prosperity is clear. It is 
also likely to be surprising, in different ways, for three rather different groups.
In the first instance, where we have observed prosperity it seems to have been 
driven from different forms of small- scale agricultural activity. But the very 
1 The predominantly poor distributions are evident in Loiske’s thesis (1995) and Ostberg’s first 
studies. It is also clear in the more extensive work of Ellis and Mdoe (2003).
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possibility of rural prosperity in Tanzania from small- scale agriculture will be 
surprising to some observers. It does not fit well with the general trends in the 
Tanzanian government’s development goals, visions, policies, and strategies for 
growth and alleviation of poverty. These are based on the understanding that the 
country seems to have made slow progress in attaining the level of economic 
growth envisioned. The agricultural sector has especially appeared in official pub-
lications to have failed to contribute meaningfully to the national development 
despite its potentials for doing so.
In the minds of policy- makers, a robust agricultural sector would produce 
food and cash crops for local and external markets. It would also generate 
employment for the large proportion of rural population. This would then 
increase the sector’s contribution to GDP. Smallholder agriculture is not thought 
to do this work. It has to be transformed. This envisaged transformation has, 
repeatedly, not happened in Tanzania according to official narratives. Most of 
the initially declared enemies—poverty, diseases, and ignorance—have persisted 
in rural areas. They dominate the past and present discussions about rural 
development and poverty alleviation. Agriculture is thought not to have raised its 
Figure 17.2 Different distributions of wealth and poverty by local definitions across 
Tanzania. This figure originally appeared in Ponte and Brockington 2020.
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economic share to balance with the amount of labour force in the rural areas. This 
is to say that small farmers have not contributed enough to, nor benefitted from, 
their national economic development.
One of the problems, as we shall see below, is that this view holds that it is hard 
for rural areas to prosper because smallholders practice ‘subsistence agriculture’. 
This is a particularly unhelpful misrecognition of their activities. It implies that 
farmers consume all that they produce, sell little (if anything), and purchase little 
food too. But this simply does not describe what we have seen, or what decades of 
scholarship reports (Bernstein and Woodhouse 2001, Bernstein 2010). There are 
very few rural households who eschew markets entirely. Where farmers do con-
sume their own produce, and sell little, such activity is unstable. ‘Subsistence’ 
agriculture is but a paved road, or price fluctuation, away from becoming com-
mercial agriculture. Alternatively, market incentives and infrastructure can 
remain unchanged, but families can begin to sell more produce because of chan-
ging norms and desires among their members. Subsistence- orientated farming 
can become much more commercial when ambitious children inherit land from 
tired parents. The need to send children to school, invest in mobile phones, or simply 
the desire to control the proceeds of their labour may encourage more sales.
The dynamism, innovation and potentiality in smallholder agriculture con-
tains within it the seeds of its own transformation. We have found that farmers 
have seized opportunities that have come with road improvements and rural elec-
trification, and improved telecommunication and means of transport. Access to 
markets, supply of seeds, pesticides, and fertilizers have all become less costly and 
strenuous. These changes motivate better farming practices and investments on 
non- farm assets. This requires thinking about rural economies and productivity 
differently from previous policy documents. We will return to this issue below.
The second audience who may be surprised are those who rely on consump-
tion surveys and poverty- line data for their understanding of change in rural 
areas. As we saw in Chapter 8 persistence of poverty in rural agricultural areas is 
plain in the latest statistics. The most recent Household Budget Surveys released 
at the time of writing indicate that both incidence of poverty (the share of the 
population whose income or consumption is below the poverty line) and extreme 
poverty are higher in rural compared to urban areas at a rate of 31.3 per cent and 
15.8 per cent respectively (NBS  2019). So too, extreme poverty is more pro-
nounced in rural areas (at 9.7 per cent) than in urban areas (at 4.4 per cent). 
Comparatively, the most rural area—Rukwa Region—has the highest rate of pov-
erty compared to other regions, at 45 per cent for incidence poverty and 19.8 per 
cent for extreme poverty (NBS  2019). Moreover, as we saw in Chapter  8, the 
decline of poverty is slower in rural areas than in urban areas.2
2 We should note that levels of urban poverty may themselves be under- reported in part because 
the costs of urban living are not properly appreciated (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2013).
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We do not doubt the validity of these statistics in their own terms. As measures 
of consumption go there are few better. But we do question whether it is appro-
priate to read off facts about poverty from these statistics. Daily consumption 
levels are important, but they will, of necessity, be a poor way of measuring 
change in societies which save daily and continually in order to invest in pro duct-
ive assets.
One of the important lessons that emerges from this book is that we need 
measures of poverty which can capture both consumption and asset investment 
(cf. Piketty 2014). The repeated picture that has been presented in this book sug-
gests that rural Tanzania is, after all, not only poor in the way that is captured in 
official narratives. These statistics misread—they miss entirely—small farmers’ 
diverse means of enjoying their wealth. This also means that these statistics are 
likely to underestimate these farmers’ contributions to national change and develop-
ment, both in terms of how they create that wealth, and the forms of consumption 
that it allows.
It is clear from the case studies in this book that an important aspect of rural 
life that we have been able to document has escaped the attention of most pol it-
ical and economic analysts in the country. Without necessarily increasing the 
levels of consumption, many households have significantly improved their well- 
being according to locally defined measures.
This calls for the need to rethink what measures of poverty are used, how pros-
perity is defined, and how Tanzania’s policies and strategies alleviate the former 
and promote the latter. To repeat, we have not found, in this research, that 
Tanzanian rural areas have been mistakenly labelled as ‘poor’ when they should 
be considered to be relatively wealthy. Rather, perhaps in keeping with our varied 
disciplinary backgrounds, we have found there are forms of locally valuable pros-
perity which have thrived in a variety of circumstances. 
But if there is more wealth, in ways that matter to rural farmers, and if this has 
come from small- scale agriculture, then the third group who will be surprised by 
these results are the critics of neoliberal economic policies and reforms which 
have swept through Tanzania in recent decades. The present authors have them-
selves been critics of neoliberalism, particularly as it pertains to environmental-
ism and conservation. Nevertheless the reforms to the government and economy 
of Tanzania under the influence of neoliberal institutions (the World Bank and 
IMF) have coincided with the growing asset base of rural Tanzanians.
This general association, however, requires nuance. Neoliberal reforms cover a 
broad swathe of activity, from privatizing parastatals, to liberalizing market con-
trols, and reducing government expenditure on key services. Any general as so ci-
ation such as we have observed needs much more specific claims about changes 
deriving from particular policies to be meaningful. As we show in the next section 
neoliberal policies have not always been sensitive to smallholder productivity.
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Joining up Rural and Agricultural Development Policies
The seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) seek a converging agenda 
that will eradicate poverty and achieve sustainable development. In signing up to 
this agenda, Tanzania committed to end poverty and hunger, and achieve good 
health, well- being, and quality education, among other things, by 2030. This coin-
cides with the country’s development agenda which is articulated in ‘Vision 2025’ 
in which Tanzania envisions graduating from a least- developed country to a 
middle- income country with a high level of human development. In particular, 
the low productivity agricultural economy will have been transformed to a semi- 
industrialized one led by modernized and highly productive agricultural 
activities.
This is a common thread that has run through much agricultural and rural 
policy in Tanzania for some time. The National Strategy for Growth and 
Reduction of Poverty I (NSGRP, which ran from 2005–10), stated that the coun-
try will have an agricultural sector that is modernized, commercialized, and prof-
itable and utilizes natural resources in a sustainable manner (URT  2005). 
Similarly when the mid- review of Vision 2025 was performed in 2009/10, annual 
agricultural growth was 4.2 per cent (which is below the expected average of 
6.7 per cent) and some of this slow progress was attributed to the fact that:
agricultural development did not live up to the expectations of the rural, 
agricultural- dependent households who were still using ancestral techniques, 
depending on increasingly unpredictable weather conditions, and with limited 
access to credit and extension services.’ (URT 2011b: 4)
In brief these statements and policies indicate that the dynamic and industrious 
smallholder sector in Tanzania which is producing so much unrecognized wealth 
is, by virtue of the invisibility of its productivity, demanded to change. The 
Tanzanian state has been vigorous in its ambitions and policy directives to achieve 
this already existing change.
Dissatisfaction as to the perceived state of the rural economy has led to many 
plans, policies, and strategies that focus on rural development generally and on 
agricultural transformations in particular. The National Strategy for Growth and 
Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP) I (2005–10) and II (2010–15) provides a frame-
work for harmonized rural development but drawing heavily from the agricul-
tural sector development strategy (URT  2016a). When Tanzania signed the 
NEPAD’s Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) 
in 2010, it also agreed to develop a national framework of implementation of 
regional objectives. This included achieving 6 per cent annual growth in the agri-
cultural sector in order to reduce poverty and achieve food security (URT 2011a).
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Tanzania’s Agricultural and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP) was 
launched in November 2011 as a ten- year comprehensive investment plan for 
agricultural and rural development. TAFSIP mapped the investment needed for 
the agricultural sector to achieve both regional and national targets. First, the 
plan attributed the disconnect between agriculture and its contribution to eco-
nomic growth with, among others, the fact that the sector is driven by small- scale 
farmers who produce for subsistence, low use of improved inputs, market con-
straints, under- nutrition, and malnutrition in the population, all of which con-
strained productivity.
TAFSIP called upon the private sector as a catalyst to the sector’s growth 
(URT 2011a). The Kilimo Kwanza policy and the Southern Agricultural Growth 
Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) Catalytic Fund as its first invention were pro-
moted as measures to stimulate private sector investments. Opportunities for 
large- scale investments in agriculture were promoted and plans for small 
farmers to participate in these sectoral transformations focused on outgrow-
ing, block, and contract farming (URT 2016a). In addition there is the com-
mercial farm component of Agricultural Big Results Now (a special programme 
designed to have aggregate impacts on various strategic areas of agricultural 
transformations).
These policies can only be understood as part of an international agenda for 
agricultural modernization that has gained local support from policy- makers 
and some local academics who equate peasants with backwardness (Forster 
and Maghimbi  1992, Maghimbi et al.  2011) and large- scale farming with 
modernity. National policies qualify this modernity as constituting farm sizes 
of over 20 hectares (combined with outgrower and contract farming), a particular 
number of livestock, and with continuous commercial activities throughout 
the year (URT 2016b). Through the stimulation of such policies policy- makers 
hope that small- scale farming will ‘change beyond recognition’ (Kweka and 
Ouma 2019).
But the problem with such ambitions is that they do not recognize the changes 
that are already taking place. The smallholder sector that these policies see is not 
the one that we have explored. Furthermore critics observe that to achieve the 
transformations envisaged these interventions will lead to a new and more ser-
ious set of problems arising from the change of land rights and lack of purchasing 
power along the agricultural value chain (Sulle 2015, Kuzilwa and Mpeta 2017). 
These policies support capitalist penetration through contracts that have hin-
dered the social reproduction of the peasantry (Moyo and Patnaik 2011). Instead 
smallholder farmers require sustainable solutions to the recurring problems of 
land tenure insecurity, quality and affordable seeds and fertilizers, good prices 
and reliable markets for produces, agricultural infrastructures, subsidies, aff ord-
able loans, and areas for pasture.
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This book has documented various creative ways that farmers have used to 
move out of poverty. The nature of their activities and especially investments in 
assets are imbedded in everyday life experience of the rural environment. In some 
cases, choices of investments start as a cultural issue before commercial 
 opportunities emerge. In other cases, only a small shift in farming practice trig-
gers transformation from old practices to those compliant with new market 
opportunities. Without donor funds, farmers have moved from growing traditional 
maize for food to carrots and potatoes or using fertilizers that have not been used 
in the past.
The kind of changes in smallholder farming we are excited about in this book 
do not feature prominently in the policy discussions about smallholder farming. 
Yet, we have found powerful locally driven transformations which are free from 
loans and conditional contracts for accessing modern inputs and selling of har-
vests. Local transformations emerge from a social fabric in which the rural econ-
omy is embedded. Farmers have different skills, ambitions, and strategies to move 
from one wealth rank to another. It is for this reason that understanding local 
perceptions of change and how that change happens is an important step towards 
policy support for small- scale farming and rural development.
For the changes we have observed to feature more prominently, then current 
data available to policy- makers in the country will need to be used differently. 
According to Kilama and colleagues (2016), the current requirements for the 
assessment of SDGs are likely to be sponsored by donors who may simply want 
national- level data for comparative purposes.
In February 2019, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) organized a statistics 
stakeholder’s workshop to discuss the controversy that had emerged after the 
release of the country’s new statistics law (2018). The controversy revolved around 
the new legal restrictions for the use and change of ‘official statistics’.3 The open-
ing statement of NBS’s Director—Dr Albin Chuwa—emphasized the importance 
of the country’s control of its statistics. In her words ‘nchi hazipinduliwi na 
majeshi bali ni takwimu’. Literally meaning that government revolutions are not 
caused by army forces but statistics.
In the light of the history of agricultural development policy in Tanzania that 
we have summarized here, a change in direction in agricultural policy which rec-
ognized the vigour of the smallholder sector would indeed be radical. But it 
would not be revolutionary. Taking change in assets seriously does not replace 
using poverty lines based on consumption. Each measure is useful. Moreover 
asset data are collected by diverse government surveys. Taking assets more ser-
ious ly is eminently compatible with existing government statistical work.
3 This law forbade the publication of statistics which were deemed to be contradictory of official 
government statistics.
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Exploring Asset Dynamics in Longitudinal Research
As we observed in the introduction to this collection, these chapters are a contri-
bution to the surprisingly niche field of longitudinal research. Here we reflect on 
the value of these studies, and their surprising paucity.
Done well longitudinal research can offer exceptional insights, as two rather 
different studies illustrate. Li’s (2014) Land’s End is based on nine visits, of up to 
several months, over a nineteen- year period to the same set of communities in 
central Sulawesi. Her detailed and highly praised ethnography shows how 
exploitative capitalist relations and deprivation emerge from within. They are 
driven by local residents and endogenous desires for progress and change. The 
second example comes from revisits to Palanpur, in India, every ten years for over 
fifty years, which has been led by mainstream economists (Bliss and Stern 1982, 
Lanjouw and Stern  1998, Himanshu et al.  2018). These works are full of facts 
about income, assets, inequality, livelihoods, and changing caste dynamics. The 
latest volume allows development economists the chance to reflect on how wrong 
theories were that had envisaged a shift of labour from rural economies to formal 
industrial employment. Contemporary livelihoods are much more precarious 
than economic theories had originally predicted.
However reviews of longitudinal studies highlight an unfortunate fact: it 
appears to be relatively rare in African research. White’s summary contains works 
from Asia, South East Asia, and Central America; Wolford adds examples from 
South America (White 2014, Wolford 2016).4 There are edited collections which 
compile longitudinal studies for South Asia (Breman et al. 1997, Himanshu and 
Rodgers 2016) and South East Asia (Rigg and Vandergeest 2012), but not Africa. 
The method has not been as well used in African contexts as it could be.
There are obvious exceptions. Caplan’s work in Mafia provides over three dec-
ades of insight built on strong persistent friendships, observation, and conversa-
tion (Caplan  1992, Caplan  1997). Guyer’s (1997) An African Niche Economy 
studied change in the hinterland of Ibadan, Nigeria, to understand how farmers 
pursued careers within the constraints and opportunities that unfolded in the face of 
growing urban demand but restrictive national economic change. Mortimore’s 
seminal contribution to understanding adaptation to drought entailed a thirteen- 
year study of a village in northern Nigeria (Mortimore 1989). The ‘AFRINT’ data-
base has tracked four thousand farmers across nine countries with three visits 
since 2002 (Djurfeldt et al. 2011, Andersson Djurfeldt et al. 2018). Bill Kinsey 
and colleagues’ long- term study of re- settlement in Zimbabwe provides unique 
insights into the consequences of land reform that stretch back over four decades 
4 White, reviewing Rigg and Vandergeest’s edited collection (2012), invoked several other studies 
(Redfield 1950, Epstein 1973, Castañeda 1995, Pincus 1996, Epstein, Suryanarayana, and Thimmegowda 
1998, Eder 2000). Wolford, reviewing Li’s work (2014) mentioned (Stolcke 1988, Ortiz 1999).
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(Hoogeveen and Kinsey  1999, Dekker and Kinsey  2011). The Gwembe Tonga 
Research Project has provided a wealth of insights on change in Southern Zambia 
since 1956.5 Wade Pendelton’s research in Windhoek provides valuable insights 
into how people cope with life before and after apartheid (Pendleton  1996). 
Richard Lee, Megan Biesele, and Robert Hitchcock have enjoyed decades of 
work among Basarwa in Botswana (Lee et al. 1996, Lee 2012). Camilla Toulmin 
has recently published a study of over thirty years of change in a rural Malian 
village (Toulmin 2020).
Other studies provide landscape- scale studies of decades of changing prosper-
ity. Tiffen, Mortimore, and Gichuki’s More People Less Erosion (1994) adopted a 
landscape- scale approach documenting a rise in investment in the landscape—at 
the same time missing the exclusions and disadvantage that this change visited 
upon poorer domestic units within that landscape (Murton  1999). Moore and 
Vaughan’s remarkable re- study of Audrey Richards work in northern Zambia 
 provides insights into one hundred years of change across a large area, deliberately 
eschewing a village- based approach—partly because of the lack of precision that 
Richards herself provided on where she had worked (Moore and Vaughan 1994).
Shorter studies include Whitehead’s work (2006) on persistent poverty in 
Ghana, Murton’s work (Murton 1999) exploring and questioning the beneficiar-
ies of landscape change in Machakos, and Mushonagh and Scoones who exam-
ined changed meanings of wealth in one Zimbabwean village between 1986–7 
and 2006–7 (Mushongah and Scoones 2012). The latter found, inter alia that in 
2006–7 cash had become less important for determining wealth, and health more 
important. A host of assets (house quality, solar panels, mobile phones) had 
become elements of a wealthy lifestyle in the later survey that were absent in the 
1980s. The Kagera restudy (Tanzania) provides remarkably detailed information 
in a region for which there is otherwise little historical data (de Weerdt  2010, 
Beegle et al.  2011). There are also some useful panel datasets from Ethiopia 
(Dercon  2006, Dercon et al.  2009, Liverpool- Tasie and Winter- Nelson  2011, 
Dercon et al.  2012). These are characterized by their tendency to focus on the 
qualities of domestic units and individuals, and quantitative analyses of the same 
(e.g. Borgerhoff Mulder  1995), and pay less attention to the politics of poverty 
creation and reduction (Harris 2009).
Longitudinal studies, then, are used in African contexts, but those we have 
listed are fewer than the studies reported in the edited collections we mentioned 
in Asian contexts. They have not, until this book was published, been numerous 
enough to collate for any particular region or country. This in turn reflects that 
fact that, more generally, longitudinal studies are surprisingly rarely used to 
understand social change. This is a niche research field. One indication of their 
5 http://www.uky.edu/~cligget/gwembe.htm.
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rarity is that recent edited collections to this genre use the method in their title. 
Their authors know it will distinguish them. Examples include The Changing 
Village in India, Insights from Longitudinal Research (Himanshu and Rodgers 2016) 
and Revisiting Rural Places (Rigg and Vandergeest 2012).
One of the reasons that such studies are niche is that they are hard to do. 
Setting aside the methodological challenges, not many people are able to return 
to former study sites. It is hard enough undertaking one study, let alone finding 
the time and funding to return. Most of the best cases are from anthropology, 
which has been founded on deep commitments to particular places (Kloos 1997, 
Kemper and Royce 2002).
The availability of longitudinal data is changing. The Living Standards 
Measurements Surveys have been instituted since the late 2000s in a number of 
African countries precisely to tackle the lack of panel data that make it possible to 
document change. These are already beginning to yield insights (Christiaensen 
2017). But these tend to be national- scale samples intended to afford national- 
level generalizations. They cannot provide detailed insights into particular places 
and the nuts and bolts of local change.
We submit that, despite the methodological difficulties, longitudinal studies 
could usefully become more normal in social science. It is, after all, routine for 
 well- resourced countries to set up large panel data sets precisely in order to trace 
change accurately over time among their citizens. Imagine the wealth of resources 
and insights that would become possible if, on getting tenure, established academics 
were expected to return to their original field sites and discuss their first findings, 
and future research directions, with the communities with which they had worked.
And what change would it make if more Tanzanian scholars who are part of 
the change described in this book revisited their old research sites? There are pos-
sibilities that the change could be taken for granted given the challenges of study-
ing familiar environments, possible research fatigue and subjectivity. Yet, as 
captured in Christine Noe’s experience in Meru, Cosmas Sokoni and Verdiana 
Tilumanywa’s in Uporoto Highlands, and Emmanuel Sulle’s in Mama Issara, tak-
ing part in the analysis of change to one’s own region could provide a unique 
opportunity for bringing new insights into rural livelihood changes.
Our point is not that all researchers must do this sort of study. But they need to 
find a good reason why they should not. When well- written works come out that 
do provide long- term perspectives then the insights make for some of the best 
possible research—robust, insightful, rigorous, and predicated on a deep under-
standing of how and why places and their residents change.
Conclusion
Tanzanian farmers are richer in assets than we have previously realized. They 
have been able to accrue these assets by savings, tightening expenditure, and by 
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growing their income from smallholder farming. They have responded to market 
incentives, infrastructural development, and social change.
These achievements are not widely recognized. Critics on the left maintain that 
Tanzanian farmers endure persistent poverty. Critics on the right insist that farm-
ing must be transformed. The one argue that rural development policies are mis-
guided, the other that they are not being fulfilled. Both miss the mark. Tanzanian 
smallholders have been better able to prosper, according to their own measures, 
than either side admits.
Policies which empower smallholders, ensure their secure access to land, 
which make farm inputs more accessible, and farm gate prices more rewarding 
will generate locally valued prosperity. Responding to change on the ground 
means that the data used in national and international measurements of poverty 
and prosperity need to fit closely with local aspirations. This requires considerable 
flexibility, and ways of accommodating diversity in the statistics collected.
If this volume proves useful then, in some respects it emphasizes the benefits of 
keeping an open mind, and being ready to admit early mistakes in this sort of 
research project. We ourselves had little idea what this project would lead to when 
we embarked upon it. We had conducted one study in central Tanzania in which 
we found that villagers were unexpectedly wealthy (Brockington et al.  2018). 
But we had no grasp of how widespread, or not, that pattern would be. We sought 
to scale- up that study, to find more case studies where we could revisit families 
and households over time. We did not anticipate finding the general patterns of 
growing assets that we have reported in this volume. Nor did we anticipate that 
there would be such variety in the timing and causes of the change.
Indeed we must also confess that we did not even properly understand the 
limitations of poverty- line data when we first embarked on this research. That 
insight came from our collaborations with the NBS. It was through our exchanges 
with them that it became clear that poverty- line data must systematically exclude 
the forms of prosperity that we were examining.6 In our presentations of this 
work internationally we have found that this lesson needs to be more broadly 
learned. For economists it is obvious. But for most other social scientists this has 
come as a surprise.7
Our ability to tell a bigger story, to bring together insights from different cases 
and researchers has fundamentally depended upon the broad- minded and gener-
ous contribution of a large number of other researchers. This has not been a sin-
gle project. It was a federation. In some respects this has, in fact, been more than 
just a research group, it has been the gathering, and formation, of a small 
6 Our first paper we published on this topic even demonstrates that missed understanding 
(Brockington et al. 2018). We had to correct ourselves in later works (Brockington 2021).
7 We have presented this work at several invited research seminars and talks in a number of differ-
ent countries in Europe as well as Tanzania. Of the approximately two hundred people who have 
attended these seminars, who tend to be well- qualified researchers, barely ten were aware of the exclu-
sions of poverty- line data.
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epi stem ic community, of people who first began to meet each other over twenty 
years ago as they worked on PhD projects. It has been one of its joys and privileges 
to bring together so much experience and insight into change in rural Tanzania. 
The Epilogue to this book captures, we hope, some of the energy and honesty that 
flowed in these gatherings.
Even now, writing as the COVID- 19 pandemic has just begun and its implica-
tions remain uncertain, our hope is that other researchers will seek to emulate the 
same methods that we have used, in other places. We recognize that they may be 
able to do this differently. We have been reliant on old survey data, which we re- 
visited with tablet- based surveys. But many rural people in Tanzania have lives 
on- line, they frequent Facebook and other social media. Access to these is riven 
with exclusions, but nonetheless they provide insights into change, issues, and 
concerns on a much more frequent basis. The tried and trusted methods, which 
hinge on continuity in the researcher presence, will remain important. And they 
will do well to incorporate the new methods and data that new social practices 
allow. This will mean the formation of other, different epistemic communities.
We would welcome that warmly. We have had the privilege of listening to the 
stories of hundreds of rural Tanzanians. It is an important and vital task. There 
will be new ways of listening to and communicating these stories in the future 
from which we look forward to learning.
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Doing Longitudinal Research
Christine Noe, Stefano Ponte, Dan Brockington, Anna Mdee, Cosmas 
Sokoni, Esbern Friis- Hansen, Verdiana Tilumanywa, Katherine A. Snyder, 
Emmanuel Sulle, Willie Östberg, Vesa- Matti Loiske, Monique Borgerhoff 
Mulder, Agnes Andersson Djurfeldt, and Torben Birch- Thomsen
The research that has been presented in this book is the product of decades of 
learning, individually and collectively of multiple researchers, research teams and 
research assistants. The chapters presented in this collection have been shared in 
two separate writing workshops, one in Copenhagen, the other in Arusha. On 
each occasion we listened to the work presented, offered observations and criti-
cisms and then went back to work again on the papers we had shared.
But the process of doing research is always much more complicated, more 
in tim ate and intricate than any academic paper or book chapter can reveal. On 
the evening of the last day of the last workshop in Arusha we sat down to share 
some of the more personal stories, motivations and tribulations that lie behind 
the formally presented findings of the previous pages. This Epilogue is a smoothed 
transcription of that discussion—with some of the reactions of the other 
re searchers listening also included. Two people (Stefano and Agnes) could not be 
present in Arusha, and we have added transcripts of further conversations with 
them recorded after they had seen a draft of the first account.
We do not wish provide much additional narrative to this discussion. You will 
read here how researchers from different disciplines, personal backgrounds, 
biases and academic and national traditions have approached the same problem 
(as nationals or expatriates) of trying to understand communities and places in 
this one country we call ‘Tanzania’. And how the communities in which we have 
worked have come to manage, shape, divert, influence, or curtail researchers’ 
interests in them. You will read how we have struggled to understand our research 
questions, how we have sought belonging and community, how we have negoti-
ated positions as insiders and outsiders and even found love. The methodological 
purist may detect the odd mistake in the techniques we have used to do our work. 
But it is important to give some insight into how we muddled through, and what 
these joys and tribulations have meant to us and some of the people with whom 
we have worked.
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Christine (Chapter 7)
Unlike most of the researchers here, it was not me who did the original research 
but Rolf Larsson. At the time of his research, I was still doing my secondary edu-
cation at Makumira Secondary School, which is in my village Ndatu, right in the 
middle of his study sites. I was grateful for the opportunity to work on a liveli-
hood change project and very happy to have come across Rolf ’s work about 
‘Livelihoods, diversification and inequality among the Meru of Tanzania’.
When the opportunity of doing a re- study came up I had this drive to go and 
do something and to write about the bitterness of coffee (laughter). My personal 
experience was bitter yet some people are enjoying the coffee (more laughter). 
I did not grow up drinking coffee. As in most other households, coffee was rarely 
available for drinking. The owners of coffee plants and beans they produced 
(almost always the men in Meru) would guard coffee strictly from the beginning 
of the process (picking) until it was sold. There was so much to do to get to the 
last point—the sale. But as a girl, in common with most women, I had to partici-
pate in the labour but never the sales.
What I remember most is the common saying that ‘if the coffee bean goes 
down, make sure you go with it!’ This was to stress the point that no single bean 
should be wasted. This would be at the picking point, which was usually around 
the rainy and coldest months (May–August), followed by piling, washing and 
sorting the harvested beans. Most of these activities depended on family labour. It 
meant going through the farm after school to pick up coffee loads and help with 
piling before dinner. It also meant waking up early to take coffee to the river for 
washing before going to school. Piled coffee could not stay for more than one day 
without washing with running water otherwise the grade is affected. Waking up 
early in the coldest months to wash coffee in the river before going to school was 
simply bitter! No wonder that when coffee disappeared (due to diseases and price 
cuts), women celebrated and associated this disappearance with their tears, 
caused by all this work and so little return. This is why we have focussed on that 
in my chapter—about ‘women tears’ and how these women have managed to 
navigate the change.
As you can see I have grown up here and I know things and this was home. But 
I have not always wanted to come here as a researcher. I wanted to come here as 
home. So there was that combination. And when I came, there was also a very 
confusing feeling for me because you kind of know things but you have to ask 
about them (laughter). But you don’t really get surprised about things. You [the 
other researchers in the room] you go to new places you get to know new culture 
and this and that. For me I’m here, I know this place and I almost expect people 
to say something I know. So this excitement of learning new things has not been 
there. And I think it has been preventing me from learning because I don’t go 
further to ask more and probe. Because when you are in a group discussion 
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almost everyone knows that you are part of them. So at some point you get 
involved in answering questions as well because people will ask you ‘what hap-
pened to your mother’ if you are with a group of women and you actually become 
a source of information for the rest of the group. You are no longer the researcher, 
but the researched.
There were good things about being culturally attached to this place and being 
a researcher because there is easy access to information; with the issue of lan-
guage you know it—even if people want to hide something you know it. People 
also have confidence in you and they give even more than you would want to ask. 
And there is an opportunity to cross- check with people who are not even your 
targets. On getting back home in the evenings, my father kept asking me and 
Olivia ‘So you went to Malala today what did you find out there?’ And then he 
would disagree and say ‘No that is not the case here’. So you get to know the case 
of the village that is not even part of this study. In terms of learning I learned the 
process of really being a researcher, and being a subject and how to distance your-
self from things that you are studying. I find it interesting because of that experi-
ence. I think I am also better placed than you who are coming and going. I can 
speak with more authority.
Just before this final workshop, Dan joined me for fieldwork in Mulala village. 
He kept picking up stories of selling cows and buying land or paying school fees, 
which I did not really pay much attention to. I told him ‘that’s always what my 
father did to expand his land inheritance and get school fees for eight of us’. The 
stories reminded me of a common saying among the Meru parents who had chil-
dren in secondary schools. That is ‘I have finished my cows’. This was especially 
pronounced by parents whose children underperformed (temporarily or long- 
term). The connection was drawn such that if the family had many children and 
one or two of them underperformed, there would be double stress for the under-
performing one—from parents and the other children—because the entire family 
is involved in raising the cows.
Zero- grazing is especially a difficult activity in Meru highlands. Not just 
because you have to go up and down with loads of grasses or banana leaves to 
feed the animals but because sourcing the grasses is hard. For most families, land 
is too small to grow fodder. Searching for grasses further down the mountain was 
the order of the day for my family. If you are downhill already on other errands, 
you would want to combine that with fodder at the end of the day. This involved 
going to fenced settler farms within and beyond the village. I remember many 
instances of sneaking into highly guarded settler farms and the risks involved in 
meeting the guards and dogs, sometimes in school uniform (because one had to 
cut down the time to go home and back). All of you here know this place [the 
‘Danish Centre’ where the workshop was held] as a pleasant place to work and 
meet, but I first encountered it as a young child because it is full of sweet grass 
and if we got up really early we could walk here and creep through the fence and 
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harvest the grass before it was light. Do not call this stealing. It is not a sin if the 
cow is hungry (laughter). Moreover there is, just behind this Danish Centre, a 
National Development Cooperation’s livestock artificial insemination farm. The 
farm keeps high- grade cows and bulls which are fed with first- class fodder. If you 
manage to feed your cow with some of that fodder, you were assured of doubling 
the amount of milk in just a day. It was so attractive for villagers to sneak in. The 
importance of cows for the general family economy and milk for daily use made 
everyone responsible for trying to get some. These memories enrich my reflec-
tions about being a researcher in the place I grew up.
Family investments in education meant foregoing good meals (accompanied 
with meat) and better housing (block houses with electricity). Parents would take 
the risk, especially given the lack of employment after school. The risk was espe-
cially high for parents who took girl children to school. Two bad things were 
expected by the community generally; pregnancy at school or marriage after 
school. Taking a girl child to school seemed a riskier investment. Those who did 
(like my parents who had seven girls and only one boy) would be under immense 
pressure to ensure that they didn’t become bad examples of failed investments. 
This is almost typical of Meru families then and now. The difference is that more 
and more girls have done well in school hence motivating others.
In our first visit to Mulala village, Olivia and I were a bit unsure of the meaning 
of what one of our respondents—Paulo Akyoo—told us. We met him at the vil-
lage centre before taking us to his home. Along the way to his house he told us 
how ‘there were no longer poor people in the village’. People had quit drinking 
because they ‘met Jesus’ and that everyone was a born again. Knowing God gave 
people the right direction, he said to us. We passed his parent’s home—Nndosa 
Akyoo—which was the first that shocked us because of the story that we had just 
heard. An old mud house with rusty iron sheets and two small thatched roofed 
huts as kitchen and for two goats gave Olivia and me mixed feelings. Then we 
arrived at Paulo’s two- room house made of mabanzi [wooden] walls. After a long 
prayer from him, he went straight to his story which made our confusion of ‘no 
more poor people’ fade away. He had taken four children to school. He had a 
university graduate, a school teacher, one still at college, and the last in a private 
secondary school. All his energy had gone into paying school fees even though he 
wanted to build a better house.
After this household I told Olivia my father could say exactly the same thing to 
Rolf Larsson but with a twist. Rolf ’s time here was when there was still coffee and 
the cooperative society built, maintained, and serviced a coffee farmer’s school. 
My school—Makumira—was connected to both the Lutheran church and Meru 
coffee farmer’s cooperative society. Through coffee sales, individual members 
could contribute in building and maintaining the school and in turn school fees 
for Meru children would be subsidized. With the good relations my father had 
with the school administration, fees could wait for coffee sales. In case of a poor 
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coffee harvest or late payments, it was possible for parents to exchange maize and 
bean harvests straight from the farm to the school store. Although with some 
pain (due to low prices at the time of harvest) my parents could keep us in school 
(sometimes four of us at the same time). But, nonetheless, coffee, maize, and 
beans could not be enough. A sale of one or two male calves would be required to 
finish school fees. Little if any could be saved to expand land holdings or improve 
the family house.
Like many other farmers today, Paulo replaced coffee with other seasonal 
crops—potatoes and carrots. The difference is in the marketing arrangements and 
some risk mitigation strategies that coffee farmers enjoyed. After visits to other 
households, Olivia and I changed our understanding of poverty and wealth. We 
started paying a lot more attention to the stories about how households had 
invested in different kinds of assets.
Coming back to Dan’s questions about cows and land, the new stories cor-
rected an earlier conclusion I had drawn in this study that land had become less 
important as a measure of wealth in the case of Meru. The fact that people trade 
cows for farm plots (whenever a land sale opportunity arises) and for children’s 
education makes land an important family asset. One of the surprises that 
emerged during the recent visit with Dan was that we heard from two formerly 
landless women who had worked as kibarua and managed to buy land, pay school 
fees, and even give an inheritance of land to their children. Land was therefore an 
important starting point for uplifting of social and economic statuses of their 
households and those of their children. After these stories, I recently went back to 
test my earlier ideas with my father—that I didn’t think land is so important now 
for the Meru people. He simply joked, ‘I didn’t know I finished my cows to get 
you stupid’.
Stefano (Chapter 12)
The first thing that I thought, was that reflecting on longitudinal work was really 
difficult because rural Tanzania had changed, but so had I. So I spent a lot of time 
trying to dissect what about Tanzania was changing and what was about me and 
my perception, experience, age, or academic status having changed that could 
explain what I thought I was observing.
I think the key question for me after the two trips I did in 2016 and 2017 and 
during the process of looking at the data, sifting through all the interview and 
focus group material and writing was ‘What does it mean to be objective in this 
context where twenty years have passed?’ I want to explore some ideas about this. 
In essence these are personal reflections but they are meant to stimulate further 
reflection on what it means to do interpretive work—especially on long- term lon-
gitudinal studies and in particular in my case when I did not go back to these 
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places for a long time. My experience was not like the more common an thropo-
logic al approach of going back every year or two, and there are challenges in that 
approach as well. It was about going back after twenty years, a very big gap. The 
before and after are very different situations essentially.
In 1996/7 I was a young PhD student. I had very little funding, so little that 
I could not afford a translator. I had to spend my first period there perfecting the 
language and being comfortable enough to start doing research. That was in a 
context when PhD schools in the United Kingdom were quite relaxed about stu-
dents spending a long time in the field. As a matter of fact it was a badge of 
 honour to stay longer. So I planned to stay six to nine months but I ended up 
staying eighteen, which was totally fine. It was not seen as a failure like now, even 
though it was riddled with failures (laughter).
But even though it was long- term fieldwork, it was divided into various loca-
tions. I did not spend eighteen months in the same place. I stayed in six different 
locations in two districts plus a lot of time in Dar sorting out the national- level 
stuff on policy. These were the days pre- mobile phones when the landlines did 
not work and so you had essentially to take the daladala [small bus] and get there. 
You wait for the person to show up and when they did not you went back and 
your day was gone. So in terms of efficiency and time to think about the little that 
you had gathered we had loads of time—there was nothing else to do. Every other 
day the electricity was off so one day I was gathering data and the other day with 
electricity I would be typing up my notes. Essentially the timeframe was so much 
more stretched out.
And then there was this extra complication as my partner was also doing her 
PhD at that time in the same locations on a totally different set of issues. So I was 
really trying to focus on my own work and then I would go to a household for an 
interview and somebody off the cuff would say ‘Who is that other skinny mzungu 
going around—that woman—she must have a really bad husband, look how 
skinny she is’ (laughter). And other people were asking what sort of man was I, 
after all where were our children?! (prolonged laughter).
And I had come in with a clear focus. I wanted to see what impact structural 
adjustment and market liberalization had on farming households and farming 
systems. Exactly twenty years later, in 2016/17, I was older, more established. 
People liked to call me ‘Profesa’ which added a whole new layer of authority that 
I did not have in the first visit. By then I’d been working in Tanzania twenty years, 
it was like a third home to me. And then going back with a project is different 
because on a PhD you are all on your own, it is everything or nothing, the risks 
are very high. This other project was with a group of great people run by this 
crazy guy from Sheffield, whom I have also known for twenty years. I stayed 
maybe a total eighteen days instead of eighteen months which means a lot. I am 
more experienced, but also you can do a lot more now in a shorter time, it is eas-
ier to travel around, you have mobile phones and our focus was more narrow.
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So I came into the field for the re- study with a lot of worries and fears, despite 
the fact that it was a fun project, quite removed from my main current agenda. 
The main fear was ‘What am I going to find about the people I interviewed?’ 
I remember some of the households very well, I had gone through some of the 
transcripts and all these memories were coming back. What if we could not find 
them or if they had died or bad things had happened to them or their kids? It was 
tense for me coming back, especially the first time when we were in Morogoro 
which is the place where I spent most time during my PhD research.
But I decided in any case I’m going to go with all the pictures I have from the 
time before twenty years ago. I found all the focus groups pictures, I printed them 
out and brought them with me. And then it was so great to find so many of the 
people. In general the fact that we could find so many was very surprising for me. 
This is something we experienced across a project. And not only that, but I would 
remember them. It is easier perhaps for them to remember me, because I was the 
stranger coming in, but I also remembered them.
And then there are the funny things people say after twenty years. I had 
brought pictures of me and three children, so I was finally at almost the age of 
50 considered a real man (laughter). But I was not quite prepared for the very first 
household that we found the guy comes to me and says umezeeka—‘you have 
become old’ (laughter). What do you do about that? You know, time has passed. 
And the second time it was umenenepa—‘you have become fat’ (laughter), and 
the third one was ‘Your Swahili has really gone downhill’ (laughter), and the 
fourth one was ‘Where is your wife?’ (laughter), and the fifth one was ‘Where you 
been all this time?’ (prolonged laughter). So it was not an easy ride, I started feel-
ing uncomfortable (laughter). I did not know how I should react. My Swahili was 
good enough to understand, but I could not respond well, so I just blurted my 
way through.
Anyway the main thing in terms of the observations was the amazing changes 
that I’ve seen. The roads, solar panels, the quality of the houses, the pikipikis all 
around, all the shops. Then you think ‘Maybe I’m being naïve’. This is all just 
because I’m not staying for long enough to find the hidden poverty and the prob-
lems and all that. And to some extent that is all true, but I could not ignore all the 
things that were objectively there.
Whether these things have the same ‘value’ to people than in the past is some-
thing we have discussed in the group and is a different story indeed. Some things 
are taken for granted now but at that time they were much more important.
Part of my reaction was like ‘Wow!, this is really great’, but part of it was ‘I do 
not have time to dig deeper’, I’m going to have a superficial, naïve perception. So 
when we had the first research meeting in Copenhagen with the larger group of 
researchers I was very nervous. We were twelve people, many of them critical of 
markets generally, a certain ilk of researcher. I was going to say ‘Wow, whatever 
happened with respect to markets it looks not too bad’ and I was totally nervous. 
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But I was not the first person to speak, I think I was the third talking from the top 
of our heads about what our first impressions were. But I remember, on hearing 
the first account, that my shoulders completely relaxed because I thought ‘Phew, 
I don’t have to say that first’ because other people had seen the same changes too. 
Many of us, perhaps with one exception, came with variations of a generally com-
mon narrative.
So it was really weird to reflect upon how important it was for me what other 
people thought. We had been going to Tanzania for a long time, and seen many 
changes. Everyone knew that in urban areas there had been a lot of change. But 
I personally thought that these changes would not have affected the most remote 
regions. But then I went to the most remote area I’ve been to [Ligunga in Ruvuma 
Region] which is really far off and I just thought ‘Wow’. But at first I felt vulnerable 
reporting things that were so different to my expectations and intellectual 
orientation.
Intellectually, my first reaction was ‘Were the arguments from my PhD right? 
Do they still hold?’ It took me a while to get over that. Eventually I realized it was 
not about my arguments, it was about understanding change. And in the paper 
I have written with Dan I have had to concentrate hard to make it not about me 
and my intellectual standing, but about understanding change itself. So the issue 
for me shifted. It was not ‘Have the changes been positive?’, but ‘Where and why 
and how are they positive?’, and that became much more liberating.
That’s a problem we face. You can change in general but you are so attached to 
what you had before. It is really difficult to be detached from it and to take a 
backseat and try to be ‘objective’. A lot of the work I do is qualitative. The inter-
views and focus groups shape our impressions more strongly than the survey 
work we do. I was concerned that I may not have been able to see well in only a 
short visit. For example, is this argument that we make about a pointed egg really 
accurate, or have we changed our definitions or not understood dynamics in the 
village. After all a lot of what matters about assets is not their monetary terms, but 
their implications for social status in a situation. Accruing an asset does not really 
create socially recognized wealth if everyone else has the same asset. So what is 
the meaning of having a metal roof now compared to twenty years ago?
The last thing that stayed with me after we finished this work was this lingering 
question: now what? Do we wait another twenty years and go back when I’m 
really, really old, and really, really fat (laughter), and my Swahili is completely 
gone? (laughter). So now what—help me out!
Dan (Chapter 8)
To understand how and why I went to Rukwa and what it was like you have to 
know a little bit more about what I did during my PhD. That was with Kathy 
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Homewood at UCL. Kathy has worked a lot with pastoral societies and is a 
 biological anthropologist. A lot of the techniques there involved counting things 
really well, enumerating things, which provided fantastic lenses into changes 
which are going on in different societies. So I was measuring milk yields, I was 
recording diet, I was weighing children and calculating their height as well. And 
I was doing this for samples in two different villages and then repeating it every 
two months. It was really really hard. I’d be in one place for three weeks and then 
would not go back there for another two months, but then I wouldn’t be in any 
other place for longer than three weeks. I was incredibly footloose, incredibly 
mobile, and could not put down roots. It took a long time for people to get used 
to me. My sample was too large because I made the classic mistake of trying to 
take on too much, which meant I was rushed all the time. At the end of each 
round I would write my data, realize there are loads of holes, and have to go back 
and there was constant pressure because I also knew that without these data 
I would not really be able to do the PhD that I set out to do well.
Plus, I was working around the Mkomazi Game Reserve which was a political 
nightmare.1 Because pastoralists had been evicted from it in the late 1980s and 
it was specifically our remit to look at the consequence of the eviction on those 
pastoralists. So I was working with the group who were also taking the government 
to the court. And very early on my PhD it appeared as if I was collaborating 
with pastoralists in disobeying Game Reserve rules. This almost meant that my 
PhD got stopped for understandable reasons. But when my project was almost 
thrown out by the government it did then mean that the pastoralists, who 
themselves had decided not to co- operate meet with me because they suspected I 
was a government stooge, decided that maybe I was not so bad anymore, 
maybe we could work with this guy. But with a start like that there were just 
continual tensions all the way through. The experience of that, especially when 
I met other anthropologists working in the field like Jim Igoe, made me realize 
that I wanted to find another place in Tanzania where I didn’t actually have to 
travel anywhere else at all. I wanted to hang out in one village and it had to be 
a hugely long way away from any conservation area whatsoever (laughter). 
And I needed to spend time with people on their own terms. As I’m sure you 
will recognize, when you are collecting biological an thropo logic al data it is to 
very particular agendas and sometimes people don’t get it. And on this occasion 
I wanted a project that people could understand more easily. And that is partly 
why I ended up in Mtowisa in Rukwa.
The other factor shaping that choice was that I was collaborating with the 
Ministry of Water and Livestock and they were interested in changes arising from 
the migration of people to the south and that’s why they said ‘Go to Rukwa. We 
1 This is described in Fortress Conservation (Brockington 2002).
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have not got many reports on what is going on there and we would like to know 
more about it.’ So it is a mixture of my desire to do better fieldwork, basically, 
because there were all sorts of problems with my PhD fieldwork when I look back 
on it and this was a chance as my mentor (Bill Adams) recognized at the time ‘to 
have another bite of the cherry’, to do rural fieldwork again, but do it better. And 
this was my chance.
And that aspect of it worked with bells on. When I was in Mtowisa in 
1999–2000 I was able to ‘hang out’, to spend time informally people. I went to 
learn much more about how the Sukuma and Fipa people were interacting and 
working together. I was able to do that but the process meant working with  people 
in the fields. It meant learning how to plough, weeding with them, herding with 
them, being invited out to people’s houses and having meals and talking about life 
histories. I had friends there with whom I could talk and just chew the fat. I spent 
a lot of time in the bar in the evenings with the chairman and his friends learning 
to drink wanzuki which was a lovely honey beer. You just learned so much and 
observed so much all the time.
The irony was that I was coming to look at change in natural resource manage-
ment. I asked people ‘how do you decide who gets to graze in particular areas?’ 
and they said ‘What do you mean? There is a grassland we just put our cows on it. 
We don’t need to ask anyone’ (laughter). So that didn’t work. So I said OK, I’ll 
look at irrigation, there’s loads of rice irrigation so I asked ‘When you decide who 
gets to water the rice what you do?’ and they said ‘We’ll be having a meeting next 
Tuesday and you can come along’ and I thought ‘Yes! I can see indigenous water 
management practices.’ And then they said ‘It’s rained, there’s loads of water, the 
meeting is cancelled’ (laughter). But I spent a lot of time working with mech an-
isms of village and district government who had huge power in resource alloca-
tion and learned a lot about that. I joined the football team and learned to play 
football. I used to be quite fast and they put me on the wing when you could run 
up and down fast and it did not make much difference if you could not actually 
kick. I was also volunteering at the secondary school because they did not have a 
maths teacher at the time so I helped out. I felt thoroughly embedded and it was 
just an absolutely wonderful experience.
There was some political activism at the time, this being still the early days of 
multi- party elections and younger men in particular were beginning to look to 
other political parties to express their desires. I was anxious to avoid any involve-
ment in politics—it could easily go badly wrong. I even left the village to work 
elsewhere when the hustings for CCM candidate for the district council came 
through. But villagers wanted to recruit me for various campaigns. I was asked to 
intervene in the struggle that they had with the district council to have a road 
built down the escarpment, allowing a more direct route to Sumbawanga. And 
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one particularly active young man interviewed me about my findings towards the 
end of my time there. I told him about the problems of governance and govern-
ment that I was working on, and would later write up. He was not impressed. ‘Yes 
we know all that,’ was his basic response. ‘But dealing with that is our problem. 
We deal with it every day. You need to recommend in your research that we need 
more agricultural inputs so that we can improve our farming. That will make a 
difference here.’ And so I was sent up the escarpment again to negotiate with a 
German business man who was buying up large quantities of crops across the 
region and persuade him to come and buy produce in Mtowisa.
And that was 2000 and coming back in 2016 I was quite nervous. I was think-
ing ‘what was I going to find?’ This is in a place which had been incredibly poor. 
There was so little there, at the same time as there was so much. There was a lake 
that was full of fish, the soil is incredibly fertile too, it is well positioned in between 
ecological zones where you can grow wheat on the escarpment and oranges in the 
valley. Coming back I did not know what to expect. Then I realized that unlike 
1999 when you had to walk between the village and the regional town which took 
six to seven hours, now there was a bus service. And it turned out that the bus 
driver had been one of my pupils at the secondary school. He told me about this 
mzungu (white person) who had used to live in Mtowisa (laughter), and then 
reminded me of all the ways in which I had failed to control the secondary school 
class which I had conveniently forgotten. And then there was arriving and the bus 
being surrounded by bodabodas (motorbike taxi—which were completely new to 
me in Rukwa), and then the telephone mast and the other changes which so many 
of us have seen.
But the joy of the return was when you were recognized—because I had not 
been back for sixteen years because I’d lost touch with people. And I met again 
the children whom I had taught to play frisbee and each of them insisting that 
each was my favourite frisbee thrower. And then, during the survey, people com-
ing up to you and insisting that ‘When you have interviewed that person you 
need to come and talk to me next’. And I said ‘It’s a random sample’ or words to 
that effect and they said ‘I’m not having that you’re coming to me next’. And that 
experience was remarkably enjoyable. Plus of course what I was finding was that 
the people who had generally speaking been worse off had had this pulse of 
resources being injected into their family incomes and homes.
And when I went back a couple of months ago again in April (and conducted 
the participatory wealth ranking of the whole village), I realized that the people 
I  had surveyed were effectively part of a different community. The village had 
changed. My sample was no longer a means of providing a representative sample 
of what was going on in the village. And that was quite sobering but hugely 
important to learn.
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Anna (Chapter 16)
We all have such embedded stories. It would be really interesting to forget about 
our research and think about ourselves as an individual in the place. I know lots 
of us have been getting involved in side projects. That human interaction with the 
community is really interesting and often tells us so much more of complexity 
and nuance than our research does. For me that sort of interaction with Uchira 
came before going there as a researcher.
I came to Uchira in a random way. I was an undergraduate at Cambridge, I had 
started studying natural sciences. I had found this growing sense of dissatisfac-
tion with natural sciences as a way of understanding the world. I became very 
interested in ideas of poverty, development, and Africa. I had been to Tanzania in 
a gap year collecting data on the marine park efforts around Mafia Island. The bit 
I enjoyed most had been working in the local communities and particularly going 
out on boats with the fishermen, looking at what they were catching, but just 
interacting with them, understanding what they did every day and the types of 
challenges they faced.
My dissatisfaction with science did not have an outlet until I discovered 
anthropology and particularly social anthropology. I will always be grateful to the 
Cambridge system that allowed me to change in my second year to study anthro-
pology. Making the switch from natural sciences to anthropology was not easy. 
There was a whole new set of philosophical debates to catch up on and a whole 
language that others who had done first year in anthropology already had and 
were equipped with. And of course essay writing skills is not something that nat-
ural scientists are necessarily blessed with.
Having changed to anthropology I was getting involved in groups like Survival 
International. I was going to a meeting of Survival International one evening 
when my friends and I noticed a small African woman walking down the street. 
She was also looking for the meeting, which was in a café nearby. This woman was 
a Tanzania doctor who was staying with friends in Cambridge and she told us this 
story in a very articulate and passionate way of how she had worked for years to 
build a health centre in this village called Uchira, in northern Tanzania, and how 
the Catholic Church had come in and wrestled it away from her and were accus-
ing her of scandals and embezzlement.
Being excited 20- year- olds full of activist verve we said we would come and 
investigate the story. So we put together a little project and I ended up going with 
a couple of people including other social anthropologists. Our contact’s story and 
association with the village were complicated, and she told us that we cannot be 
associated with her in the village. So she arranged for us to work with a village 
councillor, called Ernest Msuya.
Ernest became my very long- term collaborator. He was then in his 30s and a 
member of the village council. He was passionate and enthusiastic about the 
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village and what could be done and how he was going to change things. And he 
was our guide. We were naïve. We had barely travelled and did not know much at 
all. He took us around the village and told us about the village in his own words. 
We interviewed a lot of people in all corners of the village, we went to every local 
institution—the schools, the churches, the village office, the health centres. This 
became the basis of my longitudinal data from 1996.
My research became, through Ernest, an archaeology of development projects 
in the village and also an assessment of village infrastructure and institutions. But 
we did not know what we were doing. We were making this up as we went along. 
We had done some reading on PRA and interview techniques but it was very 
much ‘research by feel’. That became my undergraduate dissertation which stud-
ied aid and institutions through gift theory.
We also wrote a report called the Uchira Village Report which the village coun-
cil told us they had found really useful when they tried to lobby for later village 
projects. From this lobbying they ended up with a big water project funded by 
GTZ. That water project later became the subject of my PhD when I returned to 
Uchira in 2002.
The link with Uchira between 1996 and 2002 was maintained by Ernest. He 
wrote me long letters and would send pictures about what was going on and 
he asked me to help raise funds for building a small health centre. In this sense, 
I cannot be a neutral objective academic about Uchira at all. In this period I was a 
young activist, raising money for building a health centre and supporting Ernest 
in his mission.
Coming back later to Uchira and doing my PhD was also a serendipitous affair. 
I never set out to do a PhD, that was the last thing I wanted to do on leaving uni-
versity. I was going to go and work in development and ‘save the world’. After 
university I had travelled, teaching English in Nepal. When I came back I had 
wanted to stay in Yorkshire (and not in London) and do something impactful. 
I got a job that involved mentoring disadvantaged youth in North Yorkshire. I was 
then also doing a Master’s degree with the Open University and I was also fund-
raising for the village clinic for Ernest. I had not thought of an academic career 
and was just seeing where things took me.
Then, in 2001, I saw a job advertised at Bradford University for a ten- month 
part- time research assistant. This was on a DFID- funded project on sustainable 
livelihoods, and was going to cover Tanzania, Uganda, and South Africa. I thought 
it was my dream job and I applied for it even though I’d not finished my Master’s 
degree. I was offered the job and Bradford shaped the next thirteen years of my 
life. I was able to do the PhD alongside that project and by 2007 was a per man-
ent ly employed Senior Lecturer. So much for avoiding academia!
That first project for Bradford took me back to Uchira. Back in Uchira, I stayed 
in the Uchira Village Inn, and spent the evenings talking to the manager, Samuel 
Mdee and Ernest. From our evening conversations on the politics of the water 
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project, I realized that the topic would make a good PhD. I talked about this with 
Frances Cleaver [Anna’s supervisor then at Bradford] and we raised funds for it 
from the ESRC. We looked at village collective life, but using water project as 
a  focus, and as a lens for understanding the politics of ‘community- driven 
development’.
My research is rooted in a determination to be open about where you are in the 
research process and being open about how the research is being constructed. 
I suppose what I’m trying to say is that I realize I’ve always been part of the story 
and not simply recording it or observing it. I’ve always been very engaged and 
embedded different ways as a naïve undergraduate or then as a slightly more 
mature academic. I’ve always been conscious of not being the expert too. I am 
always continually surprised now after twenty years of engagement about how 
much I have to learn and still learn.
While I was doing my PhD, Samuel introduced me to his son, who was a young 
nervous- looking 24- year- old who wanted to work for me as a research assistant. 
I agreed to work with him; he could conduct a study of how young people in the 
village saw collective village life. Ernest was not too pleased about this. This young 
man Christopher duly came back to work with me and, well, now Chris and 
I have since been together for fifteen years and married for twelve. That meant a 
whole new level of intricacy opened up in terms of learning how families func-
tion, how expectations are managed, getting my head around remittances, and 
understanding how people are linked within the villages by kinship and friend-
ship. I found that the more embedded you become, the more complex things are 
and the more interconnected. The less you know about a place the easier it is to 
research set simple parameters. You can go and count things that you think you 
recognize.
And this is what I found very hard about resurveying the same households, 
because how I saw the household had changed in that time. For example, when 
I was there in 2004 and doing my tap survey (as part of the PhD) and there was 
one particular tap, outside the house of the family that I married into. When 
I  didn’t know them, it looked as though there were three different households 
living around it. Two of them were female- headed households, and one of them 
was a male- headed household with a smarter house. When I married into that 
family, I realized that they actually all functioned as one household. Then think-
ing back through the life- history interviews from 2004–5 I realized that other 
interviewees were also part of the same extended family. So I have really struggled 
with that, the more I know about the village the more I find that the interconnec-
tions are so strong that I find it hard to differentiate between individual house-
holds because still the networks of sharing and reciprocity and expectations are 
so strong.
Rather, I think that one of the most valuable things to come out of this long- 
term engagement is actually being able to see social mobility dynamics now when 
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I look at the generations and how they change. As an example I think of my 
 husband’s younger brother who has gone from being a village boy at the local 
secondary school to now being a very successful consultant in the aid business in 
Dar es Salaam with many projects on the go. I saw how that happened, and how it 
was enabled partly through family networks and linkages, and our remittances 
from the United Kingdom that assisted to get him into university. He is hugely 
successful but now faces barriers of wealth and class in Dar es Salaam as he 
doesn’t have the same family wealth as his social circle. Seeing his everyday 
ex peri ences and those of other younger Tanzanians has helped me see how social 
differentiation is changing rapidly in Tanzania.
You do not see that so much at the village level. There are differences in the 
housing. But that interconnection with the urban and the opportunities you give 
your children are really influencing differentiation. This sort of longitudinal 
research can be the only type of research that can give us some of those insights.
Cosmas (Chapter 14)
I also went in an area where I was born and there are a couple of things that 
I remember that would be good to share. One of them is related to recruitment of 
research assistants who were from the area. These people were engaged in some 
other activities within the village. Apparently one of them was a secretary in the 
local court (we call it ‘baraza’). And during his work I think he interacted with a 
lot of people, some in a good way and some in a bad way. And it did happen when 
we were as a team in different villages we went to a village where some members 
of that particular village had a case in court and it seems my research assistant 
had not treated them well (laughter). This was very bad for the team because they 
wanted to beat him but we were lucky because the chairman of the village rescued 
us; but it is an experience that I remember. We were lucky the research pro-
ceeded well.
And related to that the organization when we had village meetings or focus 
group discussions, oftentimes we could not do this without the assistance of the 
local authority like the village chairman or the village executive officer. But in one 
village, the village chairman had authority over villagers and he could choose 
who to speak and make some people not to say anything. In this one village that 
particular discussion was really controlled by the village chairman and we had to 
use other means to try and see these people and get further information rather 
than relying on this method of focus group discussion.
When I was working in my own village I really decided not to do any inter-
views (myself) because many of these people were related to me (my assistants 
undertook the interviews). And later on when I was looking at the papers after 
the interviews by the research assistants I noticed that a brother of mine who was 
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a head of a household had given false information (laughter). It really disturbed 
me. The people did not know I was doing the research, my assistants were doing 
it. I did not do the interview. So I decided to call my brother and ask him ‘You 
said this and this. Why did you say so because this is wrong, and you know it. 
Why did you want to spoil my research?’ (laughter). He also felt very bad. He had 
to apologize but I am not sure of the answers I was even getting from my own 
village, whether these were really correct or not.
But a good thing also was that these people appreciated that they had someone 
in the university. By then in the 1990s there were only three of us from the locality 
in the universities. So seeing that there was someone from the locality who was in 
the university they did really appreciate it. It was a positive thing so they were 
ready to provide some information and assist me.
Esbern (Chapters 13 and 15)
I would like to say something about a study that goes all the way back to Ujamaa. 
As a student, before I finished my Master’s, I got a student job and ended up 
spending six months in Iringa, Songea, and Mbeya working for the Water Master 
Plan Project that was planning domestic water supply for 1800 villages. I spent six 
months driving around from village to village with domestic engineers. This was 
before the tarmac road down to Songea was built and farmers were greeting me 
by slaughtering a chicken or even a goat. And it was a bit of a culture shock for me 
because for the first time when I came, in 1980, I was only 22.
During that period I realized that villagization, implemented six years earlier, 
was having a major impact on people’s lives. I realized then that the villagization 
happened in the dry season of 1974 and the government moved people, from 
where they had lived on the foot- slopes of the mountains, with easy access to 
natural resources including water, to the roads to be accessible by bureaucrats and 
the influence of modernity. This meant most people in villages were now settled 
in higher altitude than the water sources and the Water Master Plan had to plan 
gravity water schemes that got water supplies from as far as 50km away. So I wrote 
my Master’s project about the water scheme. And then after my Master’s, I imme-
diately got this research grant to go to Tanzania and do further work on this topic. 
Back then, when I did not have a family, I could spend a long time in Tanzania 
where everything was slow. I went for nine months for the first trip, I spent three 
weeks out in the field and then one week with colleagues from the University of 
Dar es Salaam, and then three weeks back in the field again. It was a time when 
there was poverty. I mean real poverty. Some people in Maliwa village had never 
seen a small car. There was not a single wheel in the whole village, there was no 
machine. The only cloth poor women had was one kanga. There were no new 
hoes in the community shop and people used worn- out hoes. I took a hoe from 
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the Chinese factory in Dar es Salaam for each of the families that I interviewed 
and I should never have done that because then I was like Santa Claus and every-
body wanted things from me and I totally spoiled my reputation as a researcher 
(laughter). But there was real poverty, dire poverty.
And for some reason I had this drive towards seeing people far away, so I ended 
up with villagers in very marginal areas that you had to drive a whole day to 
reach. Today I do not know why I chose those villages so far away (laughter). 
Because it took me a long time to drive out there. You would have to drive around 
with 120 litres of petrol on the back seat, two of those green 60 litres plastic con-
tainers, because you would have to be able to drive all the way from Dar es Salaam 
and back again, as the petrol stations up- country were often empty.
In Maliwa village they had a very low productive local bean variety and so 
I went to talk to the national bean breeder at Uyole agricultural research station 
and she gave me an appropriate modern variety that I brought back to the farm-
ers. Farmers were still cultivating this bean variety when I revisited the village 
and they had named it after me, the bean is called mzungu.
It has been a great experience to revisit these villages and I really appreciate 
having this opportunity to mentally travel back in time. Quite a few recognized 
me, and I gradually could recognize some of the farmers.
Verdiana (Chapter 14)
In 2007 I was completing my Master’s and that was my first time to engage in 
research activities. I was looking at the Impact of Mining Activities on Forest 
Resources and I took a case study of one of the mines in Mara Region (Nyamongo 
Gold Mine). I had prepared all my research tools for focus group discussions and 
key informant interviews and questionnaires to the households. I had all the per-
mits for the research activity. I was set for the field. I went to the villages. I selected 
two villages in that area. Remember in these villages the ethnic group is the Kuria. 
You have probably read about them, they are such a harsh people. If you are a 
woman or a girl you are nothing in that society, women are not valued as per their 
culture.
So when I went to the villages then the village chairman said ‘It is so difficult 
for you to interview the people in this village or to talk to them with your ques-
tionnaire. So give me all the questionnaires and I will distribute them to the 
 people in the village and give me one week (laughter) and you will collect the 
questionnaires from me.’ And there was no other alternative. So I handed all my 
questionnaires to him and went back home with the expectation that I would get 
my filled in questionnaires after a week. And after a week I went back to collect 
the questionnaires as planned and he said ‘You know I was sick. I have not dis-
tributed the questionnaires. Give me another week.’ So I gave him another week, 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 17/06/21, SPi
400 Epilogue
yet he managed to collect only five filled questionnaires out of one hundred 
 questionnaires that I handed to him. I was confused and disappointed.
And then time was not on my side, I was under pressure because the university 
has its deadlines on submitting the dissertation for examination, you have to do 
the field work at a particular time and you have to come back to the university 
and write. I was thinking ‘What am I going to do now?’ So I asked him if he could 
give me somebody to guide me in the village and do the interviews myself. He 
agreed to give me someone to guide me to the households. So I stayed in the vil-
lages for about seven days and I got cooperation from the people and about fifty 
questionnaires were completed. And from that day I said ‘Why am I doing all this 
if the people who I’m interacting with are not ready to give me the information?’ 
I did not want to do more research after my Master’s because the fieldwork was 
so hard.
But I was able to meet the deadlines and my dissertation was passed. Since 
I was an employee of the University of Dar es Salaam since November 2006 and 
one of the requirements was I to do a PhD, I was thinking ‘Now I have to go back 
to the field!’ (laughter). And writing a proposal was really a challenge for me, 
what should I write about? Which place should I go to in Tanzania? Will I go back 
to the same place as last time? Luckily enough I was involved in a project that was 
looking at small and medium- sized towns in Tanzania around mountains. For 
Tanzania Mt Rungwe was selected for the project and I thought I should try the 
southern part of the country and that is why I went to Rungwe. Although I was 
not an indigenous person, surprisingly, the people there were very co- operative, 
they were very welcoming, they asked me questions and I did not get any difficul-
ties. So even this time when Cosmas asked me to assist with his research I was 
very comfortable in Mbeya. So I realized in Tanzania, we are much divided so ci-
eties where you go to fieldwork and it becomes so difficult to get the information. 
It is only recently that women are valued in some of these societies. Indeed it was 
difficult for a woman to do her research work in such societies.
Christine
And in Maasai communities too, I did my fieldwork on the other side of Meru—
dry rangelands. I just had to become the daughter of the chairman (laughter). I was 
walking around with him and he was saying ‘Look, this is my daughter as you can 
see she looks like that [Christine is tall]’. Having the support of the big man in the 
village allowed me easy access to my respondents. I could also hold a public meet-
ing, which I did not know I could given that I was just a young woman then and 
the fact that only men could show up or speak at such meetings. Often, I was 
taken out of the subject area to answer some questions about if I really believed 
that men and women could get equal rights and how the world would be if that 
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happened. These discussions extended to the chairman’s compound in the 
 even ings after work. I was asked my opinions about genital mutilation (about 
which I knew little), marriage, and children (with a lot of concerns that I did not 
have any of these at the age of 26). I gained confidence progressively as a young 
woman in such a patriarchal society.
I came to learn that I inspired some of these Maasai parents without realizing 
it. I did my Master’s research when I had just been employed as a tutorial assistant 
at the University of Dar es Salaam. I could therefore convince the parents that it 
was worth educating girl children the same way they did their boys. Two years 
down the line, I hosted the chairman’s children in Dar es Salaam—Moses and 
Paulina—who had come for their university matriculation examinations. After 
the first degree, Moses went back to look after his herd of cattle. Paulina (having 
no cattle of her own), studied a Master’s degree and got employed at Sokoine 
University of Agriculture. These are important reflections as I work on my next 
paper about ‘Mountain Students’. In this paper I discuss how Meru parents (espe-
cially those in the middle wealth and poor group) have used farm returns to 
invest in their children’s education.
Katherine (Chapter 6)
I did not go into the field intending to do a classic ethnography but I felt com-
pelled to do so after living there. At this time in anthropology, more traditional 
topics of ethnography were considered very colonial and passé so the eth nog-
raphy I eventually wrote was an unconventional path to choose at the time.
I found my way to the Iraqw homeland of Mama Issara through the advice of 
two people; one, Garry Thomas, was an anthropologist friend of my brother who 
had done some work for the American Friends Service as a volunteer and worked 
in Karatu (then Mbulu District). The other was my advisor, John Middleton, who 
had two bits of advice for me; one was ‘don’t go live in a swamp’ and the other was 
‘why not go to Mbulu where Ed Winter has done some work’. So, off I went. It was 
a bit like throwing a dart on a map. Garry put me in touch with his former 
research assistant, Patrick Qorro, who in 1990 was the member of Parliament for 
Karatu. He was the MP for twenty years. I met Patrick, his wife Martha, and their 
children in Dar es Salaam and he very generously set everything up for me. I was 
young and impressionable and also extremely grateful for all the help that he and 
his wife Martha (who is still at the university) gave me. He passed me on to one of 
his friends in Arusha who then put me on a bus. Patrick’s driver then picked me 
up on the escarpment and took me to Mbulumbulu, where I spent a few days with 
the family. I was then deposited with one of Patrick’s friends in Karatu and I spent 
my Christmas holidays with that family who remain friends today. Patrick was 
also friends with the district commissioner of Mbulu with whom I stayed after 
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leaving Karatu. After a week or so of staying in the DC’s guesthouse, I was taken 
to Kainam and deposited in a house of a primary school teacher who was away 
on a teacher training programme. In the end, I had very little choice where I was 
going, but I was enormously grateful for the help and hospitality I got along 
the way.
The house in the primary school was a bit of a disaster and the teachers were 
really nervous about putting this mzungu there. So instead, they put me in a shed 
(laughter)! This was a temporary measure until they figured out what to do with 
me. They were very worried about me because clearly I had no idea what I was 
doing or how to live in a rural community in Tanzania. I think they were thinking 
‘she doesn’t know how to cook, she doesn’t know how to carry water on her head, 
what we can do with this lady, how are we going to care for her, she’s going to die 
and they’re going to come after us (laughter)’. So for two weeks they cooked all my 
meals and delivered my bathwater for me and after that I said ‘This cannot go on, 
you can’t keep looking after me, I do know how to live—I live on my own in 
America, I can handle this.’ And so I moved into my own house, learned how to 
carry water on my head, which was a source of enormous hilarity, and got on with 
figuring out what I was doing out there.
Soon after I arrived, there was a village meeting with officials visiting from the 
district. I sat in the crowd but was quickly ushered to the ‘special visitors’ dais. 
I protested but one woman, herself a Chagga outsider, said ‘they will be worried 
about you anyway because of metimani so you should sit with the officials’. I had 
no idea what she was talking about and little interest in sitting with the govern-
ment officials but obeyed. Later, I came to learn what she meant. Because I was 
woman alone, I was quite suspicious. Among the Iraqw, women who become 
pregnant out of wedlock or who have suffered miscarriages or stillborn or other 
deaths are quarantined [this is called metimani]. In the past, unwed pregnant 
girls were cast out in the bush. So, as my Chagga friend seemed to be implying, 
my Iraqw hosts might be wondering ‘Is that’s what happened to her, has she got 
cast out, is that why she’s here?’ (laughter). Clearly, the explanation I gave about 
wanting to learn about life in their community made absolutely no sense. Who 
goes around the world and does that kind of thing?
In the literature, the Iraqw had always been held up as excellent farmers which 
led me to propose a study on agrarian change and drivers of change. But, after a 
couple of months of talking about farming, I got bored doing that, so I started 
letting people guide me about what they wanted me to learn about. And what 
I ended up coming up with was something that looked very much like a salvage 
ethnography, in that it captured everything they wanted to tell me and made sure 
I took down. Older men and women were particularly keen for me to hang out 
with them, attend their rituals, and to write down their stories because their own 
children had very little interest in these topics. Young people thought I was a 
crazy. Why did I hang out with all these old people all the time and listen to them? 
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Some told me people were asking ‘Has this person really come all the way from 
America to listen to this? These people really have money to throw away’ (laugh-
ter). Living among Iraqw was easy in many respects and challenging in others. 
Iraqw learned in the colonial era to appear to agree to colonial administrators’ 
demands, but then secretively pursue their own agendas. While extremely wel-
coming, it took a good year for people to be comfortable enough with me to begin 
inviting me to their rituals and elder council (men’s and women’s) meetings 
and so on.
Two years of living in that village totally transformed my life; I don’t see the 
world in the same way and I never will again. For example, the Iraqw have beliefs 
about numbers. There are good numbers and bad numbers. Good numbers are 
even numbers that can be divided easily among people. So, today, I cannot give 
someone an odd- numbered thing now. I cannot hand them something which is 
only in one or three, which would be shocking. When I had a post- doc, I went 
back for a year and for the first time had a vehicle. I had a little Suzuki Samurai. 
Now, I could give people lifts! I’d pick up as many people as I could along the road 
to Mama Issara. Often, the people most vigorously asking for a lift were young 
people. As I drove along however, I saw more and more older people, men and 
women, usually carrying loads on their backs or shoulders and I could kick the 
youngsters out to give the older travellers a ride. I would tell the younger ones 
‘I don’t want to be cursed by those old people’. Iraqw believe if you do bad things 
to people, they can get justice by cursing you and bad things will then happen to 
you. It became quite a joke and younger travellers started telling people ‘forget it, 
she only gives lifts to old people’ (laughter).
I have been very lucky to go back again and again over the years. In 2001, 
I went with my family and my two- month- old child for a year. It was great being 
able to take our child ‘to work’ but I quickly realized I could not get anything 
done—everyone totally ignored me to play with him and I couldn’t get any news 
out of anyone (laughter). So I learned to leave him at home in Mbulu. Going back 
over the years has been great but it is also bittersweet. When I was on my own and 
on foot, I knew every path, I knew every stone, I knew every tree, houses of 
friends, etc. But when you have a vehicle and go for shorter periods of time, it is 
not really the same experience as living day to day for a long period. And, over 
the years, friends have died, moved away, gone to university, and many have 
started families and some are even now grandparents. The friendships I have 
made there continue and we pick up where we last left off whenever I turn up. 
I do miss the time I had as a student when I could sit around and just yak with 
people. That is how you really learn interesting stuff!
I was struck, in listening to Tina say she was not surprised by things when she 
worked in her home community. Recently, I have had a similar feeling of not only 
not being surprised, but thinking I could predict what people would say next! In 
interviews, as people were talking, I was thinking ‘I know exactly what you’re 
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going to say now’ (laughter) and sure enough, yup here it comes. While this 
familiarity has made it harder to find new things to write about, it is also a source 
of enormous comfort.
Sulle (Chapter 6)
I remember when Katherine was doing her studies and I had just joined primary 
school in 1991 the second year that she was there. And you could see this young 
white lady running and fetching rice from Mbulu town. And every time she 
passed we would stop in the class to watch her (laughter). It was really amazing 
and we were inspired that she could do things we could not do. And then she 
came with her boyfriend Sasha. He did not know how to dig with a hand hoe 
(laughter). It was really funny (laughter).
Throughout this time I did not really talk to her until I finished my primary 
school. And I did not know what I was going to study because the highest person 
who you could see who had achieved things was the head teacher who was smart 
in the standards of those days. The most important thing I remember from pri-
mary school is that I only studied hard because I did not want anybody to beat me 
at class. I just wanted to be number one. After that I got two admissions. I was 
admitted to seminary and to the government school. I did not go to seminary 
for a while because I did not have enough money but the priest convinced me to 
go and then I went to seminary.
So after I finished seminary I went home and the first plan was to build a house 
so that I could study and so that my last- born brother could study—I wanted him 
to go to secondary school. And then a messenger came to say that Mwalimu 
(teacher) Johnny was looking for me, he lived with Katherine in a compound. 
I went to this teacher and he said ‘Katherine is looking for a research assistant.’ 
And I said ‘O, but that you know my English is not good’ but we went to do inter-
views. There were four of us others from form 4, others from form 6, and some 
had diplomas.
So I got recruited and we started this work for seven months and when 
Katherine went to Dar es Salaam to do other studies she recommended me to a 
German anthropologist. And then this German anthropologist said you should 
go to the diocese director so that they can hire you. Then immediately when I get 
there the guy says ‘Do you have form 6?’ ‘No.’ ‘Diploma?’ ‘No.’ ‘Well we don’t need 
you!’ (laughter). So I went back to Katherine and said ‘I did not get that job’. I was 
so stressed because the job I was doing with her understanding democracy and 
development from the perspective of the rural people was so interesting. It was 
really empowering me in terms of writing and research was the first thing 
I wanted to do. And this German lady came back to Katherine and said to her 
‘He was not employed’, and Katherine said ‘You must get Sulle if you want your 
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project to succeed’. So then this lady said ‘I’m going to hire you using my own 
money’, and I was sitting with colleagues with form 6 who were my elders.
Then she gave me questionnaires to see how they translated from English to 
Swahili and my first impression was that these guys did a direct translation. You 
won’t get answers from the Iraqw. They were like ‘Kuna ng’ombe ngapi?’ (‘There 
are how many cows?’—laughter). You do not ask the Iraqw like that, they will be 
annoyed and tell you another story and then you leave. This is a very important 
aspect and I have learned throughout my research really getting good questions 
for people.
So I started working with her and she was paying me and then I joined high 
school and I was working with Katherine whenever she returned to the village. 
And at home I had her book and was reading it. And then other people would tell 
me ‘Sulle, do you remember the lady who wrote that book’ and I would say ‘Yes, 
yes. She knows Iraqw and our traditions more than we do. She knows about ways 
of dressing (ma’assay) that have now gone.’ And when I went back to do inter-
views and focus group discussions, things that we lived have actually gone, some 
have really gone. There is no ma’assay, there is no metimani, which is when a girl 
gets pregnant when she is not married then she is chased out. Nowadays those 
things are off. The key question of the project is the methodology: how do you 
reconcile things that you do not know? Katherine knew these things were hap-
pening. I partially know them. But I did not live with them, they are gone. So 
reconciling these things is a really important aspect and documenting them. 
Because some of the things my daughter will not know at all. They are all gone. So 
it shows that the project we are doing is really important. For my group is key and 
I sense this is true others here. It is a really thoughtful project it gives us an oppor-
tunity to reflect back to see what is happening to us.
But I want to end with a note on my experience in other places and how they 
inform my current project. I did my first research project around the Serengeti. 
The first village was Rubanda. And these guys asked me ‘Where are you coming 
from?’ ‘St Augustine University, Mwanza.’ ‘Do you have a car and a driver?’ ‘Yes.’ 
‘O, it looks like you have been sent by the VIP’ (laughter). ‘I said what is the VIP?’ 
They said ‘You know it.’ They started talking ki- iramba. They wanted to set me 
alight. Because there were some professors from the University of Dar es Salaam 
who did an environmental impact assessment and suggested that this village was 
inhibiting ecological systems and so it must be evicted.
So they started telling me all these stories, so I had to start my negotiations. 
I had to use a lot of diplomacy. I have no idea who are the VIP, I have just got a 
scholarship, and all this stuff. That was how I survived. And then my second visit 
was to Tarime. So I told my driver ‘You stand here, I am going to interview  people’. 
And I met this young lady. I greeted her and she said ‘What are you looking for?’ 
I was surprised. So immediately I started being interviewed (laughter) and she 
said ‘How did you come here, where is your car? No, you want to take our land’ 
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(laughter). Literally, she chased me away so I could not do any interview. I could 
not do any interview in Tarime.
But after having all those hard times, I did research in other places in Tanzania 
and I never had any bad experience. In fact it’s only now Katherine’s project is 
taking me back so I have actually done nothing apart from Katherine’s project in 
my own village. I have been immersed in Kilombero and other parts of Tanzania 
where people are so friendly. In fact you [overseas researchers] do not get more 
challenges than we do. So blending this type of experience from other groups in 
Tanzania brings out the lives in Tanzania and how they vary from one place to 
another.
Willie (Chapter 9)
Dan’s account from Rukwa makes me want to say something about embedded-
ness in fieldwork. Before I went to Burunge I had done anthropological fieldwork 
in Marakwet, Kenya, together with my family, which at the time included two 
children under five. This experience came to influence my time in Burunge in at 
least two ways. One was the value of making ‘the field’ home, and the other was 
an openness to allow your research planning to be sabotaged.
When children make your paths into a society, you find yourself moving in 
directions you had not planned to go. The children take you to people you might 
not otherwise have chosen to socialize with. You also end up in situations, and 
conflicts, you had not in the least planned. It quickly became obvious that there 
are particular insights to be gained from undirected encounters.
This I conclude from practical experience. However, it could equally well be 
argued theoretically. Wittgenstein described his philosophical investigations as 
travelling criss- cross over a wide field of thought.2 Following just one direction 
cripples one’s thoughts, he argued. Anthropologists are used to changing research 
designs when realities change. What matters is being honest and allowing oneself 
to be taken by surprise.
I had a research grant to go to Marakwet to study a somewhat technical topic 
on the relation between ecological zones and demography. That was what I could 
get research money for, but my personal interests were broader, and more ethno-
graphic. Planning for the fieldwork I read among many other things John 
Middleton’s book The Study of the Lugbara.3 In the introduction he writes that 
the brief for his work was to study the Lugbara. Full stop. That told of a time that 
seemed long gone already in the early 1970s, but it appealed to me, and having a 
reasonably long period of time in Marakwet ahead of me, more than two years, 
2 Wittgenstein (2009). 3 Middleton (1970).
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I thought I should not miss this opportunity to make my study as comprehensive 
as possible. There was also another sentence in Middleton’s book, already on page 
one in fact, that came to act as a loadstar to me. He wrote that ‘what I did was 
decided very largely by the Lugbara themselves’. The time in Marakwet taught me 
to let what happens govern the field research more than the set research design.
I came to the village Goima (in the Burunge area) in 1985 by chance. I was 
evaluating a land rehabilitation project in the Kondoa Irangi Highlands.4 This 
made me follow cattle herds expelled from the highlands into the surrounding 
plains to study if the conservation intervention had meant that the soil erosion 
problems had been exported elsewhere. Goima was one of the villages reported to 
have received livestock. Arriving there, I was captivated: a serene atmosphere, the 
blessed shade from fully grown trees in the middle of dry land, the white goro-
goombimo flowers against red soil, the old primary court in its quiet decay, the 
slow pace of trade in the marketplace, which was but the space below a ficus tree 
in the middle of the village. The flowering jacaranda trees at the primary school, 
birds shining in metal- bright colours, and an unassuming but warm welcome at 
the village office, housed in an old grain warehouse dating from the colonial 
period. When I later, in 1991, was offered the possibility to make a study in the 
Burunge Hills, I instantly decided to make Goima village the home base.
People have different styles of fieldwork. Detached, objective research is a 
desirable ideal, of course, but we all have our personal inclinations and yens. 
Mine were to be involved, to get close. I liked being in Goima, and the Burunge 
Hills, despite its widespread poverty, the lack of water, the feeling of remoteness, 
and the harsh living conditions that most people there faced in the early 1990s. 
When I think of it, perhaps the relative remoteness was in fact more of a bonus 
than a liability. At home I live on an island, which creates its own mentality of 
both self- reliance and fellowship. When people talked about life in the hills, I could 
recall phrases and attitudes from home.
The fieldwork in Burunge was organized in shorter periods compared to 
Marakwet, a few months at a time, spread out over a three- year period. But hav-
ing had the experience of living family life in Marakwet, I somehow ended up 
constructing a similar environment also in the Burunge Hills. Back in 1985, dur-
ing the evaluation of the land rehabilitation programme, I had worked together 
with a then newly graduated forester, Joseph Mduma, and we got along well. In 
1991, I made enquiries if he could join me also this time, and the Forest 
Department graciously released him for the entire period of fieldwork. So, there 
we were, two outsiders in Burunge, away from our respective families. We worked 
long days and spent the evenings on a small porch outside the house where we 
stayed, going through the day’s experiences and contemplating all other things 
in life.
4 Östberg (1986).
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Our room was adjacent to the Catholic church in Goima. As it happens, we are 
both Lutherans but became close with the fathers and sisters of the Goima parish. 
We participated in the Sunday mass and got to know some of the parish members 
rather well. The weekday morning masses provided tranquil moments, observing 
the light entering the church hall while listening to the sisters’ voices greeting the 
day. On Sundays, the compound was crammed with people. We made acquaint-
ances and the parish became more and more of a family to us.
We made a survey of agriculture and livelihoods in Goima and the neighbour-
ing village Mirambu during different times of the agricultural year. The farm sur-
vey provided us with valuable information for understanding natural resource 
management in the Burunge area, but when we became totally mesmerized with 
how the Burunge theorize about how soils form and change over time, we no 
longer found time to write up our survey. It was there in my notebooks, but that 
was all.
Two decades later the ‘Longterm livelihood change in Tanzania’ project came 
along. The question was put if I had primary data from the early 1990s which 
could be used for this project. For twenty- five years I had had a guilty conscience 
for having spent all that time—my time, Mduma’s time, the farmers’ time—on a 
survey which was never properly used. It was wonderful to be able to answer that 
I did indeed have such data, and that I would be thrilled at the prospect that they 
finally could come to good use.
The records were handwritten in Swedish. The process of turning the notes 
into a spreadsheet took weeks and weeks. Entering the figures into Excel columns 
turned out to be a slow process. As I plunged into my old notebooks, I was reliv-
ing the interviews, recalling the farmers we had met. The spreadsheets mentally 
took me back to the Burunge Hills.
But eventually the database was ready, and it became time to return to Goima 
and Mirambu for the re- study. Joseph Mduma, now a seasoned senior forest 
officer in Katesh, sacrificed his annual leave to return to the Burunge Hills. We 
had been back on short follow- ups a few times, but now we again had a chance to 
work properly in Goima and Mirambu. There we were joined by Olivia Howland, 
Cathbert Mwanyika, and Einhard Mwanyika, of the ‘Longterm livelihood change’ 
project, providing their expertise on organizing and conducting follow- up 
surveys.
Twenty- five years after our first study, Mduma and I could marvel at the 
changes the area had gone through, particularly the last ten years. In a chapter in 
this book we analyse the developments, but perhaps our very first impressions, 
noted down in a blog post,5 best captures how amazed we were over the striking 
contrasts between the early 1990s and the mid- 2000s.
5 https://livelihoodchangeta.wixsite.com/tanzania/single- post/2016/11/08/Getting- to- Know- Goima- 
Anew- Tracing- Change- in- a- Tanzanian- Village- with- a- 25- Year- Perspective.
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Dan
From my point of view, with respect to turning the interviews into spreadsheets, 
I  did not appreciate that Willie was not just turning Swedish longhand into 
English spreadsheets but was also re- living, re- remembering, re- thinking, and re- 
visiting the experience of the interviews. From my point of view, I think we had a 
contract (laughter). Willie sent me a sample of three written- up questionnaires 
and after a certain time period he was going to complete sixty- seven interviews. 
But I just remember that after three or four months I wrote to Willie and said 
‘How is the process going on?’ and he said ‘The mushroom harvest has been such 
a distraction’ (prolonged laughter). I’m being unfair. It wasn’t just the mushroom 
harvest; he was also planting potatoes (more laughter). So working with Willie 
has also meant that I’ve learned a great deal about the domestic economy of the 
island [Gotland] where he lives.
Vesa- Matti (Chapter 10)
Not being an anthropologist, I was more or less ordered by my supervisor: ‘Do 
not live in the village that you are going to study. You will get too embedded, you 
will not be objective. You have to stay somewhere else.’ So, I ended up in Katesh, 
25km from the village, which meant I needed a car.
My supervisor also told me not to work with any corrupt people, so I had to 
ask Swedish aid workers in the area if they knew anyone who was not corrupt. 
They recommended the district forest officer, but being one of few that weren’t 
corrupt, he was totally swamped with Swedish aid work, so he tried to find me 
someone who was not corrupt that I could work with. He connected me to the 
most corrupt person in the district council (laughter), the district planning 
officer. He recommended that I study Gitting village, which he considered ful-
filled my criteria of a rich village with major problems of land degradation.
He assigned the district beekeeping officer and two more research assistants 
who had detailed knowledge of Gitting village to work with me, and that was how 
the study started. I came to the village in 1991 and asked for the village household 
register. The village officials said ‘We don’t have one. But we may have something 
from 1974.’ It took two weeks and then I got a handwritten copy of all the names 
of heads of households that were allocated land in the villagization in 1974. 
However, many of them had died, some had moved, and a lot of names had 
changed. So, I spent three weeks with a very big air photograph of the village and 
twenty people around a table asking who lived where. I ended up with 632 names 
of household heads, most of them men, of families in the village.
After the compiling the roster I tried to communicate with the village govern-
ment. I wanted to start the study by interviewing the chairman of the village. I 
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was told he was not there that day, that he was travelling. Finally after four weeks 
someone said that he was in Endasaki (a nearby village). I asked ‘what is he doing 
there?’ and I was told he stayed at an illegal liquor bar (gongo bar). I said we must 
go there to interview the chairman and my field assistants were very unhappy 
with that. It was an interesting place because on the one side there was a long 
table where the brew was served and on the other side there were beds. People 
actually drank at the table and then went to sleep at the beds and more or less 
lived at the bar and the village chairman was one of those people. It was not pos-
sible to interview him because he was too drunk. Later however I could interview 
him and it was clear that he was a puppet for the rich farmers in the village with-
out any ambition to function as chairman.
A village executive officer from a different village, who lived in Gitting, helped 
me out and we could start a wealth ranking. It was very difficult to work in Gitting 
because there was no functioning administrative structure. Everything was 
unregulated, there was no one with whom I could communicate. Finally I started 
to talk to ordinary middle farmers that were identified in the wealth ranking 
because they had good control and were serious and actually farming in a way 
that wasn’t degrading their soils. It became very clear after the wealth ranking and 
some interviews that the problem in the village was not lack of knowledge or 
ignorance among farmers (which was a standard answer among politicians and 
subject matter specialists in the district at the time) but rather the lack of a sup-
portive administrative structure. The ‘socialist’ structure had been replaced (if it 
ever existed) by a patriarchal structure led by the richest five households in the 
village that catered for the exploitation of the village majority.
I could do my study but it took three and a half years before I had the data that 
I needed. I had been known as somebody who defended the middle farmers from 
the local big shots and the rich farmers were quite aggressive against me. By using 
the wealth ranking I could randomly sample farmers of all categories, from the 
poorest to the richest. While doing the interviews it became more and more obvi-
ous that there existed a hidden local ‘structure’ that I failed to get information 
about using my research techniques. Therefore, I made a post- doc study where 
I traced Iraqw people from their core area in Mama Issara to the areas they had 
expanded to in Manyara Region with a historical perspective on how the Iraqw 
moved out from their core area. I visited sixty- five households and made a net-
work analysis of each household as well as their clan genealogies stretching back 
up to fourteen generations. I also identified their network strategies as well as 
their natural resource management institutions. Unfortunately I got a position at 
the newly established Södertörn University before I had published my findings 
and much of these data are still waiting to be analysed and published. Instead 
I  was totally swamped in building a new university, intriguing but exhausting! 
At  Södertörn University I initiated an educational programme in development 
studies and initiated a fieldwork course for undergraduate students. In 2019, 421 
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students from my university had gathered data in Manyara Region for their 
 bachelor’s theses. Because of that I have had chances to revisit Manyara Region 
twice a year since my post- doc project. This also meant that I had a very long 
experience of the changes that have taken place in the Manyara area that was very 
useful when doing the longitudinal re- study of Gitting.
In 2012 Dan approached me about doing a re- survey in Gitting, I went to 
Gitting on my next trip (in 2013) and I could not recognize the village at all. I had 
not been there since 1994. To start with there were electricity poles going along 
the road (this was new). Coming to the village centre I could recognize the old 
lorry that was already broken down in 1994 and I could see the useless ware-
house. And there were a lot of trees, which was a very big difference. In Gocho 
they had a commercial centre with a lot of shops and restaurants. The whole vil-
lage was totally changed. And as far as I could tell there was much less erosion 
compared to the 1990s, when it was treeless. People took care of their land, people 
co- operated to stop water from flowing over the long slopes and creating erosion, 
it was indeed a totally different world!
When Olivia and I came back to do the re- study in 2015, I was amazed. I went 
to the village office and asked ‘Do you have a register of the households?’ They 
said ‘Yes, when do you need it?’ I said ‘Well, as quickly as possible’. They said 
‘Well, come back tomorrow’. And that was quite a change from sitting for weeks 
with an air photograph asking who lives in each house. In 2015, the whole list just 
came up. Of course there were some discrepancies in the lists, but we managed to 
get 1,137 names of households. From 632 to 1,137 households in thirty- four years 
with very little in- migration but quite extensive outmigration from the village!
The alcohol business was very different. In the early ’90s the women had to 
brew local beer called mangure to get some income. In those days, at 6 o’clock in 
the morning Gittingers walked to different mangure places to identify the best 
beer and it was mangure every day for many men. There was no regulation. This 
time I could not see a mangure place and women controlled that the stipulated 
pub times were adhered to.
I recognized a lot of people and they recognized me as well. Others had died, 
mainly the rich ones. I made a study of the farmers who had helped me with the 
ranking. One of the very nice things that came up there is that women are becom-
ing more independent because they can control the income of pigs and chickens. 
They get a lot of income from that. The men are complaining because women 
have too much power. All in all, social stratification which was so extraordinary 
in 1991 was now much less. The rich had become poorer and the poor richer 
contrary to my and many others’ expectations.
I have now, as I am retired, become involved in an NGO, ‘Manyara Organic 
Farming Initiative’, where two hundred farmers from ten villages in Hanang and 
Babati Districts are converting from conventional to regenerative organic farm-
ing. The project will run for the coming three years and will initiate organic 
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certification, use internationally proven methods to increase production, and 
make agriculture more sustainable.
Monique (Chapter 5)
Like Dan we got banished to Rukwa, which felt a bit like Siberia. This was 1991. In 
my case, I had been working in Eyasi and my husband in Serengeti. There were, at 
that time, too many researchers in the Serengeti. They were fighting with each 
other over everything—from the implications of putting radio collars around 
hyena necks to the ethics of families luring each others’ nannies away from each 
other to look after their respective growing broods of children. It all seemed so 
pathetic. This is Tanzania just after the 1980s ‘dark age’—really, really poor. It was 
terrible. And here were these wazungu fighting over nannies (laughter).
So in 1990 the (then) Director of Wildlife looked at Tim [Caro, Monique’s 
 husband] and me, and suggested we could cope outside of Serengeti—which we 
viewed as a compliment. He flew us all over the country in his little Cesna. 
I remember well, he was so short he could not actually see out of the front of the 
aeroplane. As we came west of Rungwa the rain started and we were enclosed by 
thick cloud. He remarked, ‘I cannot see anything’. He asked Tim ‘You look out left’ 
while I looked out right. I was breastfeeding a tiny baby who was turning blue 
because it was so high up (laughter), and we were looking for the Central Line 
railway tracks that would take us towards Mpanda, and (hopefully) the airstrip. 
So this was how we ended up in Katavi five years later, where I started working in 
the villages that lie south of the national park (in Mpimbwe, then part of Rukwa 
Region).
We got funding in place by 1995 and, now with a 5- year- old, we started living 
in the national park at a small ranger station, because of my husband’s research in 
conservation biology and park- based research. From a professional perspective 
I didn’t much like living there, despite the natural beauty of the Ikuu River. I felt 
like Malinowski, living at my lovely campsite, and toddling off to the village for 
brief sojourns. I also felt I was setting a bad precedent for my graduate students—
commuting to the village and back. How would the local community, who suf-
fered from the depredations of lions, elephants, hippos, and bushpigs, ever trust 
me? Finally thank goodness we got kicked out of living in the national park (a 
long story involving a dog, a horse in foal, hippos on the Ikuu flood plain, and a 
pregnant woman—you work it out (laughter)). So we ended up moving down to 
Mpimbwe, and settling in the village of Kibaoni.
Twenty years have passed with comings and goings from the site. It was fas cin-
at ing to follow the fates and fortunes of families for so long. Like Tina, however, 
I also found that, after fifteen years, I knew exactly what was coming up, and I was 
becoming less curious, maybe a bit bored, and asking less carefully thought- out 
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questions. That’s one of the reasons why we finally left that study site, fatigue. 
Now we have moved to working on Pemba (Zanzibar).
What are my personal reflections on my times in Mpimbwe? This is something 
I have often asked other researchers working in the global south but now it’s my 
turn to answer.6
For me going with my family was vital. Living as a professor in America, life is 
so pressurized. I watch my colleagues in the summer. They send their kids to 
camp and write papers or teach a summer course. We, on the other hand, would 
just pack up as a family on 1 June and spend three to four months in Mpimbwe as 
a family. It was just so fascinating to have a kid living with me in the villages. As 
he grew up he would do amazing anthropology, telling me for example whom he 
had heard was really related to whom, or what the local scuttlebutt was from a 
kid’s perspective.
I loved to watch the freedom that he had, and the trust he could place in others. 
Arriving in the village after many months’ absence, and fresh (or not so) from the 
four- day drive to Pimbwe (yes, from Dar, it took that long, and that’s without car 
problems), we would sleep heavily and long. Our son however would shoot off 
into the village early the next morning to find his friends. We would have to go 
and sort out paperwork at the divisional office in Usevya, and I remember once 
seeing my son on the horizon with two of his friends, all on an old Chinese bike 
together, constantly falling off as they hit the matuta (cultivation ridges). It’s so 
great to be able give your kid the freedom they don’t have elsewhere (or at least in 
many parts of the world) because you’re worried about security.
So for me the personal experience of doing fieldwork, together with the family 
experience and all the amazing stuff I’ve learned from people, has just made it all 
worthwhile. It’s a wonderful lifestyle and I’m incredibly grateful to the people of 
Tanzania for allowing me to share life’s adventures with some of them. I think we 
mentioned it before but some of us have made our careers on the basis of these 
studies we’ve done—we should never forget that.
We have tried in the last six or seven years in Mpimbwe to give back. We have 
worked with educational, environmental, and poverty alleviation programmes in 
Mpimbwe that are persisting now as vibrant grassroots campaigns. Some of these 
programmes I initiated, helping with finding external funding, in part because 
I felt guilty for my privilege, and in part because I was now in a position to give 
back and raise money and support community groups. I should also acknowledge 
that I did it in part because Mpimbwe is very poor, as you have seen in my work, 
and people were always asking me for help. It was killing me, and I was unable to 
respond to people individually. So I proposed we set up an organization—in fact a 
series of organizations and campaigns—to address the big challenges in the area. 
6 Borgerhoff Mulder, and Logsdon (1996).
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Mistakenly, I thought by setting up the organization it would protect me from 
these demands (prolonged laughter). Yes, quite the contrary. I thought I was 
smart, but it just made things more and more complicated. Yet, as we have pulled 
away from Mpimbwe to Pemba the programmes have taken on a life of their 
own,7 and although we still serve on the board and advise a lot on fund raising, 
it’s really great to see people in Mpimbwe start to engage with the outside world 
on their own terms and to achieve their own personal successes.
Agnes (Chapter 11)
When I started my PhD I wanted to do long- term fieldwork in Zimbabwe. I was 
focusing on small- town urban growth, migration, and remittances. It was a very 
geographical project. In Stockholm University, where I was based, there was a 
group of human geographers who were inspired by anthropological and ethno-
graphic approaches. I had come from Lund, which had a much more quantitative 
approach. And I came to Stockholm and they thought that I was incredibly back-
wards and square (laughter). And so I tried to take the anthropological route in 
terms of embeddedness and I was planning to spend a year in the field. But the 
process of getting research permits and all the formalities of going to Zimbabwe 
turned out to be very complex. I had started out by doing a pilot study in a small 
town in eastern Zimbabwe, but formalizing the research process for my main 
stretch of field work took a lot of time. While waiting for the process to be com-
pleted I went for one round of archival work staying in Harare. By the time all the 
permits were in place the political crisis had escalated and my time was running 
out. This was in the late ’90s. I ended up having to do my fieldwork really quickly 
because my funding was running out and the political situation was difficult. 
I had done some basic language classes but nothing proper and so I felt a bit of an 
impostor. I ended up living in the township for about three months staying with 
this family that I had met—the lady who cleaned at the hotel where I had stayed 
the first time around took me in. In the end, no one, not even the war veterans 
and the party functionaries who wondered what I was up to asked to see the 
research permit! Living with the family in the township turned out to be the best 
way of handling any suspicions. And I was in between doing it properly (living on 
site) and having to handle the plan B that had been imposed on me. This is a 
golden thread through this collection, at least from the perspective of researchers 
from the global north working in African contexts. You set out to work in African 
contexts to do one thing and you end up doing something quite different.
7 http://www.lcmo.or.tz/.
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For my PhD I was interested in finding out about livelihood systems across 
space and the linkages between the rural and the urban from an urban perspec-
tive. So I had this idea of doing in- depth interviews to capture household struc-
tures and household functioning and food remittances. Some of these were things 
that I only realized were important while I was in the field. But I did not come 
back with the data that I was expecting to. It was also winter and rained a lot 
(laughter), and the sampling and interviewing were hard and so my fieldwork 
data were not sufficient. So I had to boost them with other data and I ended up 
doing quite a lot of archival work, including in the United Kingdom in London 
and Oxford. The particular town where I was based was originally a refugee camp 
for Polish refugees in the war. It had been a Red Cross camp for women and chil-
dren and so I used the historical archival records to learn more about its back-
ground. My dissertation ended up being this weird thesis about the economic 
geography of this place combined with an exploration of how households func-
tion, how do they navigate food shortage and handle livelihood insecurities under 
economic and political pressures. There was also work on institutions and local 
government. It was a very eclectic approach (laughter) which suited the topic 
quite well.
And after that I thought I am never going into academia again. I want to do 
something completely different. I went to work for the civil service which I did 
for a couple of years and it was very boring (laughter). But then I was recruited 
into AFRINT.
I joined because there happened to be funding. This is the advice I give to stu-
dents. Don’t be too rigid in what you want to do. Don’t turn down offers that 
could be good even if they are different from what you wanted to do. For me there 
happened to be funding around for this project and it was an opportunity. And 
there was no other funding—we don’t have many departments to choose from. 
It’s only Lund, Stockholm, or Gothenburg that have any development geography. 
It is a quite marginal sub- discipline in other departments.
I remember the first time I met with AFRINT colleagues I thought I had to be 
completely honest and told them I had never done any statistics in my life (laugh-
ter). So I was really starting from scratch. I had not worked on statistics or survey 
design. At first I was involved as a post- doc and then put in charge of the data-
base. I just had to learn how to manage it and I did.
AFRINT was originally conceived initially as a cross- sectional study (funded 
by Sida) but an advisor to the project had said right at the start ‘Prepare for a sec-
ond phase’. I came on board in that second phase of AFRINT, which was also 
funded by Sida. We spent the first two years trying to get funding from SIDA for 
the third phase because they had funded the first two. And we thought now it is 
becoming really interesting so we tried to get a third phase from them but they 
did not have funding. So I had to apply elsewhere. I applied with four different 
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grants to enable the third phase of the project and this was how Dan and I met 
through the DEGRP project.8 This allowed us to return to Tanzania and 
Mozambique. I had already secured money for Kenya, Ghana, Malawi, and 
Zambia. Getting all this funding was a lot of work because it was so staggered and 
it took time.
But then other things evolved over time. I am now the primary questionnaire 
designer of this project (laughter). I do a lot of questionnaire design and research 
design. Sometimes it is frustrating having this mixed methodological background 
because I get the feeling that I am just a fraud in all these areas but at the same 
time you also learn from your shortcomings. Also since I joined AFRINT, under 
my leadership, we have added a lot of qualitative work. It’s been possible to say 
more about the quantitative data because we have better qualitative data.
But the frustration has been the lack of fieldwork. I was excited about the pros-
pect of doing fieldwork—I like to be in the field, which I do now myself, though a 
lot is managing the project. I have to get people in a good mood and the right 
humour. There is a great deal of team- building and being on the same page and 
ensuring we want the same things. It would have been very difficult if AFRINT 1 
had not worked so well to start that all from scratch. That spirit has been very 
important when there have been challenges to the project. When there has not 
been funding—or funding is complicated—and there are unwelcome surprises, 
we need this spirit in the data- collection process. Even if you are not embedded in 
the field you need to be embedded in the team; otherwise it won’t work. We also 
work very closely with the partners in each of the different countries. Aida 
(Isinika) was part of the founding team (so we must have met the first time in 
2007). And that introduces more variety, and makes things more challenging, but 
also more interesting to manage.
There is a strength in having this overview and being able to pick up generic 
patterns, especially with AFRINT because it is a cross- country study and we have 
the same research design everywhere to allow comparison. We have developed 
the research design as a collective, both the design itself and the questionnaire. 
The grounds for comparison are really useful and if you write from a theoretical 
perspective it is also a strength because you can tease out patterns. There are some 
places I have been to several times, for example in Zambia, when even if I go for 
only two to three weeks I go back to the same places to pick up on change. This is 
also the case in Ghana.
In Tanzania it is really interesting because where we had seen considerable 
intensification, now it is looking as if intensification is declining and may have 
been a response to a particular set of conditions which, in the space of only a few 
years, no longer apply. And it seems that may have been a classic boom and bust 
8 DfID- ESRC Growth Research Programme: see https://degrp.odi.org/about/.
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and a response to declining rice prices.9 But because we have comparative data 
from Malawi and Zambia we can also see some intensification of staple food 
crops in Zambia which is heavily connected to really strong state support and 
subsidies. Whereas in Tanzania if I understand correctly the subsidies have been 
scrapped. You can see this directly in the data.
In Tanzania there is also considerable disparity between villages and regions. 
So longitudinal change by village varies a lot, even within a place like Kilombero. 
In terms of the other dynamics in Tanzania I remember from the workshop in 
Copenhagen we could see things like housing dynamics which have improved. 
I  think I agree with Stefano who observed an egg- shaped distribution—that is 
also the feeling I’m getting. Another issue is that the transition to adulthood is 
being delayed in all three countries. This is being scuppered by a lack of land or 
by adults finding other things to do with their land.
It is really interesting in the project in this edited collection how many different 
ways we can measure longitudinal change, and the commonalities and differences 
between the study sites. And things always seem to be much more complex the 
more you explore things. This is a challenge across all social sciences. But it is 
even more so if you are returning to a place or returning to data over time. And if 
you scratch the surface you uncover things.
And if you look at the questionnaire from AFRINT 1 it is really basic com-
pared to the subsequent phases. This is the challenge of doing a longitudinal 
study, you are constantly bound, you are limited by the restrictions of the first 
phase. You realize over time that things are much more complicated, that so ci-
eties evolve and that you would like to have a much longer record of some things 
than you actually have. And you can’t do anything about it. You become a victim 
of the longitudinal surveys in some ways. Whereas it can tell you a lot about 
things in other ways.
Torben (Chapter 15)
I think I will bring in the perspective of the research assistants. Because if I look 
back on my work and coming back to Tanzania (except for when I went to Rukwa, 
when I could not bring Mwanyika) I have always worked with Einhard Mwanyika. 
Esbern has worked with Mwanyika longer than me but I first met him in 1986 
coming as a Master’s student. I was staying in a village in Njombe. We were groups 
of students staying in different villages and Mwanyika and his wonderful wife 
Constancia were working with one of the groups of students, and that is how I got 
to know him then.
9 Andersson Djurfeldt et al. (2020).
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We got very close as a group, it was a very nice group and we had very good 
people to assist us and help us with translations, and we were young and very 
inexperienced. We were in very good hands. Before leaving Njombe we had this 
party and we got a little bit drunk and so on. Just a little bit, opening beers with 
our eyes (laughter), and funny things like that, it was a fantastic party [Torben 
demonstrates opening beers with his eye socket to more laughter]. That was my 
first time in Africa, my first time in Tanzania, opening beers with my eye—it 
could not get better.
But what I wanted to say was that we had a very good bond with our local 
assistants including Mwanyika. When we said goodbye, we were laughing and 
crying and we agreed that we would not say goodbye, because we may meet again. 
After the Master’s I did my PhD in Zambia and Rukwa, and I passed by Njombe 
on the way down there to meet Mwanyika and his wife Constancia, so we kept the 
contact.
In 1994 we got the SASA research programme [Sustainable Agriculture in 
Semi- Arid Africa], and Mwanyika was chosen to be the manager of a trial farm in 
Ikuwala, managing all the local staff and people hired in to assist. Being a former 
agricultural extension officer, he was really doing a good job, and in addition he is 
extremely good with people.
Quickly questions were raised: should he manage the fields or should he work 
with us as a translator? In those days the soil scientist researchers had been com-
ing in and out every day, and staying overnight in Iringa. However, this was not 
going to work for me. So I ended up staying in the best house in the whole village 
of Ikuwala. It was a small brick house with a tin roof built as storehouse for equip-
ment needed on the trial farm—in those days it was the best house in the whole 
village. To avoid the daily trips to Iringa we cleared a room and slept there so we 
could actually be in the village twenty- four hours a day—experiencing the late 
afternoons when people come back and go drinking and talk. That is when all the 
stories are told. Mwanyika was like the filter in many ways. He would come to us 
slowly and say ‘maybe we should do things like this’. I always listened to him 
because his advice was always sound. He opened many doors for me. I feel 
extremely lucky and privileged to have been working with him for so many years.
We had the SASA programme for many years: 1994 to 2000. Mwanyika left his 
job in the government, which his wife was not happy about, to work on the 
research projects—he was well employed for many years with us. We had another 
project that took me back to this area. I had a PhD student who was working on a 
project on climate change who chose to work in Ikuwala as well—based on my 
advice (laughter). So, we got to go back, and I went in the field with him and 
Mwanyika.
Later on, I got other projects—once we had a chance, together with a soil sci-
entist interested in soil carbon, to go back to Ilambilole. I had data on a long his-
torical development of land use from these villages. So, it was interesting to 
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combine this with how long people have been farming in certain places, and 
investigate the impacts and consequences for carbon in soil. Therefore, we 
emailed Mwanyika (this being in 2001!), and of course he was ready and willing 
to help, and it ended up being the most efficient fieldwork I have ever done. We 
flew into Dar es Salaam, picked up one of the former research cars, and drove up 
the same day to Iringa. The day before Mwanyika had been in the village an noun-
cing that we were coming and setting up meetings. He met us in the evening in 
Iringa. The next day we went to buy shovels and hand hoes because we were doing 
soil sampling. And the next day we were in the village doing our work.
So, the feeling of coming back after twenty years or twenty- five years—it is 
amazing. It is wonderful particularly when you are received well. We have been 
building up this relationship. He is the same age as me, and it is a very close 
bond—it has been a long relationship since 1987 and still ongoing. When work-
ing with Mwanika now, it is so easy, because it is like there is a connection right 
away. You sit and explain the purpose of what we are going to do now, and he 
picks it up right away. So that is very easy. Everyone likes him no matter where he 
goes, and I think he has had the same pleasure that we have had going back to 
these places. The latest I heard from him is today when he sent me an email, 
knowing I was in Arusha.
He has worked with over twenty PhDs for more than thirty years now. The 
good thing about this story is that Cathbert, Mwanyika’s son, is now helping us. 
Esbern helped funding the education of Cathbert, who has worked with so many 
of us in the present research project (presented in this book) in Mbeya, Morogoro, 
Dodoma, Iringa, Ruvuma, and Manyara. Cathbert has worked in thirty- two of 
the thirty- seven villages covered in the survey presented in this book.
To conclude I would like to bring us back to Ilambilole, and at night outside 
the dispensary. We were sitting there, just having finished our food. I took out a 
small bottle of whiskey, and we were having a small glass. I was looking up into 
the sky, and then I saw the Big Dipper. I said ‘Are you aware, actually you can be 
sitting here watching the Big Dipper, and I can be in Denmark looking at it at the 
same time—so we are not further away even though we are far away. We can 
watch the same stars at the same time.’ He was blown away, he thought wow, 
I never thought of that. I said ‘Even though we are apart that is how close we are’.
Mwanyika has worked for so many foreign researchers, but by the end of the 
nineteenth had actually never been out of the country. The most mind- blowing 
thing he had been to was the seaside with Esbern at Dar es Salaam. So we invited 
him to join us for the closing SASA conference in Copenhagen. He was there for 
a month, he stayed two days with all the researchers with whom he had worked.
We took him around. I took him to a Viking Museum in Roskilde. We wanted 
to tell him the story of where we came from. Then I took him to a Danish pig 
farm run by my wife’s uncle. We had to dress up in white clothes to enter the 
 stable, and it was very different from anything he had seen or known in Tanzania. 
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After the visit in the stable we went back to the main house and sat in the kitchen, 
having coffee and Danish pastry. The two farmers (the Dane and the Tanzanian) 
were sitting at the table, and I ended up just watching them as they began talking 
about pig farming. It was so striking to see this highly commercialized and 
mechanized pig farmer and this former extension officer from the southern 
highlands of Tanzania link up so well simply because they were farmers.
When you first visit Africa and come back, you realize how different and dra-
matic the changes are, and that things in Denmark previously looking important 
are no longer important when you put them in perspective. Then you learn to 
jump in and out of these different realities and the transitions become easier. 
However, I realized when I saw these two people sitting there that maybe we are 
not that different. There are many commonalities. It also illustrates who Mwanyika 
is: he can walk in anywhere and start talking to people, and we have to appreciate 
the assistance that we, as foreigners coming in, have enjoyed.
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